Budgeting for Accountability: A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China

Budgeting is an important mechanism for ensuring public accountability. How do budget reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era compare to those in contemporary China? Are administrative and legislative budget controls essential to an effective, efficient government? Though the two countries differ in many respects, significant parallels between their budget reforms are evident. In the United States, electoral accountability alone does not guarantee overall government accountability if proper budgetary institutions are absent. China's recent budget reform reveals that it is possible to develop accountability, absent open elections, but with limitations and constraints. Lessons on budgeting and accountability for other developing and transitional countries are drawn from this comparative study.     

Regulatory reform in the era of new technological development: The role of organizational factors in the public sector

What is the role of organizational factors in fostering regulatory reform in response to new technological development? Existing studies provide useful frameworks to understand regulatory reform in rapidly changing circumstances but still lack a systematic analysis of how organizational factors affect regulatory reform in the public sector. To fill this gap, we examine the impact of several institutional elements that are central to defining organizational characteristics, such as job tasks, bureaucratic autonomy, and organizational culture. We theorize that regulatory reform is more likely when public sector organizations are more receptive to external changes, which are determined by these characteristics. We leverage original surveys from over 1,000 civil servants in Korea, one of the front runners in new technological development, and find support for our prediction. We find that the implementation of regulatory reforms is more likely when (i) organizational tasks are relevant to scientific and technological development, (ii) higher levels of bureaucratic autonomy are granted, (iii) agency heads demonstrate stronger leadership, and (iv) organizational culture is less authoritarian. Our study makes clear contributions to the literature on public management and regulation theory, and has important implications for regulatory reform in the face of new technological development.     

The Impact of Electoral Reform on the Public Service: The New Zealand Case

October 1996 marked the beginning of a new era in New Zealand politics, with the advent of a system of proportional representation based on the German model. This article explores the impact of electoral reform on the public service. First, it summarises the extensive public sector reforms during the mid-to-late 1980s and considers the preparations undertaken by the public service for proportional representation. Second, it outlines the concerns and expectations about the likely consequences of the new electoral system on the bureaucracy. Third, against this background, the article examines the extent to which the public service has been affected by electoral reform. It is argued that despite some notable changes to the political environment within which officials operate, the overall impact of proportional representation on the public service to date has been modest. The analysis presented here is based on a series of interviews conducted during 1997 with ministers, senior public servants, ministerial advisers and parliamentary officials, along with a range of secondary sources.     

Are public organizations suffering from repetitive change injury? A panel study of the damaging effect of intense reform sequences

In the last decade, reforms in the public sector have been implemented at an ever‐increasing pace. Hereby, organizations are repetitively subject to mergers, splits, absorptions, or secessions of units; the adoption of new tasks; changes in legal status; and other structural reforms. Although evidence is largely missing in the literature, there is a growing belief that such intense reform sequences may be damaging to organizations. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by empirically examining the existence of such repetitive change injury for public organizations. To do so, we employ organizational absenteeism rates as an indicator for repetitive change injury and link this to the reform sequences an organization experienced. Results indicate that intense reform sequences disproportionally increase organizational absenteeism rates, supporting the existence of repetitive change injury and suggesting that reforms remain rooted in organizational memories for a longer time than is often assumed.     

The Market Turn in EU Governance—The Emergence of Public–Private Collaboration

The question asked here is how the horizontal relationship between public and private actors, with the overall aim of delivering public service, is squared with the requirement of democratic accountability according to the traditional model of command and control. Empirical analysis of the European satellite navigation program (Galileo), the European Investment Bank and health, and the European Financial market (the Lamfalussy model) shows that efficiency is at the forefront of the collaborations. Democratic accountability is assumed to take place because there is a formal chain of delegation. However, the private actors are not part of that chain and their accountability is never addressed. The market turn in European Union governance has opened up for private authority and emphasis of output legitimacy. It has not opened up for democratic reforms according to the very authority system of governance. We are dealing with a governance turn and yet it is still government.     

Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: Major Constraints and Strategies

Many Asian countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public-sector reform, but their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. Except for a few, many Asian developing countries are still struggling with political and socioeconomic weaknesses. Indeed, the nature of public sector reform in many Asian developing countries differs substantially from that of advanced countries. Furthermore, the concept of accountability is not interpreted equally throughout the world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the major constraints to enhancing public accountability in Asian developing countries and to discuss major strategies to promote such accountability from the perspective of developing countries. This article first reviews the concept of accountability and its development, followed by discussion of constraints in enhancing public accountability and public sector reform, key measures to enhance public accountability, and implications and conclusions.     

The Expenses Scandal and the Politics of Electoral Reform

The scandal over MPs' expenses that erupted in 2009 was followed by a surge in discussion of electoral reform. A range of reforms to Westminster's existing electoral system are now high on the political agenda. This article examines the extent and the nature of the scandal's impact on the electoral reform debate and draws out comparative implications for the sorts of conditions that can force politicians to accept electoral reforms that they do not want. It finds that the expenses scandal significantly changed debate about some electoral reform topics, but not about others. It proposes three factors likely to increase the impact of scandal in sparking reform: that the scandal is seen as harming ordinary people in their daily lives; that reforms can readily be understood as likely to mitigate the sources of scandal; and that those reforms do not seriously harm politicians' own perceived interests.     

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE USA: LESSONS LEARNT AND TO BE LEARNT

Abstract: In the 1970s, both Australia and the United States instituted legal reforms aimed at promoting greater accountability among public servants. Prompted by growing awareness of the need to encourage and protect federal government whistleblowers, Congress enacted whistleblower protection measures in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Although the notion of open government in Australia has never been extended to include whistleblowing by public servants, probing the issue of whether or not United States whistleblower protection can serve as a reform model in the search for more effective legal mechanisms for ensuring government accountability can provide lessons and insights of value to Australian public administrators. Analysis of the role and impact of the Office of the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board as established under the Civil Service Reform Act reveals many difficulties associated with whistleblower protection. Research has substantiated the jurisdictional ambiguities, administrative and procedural deficiencies and lack of sanctioning power which plague this reform effort. Similar deficiencies also impede the protection of parliamentary witnesses in Australia. Evaluation of whistleblower protection leads to the conclusion that reform models in either country for ensuring government accountability must not be judged solely through examination of statutory provisions. There must also be in place strong stabilising factors such as political unity, economic comfort, social discipline, civic virtue and public service ideology in order to achieve the common public service goal of rendering governmental decision-making more accountable to persons affected by it and open to review by independent decision makers.     

Legitimacy and context: implications for public sector reform in developing countries

This article examines the interplay between legitimacy and context as key determinants of public sector reform outcomes. Despite the importance of variables such as legitimacy of public institutions, levels of civic morality and socio‐economic realities, reform strategies often fail to take such contextual factors into account. The article examines, first, relevant literature – both conceptual and empirical, including data from the World Values Survey project. It is argued that developing countries have distinctive characteristics which require particular reform strategies. The data analysed shows that in Latin American countries, there is no clear correlation between confidence in public institutions and civic morality. Other empirical studies show that unemployment has a negative impact on the level of civic morality, while inequality engenders corruption. This suggests that poorer and socio‐economically stratified countries face greater reform challenges owing to the lack of legitimacy of public institutions. The article concludes that reforms should focus on areas of governance that impact on poverty. This will in turn help produce more stable outcomes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Support for Performance‐Based Funding: The Role of Political Ideology,Performance, and Dysfunctional Information Environments

As performance‐based mechanisms for accountability have become increasingly commonplace in the public sector, it is apparent that administrative reactions to these reforms are central in determining their effectiveness. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about the factors that drive acceptance of performance‐based accountability by administrative actors. This article employs data collected from an original survey instrument to examine the perceptions of presidents at American public colleges and universities regarding performance funding. The author finds that acceptance of performance as a basis for funding is driven by a variety of factors, including the partisanship of the state legislature, organizational performance (measured by institutional graduation rates), dysfunction in the external information environment, and the political ideology of university presidents.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

Many externally motivated public sector reforms produce less change than expected. This article argues that we should expect limited reform results in respect of certain organizational attributes. Applying institutional theory on isomorphism, the argument is simply that reforms are harder where they influence organizational characteristics that (i) are difficult to observe externally, (ii) are core to the organization, and (iii) involve actors with whom the externally defined change agenda is unlikely to resonate normatively. These arguments are tested in an analysis of Public Financial Management (PFM) reform in Africa, where evidence is supportive. The article contributes to public management literature, and comparative studies in particular, by applying a well-suited theory to the study of public sector change. The approach and findings should be of particular interest to the development community, shedding light on why reforms routinely underperform—in PFM and beyond, extending to topics like externally driven nation building.     

A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords

The disproportional electoral system of the House of Commons is increasingly contested, while the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords has been criticised for a century. I first argue that simultaneous reform of both chambers creates the opportunity for far more optimal outcomes than possible under attempts to reform just one chamber. I then argue that bicameralism should continue so that the UK can be represented in two, currently convoluted, ways: as a singular polity in partisan terms and as both an aggregate of constituencies and union of nations, in geographic terms. The former would best take place in a reformed House of Commons, responsible for government formation, and composed of around 300 MPs elected by ‘pure’ proportional representation. The latter would best take place in a reformed House of Lords of around 300 peers, elected by plurality voting from single-member constituencies. Together, these reforms would improve governance, representation, legitimacy, accountability and the robustness of the union, while retaining celebrated facets of the status quo such as simplicity and the direct constituency link.     

Catalysts and barriers: Explaining electoral reform in Western Europe

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster (‘catalysts’) and ones that may hinder (‘barriers’) the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought.     

Party Servants,Ideologues or Regional Representatives? The German Länder and the Reform of Federalism

This article considers recent attempts to reform German federalism, the failed 2004 reform, and the reforms agreed in 2006 and 2009. It compares partisan, ideological and territorial factors which contribute to an understanding of reform, finding that all three have a role in explaining actors’ views of reform proposals. Two other claims are developed: that in some aspects of the reforms, a division between ‘generalist’ and ‘subject specialist’ politicians became apparent; and that a decisive change between 2004 and 2006 was the formation of a grand coalition at a federal level, which paved the way for agreement upon reform proposals.     

Administrative reform in a changing political environment: The case of Hong Kong

Since 1989, the Hong Kong government has implemented a programme of public sector reform that is based on the principles of ‘new public management’. The reforms initially focused mainly on financial management reform, including delegating responsibilities for resource allocation; re-defining the roles of the central resource branches; setting up trading funds in departments that provide services directly to the public; and instilling a new corporate culture of service throughout the government. Some progress has been made in implementing the reforms. In 1993, the government realized that further civil service reform was necessary to support the reforms. The government proposed to delegate more authority to department heads on personnel matters; give managers more freedom to manage personnel; and simplify personnel regulations and procedures. These ‘new public management’-type reforms are usually associated with stable, relatively unchanging environments. In Hong Kong, however, the reforms have been proposed and carried out in an environment of considerable political turbulence which has both facilitated and hindered their implementation. Because of the declining legitimacy of the colonial government, British authorities may not have the political capacity to implement the reforms. Opposition from both department heads and civil service unions to aspects of the reforms has already emerged.     

The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and its Consequences

The UK political system has long exemplified 'majoritarian' or 'Westminster' government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention, although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system.     

Patrons against clients: Electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states

Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition – potential and certain electoral losses – which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross‐country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis‐incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double‐edged sword for institutional reform.     

乡镇机构改革中若干问题的思考

取消农业税後，中国各地正紧锣密鼓地进行乡镇机构改革试点，大规模的改革已箭在弦上。本文对乡镇机构改革试点中出现的一些问题，如政府责任、机构对应、交叉任职、公共物品供给、经济职能、乡村撤并、社会稳定以及上级政府的呼应性改革等进行了讨论。     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.