Operation Lal Dora: India's Aborted Military Intervention in Mauritius

Abstract

As India expands its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, it will need friends that it can count on. The island state of Mauritius has long been one of India's closest allies in the region. This article discusses India's plans for a military intervention in Mauritius in 1983 to prevent a feared coup that may have threatened India's interests. A naval task force was readied, but the intervention did not proceed because of disagreements in India's leadership. Instead New Delhi facilitated a political solution to the crisis that firmly consolidated its special role. This previously undisclosed episode sheds light on India's thinking about the Indian Ocean, the alignment of India's interests with the United States, and India's military capabilities.     

ASIAN WAR MACHINES

ABSTRACT

The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India–Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.–India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.     

An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is now 28 years old, yet its success is nominal. That more important bilateral issues are discussed on the sidelines of SAARC Summits proves the point. Intra-regional trade is still miniscule compared to the region's overall share in the world trade. The biggest defaulter is India, the most prominent member of the group. The purpose of this paper is first to raise the question whether South Asia qualifies to be called a region, and second to argue that, given the problems it faces with most of its neighbours, India is forced to conclude that SAARC matters the least for it. For economic and strategic reasons, India's interests lie in global networking and in a balanced relationship with China. Since Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic presence in South Asia poaches into India's perceived sphere of influence, India's interest in SAARC is limited to that context for otherwise it neither provides large markets for India nor does it contribute to India's strategic policy. Inversely, such a situation justifies India's neighbours playing the China card to bargain with India though that card its losing its value. To buttress our arguments we have drawn from the region's historical experiences as well as from recent developments in international and South Asian politics, including domestic politics.     

India's “Look East” Policy

A combination of economic, strategic, and domestic considerations has led India to pay greater attention to its eastern neighbours since the 1990s. India's steadily growing ties with East and Southeast Asian countries have become an increasingly important element of India's foreign policy. India is working with these countries bilaterally as well as through regional frameworks like the EAS, ASEM, and ASEAN, and sub-regional organizations like BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. The main driver remains economic, and India has many ongoing and planned FTAs with the countries of this region. Of late, defence and security ties too have grown. However, India's relations with China remain tense and troubled, with persisting differences over the border, Tibet, and China's patronage of India's South Asian neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Asia's major players will have to overcome internal rivalries and consciously evolve a cooperative paradigm for Asian security and cooperation to enable Asia to play a leading global role.     

India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 ¹See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.     

India and Australia: Security Dynamics in the Asia Pacific

India and Australia are rediscovering the vast potentials of maximizing mutual benefits that are inherent in their complementary economies. There is also a great deal of convergence of interests in the strategic domain. As an emerging power, India's profile has attracted attention by countries in the Asia Pacific region, which tended to neglect it in the past. The rise of China and its assertive stances have created an element of uneasiness in the region. Its military modernization and beefing up of naval capability are suspected to be behind enhancing its power projection capability.

The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean for the region is huge. The region's growth is inextricably linked to the Indian Ocean. The littoral states in the region are home to 2.6 billion people, almost 40% of the world's population. The Indian Ocean is the world's third largest body of water, and the world's leading energy and trade seaway. The volume of global trade brings with it the re-emerging problems of terrorism and piracy, a shared policing challenge for all littoral states. The security of the Indian Ocean goes to the heart of both India's and Australia's national interests.     

China Crisis? Indian Strategy,Political Realism,and the Chinese Challenge

Abstract

China's rise has provoked a substantial debate about its possible consequences for Indian security and its implications for Indian strategy. This review essay examines the parameters of this debate, concentrating especially on the rise of a new American-derived political realism in Indian thinking about China. It argues that in urging India to abandon its longstanding posture of strategic restraint, the new realists overestimate India's political military capabilities and run the risk for driving India toward a costly and dangerous confrontation with China.     

The Iraq treaty, 1930

India's relations with the Gulf countries started to flourish in the 1990s after India succeeded in de-hyphenating Pakistan from its policy toward the Gulf. Though Pakistan remained a factor as it continued to raise Kashmir and internal situation in India at multilateral forums such as OIC to evoke anti-India sentiments, it did not remain an underlying factor in as was the case during the Cold War era. In the contemporary dynamics, when India-Gulf relations are progressing toward strategic partnerships, Pakistan has re-emerged as a factor but its nature has changed. As highlighted in the joint statements issued during the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to the Gulf countries since May 2014, India can now put pressure on Pakistan by highlighting its policy of sponsoring terrorism. This was evident when the Arab Gulf countries condemned the Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) terrorist attacks. India's relations with the Arab Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries are independent of their engagements with Pakistan and India-Pakistan tension, but New Delhi has stepped up efforts to raise the issue of cross-border terrorism and use of religion to incite terror activities against India during its engagements with these countries. It underlines the growing convergence between India and Arab Gulf countries over regional issues and the ability of India to isolate Pakistan over issues related to terrorism.     

Land without shade

In the wake of the BJP's crushing defeat of Congress in the national elections held in May 2014 the author assesses India's prospects and potential in the light of the oft-made comparison with China. India is famously diverse, the largest democracy in the world, with a relatively young population. India is secular, in the sense that state and religion are not linked, but at the same time India is a deeply spiritual society, diversely religious. In all these areas China's experience is wholly different, but not necessarily better, though in purely economic terms China is far ahead of India and Indian underperformance. Nonetheless, India is likely to be just as central to global issues like climate change, the digital revolution, public health and migration. In addition, managing all aspects of the relationship with Pakistan will be one of the key issues for 21^st century security. In all this, while poverty, caste and appalling governance will hold India back, diversity, tolerance and an entrepreneurial culture should help her forward.     

The Implications of Taiwan's Declining Defense

Taiwan's declining defense capability has increasingly tilted the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait towards China. While the current status quo suits Taiwan's domestic political realities and postpones the Taiwan question to the future, its declining defense capabilities vis-à-vis China hold important implications for Taiwan. They include the reduction of its political bargaining power with China, the undermining of stability in the Taiwan Strait as China increasingly has a viable military option, and ultimately decreases the probability that the status quo can be maintained. Left unattended, Taiwan's declining defense capabilities narrow Taiwan's options and could lead to unpalatable outcomes, including sudden crisis and conflict, and the ultimate resolution of the Taiwan problem on China's terms.     

Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia

This article outlines the growing importance of India's relations with the Central Asian region. In particular, it explores security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the relationship. Important considerations for India in dealing with Central Asia include terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, energy security, and new export markets. Of equal gravity, however, is the nature of great power competition in the heart of Asia. The argument presented here is that India's relations with Central Asia are calculated to gain strategic depth in the region. However, relationships with Pakistan, the United States, and the Asian great powers tend to constrain these ambitions. The future direction of India's strategic relationships with Central Asia remains fluid.     

The nuclear option in India's security policy

Notwithstanding its good international citizenship on arms control, its low defense expenditures, and its democratic institutions that are largely taken for granted by the West, India's ambiguous nuclear posture is a self‐inflicted wound that will not heal so long as it neither acquires nor renounces nuclear weapons, says Ramesh Thakur. He argues that India has four options: to become an overt NWS, to reject the NPT but sign the CTBT, to renounce the nuclear option, or to maintain its present threshold status while keeping open the nuclear option. Thakur was head of the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University and has been appointed as vice rector at the United Nations University, Tokyo.     

India's “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions

This article considers how India sees the Indian Ocean, and in particular its drive to make the Indian Ocean, “India's Ocean.” Various comparisons and links are made. Firstly there is the role and application of Mahanian tenets of “sea-power,” in particular naval projection, control of sea-routes and access to bases. Second is the contrast between the earlier maritime visions of Kavalam Panikkar (1945) and Keshav Vaidya (1949) and the continental mindset evident under Nehru and his successors which saw neglect of India's maritime power. Third is the strategic vision evident since 1998 with the BJP government and maintained by the Congress administration since 2004. This has underpinned India's Naval Chief of Staff Arun Prakash's current eloquence on the possibilities opening up for India in and around the Indian Ocean. Questions of intent (strategic doctrine) and the application of “state power” (spending, bases, ships and equipment, geographical reach) are woven together.     

WHO OWNS INDIA’S HISTORY? A CRITIQUE OF SHASHI THAROOR’S INGLORIOUS EMPIRE

The historiography of Britain's colonial past has always been problematic, shaped by conflicting mythologies about Britain's role as benefactor or exploiter. In the wake of Indian independence in 1947 it was in the interests of India's national identity to present what had gone before as a period of unmitigated oppression challenged by a united people. The consequence was widespread ignorance about the realities of British rule and of the Indian economy prior to and after British rule, exemplified by a current best-seller written by a well-known Indian political figure, Dr Shashi Tharoor, whose main arguments are examined; in particular, his central claim that India was a wealthy nation prior to Britain's colonial intervention reduced to poverty by Britain's ‘depredations’.     

INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY AND THE ‘SINO-INDIAN GREAT GAME’

Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.

The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptions of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.     

Assessing India's Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns

Abstract

This article attempts to locate and assess the sources of India's land warfare doctrines and capabilities. It begins by briefly examining the Indian army's significant combat experience in dealing with the external and internal security threats during the past six decades. The first section analyzes the security challenges and threats that presently drive the evolution of India's land war–fighting doctrines and capabilities. The next section explains the military imperatives that are driving this doctrinal change. In the next section, the current status of India's land war–fighting capabilities is discussed. The subsequent section examines the institutional limitations that inhibit organizational change, and the final section highlights how these doctrinal and capability gaps might be addressed in the future.     

Review: India's political economy

Abstract

Though this is an extremely important study from one of the most perceptive of U.S. scholars of India, it is not, despite its title, a study of India's “political economy.” That would require a much fuller analysis of Indian relations of production and their contradictions-including those of class, caste, gender, and nationality—within the framework of the world capitalist system. Instead, it is basically a detailed analysis of Indian government economic policy since independence, with a discussion of economic dilemmas and rural class-caste contradictions as a backdrop.     

India’s Surgical Strikes: Response to Strategic Imperatives

ABSTRACT

In September 2016, militants who were allegedly backed by Pakistan attacked an Indian Army camp in Uri. The government in New Delhi was facing important regional elections. It faced intense public pressure to muster a military response. Such a response, however, ran the risk of triggering a nuclear exchange. Ten days after the Uri attack, India reported that it had carried out ‘surgical strikes’ on terrorist training camps in Pakistan-controlled territory. The paper examines this specific episode in India–Pakistan deterrence dynamics, focusing on the nomenclature ‘surgical strikes’. The paper argues that the choice of the term itself is new and worthy of investigation. Using qualitative content analysis of the official announcement of the operation, it identifies specific rhetorical moves by the Indian government that framed the response as a surgical strike. The paper also considers other statements in the media by high-ranking political and military leaders regarding the strikes, and the reception of these statements by the Indian audience, by Pakistan, and by the international community. The concluding section sounds a note of caution about future iterations of so-called surgical strikes. While the term ‘surgical strike’ can be useful in some circumstances, it produces destabilising outcomes in others.     

TAIWAN'S GROWING SECURITY VULNERABILITY: FROM CHEN SHUI-BIAN TO MA YING-JIU

Taiwan-China relations have experienced a remarkable détente since KMT candidate and cross-strait moderate Ma Ying-Jiu was elected president on Formosa in 2008. Yet despite the rapprochement and its concomitant reduction of military tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the island's security position vis-à-vis China has been in steady decline since the early 2000s. Ma's expectation that closer economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing will result in greater international space for Taiwan have so far not yet been realised. On the contrary, deeper connections with the mainland seem to but accelerate the growth of Taiwan's security vulnerability.