Editors’ Introduction

Abstract

This article explains why the United States has not fought a preventive war against North Korea despite that country’s moves to arm itself with nuclear weapons. I argue that the absence of war is mainly attributable to military strategies that the US military has with regard to North Korea. With only attrition strategies available, the United States neither expects to lose a precious military opportunity nor anticipates grave future vulnerabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. The prospect of a costly attritional campaign deters both Washington and Pyongyang from resorting to military force. Straightforward attrition strategies also allow little chance for miscalculation, thereby making inadvertent escalation to war unlikely. The research finds sufficient evidence for my argument, whereas conventional explanations offered by international relations theory fall short when applied to this case.     

The North Korea Problem: Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate,Economic Reforms and Beyond

ABSTRACT

Despite a plethora of research on North Korea, understanding and managing the challenges posed by the country have long been complicated with no simple solution to put an end to this decades-long security and economic predicament on the Korean Peninsula. With the potential for international conflict, attention must be given to the converging messages emerging from the scholarly works reviewed in this article: Glyn Ford, Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff, Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War and William Overholt’s collection North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? These works speak to the need to: take seriously the risk of nuclear war; consider the connectedness of the North’s decades-long security and economic reform dilemmas; and to acknowledge that the mistrust that is deeply rooted on all sides must be mitigated to bring peace. These books are published at a critical juncture of increased tensions following a highly publicised but remarkably short-lived effort at a breakthrough on the Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang’s rapidly evolving security posture and its perennial domestic challenges. Each of these volumes provides valuable insights on these challenges for North Korea and internationally.     

Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits: The Limits of Collaboration

Abstract

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice.     

Should South Korea go Nuclear?

A nuclear debate has arisen in South Korea following North Korea's nuclear tests and weapons program. Despite the US extended nuclear deterrence for its security, a sizable section of the people in South Korea have started debating if their country can revisit the nuclear option as a deterrent to North Korea's continued threats. Several law makers have started articulating such a view. Several opinion polls held recently also endorse such a view. However, the US is unlikely to allow South Korea to take the nuclear path as it would have serious consequences not only for the region but also the world. China would also not rejoice with the prospect of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. If South Korea goes nuclear, Japan and Taiwan will find it difficult to resist having their own nuclear weapons. To stem such a trend, it becomes all the more necessary for the international community to address the issue of denuclearizing North Korea. The suspended Six-Party-Talks ought to restart soon and China has a great role in reigning in Pyongyang. Fortunately, the government in South Korea has not supported the view of the country going nuclear. But if the security situation deteriorates further, it might become irresistible for the government to have a rethink, with an inevitable domino effect in Japan and Taiwan soon.

This article makes an in-depth study of the prevailing trend in South Korea, the views of some influential law makers pleading for the country to go nuclear, various public opinions polls, possible US stance and implications that such a change in policy would have on the region's security situation and the author's assessment based on the critical examination of the above-mentioned factors. Many sources have been cited to analyze this issue before arriving at an objective assessment of the point raised in this essay.     

Old and new Korean wars

Abstract

As I write this we have come off one week when it looked as if we might have another war in Korea, and the next week when peace broke out between Washington and Pyongyang as a result of Jimmy Carter's meetings with Kim Il Sung. This pattern of crisis followed by relaxation has lasted at least since the spring of 1993, when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. During the entire period most Americans and especially our print and television media have demonstrated that they have no understanding of the terrible destructiveness of the Korean War—and therefore they easily conjure up a new one. Indeed, talk of a new war in Korea is casual and almost routine in the United States.     

A sinologist’s observations on North Korea

This report provides reflections on a one-week visit to North Korea in April 1989 by a China scholar who lived in Maoist China. It draws on meetings with American and Chinese specialists on Korea, and with North Korea scholars and Party officials. It compares Kim’s North Korea with Mao’s China in terms of agriculture, policy towards education and intellectuals, and the Cult of Personality; it discusses apparent tentative stpes in the North towards openness and reform, but recognizes the dilemma of understanding complicated forces for the against reform in such a short visit. Finally, the report outlines discussions with North Korea international relations specialists and a member of the Secretariat of the Korean Worker’s Party which welcomed the end of the cold war and improved Sino-U.S., U.S.-Soviet, and Sino-Soviet relations as favorable for peace in the region and Korean reunification. He is author ofAgrarian Radicalism in China, 1968–1981 (Harvard University Press, 1989).     

LIMITED WAR,UNLIMITED TARGETS

In the early days of the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had a policy of precision bombing military targets only. Policy-makers in Washington, D.C., formulated this policy to ensure the protection of Korean civilians and to increase the effectiveness of their air operations. Senior USAF officers in Korea, however, were unhappy about the limitations placed on them by Washington. In their strategic air operations against targets in North Korea USAF officers followed Washington's precision bombing policy, but they insisted that USAF bombers be permitted to use incendiary bombs against population centers in North Korea. China's entry into the war in November 1950 led to a drastic change in the precision bombing policy. On 5 November 1950, when the UN forces began suffering defeat after defeat in battles with the new enemy, General Douglas MacArthur designated cities and villages in North Korea as “main bombing targets” and permitted the use of incendiary bombs, which had been used in attacks against Japanese cities during World War II. From that point until the end of the war, the USAF regarded North Korean cities and villages as their crucial targets as political and military occasion demanded.     

POLICIES OF LAST RESORT FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

This paper analyzes the policy remedies for dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. After six nuclear tests and three recent successful ICBM tests, North Korea is close to miniaturizing nuclear warheads and establishing a reliable delivery system, thus achieving a much-feared nuclear weapons capability. In defiance of the extraordinarily tough U.N. Security Council resolutions, Pyongyang persists in developing nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear weapons program already has exceeded the strategic patience, of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Harsher policy options to deal with the DPRK nuclear weapons are imperative. Several drastic options, including severe sanctions, preventive bombing, nuclear armament of South Korea, are evaluated in the final round of engagement policy on guaranteeing nonaggression and a peace agreement with Pyongyang.     

A Conceptual Analysis of the Six-Party Talks: Building Peace through Security Assurances

Abstract

Dissuading proliferators from developing nuclear weapons entails application of the global nonproliferation norm. Insomuch as proliferators' motivations to develop nuclear weapons are embedded in regional security concerns, security assurances taken for nuclear disarmament would include measures addressing these regional security concerns. Such measures are compatible with the need not to motivate other proliferators to develop nuclear weapons. The September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks incorporated a pledge to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, which demonstrated the link between the regional undertakings and North Korea's denuclearization process. North Korea's nuclear test is no doubt a deviation from the document and the international community must retain collective sanctions. However, building a peace regime remains an effective means for defusing the nuclear standoff.     

Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: Visit of the MV Green peace Spotlights South Korean Nukes

Abstract

The problem of plutonium proliferation in Northeast Asia has received a great deal of international attention in the past few years, in the first instance over Japan's plutonium program, and most recently about the suspected production of plutonium in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both countries' nuclear programs have touched off regional and global fears of a de facto nuclear arms race.     

North Korea – Challenge for the Major Powers

Abstract

Since North Korea is one of the world's most enigmatic societies, it is difficult to understand precisely the factors determining its policies. The prevailing power structure, the primary political considerations, and the stability of the current order are each subject to question. Meanwhile, a history of relations between the United States and North Korea reveals repeated movements forward followed by renewed breakdowns. In general terms, China is a crucial actor as the North's chief economic and strategic supporter, with South Korea also vitally important. Russia currently plays a limited role, and relations between Japan and North Korea are hostile. At the close of 2006, negotiations are once again underway but with no agreements reached. Thus, it is difficult to be optimistic about an early resolution of the key issues despite some favorable signs.     

North Korea’s Resurgence and China’s Rise: Implications for the Future of Northeast Asian Security

Today, Northeast Asia’s security situation is changing rapidly. North Korea is reviving and China’s power is growing at an alarming rate. While the U.S. continues to suffer diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East and from international terrorism, China’s and North Korea’s power is likely to futher increase, polarizing the Northeast Asian security structure, with South Korea, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus North Korea allied with China. The liberal democracies should pursue peace with North Korea and China to preclude the situation from aggravating, but should be ready in the longer term to meet, in diverse ways including strengthening their alliances, the challenges posed by rising powers.

Perceptions toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: Findings from a public opinion survey

Due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s nuclear weapons test represents a serious security threat to East Asia as well as a global risk. Many sources, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, argue that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a security threat to the United States because missiles fired from North Korea could reach Hawaii or Alaska. Against this backdrop, however, no empirical research analyzing how much the ordinary American feels threatened by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted. This paper examines American public opinion toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program based on a regional survey conducted in Hawaii during the summer of 2005. The research compares and evaluates through various quantitative research methods, to what extent the respondents’ various demographic, political, and socioeconomic backgrounds seem to have divergently influenced the perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In the evaluation of the majority of people in Hawaii, North Korea is pursuing the nuclear weapons program to enhance their national prestige and for self-defense purposes. Many respondents proposed multilateral negotiation as a desirable settlement method for managing North Korea’s nuclear program.     

Statement on peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

We who have been praying and working for peace and the reunification of Korea would like to express our deep concerns about the rising tensions surrounding the north Korean nuclear controversy and the potentially imminent war on the Korean peninsula. We still remember vividly the nightmare of the Korean War beginning 25 June 1950, and we have endured tremendously painful experiences for the last half century because of the division of our country. We would like to express our positions to the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as we firmly believe that the shortest route to reunification is through the reconciliation and solidarity of the Korean people:     

US Foreign Policy and the Korean War

Abstract

Sometimes called the “Forgotten War” because Americans pay so little attention to it, the Korean War was nevertheless a pivotal event in US foreign policy. Three themes will be integrated into this article as it analyzes Korean War policy. First, the Korean War heightened the debates and divisions among US foreign policymakers. If Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor helped to silence these divisions, then President Truman’s handling of North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea helped resurrect them. Second, while foreign policy goals are generally assumed to drive the objectives of war in the classic Clausewitzian sense, the opposite frequently occurred in Korea as changes on the battlefield drove policy objectives of officials in Washington. Third, although the Americans, Chinese and Soviets all worked assiduously to keep the Korean War limited to the Korean Peninsula, the war had repercussions far beyond the Korean battlefield. Its ramifications were felt in Taiwan, Vietnam, Europe and in US defense expenditures as well.     

Future dynamics in Sino-Korea relations

This article argues that the basic interests of the major actors involved in the Korean problem converge on the cross-recognition and “two Koreas” formula. Seoul’s diplomatic normalization with Moscow, and North Korea’s ongoing negotiations with Tokyo, testify to this trend. Because of its sensitivity to North Korea’s dilemma and carefully measured policy, China has succeeded in sustaining North Korea’s trust while improving its ties with South Korea. Shaken by the changes in the international system and threatened by the rapidly growing economic capability of the South, North Korea’s overall foreign policy objective is shifting from unifocation to accepting the existing status quo, a movement toward a direction that China has been advising. A mostly likely breakthrough to the stalemate in Korea will come from the Pyongyang-Tokyo bilateral relations. Ironically, when the South feels more confident than ever before about the possibility of unification under its terms, the rest of world is moving toward the cross recognition it has advocated. Whether the two Koreas with over-lapping diplomatic relations with all four major powers surrounding the peninsula will be able to achieve the unification that all Korean people desire will largely depend on how the regimes manage inter-Korean relations in coming years.     

Russian Energy and the Korean Peninsula

The recent agreements concerning North Korea’s nuclear program raise possibilities for providing North Korea with energy (oil and gas) to compensate for the termination of its nuclear program and of integrating it more broadly into the Northeast Asian economy. Russia has long wanted to play the role of provider of oil and gas to North Korea and these agreements open up new opportunities for it to do so. However, serious obstacles in the nature of North Korea’s precarious economic situation and its consequences, international rivalries in Northeast Asia, and Russia’s own energy policies present serious obstacles to the realization of Russia’s ambitions as regards North Korea and as energy provider to Northeast Asia as a whole.     

A Geo-Economic Object or an Object of Geo-Political Absorption? Competing Visions of North Korea in South Korean Politics

Abstract

The so-called Sunshine Policy launched by the liberal regime of South Korea brought about a significant transformation in its visions of North Korea. Through it, North Korea became an “object of development.” This was something different from the previous idea of North Korea as a politico-military target. However, to conservatives, North Korea remains within the politico-military realm as an object of territorial and ideological absorption. As a result, political conflicts in South Korea in the conception of North Korea – between a geo-economic object and an object of geo-political absorption – entail competitive appropriation of the discourse of “China’s colonisation of North Korea” and affect the way North Korean territory is produced.     

Economic Interdependence and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Abstract

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies.     

Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.