Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015

There are many myths about referendums. The most common one is that voters are inherently sceptical and tend to vote no when given the opportunity. This article analyses some of the commonly held ‘truths’ about referendums on EU matters. Based on a statistical analysis of all forty‐three EU‐related referendums since 1972, it shows that governments tend to lose referendums if they have been in office for a long time, that emotive words on the ballot paper are correlated with a high yes vote and that a high turnout is correlated with a vote against European integration, but campaign spending is inconsequential. Based solely on statistical evidence from the previous forty‐three referendums, the opponents of EU membership will win the Brexit referendum.     

The Democratic Duty to Oppose Brexit

What should be the position of democrats in response to the Brexit referendum? Many urge a duty to accept the result. This article argues the contrary. If someone is a UK citizen, has a belief that leaving the European Union will be damaging to the common good of the UK and is a convinced democrat, then that person has a duty to oppose Brexit. Neither of the two principal reasons for accepting the result—a claim of popular sovereignty or of parliamentary sovereignty—imply a duty not to continue to oppose. Arguments from political equality for simple majority rule do not apply when the alternatives are ill defined. More generally, popular sovereignty presupposes and does not replace constitutional democracy, and in a parliamentary democracy there is always a continuing right to oppose.     

UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum

This article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the ‘Leave’ campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters.     

Brexit and the British Constitution: Reflections on the Last Three years and the Next Fifty

The decision to leave the EU provoked the biggest constitutional crisis of recent British history. The referendum—a device for circumventing the parliamentary process—was followed by conflict between a minority government and a majority of MPs unwilling to leave the EU without satisfactory alternative arrangements. The courts, drawn into this conflict, upheld conventions that sustain the authority of Parliament and restrain the despotic power of ministers. The reaction of members of the current government was to take disreputable and anti-democratic positions against both the Speaker of the House of Commons and the courts. They now have a sufficient majority in Parliament to resume adherence to constitutional conventions and restore a political culture of debate and tolerance, but they show little sign of doing so, and there is a risk that they will do irreparable damage to the political culture that underpins democracy.     

England,Englishness and Brexit

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of ‘national’ attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote ‘Leave’, while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for ‘Remain’. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an ‘archaeological’ approach to a limited evidence‐base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break‐up of Britain.     

This Time it's Different: Legitimacy and the Limits of Differentiation after Brexit

British political debate since the EU referendum has hinged on what type of Brexit to pursue: hard or soft. Yet, unlike in instances of treaty rejection, the EU made no counter offer to avoid a breakdown in relations that would follow the hardest of exits. This remarkable unity in not discounting the possibility of a hard Brexit demonstrates that UK withdrawal is very distinct from previous wrangles over EU reform. Drawing on the work of Kissinger, this article argues Brexit is a revolutionary act that denies the legitimacy of the EU order. Hence this process does not conform to other episodes of differentiation. When Westminster sought opt‐outs, it did not reject the core principles of integration. By not seeking to oppose a hard Brexit, Brussels has forced the UK government to find a new legitimising principle to govern EU–UK relations, transferring the burden of adjustment to London.     

Constitutional Illegitimacy over Brexit

Members and supporters of the British government say that the only constitutionally legitimate course of action over Brexit after the referendum is to press ahead with withdrawal from the European Union, even if that would entail the complete severance of all ties (which we normally call ‘hard Brexit’). A more sophisticated view of the constitution, however, shows that these more or less populist arguments are false. As the Supreme Court confirmed in the recent Gina Miller judgment, the constitution did not change with the June referendum. Parliament is still supreme and determines both ordinary legislation and constitutional change. In fact, if one examines closely the claim that the referendum entails hard Brexit, it becomes obvious that this claim is false as well. The referendum opened the door for one among four different possibilities. Which Brexit option—if any—the United Kingdom should take is a matter for Parliament now to decide, following the normal processes of democratic deliberation and representation.     

How Do We Write the History of Brexit?

The vote to leave the European Union in 2016 and the political crisis that followed offer obvious subjects for the political historian. Yet, the study of Brexit raises serious challenges for academic writing, concerning method, the political preferences of the historian and the implication of history as a discipline in the European debate. This article explores some of the dilemmas and opportunities confronting the historian of Brexit, focussing, in particular, on the challenges to be addressed, the utility of conventional political methods and the insights that might be drawn from allied fields. It argues for a greater emphasis on the imaginative resources on which the different campaigns could draw, urging greater attention to conventional wisdoms, languages of class, collective memory and the forging of cultural or exceptionalist identities.     

The Political Limitations of Evidence: A Critique of the Electoral Reform Society's It's Good To Talk

The Electoral Reform Society has called for more and better quality information to improve democratic debate in relation to referendums. This article argues that, particularly in relation to the European Union referendum, this would have had a marginal impact, because much of the debate was not reducible to facts and emotional and dispositional factors were of particular significance in the campaign.     

Do We Want a Referendum on the Common Market?

In March 1975 Britain quarrelled about whether to hold a referendum on membership of the European Community. The Hansard Society organised an important debate about it between Enoch Powell, Geoffrey Howe, John Mackintosh and Keith Kyle. This is a report on that event drawn from a recently discovered recording. Many of the arguments deployed then are being repeated in today's debate about a ‘people's vote'—including the long‐term effects on the UK's constitution of having recourse to the referendum device.     

Migration,Internal Security and the UK's EU Membership

A key part of the debate about the UK's membership of the EU is concern about levels of migration and the impact upon security. This paper assesses how much impact EU membership has on each of these issues, and examines the likely impact of leaving the EU in each of these areas.     

What does Brexit Mean for the UK's Climate Change Act?

This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.     

Referendum Policies across Political Systems

This article compares the use of referendums across political regimes over time in Europe. It does so on the basis of a new typology that differentiates between policy domains and degrees of abstraction. The analysis shows different patterns in referendum use between authoritarian regimes, countries in transition and democracies. In addition to the variation in policy domains, the findings indicate different institutional features within the polity types: the process of initiation, the turnout in referendums and the rate of approval. The empirical evidence draws on an original dataset of 620 referendums organised at national level in Europe between 1793 and 2017.     

Housing and populism

Abstract

The recent success of populist candidates in the UK and Continental Europe has sparked a major debate between those who view populism as a reaction of the economically ‘left behind’ and those who view it as a cultural ‘backlash’ by groups with declining social status, pointing to stark divisions between urban and rural areas, core and periphery. This paper bridges the economic and values-based approaches to populism by arguing that the geography of wealth inequality offers a convincing explanation for the pattern of populist vote share. Drawing on fine-grained house price data in the UK and France, it is shown that the pattern of house prices ? even within small districts ? plays a major part in shaping support for Brexit and Marine Le Pen. The findings illustrate how longstanding variation in local wealth shapes the geography of discontent and drives populist appeal. Populism, the article concludes, is primarily a politics of place, and place is a product, in part, of the housing market.     

How to Win the UK Referendum on the European Constitution

Opinion polls suggest the UK Government faces an uphill task in winning the forthcoming referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. This article provides a detailed analysis of the factors that are likely to decide the referendum outcome. Using recent survey data, we analyze the factors that influence individual-level support for the Constitutional Treaty. These results show that it is not only general attitudes towards European integration which are likely to play an important role, but also partisanship and satisfaction with the government. Given the low levels of information about the Constitution and the large number of undecided voters, the campaign itself will be crucial to the outcome. We argue that while information alone will not necessarily persuade voters, a successful campaign strategy by the yes-camp could make a decisive difference by motivating and informing voters, as well as setting the agenda for the debate.     

Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum

As Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.     

What is the Norway Model? Mode of Affiliation or Political Compromise?

Brexit is a high‐stakes political process, but there is still no clear understanding of the political factors that underpin the various affiliation modes that the UK is currently debating. These are treated as quite static constructs, with emphasis on legal detail not the political and societal conditions that make them operate. What does the inclusion of the UK in the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement—which is the core component of the Norway model—do to that arrangement, itself a domestic Norwegian compromise? Will the arrangement continue to function, or will the UK's presence fundamentally alter or even abrogate the arrangement? This article spells out the specific political presuppositions that the Norway model rests on, and notes that the UK cannot emulate these. In addition, it argues that the more closely attached to the EEA agreement the UK is, the more precarious the arrangement will be.     

Not Big Brand Names but Corner Shops

ABSTRACT

Does New Labour's model of a centrally orchestrated and national-centric political communication strategy effectively engage the electorate? Drawing on interviews with those active in politics “on the ground,” this paper argues that the centralised party model has become unpopular. Furthermore, as these activists tell us, the model is also causing the electorate to reject the democratic process and become apathetic about the political system. Many in Britain, therefore, look to a more locally focussed model, one that has proved successful for the Liberal Democrat party. This model allows communication to be managed at the local level and for the candidate to interact with the local context. An effectively marketed, locally contextualised strategy allows politics to connect with the electorate and, we would suggest, will become more widespread with the realisation that top-down politics does not engage with voters.     

Beyond for or against? Multi-option alternatives to a corrective referendum

Referendums commonly offer a binary choice between supporting and rejecting proposed legislation. Binary designs benefit from simplicity and guarantee a majority result, but also provoke voting biases and interpretation challenges. Referendum designs offering multiple policy alternatives provide a different approach which could alleviate binary referendum challenges whilst maintaining the aggregative benefits. Offering more than two options, however, raises new challenges in designing the referendum process and obtaining majority results. This article uses survey data collected on a corrective referendum held in the Netherlands in 2018 to compare the challenges faced by binary and multi-option referendum designs respectively. The analysis demonstrates how the multi-option design empowers voters in expressing their preferences and delivers more detailed and constructive referendum results. Building on the survey data, the article subsequently discusses the challenges of extending choice and concludes that alternative voting methods can mitigate some of these challenges.     

Brexit,the Belfast Agreement and Northern Ireland: Imperilling a Fragile Political Bargain

The major impact of the Belfast Agreement was to engineer a peaceful coexistence between nationalism and unionism that involved each bloc recognising it had sufficient power to thwart the political ambitions of the other side, but not enough to push through its own agenda. This paper argues that Brexit seriously damages this peaceful coexistence and could trigger what is termed an Ulster war of attrition in which Northern Ireland becomes entrapped in a political stalemate where each side strives to triumph without having sufficient power to do so. It also argues that to restore internal political stability in Northern Ireland, and to indemnify against the risk of disorderly relationships between the British and Irish governments in the future, the strategic importance of Strand 3 of the Belfast Agreement requires strengthening.