"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal

The work of state intermediate appellate courts is often described as “correcting legal errors” and “supervising” trial courts. But what do these labels mean in practice? This article explores the intermediate appellate process through a study of criminal appeals in a California Court of Appeal. Part I describes the characteristics and dispositions of criminal appeals. Contrary to popular impression, a conviction was reversed in only about 5 percent of these appeals. To explain the low reversal rate, part II draws upon interviews with justices of the Court of Appeal to examine the institutional norms and perspectives guiding the court's decisions. The basic decision norms described by the justices are norms of affirmance: for example, the harmless error rule and the substantial evidence rule incline the court to affirm despite certain legal errors or factual questions. Moreover, the particularistic approach the court typically takes in its decision making apparently sensitizes it to the substantive characteristics prevailing in criminal appeals: the crimes are serious and there is little doubt about factual guilt. The low reversal rate and the analysis of the court's norms suggest that intermediate appellate review of criminal convictions is narrower and more constrained than the “error correction” and “supervision” labels imply. Part III explores the implications of the case study for appellate policy.     

Dintwe v the Directorate of Public Service Management and others: when the court suppresses freedom of expression

This article examines a recent case involving freedom of expression in Botswana and tests it against the country’s constitution. It argues that the Court of Appeal in Botswana erred in the manner in which it adjudicated the case because it departed from well-established common law regarding constitutional interpretation which was laid down by the court itself. If the court had taken the established three past-test approach, it might have reached a different conclusion. In reaching its controversial decision which, we argue, undermined freedom of expression, the court failed to disclose which rights or interests it was protecting in limiting freedom of expression.     

Lawyers' Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a “Political” Institution?

Do legal elites—lawyers admitted to federal appellate bars—perceive the Supreme Court as a “political” institution? Legal elites differentiate themselves from the mass public in the amount and sources of information about the Court. They also hold near‐universal perceptions of Court legitimacy, a result we use to derive competing theoretical expectations regarding the impact of ideological disagreement on various Court perceptions. Survey data show that many legal elites perceive the Court as political in its decision making, while a minority perceive the Court as activist and influenced by external political forces. Ideological disagreement with the Court's outputs significantly elevates political perceptions of decision making, while it exhibits a null and moderate impact on perceptions of activism and external political influence, respectively. To justify negative affect derived from ideological disagreement, elites highlight the political aspects of the Court's decision making rather than engage in “global delegitimization” of the institution itself.     

A Court as the Process of Signification: Legal Semiotics of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in 1996 was a landmark case because, for the first time in history, the legal aspect of nuclear weapons was addressed. The decision has evoked controversies regarding the Court’s conclusion, the legal status of international humanitarian law in relation to nuclear weapons, and a newly introduced concept of state survival. While much legal scholarship discusses and criticizes the legal significance of the opinion, there has not been enough scholarship examining the Court’s specific choice of words and concepts that sustain its wider ideological and political position in the opinion. The paper argues that the Court’s vague and controversial logic is attributed to its confrontation with two international orders/codes: the legal order (or international law) and the political order (or state practice). The paper engages in legal semiotics as methodology to decode legal text and discover a deep structure that sustains networks of codes, according to which text is interpreted. Through the semiotic examination of three sets of key concepts (1) “permitted” and “prohibited,” (2) “threat of use” and “possession of the weapon,” and (3) “state survival,” the paper shows the ICJ’s confrontation with two orders/codes and eventual prioritization of the political order over the international legal order. The analysis of the opinion based on legal semiotics indicates an intimate and inseparable relationship between state practice and international law, which must be disentangled for the sake of the rule of law.     

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.: Supreme Court Expands Rights of Regulated Parties to Challenge Agency Decisions

This article analyzes the potential impacts of the Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. Prior to this decision, federal agency action that merely provided information could not be challenged because of the Administrative Procedure Act allowed parties to challenge only “final agency action.” The Court recognized that some actions that merely provide information can be final because they have legal consequences. To understand the extent to which the Hawkes decision expands the right to challenge agency action, the article compares the Hawkes decision with the Court's decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the Court also discussed the issue of “final agency action.” The article concludes that the Court's reasoning regarding what type of consequences make an action “final” is the key to understanding what regulatory action can now be challenged.     

Price v. Time Revisited: The Need For Medium-Neutral Shield Laws In An Age Of Strict Construction

Journalists were alarmed when, in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied shield-law protection to Don Yaeger, an investigative reporter for Sports Illustrated, in a libel suit by fired football coach Mike Price. Yaeger is a journalist, and Alabama's shield law offers absolute protection even when a journalist is a party to a case. The court's decision turned on the fact that Alabama's seventy-three-year-old statute does not include the word “magazine.” This article shows that this hole in the “covered medium” language of Alabama's statute is not uncommon among the nation's thirty-six shield laws and that the Eleventh Circuit's strict reading of the statute's text is not at odds with current trends in statutory interpretation. Those two facts, combined with the rise of the Internet as an important vehicle for journalism, suggest the time is ripe to scrutinize and modernize shield laws, some of which have been on the books for more than a century.     

Interpreting Statutory Purpose – Lessons from Yemshaw v Hounslow London Borough Council

Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC is a significant case in the fields of housing and family law, as well as giving rise to important issues as to the judicial role and statutory interpretation more broadly. This note critically analyses the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Yemshaw, in which the principal issue was whether the definition of ‘violence’ for the purposes of the Housing Act 1996 extended to non‐physical as well as physical forms of harm. In rejecting the view of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court adopted a wider definition of violence to encompass emotional and psychological as well as financial abuse. This commentary adopts a fresh stance by examining closely the context surrounding the enactment of the Housing Act 1996 and how this informs the question of statutory interpretation. In so doing, the author suggests that the interpretation employed by the court is significantly undermined.     

Mt. Laurel: Is it Based on Wishful Thinking?

“The people of New Jersey should welcome the result reached by the Court in this case, not merely because it is required by our laws, but, more fundamentally, because the result is right and true to the highest American ideals.” With these words Justice Pashman, in his concurring opinion, set forth the underlying assumption upon which the New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision to make the validity of municipal zoning dependent upon a new and complex standard. Mt. Laurel clearly establishes a new judicial standard for judging the validity of municipal zoning. However, whether that standard is likely to achieve its laudable objectives or whether its chances of success will be limited by political realities' that belie the noble ideals upon which the decision is based, remains to be seen.     

Advocacy in Constitutional Choice: The Cramer Treason Case, 1942–1945

How did advocacy at each level of the federal judiciary help shape the leading decision in American law of treason? This article, adapted from a forthcoming biography of Judge Harold R. Medina, is a case study based on Justice Department archives and the personal papers of Medina, Charles Fahy, and seven Supreme Court Justices. It analyzes the whole case, from the lawyers’standpoint, to illuminate the role of counsel in transforming a minor wartime incident into the first treason case decided on the merits by the Supreme Court and the tribunal's only decision during World War II to limit constitutional war powers. Accenting litigation strategy and the use of history in constitutional interpretation, it is a story also of the struggle by counsel on both sides of the case to uphold high professional standards amid the passions of total war.     

Response to “Ideology and Rhetoric Replace Science and Reason in Some Parental Alienation Literature and Advocacy: A Critique,” by Milchman,Geffner, and Meier

The author wrote an article, “Parental Alienation and Misinformation Proliferation,” for this Special Issue of Family Court Review, which is devoted to various aspects of parental alienation (PA). This short article is a response to the article by Milchman, Geffner, and Meier, which discussed my article and other contributions to the Special Issue. All of these articles represent an attempt by the Editors of the Special Issue to promote “dialogue” among writers who have different perspectives regarding parental alienation. In my view, this is a misguided endeavor, since the publication of cascading criminations, recriminations, and re‐recriminations simply creates confusion and consternation for the readers of Family Court Review. This new article offers an alternative approach for creating constructive dialogue among PA‐promoters and PA‐detractors, that is, convene a face‐to‐face discussion of these individuals and encourage them to write an article together in which they jointly explain their various perspectives regarding PA.     

欧洲人权法院对质询问规则的转变及启示-以“卡瓦贾诉英国案”为主线的考察

由《欧洲人权公约》第6条第3款d项之规定所形成的对质询问规则，在欧洲人权法院审理“卡瓦贾诉英国”一案之后发生了根本性的变化，即从“唯一或决定性规则”转变为了以“三步审查规则”为内容的“卡瓦贾检验标准”。导致这一变化的原因，不仅源于英国法的影响，也有欧洲人权法院对公正标准的调校以及应对案件激增的考虑。而以该案为主线的考察对我国无疑也有着积极的借鉴意义。     

From Helping Court to Community‐Based Services: The 30‐Year Evolution of Australia's Family Relationship Centres

As a centrepiece of Australia's 2006 family law reforms, the community‐based Family Relationship Centres (FRCs) represented a major development in the Government's commitment to incorporate family relationship services into its family law system. This paper sees FRCs as a logical development of the original conceptualising the Family Court of Australia as a “helping court”. The paper suggests that the aspiration to create a helping court was partially achieved in 1976 via the creation of an in‐house family court counselling service, which was primarily focused not on law and legal principles, but on supporting the ways in which family members were managing the task of redefining relationships. While generally valued by judges and others, this service nonetheless found itself in tension with the Family Court's continued primary commitment to legally informed and adversarially driven negotiation and decision‐making processes. Since 2006, the creation of FRCs has spearheaded a family law system that provides relationship‐focused interventions away from the courts as the default option for most parenting disputes. Consistent with this aim, there is evidence of a diminished percentage of cases now requiring judicial intervention. The 2006 legislation also provides for courts to conduct “less adversarial trials.” Paradoxically, this has occurred alongside unequivocal evidence from the Australian Institute of Family Studies’ evaluation data that judicial officers are dealing mainly with families displaying seriously dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours. The legal challenge in dealing with these cases is for courts to provide child focused, fair and non‐destructive internal processes. In addition, however, it is increasingly clear that to support and help facilitate their decisions, courts also need good working relationships with FRCs and other community based services. FRCs and the 2006 reforms offer the possibility of moving beyond the ideal of a “helping court” to the broader concept of helping family law system.     

Manners of Imagining the real

What counts as evidence? What is accepted as true in court given the evidence admitted? How are subordinated peoples further oppressed in courts because they cannot demonstrate that their experience is fact? Drawing on the confirmation brings for Clarence Thomas as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the testimony of Anita Hill in those hearings, the author explores the ways in which representations of sexual violence against women can be seen as not “real.”     

Trámite legal para el pago de obligaciones pecuniarias impuestas al estado colombiano en decisiones sobre derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario

This article is one of the research results of the project “Impact of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights case law on Latin American High Courts rulings. Study about Brazil, Mexico and Colombia”. The author indicates how the Colombian State was seen compelled to send off a Law in the year 1996, through which, receiving a special procedure, he is included inside his internal code the guarantee of not repetition as mechanism of application of the decisions in matter of human rights and international human law in said country.     

“全域数字法院”的构建与实现

近年来中国互联网司法发展取得了显著成效,为建设一种全新的法院样态——"全域数字法院"提供了可能。与既往的法院信息化建设不同,"全域数字法院"是一场重塑性的制度革命,它以线上线下深度融合、内网外网共享协同、有线无线互联互通为基本要求,更加注重系统集成与数字赋能,更加注重流程再造与制度重塑,更加注重全面数字化与高度智能化,运用"技术+制度"为实现更高水平的公平正义注入新效能。建设"全域数字法院",主要路径是通过"平台化建设""无纸化转型""智能化赋能"三阶段,打造全生命周期的司法平台,提供全时空在线的司法服务,构建全流域智能的司法模式,驱动司法制度的全方位变革,并最终实现司法领域从数字赋能到制度重塑的革命性变革。     

Genuine Auto Parts v EPA: How to Challenge Agency Findings of Fact

Abstract

This article discusses how to challenge decisions of fact made by administrative agencies, based on a recent federal appellate decision in which a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency was overturned. In Genuine Auto Parts v EPA, the court concluded that the agency’s failure to address an important element of the matter made its decision “arbitrary and capricious” and “not supported by substantial evidence.” The article discusses the relationship between “arbitrary and capricious” and “not supported by substantial evidence” as independent grounds for overturning an agency decision and concludes that both require a challenge to the decision-making process, not a challenge to the substance of the agency decision and the both require a rational process so that an agency failure to articulate a reason for its decision can be grounds for reversal.     

MUDDLING THROUGH THE MURKY WATERS OF TROXEL

A critical case in the area of third-party visitation rights was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in July 2000 ( Troxel v. Granville ). A plurality in this case held that a Washington grandparent visitation statute was not facially unconstitutional but was as applied to the facts of that case. The author discusses the varying opinions of the Supreme Court justices in the Troxel decision. Next, he analyzes the plurality opinion to determine the appropriate standard of review in grandparent visitation cases. Following is a consideration of how the decision will affect other state grandparent visitation legislation. Examining these issues, the author concludes that future third-party visitation cases will be decided on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.     

外国船员工资索赔:诉讼和仲裁之间的选择——评美国联邦第九巡回法庭the“Rogers v.Royal Caribbean Cruise Line”案

简要介绍美国联邦上诉法院第九巡回法庭the"Rogers v.Royal Caribbean Cruise Line"案的案情,回顾美国国会对船员在法院诉讼追偿工资的法定保护和支持执行《纽约公约》下仲裁的两个政策的历史背景以及法庭判案所遵循的先例,按照对案件争议点的审理思路,逐一分析法庭对船员雇佣合同中仲裁协议是否被美国《联邦仲裁法》排除条款排除、《公约法案》和《联邦仲裁法》发生冲突时的优先适用、仲裁协议是否合理以及仲裁条款是否符合公共利益的推理过程,论证法院判决的合理性,提出与判决相反的可能性解释,从而得出结论:出于权衡国会相互冲突的政策的目的,法院判决强制执行仲裁。最后,提出该案例对中国船员立法的借鉴意义。