"金三角"毒情发展现状及我国对策

进入21世纪,全球毒品问题继续泛滥,并呈现出显著的特点,即在海洛因、可卡因贩运和滥用持续增长的同时,出现了冰毒等苯丙胺类兴奋剂毒品在全球流行的强劲势头.据2001年联合国禁毒署最新报告,毒品贩运涉及到170个国家和地区,134个国家和地区出现了毒品消费问题.全世界有1.8亿吸毒者,其中1.44亿吸食大麻,2900万吸食苯丙胺类兴奋剂,1400万吸食可卡因,900万吸食海洛因,450万吸食鸦片.与此相关,毗邻我国的世界最大毒源地之一--东南亚"金三角",毒情也出现了新的发展变化,对我国的危害日益加剧.     

缅甸"金三角"的人文地理与毒品贸易

60年代至70年代,罗星汉和罗星民两兄弟是"金三角"最大的毒枭.80年代冒出了一个臭名远扬的坤沙,取代罗星汉,成为"金三角"的头号大毒枭.90年代正当坤沙的势力日渐式微的时候,又冒出了更多年富力强、神通广大的新毒枭.新的海洛因王国还伴随着前几年缅甸国内发生的两起重大政治事件而兴旺发达起来.自1989年缅共发生内讧导致该地区的内战结束后,原缅共的指挥官和干部获准在缅甸北部地区自由行动.这种自由行动同政府允许他们自由操业的政策结合在一起,使该地区发生了一个明显的变化,那就是毒品加工从比较简单的生鸦片生产工序发展到建立先进的海洛因提炼厂.     

"金三角"禁毒背后的中美泰缅四边关系

早春是罂粟花开的时节.当金三角的罂粟花盛开的时候,小小的金三角却在中南半岛激起了一个不大不小的政治漩涡.为了安抚当地少数民族、巩固边境,缅甸在禁毒中一直采取极为谨慎的姿态;泰国深受缅甸毒品之害,与缅甸还存在领土纠纷,在反毒过程中不得不权衡自己的得失;美国当然重视禁毒,不过对于美国而言,让缅甸现政府倒台或许更重要;中国积极帮助缅甸禁毒,但对于影响边境安宁的迹象却也不得不加以警觉.     

“金三角”毒品形势的新变化

90年代以来,我国境外“金三角”地区的毒品形势发生了重大变化,以1996年1月坤沙集团向缅政府投降为标志,传统的三大贩毒集团均已先后瓦解或退居次要地位,一些新崛起的毒品犯罪集团成为制毒贩毒活动的主角,而且其活动规模更大,对我国的影响更深。近年来,境外各毒品犯罪集团间的分化组合、此消彼长趋势愈演愈烈,加大了有关国家和国际组织禁毒工作的难度。基于此,本文拟对“金三角”毒品形势的新变化作一简要分析,以利于有关部门正确决策,有效打击境内外各种毒品犯罪组织。一、九十年代云南境外毒品形势的发展变化我国的毒品问题是在80年代初出…     

泰国的禁毒运动

制毒、贩毒和吸毒是当今世界最大的公害之一。它跟艾滋病、恐怖主义一样,是人类的大敌。目前全世界毒品的种植、生产和消费仍呈蔓延和发展的趋势,毒品问题已成为全球性的问题,几乎没有一个国家能幸免于难。地处世界著名毒源“金三角”的泰国,更是在劫难逃,长期受到毒品的危害和困扰,可以说,毒品已成为泰国国家安全与稳定的主要威胁之一。他信政府自2001年2月上台执政以来,把禁毒作为与脱贫、治贪并列的三大施政目标之一。他信认为,毒品是泰国当前的大敌,防毒反毒是政府的当务之急,提出了向“毒品宣战”的口号。近三年,由于措施得力,行动果断,所以扫毒工作战果累累。泰国政府禁毒的成功将不仅造福于全体泰国人民,也将为整个亚洲乃至全世界的禁毒斗争做出历史性贡献。     

越南毒品问题的特点与发展趋势

当前越南毒品问题的主要特点是毒品来源和流向多元化、国际化,毒品类型多样化、精制化,吸毒群体扩大化、年轻化.近年来越南政府采取一系列措施加大了禁毒力度,取得了一定成效,但毒品形势仍十分严峻,并将对我国产生不容忽视的影响.加强中越禁毒合作势在必行.     

缅甸禁毒近况

缅甸现在正面临着控制毒品滥用,避免毒品在缅甸泛滥的紧迫任务。为此,缅甸政府制定了收入替代计划,包括进行作物替代和牲畜饲养,以改变缅甸农民种植罂粟、大麻等不良习惯。此外,还采取有效的法律措施对毒品吸食者进行戒断和治疗,力求减少毒品的吸食,并为提供良好的社会环境创造条件。     

印度"东进"的战略逻辑及其变迁

印度"东进"是一个战略系统,其要素由南亚地区战略、 从"向东看"到"向东行动"、"印太战略"等构成.南亚地区战略构成了印度"东进"的基础,从"向东看"到"向东行动"体现了印度在"东进"上的心态与行为变化,"印太战略"则更加明确了印度"东进"的战略形态与内容.印度"东进"的战略逻辑由一般性战略逻辑和特殊性战略逻辑构成,这两种逻辑的根本目的都是服务于印度成为世界大国的目标.在它们的共同推动下,印度"东进"的战略逻辑发生了显著变迁,呈现出从普遍排他性到特定排他性、从经济为主到安全建构、从非结盟到结盟行为体、从地区权力到全球权力等方面的变化.印度"东进"对中国的影响显而易见,其逻辑决定了中印关系的互信程度将长期保持很低,甚至是赤字的水平,在地缘政治安全方面也给中国造成一定的压力.     

韩国海关的反毒品走私斗争

1990年8月，韩国海关获得了缉查毒品、逮捕毒品走私犯和没收走私毒品的权力。1990年韩国海关成立情报部，负责协调、计划和支持全国各地海关的反毒品行动，并通过外国海关收集海外情报，提高调查技术。1993年2月，韩国海关成立了毒品走私专门调查组；1993年4月在金浦海关成立毒品调查部，以有效对付机场内不断增加的毒品走私活动。1996年7月，情报部更名为专门调查部。为了更有效地打击毒品走私，韩国海关建立了43个毒品调查小组，并在汉城、釜山、仁）！；、大邱、光州和水原等6个地区成立了6个特殊拦截行动小组。韩国还正在建立自动情报管…     

"色彩革命"与独联体的未来

吉尔吉斯斯坦变局表明,独联体内部的新一轮"民主化"浪潮继续上涨.这是继苏联解体之后,原苏联国家确立新国家身份的延续.如果说,苏联解体解决了这些国家"离开谁"的问题,那么"色彩革命"则将解决"靠近谁"的问题.这一进程不可避免地会对独联体产生重要冲击.一系列"色彩革命"之后,格鲁吉亚、乌克兰等独联体"民主先锋"的角色、立场将发生重要变化,独联体内部因"民主化"问题而引发的矛盾将进一步凸显,俄罗斯在独联体的威信可能继续下降,独联体未来发展前景堪忧.     

2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

近年蒙古国经济形势分析

文章分析了蒙古国经济近年来出现再次回落的原因,阐述了有利于经济发展的一些积极因素,指出蒙古国经济发展还要经历艰难的历程.