地方政府投融资平台信用风险研究及相关建议

对全国地方政府债务及已发债的地方政府投融资平台数据资料进行统计分析,认为现阶段投融资平台自身负债规模远超出自身偿债能力,且在未来信用风险将呈上升趋势。而由投融资平台本身属性和业务特征决定,地方政府信用构成了投融资平台信用的最终保障。但目前由于难以对地方政府信用状况进行系统性评估,加之受中国竞争模式之下的评级体制约束,信用评级很难真实揭示投融资平台信用风险。提出如何化解地方政府投融资平台信用风险的政策建议。     

基于政治资源诅咒效应的地方政府债务风险形成机制及治理

首次基于政治资源诅咒效应理论,从融资平台视角分析了地方债务风险形成机制。发现地方政府融资平台存在政治资源诅咒效应,即相对丰富的政治资源导致地方政府融资平台成为地方政府追求政绩的工具,弱化了风险控制意识。同时为维系政治资源较高的投入,增加了地方政府利用政府债寻租的机会,挤占了地方债有效利用的空间,从而导致地方政府债务存在较高风险。从控制政治资源关联度、优化地方政府融资平台监管机制、构建风险管控体系及加强公司治理等四个层面提出相应的地方债务风险治理措施。     

地方政府融资平台市场化转型:进展、挑战与建议——基于珠三角地区四地市的调研

正中央为防范地方隐性债务风险,明确要求剥离融资平台公司政府融资职能,融资平台公司不得新增政府债务。这意味着融资平台公司的政府信用被抽离,地方政府不再允许新增融资平台类隐性债务。而且预算法明确了发行地方政府债券为地方政府融资的主要方式。融资政     

政府信用风险及其治理机制

世界范围内的政府信用缺失已是一个不争的事实,其风险有进一步扩大的趋势.政府信用风险源自政府组织、政府行为、政府政策以及政府绩效和官员个人形象等多个方面；政府信用风险形成的机理在于,在“强政府——弱社会”的治理模式中,政府的信用责任与信用能力不对等,强权力与弱监督的权力结构使政治系统的生态出现失衡,导致信用风险.对政府信用风险的治理必须从行政系统与作为行政系统主要外部环境的社会公众两个方面努力,并建立相应的信用风险的防范、责任、惩罚、监督等机制及相应的保障措施.     

科学发展观视野下的地方政府竞争

地方政府竞争是基于中央政府与地方政府关系、地方政府间的法制环境,在我国,主要包括地方政府的法律地位、地方财税制度、政绩考核制度、反垄断制度.由于法制环境的不完善,导致地方政府竞争处于困境,不适应科学发展观的新要求.而要充分发挥地方政府竞争的正效应,克服负外部性,有必要从法制途径进行规范.其基本思路是:完善中央与地方权限的划分制度;改革户籍制度和选举制度;完善地方财政税收制度;建立以提供公共服务能力为中心的多元标准的绩效评定机制;完善反垄断制度和司法监督制度.     

建立地方政府债务风险长效管理机制

当前,我国地方政府债务规模急速膨胀,债务风险凸显,债务问题已成为影响经济社会稳定和发展的重要因素。本文从地方政府债务风险现状入手,在借鉴国外有关防范债务风险经验的基础上,提出了改革现行管理体制,明确中央与地方政府间关系;改革现行财税体制,适当加大主体税种的地方留成比例;改革政府预算体制,将地方债全面纳入政府预算进行反映和管理;改革财政转移支付制度,加大一般性转移支付比例;建立地方债务约束机制,改革地方官员考核制度;逐步剥离融资平台承担的政府融资职能,重新对各融资平台进行定位等措施。     

我国省级地方政府债务风险影子银行化的成因、途径及其控制

运用"两线三区"法剖析了当前省级地方政府的债务构成,发现政府间接债务和融资平台公司债务存在比较明显的影子银行化问题,而且债务负担率较高的省级政府非信贷渠道的影子银行融资规模更高。在分析省级地方政府债务影子银行化成因的基础上,为了控制省级政府债务风险的影子银行化程度,需要从财政和金融风险交叉传染的路径中斩断风险传播的链条、从风险传导的前端和末端链条加强对省级政府及其融资平台公司和开展影子银行业务金融机构的风险监管。     

地方政府和社会资本合作风险防范机制研究

近年来,政府与社会资本合作在治理地方政府债务问题、提升公共物品供给效率等方面发挥了积极作用,但其爆发式增长也使得地方政府面临不断增加的风险,包括决策风险、财政风险及企业违约带来的风险。地方政府应通过建立项目评估体系、加强财政承诺管理、完善绩效监管制度及发展二级交易市场等方面的积极努力来构建政府风险防范机制,促进政府与社会资本合作模式的规范化发展,实现地方政府与社会资本合作中的多方共赢。     

地方政府融资平台风险及其治理

近年来,地方政府融资平台在增强地方政府财力,加快基础设施建设,推动社会事业发展和拉动内需等领域作出了重要贡献。但是由于地方政府融资平台从设立之日起就有着设立不规范、企业管理制度落后、信息披露不完全、杠杆率偏高过大、融资渠道单一、现金流覆盖偏低的缺陷,最终可能产生不良贷款率提升、地方财政间接还款压力增大、国进民退、经济波动等风险。规范现有地方政府融资平台,实现地方政府融资平台长期健康发展,需要尽快清理现有地方政府融资平台及其债务,同时着力构建地方政府融资平台治理的长效机制,使地方政府从过度依赖融资平台中解脱出来。     

地方政府融资平台的财政支持与风险防范

我国地方政府融资平台大部分是运用财务杠杆负债经营,蕴藏着巨大的偿债风险,地方财政收入的不确定性及其他因素都加剧了融资平台的偿债风险.本文探讨了地方政府融资平台基于财政方面的支持,分析了其带来的风险,并给出相应的风险防范的政策建议.     

政府控制、制度环境与信贷资源配置

将政府控制内部结构与制度环境纳入统一分析框架,深入研究了政府控制内部结构对银行信贷资源配置的影响,以及在不同制度环境下政府控制内部结构对信贷资源配置发挥的作用是否有所不同。研究表明:政府行政级别越低,越有动机干预银行信贷资源配置,帮助其所控制公司获得银行贷款,公司银行借款水平就越高。与通过实业主体控制的公司相比,在政府通过国有资产管理机构控制的上市公司,政府通过干预银行信贷资源配置帮助公司获取银行贷款的行为更为便利,该类公司具有较高的银行借款水平。与制度环境较差的地区相比,在制度环境较好的地区,政府控制内部结构对银行信贷资源配置发挥的作用相对较小。研究有助于深入理解信贷资源配置行为的制度根源。     

Government‐wide Financial Statements and Credit Risk

Now that state governments issue comprehensive annual financial reports in accordance with Statement No. 34 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, it is possible to generate a consistent and comprehensive set of government‐wide financial information. We use the information to develop financial ratios to benchmark government financial performance from information beyond the traditional general fund, and test the hypothesis that such information is incorporated into the assessment of credit risk. We provide an empirical analysis of the incorporation of government‐wide financial information into state government credit ratings, which provides a positive empirical test of the theory of certification and demonstrates how information from the government‐wide financial statements is infused into financial markets.     

共享经济中供需双方的信用风险管理研究——以知识技能共享为例

共享经济正在成为“双创”的重要切入点。较之实物商品,知识技能更容易通过互联网平台分享,但也更容易因为供需双方的信息不对称而引发各种纠纷,进而导致共享平台难以为继。解决这些问题的根本在于强化市场经济有效运行的基础——信用风险管理体系,包括对供需双方身份、交易和评价内容的信息审核机制,充分反映双方交易历史、交易能力和信用现状的信用评价体系,动态保证金、第三方资金托管和商业保险相结合的信用保障机制,有第三方参与仲裁的在线争议处理机制,及平台、政府和行业协会协调运行的三方联合监管等五个方面。这些内容,也构成了共享平台风险管理和控制的重要内容。     

An Investigation of the Characteristics of Local Governmental Units Disclosing High Deposit and Investment Credit Risk as Defined by Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 3

As a result of severe financial losses by local governments in the mid-1980s due to falling interest rates, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 3 was issued. The GASB No. 3 provides information for assessing a government's actual and future deposit, investment market, and credit risks. This article investigates the number of governments disclosing deposits and investments in the high risk category and determines if there are common characteristics among those reporting high risk deposits and investments.     

Money Talks: The Environmental Impact of China's Green Credit Policy

This study examines the impact of China's green credit policy on the environment. In particular, we consider an initiative that requires all banks to base their loan decisions on corporate environmental performance. This is an important issue since it is globally gaining popularity to leverage bank loans as an avenue to enforce corporate environmental responsibility. Moreover, there are only a handful of empirical investigations in relation to the impacts of credit constraint on corporate environmental behaviors and strategies. This research also provides useful insights on how to enhance environmental regulation enforcement, using the Environmental Protection Bureau in partnership with local banks to exert a creditable threat of financial constraint on unfavorable environmental outcomes. Using the synthetic control method and difference‐in‐differences analysis, we find that this policy has significantly motivated firms, particularly those firms with a higher dependence on external financing, to reduce water pollution. We further discover that the policy compels firms to favor pollution prevention at the source instead of end‐of‐pipe treatments, since the policy imposes a long‐term credit constraint on pollution.     

Shifting Boundaries between the Public and Private Sectors: Implications from the Economic Crisis

What are the differences between the public and private sectors as well as their interrelationships in light of the recent financial crisis? Has the global economic crisis fundamentally shifted the boundaries between the two sectors? This essay examines the nature and extent of the shift. The authors present an analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to highlight the massive transformations that are taking place and to introduce lessons for future policy initiatives. Between financial rescue missions and the economic stimulus program, government spending accounts for a bigger share of the nation’s economy—26 percent—than at any time since World War II. The government is financing 9 out of 10 new mortgages in the United States. If you buy a car from General Motors, you are buying from a company that is 60 percent owned by the government. If you take out a car loan or run up your credit card, the chances are good that the government is financing both your debt and that of your bank. —Edmund Andrews and David Sanger, New York Times, 2009     

Beyond 5 Percent: Optimal Municipal Slack Resources and Credit Ratings

Local governments tend to keep large amounts of slack financial resources to hedge against risk and uncertainty. To date, there has been little empirical research on whether those slack holdings are inadequate, adequate, or perhaps excessive relative to those risks and uncertainties. I address this gap in current research by using credit quality as a criterion to consider “optimal” slack resource levels. I find that for a national sample of local governments, slack resources’ effect on credit quality is statistically but not substantively significant. Having some rather than no slack increases, the likelihood of receiving a more desirable rating by 5–9 percent, but large slack holdings have little if any additional effect. These findings have implications for future work on slack resources, and for debt management broadly.     

Development of Local Government Debt Financing Markets: Application of a Market‐Based Framework

Needed is clear guidance on how to develop market‐based debt financing systems in transitional and developing countries. We propose an analytical framework useful for identifying constraints to financial development and providing recommendations to overcome constraints to develop municipal financing capacity. The proposed framework is applied to five country case studies: Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, and South Africa. The thesis of this paper is that municipal credit market development is related to improvements in the legal/regulatory framework governing local borrowing, the capacity of financial institutions to assess risk, and borrower capacity to support and manage debt.     

The Rise of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Effective Financing Approach for Infrastructure Investment?

The rise of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China has spurred heated debates about their purpose and effectiveness. This article traces the fluctuation of China's PPPs over several decades and finds that PPPs have played a supplementary role in China's infrastructure investment, as a response to the pressures of fiscal shortfalls and government debts. The resurgence of PPPs in recent years aims to bridge the infrastructure gap and alleviate ballooning local debts. These expectations, however, are hard to realize. China's PPPs mainly involve state‐owned enterprises and place increasing financial burdens on the government. The central government has taken measures to attract private sector investment to mitigate the financial risk, but the prospects for PPPs remain unclear.     

Waste in the Sewer: The Collapse of Accountability and Transparency in Public Finance in Jefferson County,Alabama

Following failed auctions for sewer debt in April 2008, major bond rating companies downgraded Jefferson County, Alabama’s bond rating to D (default) triggering massive mandatory payments by the county to its creditors. At the time of writing, the county teeters on the brink of actual default and bankruptcy, unable to pay service on its $3.3 billion sewer debt portfolio. If the county defaults, it will be the largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history, eclipsing Orange County, California’s 1994 default. The intriguingly complex tale of the Jefferson County debt crisis is recounted here by identifying and examining failures of transparency and accountability by local bureaucratic and political actors, private financial institutions, as well as the larger regulatory framework governing public finance. Enhanced regulation of local government and the financial sector plus greater local government capacity to close accountability gaps and thus prevent future crises of similar scale in this or other jurisdictions are recommended.