可怕的“羡腐心态”

当前,社会上存在一种“羡腐心态”,所谓“羡腐心态”,就是从心眼里,在思想感情上不是“痛恨腐败”,而是“羡慕腐败”,即对腐败发自内心的认同、嫉妒、羡慕和期待。其表现形式多种多样,形形色色:认为当官发财理所当然,贪污受贿心安理得,视能捞会贪为“有能力”,把清正廉洁的干部当成“没本事”、“假正经”;崇拜当官者、崇拜有权者、崇拜以权谋私者,看别人吃香喝辣流三尺长的涎水,“你看人家多风光、多气派,不枉来世一场”;认为有权不用,过期作废,“过了这个村,没有这个店”,“不捞白不捞,捞了也白捞”;认为别人贪自己不贪太吃亏,有一种从众…     

“三不腐”机制在规范高校权力运行中的思考

"不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐的防范机制、不想腐的保障机制"是党中央推进党风廉政建设和反腐败工作的重要举措,是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重要内容。将"三不腐"机制运用到高校权力运行的监督制约中,是有效遏制"象牙塔"腐败和消极腐败的治本之策。     

一体推进“不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐”的理论思考

将一体推进"不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐"作为反腐败斗争的基本方针和全面从严治党的重要方略,这是习近平总书记关于新时代深入开展反腐败斗争的重要思想。坚持一体推进"三不腐"具有重要时代意义,它是对反腐败历史经验的重要总结、对反腐败思想理论的高度提炼、对反腐败现实情况的深刻把握、对国际反腐经验的有益借鉴。贯彻落实这一方针的基本要求包括:加强一体推进"三不腐"的统一领导、贯通运用监督执纪的"四种形态"、提升一体推进"三不腐"的工作效能及其融合协同。要构建一体推进"三不腐"的体制机制,必须健全党和国家的监督体系、完善权力配置和运行制约机制、优化纪检监察监督机制、建立"三不腐"融合的具体制度。     

实现不敢腐:标准、差距与对策

党的十九大首度设定"夺取反腐败斗争压倒性胜利"的战略目标,实现不敢腐是关键的第一步。不敢腐意味着针对腐败行为的惩治行动能够发挥出充分的威慑效应。实现不敢腐需要具备四个方面的条件或标准,即:反腐败的法律和纪律科学完备、反腐败机构执行得力、惩治腐败行动能够遏增量和去存量、惩治腐败的行动特别是结果能够实现透明和公开。对照这些标准,我们还存在或大或小的差距,主要体现在两个方面,即:反腐败机构及其体制还未改革到位、化解腐败存量依然面临巨大挑战。要实现不敢腐,就必须着力补足这两个短板,尽快将反腐败机构改革到位,以有效的策略快速去除腐败存量,同时加强廉政教育也不可或缺。     

“有案必查、有腐必惩”如何可能——以纪检监察机关立案制度改革为视角

坚持"有案必查、有腐必惩"是新一届中央纪委提出的庄严承诺,表明了党和国家刹风整纪、遏制腐败、推进廉洁政治建设的坚强决心。当前纪检监察机关选择性立案现象比较突出,无法形成"不敢腐、不能腐、不易腐"的长效机制。因此,要对现行纪检监察机关立案制度进行改革和完善,使立案程序简化与去独立化;以立案登记制度代替现行的立案审批制度,限制和规范审批权的行使;建立健全案件线索管理和立案监督制约机制,提高案源质量,防止案源流失。     

新时代如何增强不想腐的自觉:十八大以来的基本经验

"增强不想腐的自觉",是新时代中国共产党党建工作的重要任务。十八大以来的基本经验告诉我们,应注重发挥教育、制度、惩处、监督等手段的整体合力,采取标本兼治、多管齐下防治腐败策略,以推动党员、干部尽早向不想腐目标迈进。具体而言:通过开展系列思想政治教育活动,旨在提升党员干部的觉悟程度,增强不想腐的自觉;通过不断完善反腐败党内法规制度体系,并不断加强现有党内法规制度的执行力,大幅度减少腐败机会以遏制腐败动机,推动不能腐向不想腐转变;通过保持高压惩治腐败态势,提升腐败综合成本以压制腐败动机,促使不敢腐向不想腐转变;通过构建廉洁政治生态,营造风清气正的从政环境,为实现不想腐目标提供良好的环境支撑。     

新时代一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐的理论思考

新时代一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐,是基于长期反腐败斗争正反两方面经验的深刻总结,是协调推进"四个全面"战略布局的客观要求,是夺取和巩固反腐败斗争压倒性胜利的行动遵循。当前,正确理解一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐的逻辑基础、内在关联、本质要义和正向效应,有助于明确新时代反腐败斗争的新策略。在一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐的实现路径上,要重在凝聚思想共识、构建三维机制、夯实政治基础。     

警惕“腐败文化”

山东临沂市委党校李抒望:当前我国反腐败斗争存在的一个突出难题在于,反腐倡廉的文化资源短缺,腐败在很大程度上得到一种文化上的支持,渗透于一些人的日常行为模式之中。其中集团性腐败、体制内腐败和人们的羡腐心理,都是这种“腐     

"三不腐"机制中的社会关系嵌入研究

社会关系嵌入于"三不腐"机制各个环节运行过程中,对"三不腐"机制功能的发挥具有重要影响。基于嵌入性理论框架审视,社会关系通过角色认知、协同保障制度和廉洁文化等三个方面嵌入于"三不腐"机制运行过程中。在社会关系嵌入的背景下,"三不腐"机制因角色转化机制降低腐败成本、协同保障制度漏洞降低信任水平和内外部文化因素提供腐败动机生存空间而面临功能困境。以社会关系模式优化为导向,从以重构"利益—情感"共同体明确角色认知、以协同保障制度建设推进多元合作、以精神趋同消除腐败动机等三个方面构建治理进路。     

高校基建腐败案件实证分析与对策建议

高校基建腐败是高校腐败的重灾区,高校腐败案件的研究是高校发展的重要课题。新世纪以来我国高校基建腐败具有群体案件多、作案时间长、腐败形式多样等特征。通过实证分析高校基建腐败的原因主要有:个人理想信念缺失,法制意识淡漠;法律实施不力,惩戒机制不健全;政治生态净化迫在眉睫等。预防高校基建腐败案件的发生需要加强教育和培养,形成"不想腐"的价值体系;强化制度建设,构建"不能腐"和"不敢腐"的法治体系;优化政治生态环境,塑造"不易腐"的文化体系。     

从文化视角看腐败成因与廉政建设

廉政文化与腐败文化是相比较而存在,相斗争而发展的.中国的腐败文化,是多因一果.建设廉政文化,要按其路径指引,从加大反腐倡廉的宣传教育,提高改革的协同性,推进政治改革,加强廉政制度建设,强化实践的监督与惩处力度等方面努力.     

Corruption and Rent-Seeking

The rent-seeking theory was one of thefirst economic instruments developed tomodel corruption in the public sector.Comparing corruption with lobbying, itproposes that the former is the lesser oftwo evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources inthe competition forpreferential treatment. This study showsthat the traditional rent-seeking theorymisunderstands three factors: first, theimpact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent'ssize; second, corruption as a motivationfor supplying preferential treatment andthird; that corruption involves a narrowerrange of interests than those ofcompetitive lobbying. Taking these factorsinto consideration, the opposite argumentis valid: corruption has worse welfareimplications than alternative rent-seekingactivities.     

Tackling Corruption at its Source: The National Corruption Prevention Bureau

In Spring 2007 as part of its ongoing anticorruption efforts, the PRC announced the establishment of a new organization called the “National Corruption Prevention Bureau” (NCPB). The article first examines the origins of the NCPB and its position in the current Chinese anticorruption regime. The NCPB will concentrate primarily on information collection and coordination work. Given these goals, This article examines the organization’s potential for improving work in three areas related to information collection and coordination; increased oversight of the private sector, improving information quality and dissemination, and strengthening routine anticorruption activities. The final section examines potential problems that will likely limit the ability of this new organization to improve anticorruption work, such as the possibility of increasing complexity within the anticorruption system, and the NCPB’s limited independence from the agencies it seeks to coordinate.

Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians—as well as to create incentives for performance—declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.     

医疗腐败的成因与治理

医疗卫生系统的腐败是社会各界最关注的一种腐败。它的产生有着复杂的政治、经济、社会和文化因素,还有人们的心理活动、价值取向、文化观念等因素。治理医疗腐败要采取综合治理,从加强对医院领导干部和重要岗位人员的职业道德、反腐倡廉教育入手,以建立健全管理制度、奖励和惩罚制度、考核制度及药品招标采购的相关制度为重点,发挥党内监督和群众监督的作用,建立医院反腐倡廉的监督体系。以落实领导干部述职述廉、院务公开、＂三重一大＂制度为抓手,从长远考虑,从解决具体问题做起,逐步构建医疗腐败的惩防体系。     

Corruption and support for decentralisation

Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national-level corruption decreases satisfaction with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly, information on regional-level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey experiment in Spain and confirm its cross-national generalisability with data from the European Values Study.