Distributive politics,ward representation,and the spread of zoning

This analysis examines two alternative explanations for the adoption of comprehensive zoning ordinances in the years immediately following its initial adoption in New York City. The market failure explanation predicts zoning adoption in cities where externality problems (represented by heavy incidence of manufacturing) exist. The distributive policymaking model treats zoning as a form of regulation that is most likely to be found in cities where local legislators are elected from geographically-concentrated constituencies (e.g., wards) and therefore try to target policy benefits to their own constituencies while spreading the policy costs over all constituencies. Some support is found for each model. Especially striking is the interactive effect of ward representation and of economic interest (i.e., levels of home ownership).     

Party system nationalisation and social spending

Party systems diverge in their levels of nationalisation. While in some countries parties obtain similar levels of electoral support in all districts, in others parties get very asymmetric electoral shares across districts. The distributive consequences of this have been seldom studied. The argument tested here is that when political parties have nationalised electorates they have stronger incentives to provide social policies that spread benefits all over the territory. This argument is tested in 22 OECD democracies for the period 1980?2006. The results show that, regardless of the electoral system in place, there is a positive relation between party system nationalisation and social spending.     

Fairness on the Day after Tomorrow: Justice, Reciprocity and Global Climate Change

Climate change raises important questions of global distributive justice, which can be defined as the issue of how benefits and burdens should be distributed within and between generations. This article addresses two conceptual issues that underpin the relationship between climate change and the part of distributive justice concerned with the entitlements of future persons. The first is the role of reciprocity, conceived either as mutual advantage or fair play, in the allocation of distributive entitlements between generations. The second is the extent to which theories of 'justice as reciprocity' can ground duties of intergenerational justice that underpin radical policies to manage the causes and impacts of global climate change. I argue that theories of justice as fair reciprocity generate significant duties of environmental conservation, despite these duties not being owed directly to the not-yet-born.     

Mandatory Versus Incentive-Based State Zoning Reform Policiesfor Affordable Housing in the United States:A Comparative Assessment

To break the chain of exclusionary zoning and produce affordable housing, mandatory state zoning reform policies have been in place for a couple decades in the United States. Their success is often constrained by local resistance and noncompliance. Some scholars argue that the lack of incentives to communities for affordable housing production is one of the main reasons for their resistance to state mandates. At present, no incentive-based state zoning reform policy is at work except in Massachusetts. Inclusionary zoning policies do offer incentives to developers but not to communities. This article examines the strengths and weaknesses of mandatory state policies and Massachusetts's incentive-based policy and offers policy insights for the future.     

The administrative state and fiscal policy: A comparative analysis of political issues in China and the United States

This article examines the budgetary politics in China and the United States. It illustrates the inherent political nature of fiscal policies produced by different political and economic systems. Although both countries are concerned with the distributive effects of reform, the study indicates that the central government of China confronts issues related to the distribution of power between the center and the provinces during economic transformation. In contrast, the debate in the United States is produced by the distribution of costs and benefits brought about by federal fiscal policy. The context of the debate is influenced, in part, by the administrative state.     

Privatization as a Political Priority: The British Experience

This article challenges conventional approaches to Thatcher's privatization campaign in which privatization has been judged on the basis of its economic or public policy merits. The privatization programme of the Thatcher Government was driven by political objectives and thus it was more coherent than has been usually asserted. Politicians are motivated by maximizing their political benefits (power) rather than by the pursuit of the common good, that is optimal economic and public policies. Unlike some other papers who have considered the political aspects of the Conservative privatization programme, this paper introduces a distinction between what were the Conservatives' perceptions of the political consequences of privatization and the actual effect of this programme.     

The Face of the State

From a liberal perspective, policies designed to permit the participation of minorities in national institutions while retaining their cultural particularities are justified either on the grounds that culture has a particular importance or on the basis of equal treatment of individuals. This paper argues that such policies, while not without benefits, have at least the potential to compromise the perceived neutrality of an important state institution. It focuses on the Canadian decision to permit the use of religious symbols as part of the uniform of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Advocates of such policies focus only on their benefits and ignore the potential difficulties; the paper argues that a more balanced assessment is required, one which weights advantages and disadvantages.     

Justifying grounds for multicultural policies in Korea: universal human rights versus benefits of diversity

Multicultural policies often deviate from the principle of equal opportunity since it assumes exclusive policy target groups with extra budget and appropriate organization. If this is so, by what rationale can multicultural policies be justified? Why should we accept such unequal treatment as a procedural method to achieve a more equal society as the final goal? This paper examines justifying logic for multicultural policies that inevitably have an arbitrary aspect of state intervention. This paper first differentiates two kinds of logic, namely universal human rights and the benefits of diversity, which provide supporting rationale for the implementation of multicultural policies. We can witness from the US history that the benefits of diversity have increasingly become the main logic justifying affirmative action instead of liberal discussions on social justice and universal human rights of the 1960s. Korea also shows such a shift towards a utilitarian justification which has focused heavily on the benefits of diversity. However, the utilitarian rationalization for multicultural transition can be easily withdrawn when the benefits of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity disappear, suddenly leading to unexpected discriminatory situations. In this context, this paper argues that discussion of normative justification is required, and such discussions need to be internalized among the citizens of a political community.     

Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions

Public Choice - This paper poses a deceptively simple question. It asks, how can a program or group of programs that provides distributive benefits to recipients in a minority of legislative...     

Soldiers and Wayward Women: Gendered Citizenship,and Migration Policy in Argentina,Italy and Spain since 1850

Policies that regulate peoples international movement and their state membership have historically made distinctions based on perceived sexual differences, but little is known about the process by which this has happened. This paper explores how and with what consequences migration and nationality policies have been gendered in two quintessential countries of emigration (Italy and Spain), and in a country of immigrants (Argentina) over a 150-year period. I argue that these migration and nationality policies have reflected the dynamics of the political fields in which they have been crafted. Especially before the Great War, laws and official practices that showed a disproportionate interest in men as soldiers and workers, and in women as mothers and as morally suspect subjects mirrored a dynamic of competition over migrants among these countries. A subsequent harmonization of policies reflected a dynamic of accommodation to the realities of a settled emigrant population and dual nationality. In addition, the administrative mechanisms coupled with these laws have operated differently with respect to men and women. The consequences of these laws and mechanisms have persisted even when the letter of the law has ostensibly become gender neutral.     

Democratic Legitimacy, Public Justification and Environmental Direct Action

This article addresses the question of whether environmental direct action against policies or institutions that are recognised as democratically legitimate can be justified. Arguments that seek to tie environmental outcomes to stipulated requirements of either the democratic process or distributive theories of justice are found wanting in this regard. However, one of the central justifications for the losers in a democratic settlement accepting defeat is policy reversibility. The non-reversible element in significant areas of environmental change entails that environmentalists are forced to play a 'one-shot' political strategy. This fact lends support to the justification of environmental direct action in such cases, although it may also apply beyond the sphere of environmental politics.     

Presidential Address: “A Thousand Petty Fortresses”: Administrative Burden in U.S. Immigration Policies and Its Consequences

Contradictory elements in U.S. immigration policy, reflecting a long‐time struggle between inclusionary and exclusionary views, have resulted in federal legislation filled with compromises and tradeoffs that, at state and sub‐state levels, play out in unclear interpretations and uneven, highly discretionary administration and enforcement of immigration law and policy. This research describes a tool of discretionary administration—administrative burden—that is increasingly used in enforcing immigration law and policies at state and sub‐state levels and presents a theoretical frame for more fully investigating and addressing its consequences. The application and implications of administrative burden are explored empirically and qualitatively in a case study analysis of an enforcement‐oriented policy change in Texas that denied access to birth certificates for some citizen‐children born to Mexican immigrants. To better understand the potential consequences of this and related policies, interviews with immigrant parents and longitudinal data from a survey of children of immigrants are analyzed to assess both short‐term and later outcomes of children who are denied economic assistance and other benefits under policies that impose barriers to their integration into society. The study findings point to serious, adverse consequences for citizen children of state and sub‐state immigration policies that create administrative burden and perpetuate racial discrimination, while simultaneously diminishing the transparency, fairness, and effectiveness of public administration.     

The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics

We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e., that members of a state's House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolate appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of benefits to the end of senatorial terms, but that the House blunts this tendency with countercyclical appropriations. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.     

Between technocracy and politics: How financial stability committees shape precautionary interventions in real estate markets

Implementing precautionary measures that have obvious distributional consequences today but often only invisible future benefits is politically difficult. It requires that policymakers reconcile technocratic expertise with political consent. This paper traces attempts to enact such measures, focusing on countercyclical policies to limit the systemic risks of housing booms as proposed by financial stability committees in Germany, France, and the Netherlands from 2015 onwards. These committees bring together technocrats and political authorities in order to overcome the inaction bias inherent to these measures, seeking to forge both epistemic and political consensus on the need for action. We find that the work of these committees is characterized by lengthy processes of consensus-building, during which technocrats amass evidence and search for politically acceptable solutions. We argue that whether this leads to meaningful steps crucially depends on the committee's institutional set-up. What particularly matters is its capacity to engage the Ministry of Finance in binding discussions and the governance arrangements for the activation of precautionary instruments, which shape whether a shared framing of the problem and appropriate response emerges.     

Three Strategies to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy

This paper presents results from fiscal impact simulations of three national‐level policies designed to prevent unintended pregnancy: A media campaign encouraging condom use, a pregnancy prevention program for at‐risk youth, and an expansion in Medicaid family planning services. These simulations were performed using FamilyScape, a recently developed agent‐based simulation model of family formation. In some simulation specifications, policies’ benefits are monetized by accounting for projected reductions in government expenditures on medical care for pregnant women and infants. In a majority of these specifications, policies’ fiscal benefit‐cost ratios are less than 1. However, in specifications that account additionally for projected savings to programs that provide a broader range of benefits and services to young children, all three policies have benefit‐cost ratios that are comfortably greater than 1. The results from my preferred specifications suggest that the simulated policies would produce returns to taxpayers on each dollar spent of between $2 to $6. On the whole, the results of these simulations imply that all three policies are sound public investments.     

Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation

Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid increases the incumbent party's turnout but decreases opposition‐party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party's voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust the incumbent. Analysis of individual‐level data on FEMA hurricane disaster aid awards in Florida, linked with voter‐turnout records from the 2002 (pre‐hurricane) and 2004 (post‐hurricane) elections, corroborates these predictions. Furthermore, the timing of the FEMA aid delivery determines its effect: aid delivered during the week just before the November 2004 election had especially large effects on voters, increasing the probability of Republican (incumbent party) turnout by 5.1% and decreasing Democratic (opposition party) turnout by 3.1%. But aid delivered immediately after the election had no effect on Election Day turnout.     

Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

This is an article about package deals in EU legislative politics and their effects on policy outcomes. It analyzes interchamber exchange between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The main argument is that package deals allow Member States control over the financial aspects of legislation and ensure its timely adoption. In exchange, the Parliament gains access to some of the EU's most expensive policy areas. Intercameral logrolling is analyzed across all EU legislation completed in the period 1 May 1999–30 April 2007, including 2,369 issues, 1,465 legislative proposals, and 19 policy areas. The results indicate that package deals in the EU are conditional on the distributive nature of proposals and their urgency. In turn, through logrolling, the Parliament extends its influence in distributive policies.     

Instant winners: Legal change in transition and the diffusion of state lotteries

This paper investigates the determinants of legal change in a public choice framework. An empirical model explaining the timing and probability of decisions to adopt state-operated lotteries is developed. Employing a Tobit estimator and explicitly considering the effects of state-specific constitutional and political structures, spending and tax policies, and federal revenue importation, evidence is presented showing that legal change is much like economic change: Lotteries are more likely to be adopted and to be adopted earlier where the costs are lowest relative to expected benefits. State legislatures appear to be the main beneficiaries of this public choice process.     

International Organizations in Transfer of Infectious Diseases: Iterative Loops of Adoption, Adaptation, and Marketing

Over the past few years increasing attention has been given to the role of international organizations in the diffusion of policy ideas and promotion of particular macro-level policies. Much of the attention has been on the ideological driving forces behind such policies, and on the extent to which the policies are externally imposed. There has been limited discussion on the bread-and-butter, technical policies of international organizations, and how they devise, adopt, adapt, and then promote what come to be seen as policies of global "best practice." This paper seeks to redress this gap by looking at the process of transfer of two infectious disease policies between international and national levels. It demonstrates that international organizations play different roles in policy transfer at particular stages in the process. The paper suggests that health policy transfer is a long adaptive process, made up of several iterative loops, as research and clinical practices developed in one or more countries are adopted, adapted, and taken up by international organizations which then mobilize support for particular policies, market, and promote them. Assumptions that new ideas about policies flow "rationally" into existing decision making are challenged by the processes analyzed here. Policy transfer, given the experience of these infectious diseases policies, goes through separate, "bottom-up," research-oriented, and "top-down" marketing-oriented loops. Individuals and different configurations of networks play key roles linking these loops. In the process, complex, context-specific policies are repackaged into simplified guidelines for global best practice, leading to considerable contestation within the policy networks.