The provincial role in the Canadian welfare state: the influence of provincial social policy initiatives on the design of the Canada Assistance Plan

Abstract. Provincial social welfare programs are often treated as provincial government responses to federal initiatives establishing shared-cost programs in the welfare field. In this paper, this traditional viewpoint is reversed, showing that the federal government's Canada Assistance Plan of 1966 was the result of provincial social welfare initiatives. Federal policy is shown to have been designed to accommodate as cost-sharable those programs in which provinces (particularly Alberta and Ontario) were already involved. The federal government had to make considerable additions to, and concessions concerning, the proposed program in order to retain provincial support for the new national welfare program.     

Canadian cities and the American example: a prologue to urban policy analysis

Abstract: The developmental pattern that characterizes metropolitan areas in the United States often serves as a basis for evaluating the condition of Canadian cities and attributing a distinctive thrust to Canadian urban policy. To be meaningful, however, comparative evaluations have to take account of the way government activities have helped to shape U.S. metropolitan areas over an extended period of time. A criticism implicit in much US. urban analysis is that government activities have persistently contributed to large inequalities in the social and economic condition of metropolitan area municipalities. In Canada, by comparison, interjurisdictional equalization has played a larger role in federal-provincial relations than it has in federal-state relations in the United States. It also seems to have influenced the way provincial governments dealt with municipalities during the 1960s and 1970s. At the present time, however, provincial governments are allowing the governmental systems of metropolitan areas to become more fragmented. They are also under pressure to reduce or abandon their efforts to equalize services and property tax burdens among municipalities. How they respond to that pressure will help to determine how closely the development of Canada's metropolitan areas conforms to the pattern of urban development characteristic of the United States.     

Public health and collaborative governance

Abstract: The nature of governance in Canada, both horizontally (between federal departments) and vertically (between federal and provincial governments) is changing. Or is it? Two distinct trends seem to have emerged over the past decade: one towards horizontal coordination and one towards vertical collaboration. These trends are perhaps best exemplified by the Public Health Agency of Canada, which depends very emphatically on integrated relationships both with other federal departments and with provincial and territorial governments. Yet in the past year, severe criticisms have emerged regarding the agency's ability to meet its objectives. To what extent are these problems due to the failure of collaborative governance? On a wider level, have decision-makers been too insouciant about making importunate public policy decisions on an assumption of the viability of collaborative governance? This article argues that problems in vertical collaboration in public health have occurred largely due to failures in horizontal coordination within the national government.     

Birds of a feather? The role of partisanship in the 2003 Ontario government transition

The question posed in this article focuses on whether partisanship affects government transitions. The way governments assume power in Canada is an intriguing part of politics, but we have only a limited knowledge of transition mechanics. There has been no investigation into whether transitions have an inter‐governmental dimension, for instance, nor have transitions been studied with the government's partisan complexion in mind. This article addresses this gap in the literature by examining the 2003 Ontario Liberal transition through inter‐governmental and political lenses. Using indicators to assess the role and impact of partisanship, the Ontario case suggests that partisan complexions matter in how the transition process is planned and executed. The provincial team will seek advice on the matter from their federal cousins, for example, and will recruit experienced political staffers from Parliament Hill to be part of the new sub‐national government. Shared partisanship may also predict whether harmonious relations with Ottawa will prevail during the first several months in power. The article concludes by asserting that in provinces where political party organizations formally overlap or are informally intertwined across the federal divide, partisanship can play a role in determining how a new government prepares and implements its transition process.     

Le chevauchement des programmes fédéraux et provinciaux: un bilan

Sommaire: Après avoir montré que le chevauchement des programmes fédéraux et provinciaux est une caractéristique fondamentale de l'activité gouvernementale au Canada et qu'il a son origine dans les dispositions de la Constitution, cette étude présente une évaluation qualitative de ses conséquences quant à l'efficience et à l'efficacité du système politico-administratif canadien. Ces conséquences sont envisagées sous l'angle du coût de l'action gouvernementale, de l'efficacité des politiques publiques, du fardeau imposé aux administrés en matière de transactions avec l'État et de la portée du principe de la responsabilité politique des gouvernants envers la population. Vue dans cette perspective, la duplication des activités fédérales et provinciales apparaît comme une source d'inefficience et d'inefficacité pour la gestion des affaires publiques. Elle justifie qu'on s'interroge sérieusement sur la valeur du partage actuel des pouvoirs entre les deux ordres de gouvernement. Abstract: After showing that the overlap between federal and provincial programs is a basic characteristic of government activity in Canada rooted in the provisions of the constitution, this study presents a qualitative assessment of its consequences for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Canadian political-administrative system. These consequences are viewed from the viewpoint of the cost of government action, of the effectiveness of public policy, of the burden the administered face in dealing with governments, and of the scope of governmental political accountability to the people. From this angle, the duplication of federal and provincial activities appears to be a source of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the management of public affairs. It raises serious questions as to the adequacy of the present sharing of powers between the two levels of government.     

Above and below the line: Strategic communications and media management in Canadian governments

This research note examines “below the line” media relations planning templates that are used to coordinate the release of government information, such as communications plans, event proposals and social media calendars. Methodological pathways to collect data through access to information are discussed. Templates and guidelines obtained from Canadian federal, provincial and territorial governments are classified into six phases of production: planning authorization, strategic planning, tactical planning, logistical planning, approval of media products and evaluation. The findings suggest political strategizing is least prevalent on matters involving public safety and crisis communications.     

Conditional grants and provincial government budgeting

Abstract. The conditional grant has become an important instrument of federal government assistance to the provinces in the last decade. But while the federal government has increased its use of conditional grants, the grants have been subjected to increasing criticism by the provincial governments. The primary complaint of the provinces is that these grants interfere with provincial expenditure priorities and cause a reallocation of provincial resources. Provinces have charged that major programs, such as Medicare, were initiated by the federal government without meaningful consultation and that the provinces were forced to participate or forego the federal contribution. The provinces have claimed that in order to participate they have to substitute or divert funds from existing or planned programs to the shared-cost program, resulting in a substitution effect in their budgets. The Ontario government has been particularly critical of conditional grants on these grounds. An analysis of shared-cost programs in the case of Ontario, however, indicates that conditional grants have not produced relatively significant substitution effects in the budget of that province. While provincial dissatisfaction with the conditional grant system continues, the two parties have been unable to find a mutually acceptable alternative. Sommaire. Dans les derniers dix ans, le gouvernement fédéral s'est beaucoup servi des subventions conditionnelles pour accorder de l'aide aux provinces. Mais, au fur et à mesure que le Gouvernement fédéral utilisait de plus en plus ce mécanisme, les gouvernements provinciaux intensifiaient leur critique des subventions conditionnelles. Le principal grief des provinces, c'est que ces subventions affectent les priorités provinciales concernant les dépenses et causent une réalocation des resources provinciales. Les provinces se plaignent que le gouvernement fédéral mette en Æuvie des programmes importants, tels que Médicare, sans vraiment les consulter préalablement, les forçant ainsi à participer ou à renoncer à la contribution fédérale. Les provinces ont prétendu qu'il fallait qu'elles substituent ou qu'elles soustraient, au bénéfice du programme à coûts partagés, des fonds prévus pour des programmes existants à créer, effectuant ainsi des substitutions au sein de leur budget. Le gouvernement de l'Ontario, en particulier, a critiqué les subventions conditionnelles pour ces raisons. Néanmoins une analyse des programmes à coüts partagés révèle que les subventions conditionnelles n'ont pas produit de substitution importante dans le budget de cette province. Les provinces continuent à se plaindre du système des subventions conditionnelles mais les dew parties n'ont pas réussi à trouver d'alternative qui convienne à l'une et à l'autre.     

Federalism and university governance in Canada

There is increasing interest in how universities are governed, externally and internally (Austin and Jones 2016). Drawing on a comparative case study of the governance of six major Canadian universities and the literature, this article describes the impact of federal research and innovation policy and programs on universities and reflects on Ottawa's role. We suggest that the federal government participates in the external governance of universities, but in a way that differs significantly from provincial governments. Canadian federalism appears to be generally beneficial for university autonomy and examination of its operation sheds light on factors that enable universities to sustain their autonomy.     

Federalism and government regulation: the case of the Canadian insurance industry 1927–34

Abstract. Federalism poses special problems for the regulatory activities of the state. In Canada, federal and provincial governments have frequently disagreed over which could best exercise such controls, keeping in mind not only the public interest but also the needs of the private parties involved. The business of insurance is a case in point. The decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council confirmed that the provinces had important powers to regulate the writing of insurance. Yet Ottawa argued that protection of policyholders and considerations of economy and efficiency required uniform national standards. The provinces pointed instead to the greater simplicity and responsiveness of local control as well as to the steadily diminishing sphere of constitutional authority possessed by the central government. This conflict came to a head between 1927 and 1934 when the Insurance Superintendents of Ontario and Quebec led the resistance to the activities of the federal Insurance Department. Support for the provincial bureaucrats came from reciprocal and mutual insurers, while the joint-stock life insurance companies backed Ottawa. Indeed, these private interests used the federal-provincial conflict to seek special favours from the regulatory agencies. The dispute ended because politicians concluded that little was to be gained from the continuation of bureaucratic competition. Sommaire. Le fédéralisme pose des problèmes particuliers pour les activités de contrôle de l'Etat. Au Canada, les gouvernements federal et provinciaux se sont souvent trouvés en désaccord au sujet de la question de savoir à qui il était préférable de confier l'exercice de ces contrôles, gardant à l'esprit non seulement l'intérêt public, mais aussi les besoins des intérêts privés en cause. Le secteur des assurances constitute un exemple particulièrement bien choisi. Les décisions du Comité judiciaire du Conseil privé ont confirmé que les provinces disposaient de pouvoirs importants pour réglementer l'établissement des contrats d'assurance. Ottawa a cependant fait valoir que la protection des détenteurs de polices ainsi que des considerations d'économie et d'efficacité nécessitent l'application de normes uniformes à l'échelle nationale. Les provinces ont, de leur côté, attiré l'attention sur la simplicité accrue et la rapidité d'application des mesures de contrôle local, ainsi que sur les pouvoirs constitutionnels de plus en plus restreints dont dispose le gouvernement central. Ce conflit a atteint son point culminant entire 1927 et 1934, lorsque les Surintendants des assurances de l'Ontario et du Québec ont pris la tête d'un mouvement de résistance aux activités du ministère fédéral des assurances. Les compagnies qui offraient des assurances réciproques et mutuelles ont appuyé les bureaucrates provinciaux, tandis que les compagnies d'assurance-vie par actions ont soutenu Ottawa. En fait, ces intérêts privés ont exploité le conflit federal-provincial pour essayer d'obtenir un traitement de faveur de la part des organismes de contrôle. Le différend a pris fin le jour où les hommes politiques ont conclu que l'on n'avait rien à gagner de la poursuite des affrontements bureaucratiques.     

Federal‐provincial overlap and civil servants: The case of occupational training in Quebec and Ontario

Abstract: Over the years, many analysts concerned with how federations work have presented the reduction of federal‐provincial overlap and duplication as a way of decreasing intergovernmental tensions. While some have presented such overlap and duplication as inevitable or even beneficial, few have tried to establish how overlap really works and whether it is a real problem or one created mostly by the provincial governments who wish to take issue with problems of federal funding, joint management and accountability. Despite the fact that, ultimately, public officials are in the best position to determine whether federal‐provincial overlap is causing inefficiencies, even fewer studies have focused on how they manage their relationship in areas where two orders of government are involved. Thus, the best possible source of information on how overlapping sectors are managed has been left out. This article examines how federal and provincial officials in Quebec and Ontario have managed their relationships in a particularly contentious sector: occupational training. Sommaire: Plusieurs auteurs intéressés au fonctionnement des fédérations ont, au fil des années, eu tendance à présenter la réduction des empiètements et recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux comme une façon de décroître les tensions intergouvememen‐tales. Certains auteurs ont présenté de tels chevauchements et dédoublements comme inévitables, voire bénéfiques, mais peu d'entre eux se sont penchés sur le véritable fonctionnement de ces empiètements et s'ils sont un problème réel ou principalement créé par les gouvernements provinciaux désireux d'engager une contro‐verse sur des questions de financement, de gestion commune et d'imputabilité. Bien que les fonctionnaires soient, ultimement, les mieux placés pour évaluer si les recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux constituent des sources d'inéfficience, peu d'écrits font état de la façon dont les fonctionnaires gèrent leurs relations lorsque les deux ordres de gouvernement sont impliqués. Ainsi, la meilleure source d'information sur la gestion de ce type de recoupements nous manque. Dans cet article, nous examinons comment des fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux au Québec et c'n Ontario ont géré leurs relations dans un domaine particulièrement conflictuel: la formation de la main‐d'æeuvre.     

“What do we want and how do we get there”: A comparative content analysis of First Nations Comprehensive Community Plans in British Columbia

First Nations are important regional development actors, and yet their development ambitions and goals have often been ignored or poorly understood by settler governments. Since 2004, the Canadian federal government has supported First Nations governments and Tribal Councils to develop Comprehensive Community Plans (CCPs)—community planning documents that are meant to set priorities and guide development in the medium to long term. This study employs a quantitative content analysis of all publicly available CCPs and related strategic planning documents in British Columbia in order to understand development priorities and in doing so, reveals a mismatch between the interests of First Nations and settler governments.     

Commissions of inquiry and policy change: Comparative analysis and future research frontiers

Canadian governments have spawned hundreds of federal and provincial commissions of inquiry (COIs). Many scholars have completed in‐depth analysis of particular COIs but less attention has been paid to policy impact and comparisons across COIs. This study addresses the following questions. What role do COIs play in policy change? Would policy change likely have occurred without the COI? Why do some COIs result in policy change and others do not? This analysis reports on findings from in‐depth case studies of ten COIs. It uses a theoretical framework focusing on ideas, institutions, actors and relations to examine whether and how COIs lead to policy and administrative change.     

The Commission on the Relations between Universities and Governments: summary report!

Abstract. The Report of the Commission on the Relations between Universities and Governments was published in June 1970, in both English and French. The Commission was created by the university community rather than by government, and its members were Professors René Hurtubise and Donald Rowat. In this article, Dr Rowat summarizes the Commission's main findings and recommendations, and comments on the rising cost of post-secondary education. The Report deals with the role of the university in society, the relations between universities and provincial governments, the role of the federal government in higher education and research, and problems of interprovincial coordination. So as to protect university independence in the face of growing provincial supervision, the Report recommends the creation of provincial university coordinating commissions, with members from government, the universities and the outside public. The Report also argues that the federal government's role in higher education should be more limited, and that its role in university research should be co-ordinated with that of the provinces. To promote interprovincial coordination, the Council of Ministers of Education should be strengthened and there should be created under its aegis an interprovincial commission on higher education. Rapidly rising costs will force us to face basic questions regarding how many should go to university, what kind of higher education is to be given, and how it should be organized. Sommaire. Le Rapport de la Commission sur les relations entre les universités et les gouvernements a été publié en juin 1970, à la fois en anglais et en français. La Commission avait été créée par le Communauté universitaire plutôt que par le gouvernement, et ses membres étaient les professeurs René Hurtubise et Donald Rowat. Dans cet article, le Dr Rowat resume les principales conclusions et recommandations de la Commission et fait le point sur le coût croissant de l'éducation post-secondaire. Le Rapport traite du rôle de l'université dans la société, des relations entre les universités et les gouvernements provinciaux, du rôle du gouvernement fédéral dans l'enseignement supérieur et la recherche, ainsi que des problémes de coordination interprovinciale. Afin de maintenir l'indépendance des universités face à une intervention provinciale toujours plus grande, le Rapport recommande la création de Commissions de coordination universitaires provinciales formées de membres du gouvernement, du corps universitaire et du public. Le Rapport soutient également que le rôle du gouvernement fédéral dans l'enseignement supérieur devrait être plus limité et que son rôle du point de vue de la recherche universitaire devrait être coordonné avec celui des provinces. Pour favoriser la coordination interprovinciale, il faudrait augmenter le pouvoir du Conseil des ministres de l'éducation et créer, sous son égide, une Commission interprovinciale de l'enseignement supérieur. La montée en flèche des frais nous obligera bientôt à considérer des questions fondamentales: le nombre de jeunes gens à admettre dans les universités, le genre d'éducation supérieure à fournir et la façon de l'organiser.     

长江三角洲地区横向府际关系——从法律视角提出的要求

府际关系即政府之间的关系,包括中央政府与’地方政府之间、地方政府与地方政府之间的关系。我国的府际关系多靠政策调整,且随意性大。应当将府际关系纳入法律调整的范围,使其满足经济、社会发展的需求。本文选取长江三角洲地区作为研究对象,探讨了该地区当前府际关系的现状和存在的主要问题,试从法律的角度对横向府际间关系提出新的要求。     

Assessing policy capacity in Canada's public services: Perspectives of deputy and assistant deputy ministers

Abstract: The state of policy capacity within Canada's various levels of government has for some time been the subject of discussion both within the public services themselves and among the academic research community. Drawing on the results of a 2006 survey of deputy and assistant deputy ministers working in Canada's federal, ten provincial and three territorial governments, this article presents assessments made by the most senior leadership. The survey results show that ninety per cent of deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers agree that policy capacity has changed but that the change is not uni‐directional. Both improvements and decline in policy capacity were observed, although assessments of decline were somewhat more pronounced. Moreover, improvements in policy capacity were found to be associated with a reduced focus on direct service delivery, a greater concern with long‐term planning, and the presence of a political leadership interested in innovation. Conversely, declining policy capacity was found to be linked to centralization of power, the loss of institutional memory, and “churning” within the ranks of the executive leadership. Additionally, level of government was also observed to be linked with change in policy capacity, with provincial deputies reflecting more negatively on policy capacity decline in their government than deputies at other levels.     

Does public reporting measure up? Federalism,accountability and child-care policy in Canada

Abstract: Governments in Canada have recently been exploring new accountability measures within intergovernmental relations. Public reporting has become the preferred mechanism in a range of policy areas, including early learning and child-care, and the authors assess its effectiveness as an accountability measure. The article is based on their experience with a community capacity-building project that considers the relationship between the public policy, funding and accountability mechanisms under the federal/provincial/territorial agreements related to child-care. The authors argue that in its current form, public reporting has not lived up to its promise of accountability to citizens. This evaluation is based on the standards that governments have set for themselves under the federal/provincial/territorial agreements, as well as guidelines set by the Public Sector Accounting Board, an independent body that develops accounting standards over time through consultation with governments.     

Second chambers: German experience and Canadian needs

Abstract The problem of constitutional reform was an important Canadian political issue from 1967 to 1971. The lengthy discussions failed to produce any cohesive results due to the inability of the various governments to reconcile their particular interests. One of the areas of concern was the makeup and the powers of the Senate. As a federally appointed body it has not fulfilled in any satisfactory way its role as a representative of the regional interests of Canada. Despite the acknowledged dissatisfaction with its present role, the various governments were unable to agree on a more effective one and the best that could be offered was some partial provincial power of appointment along with the limitation of the power of the Senate over legislation. It is the purpose of this article to suggest that a state of affairs has been reached in the Canadian federation where more positive measures are essential. Whether we like the idea or not, it must be recognized that under present conditions provinces are seeking and obtaining greater power over national policies without accepting any direct political responsibility for their activities. One answer to this problem which has never been fully examined is that adopted under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. In that country the second chamber, the Bundesrat, is directly representative of the state governments and has extensive powers of veto over all matters affecting the state (Land) interests as well as a suspensive power over other national matters. The effective authority of the states is greatly enhanced in this respect by the fact that they are responsible for the administration of many of the federal laws. Such a system may not be adaptable to Canada, but it might provide a means of reconciling provincial and national interests. It would combine provincial power with political responsibility, something sadly lacking at the present time. This is a matter worthy of much deeper study than has been applied to date. Sommaire. Le problème de la réforme constitutionnelle a été une question politique d'actualité au Canada de 1967 à 1971. Des débats prolongé n'ont pas réussi à produire résultats cohérents, les différents gouvernements s'étant montrés incapables de concilier leurs intérêts particuliers. L'un des sujets à l'étude avait été la composition et les pouvoirs du sénat. En tant qu'organisme dont les membres sont nommés par le gouvernement central, il n'a pas réussi à représenter de façon satisfaisante les intérêts régionaux du Canada. Mais bien que les différents gouvernements se soient déclarés peu satisfaits de son rôle actuel, ils n'ont pas réussi à se mettre d'accord sur les améliorations à apporter et ils n'ont pu proposer miew qu'un pouvoir provincial partiel de nomination ainsi que la limitation des pouvoirs du sénat sur la législation. Le but de cet article est de montrer que la Fédération canadienne en est arrivée à un point où des mesures plus positives sont essentielles. Que cela non plaise ou non, il faut reconnaître que dans les conditions actuelles, les provinces recherchent et obtiennent plus de pouvoirs sur les politiques nationales sans accepter de responsabilité politique directe pour leurs activités. L'une des solutions à ce problème qui n'a jamais étéétudiéà fond est celle qu'a adoptée la loi fondamentale de la République fédérale allemande. Dans ce pays la deuxième chambre, le Bundesrat, représente directement les gouvernements des Etats et a des pouvoirs étendus de veto sur toutes les questions touchant aux intérêts des Etats (Land) ainsi qu'un pouvoir suspensif sur d'autres questions nationales. Le fait que les Etats soient responsables de l'administration d'un grand nombre de lois fédérales augmente d'ailleurs considérablement leur autorité réelle. Un tel système ne pourrait peut-être pas être adopté intégralement au Canada, mais il pourrait nous fournir le moyen de conciIier les intérêts provinciaux et l'intérêt national. Il permettrait de combiner le pouvoir provincial et la responsabilité politique, ce qui manque malheureusement à l'heure actuelle. C'est là une question qui mérite d'être étudiée beaucoup plus à fond qu'elle ne l'a été jusqu'à maintenant.     

Accountability regimes in federal‐provincial Labour Market Agreements 1995‐2015

Workforce development policy in Canada has undergone extensive reforms in the past two decades, often driven by intergovernmental pressures. Many of these reforms, including the transfer of thousands of federal civil servants to the provinces, along with $2.5 billion annually, have occurred largely unnoticed by the public, or even recipients of services. Accountability measures have remained weak as the federal and provincial governments have few incentives to increase public scrutiny. In particular, transparency (making information available for public scrutiny) and justification (the provision of reasons for decisions) are inadequate. A more inclusive public accountability framework in the policy area needs to be developed that can support innovation in programs.     

The National Transportation Act and Western Canada: a case study in co-operative federalism

Abstract. The transformation of the Canadian federal system from classical to co-operative federalism has placed greater importance on consultations between federal and provincial governments prior to the balkation of policy within their respective jurisdictions. There is, however, an absence of case studies that examine the interaction among provincial governments, provin-cially or regionally based pressure groups, Members of Parliament from a particular region or province and the federal cabinet in the formulation of policies in areas of federal jurisdiction. Using the enactment of The National Transportation Act of 1967 as a case study, the paper examines the policy-making process within the Canadian federal system as it affects the Western Canadian provinces. The central thesis of the paper is that the consultative mechanisms employed by the federal government in areas of provincial jurisdiction limit the extent to which provincial policy inputs are injected into the decision-making process. Co-operative federalism is entering a new phase that will be characterized by the establishment of specialized structures to permit the input of regional views at the federal level on a regularized basis. Furthermore, the provinces will attempt to develop regional policies in the hope that this will strengthen their bargaining position with the federal government. Sommaire. La transformation du système fédéral canadien, de fédéralisme classique en fédéralisme coopératif, a donné une grande importance aux consultations entre le gouvernement fédéral et les gouvernements provinciaux avant l'adoption définitive de politiques dans leurs juridictions respectives. On manque cependant d'études portant sur des cas d'espèce qui illustreraient l'interaction des gouvernements provinciaux, des groupes de pression provinciaw ou régionaux, des députés d'une région ou d'une province donnée et du cabinet fédéral, dans la formulation des politiques du ressort fédéral. En se servant comme cas d'espèce de l'adoption de la loi nationale sur les transports de 1967, l'auteur de la communication étudie le processus d'é'laboration des politiques dans le cadre du système fééral canadien, du point de vue de ses répercussions dans les provinces de l'Ouest. Sa thèse centrale, c'est que les mécanismes consultatifs employés par le gouvernement fédéral dans les domaines qui sont du ressort des provinces limitent l'incorporation des apports provinciaux dans le processus de prise de décision. Le fédéralisme coopératif entre dans une nouvelle phase qui sera caractérisée par la création de structures spécialisées afin de permettre l'apprt méthodique des opinions régionales au niveau fédéral. De plus, les provinces essaieront d'élaborer des politiques régionales, espérant ainsi renforcer leur position dans les négociations avec le gouvemement fédéral.     

The governance of post‐secondary education systems in British Columbia and Ontario: Path dependence and provincial policy

Provincial governments retain an essentially unrestricted jurisdictional autonomy as regards the structuring and coordination of post‐secondary education (PSE) systems. It is at the provincial level that crucial balances must be struck between the competing demands placed on costly PSE systems. This article develops a comparative historical analysis of the British Columbia and Ontario cases in this relatively neglected area of provincial public management. Strong path‐dependent logics are identified in both cases, anchored in interconnected networks of institutional and local interests. Current developments in both provinces are assessed against the background of these longer‐term historical patterns and in relation to wider international trends.