Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU–Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.     

The Impact of External Factors on Regime Transition: Lessons from the Russian Regions

While many studies have examined the external dimensions of democratization, the role of external anti-democratic factors remains unaddressed. Using an original dataset to analyze the presence and impact of external anti-democratic factors, this article aims to untangle the international dimensions of regime transition by singling out foreign trade. International post-Soviet trade links' impact on subnational political regimes in Russia is analyzed. Trade links between post-Soviet states and their regions are longstanding, dating back to the Soviet or even the tsarist period. The authors hypothesize that this variable was an important factor in regime transition in Russia's regions. The findings have wider implications for area studies and theoretical studies of democratization and regime transition.     

Russia,the death penalty,and Europe: the ambiguities of influence

Studies of capital punishment worldwide investigate how international influence affects the death penalty. We analyze European influence on the death penalty in Russia over the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, using two parameters: the changing mechanisms of influence in each period and the death penalty's significance in the broader spectrum of punitive violence. On the first parameter, in the tsarist period, European influence on Russian policy was “productive” – exercised through prestige, moral suasion, and “diffusion.” In the Soviet period, European influence was blocked. In the post-Soviet period, European influence is coercive, as the Council of Europe has unsuccessfully sought to compel Russia to abolish its death penalty. On the second parameter, the death penalty in Russia has always been only one of many forms of state-sanctioned punitive killing. In consequence, the Council's involvement in Russia's death penalty has produced an incoherent policy outcome and has entangled the Council in Russia's authoritarian politics. Russia thus exemplifies the hazards of external involvement in death penalty abolition.     

The War in Ukraine: Risks and Opportunities For the ‘Post-Soviet South’

The invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves through the South Caucasus and Central Asia, subjecting the eight countries of the post-Soviet area to economic, political, and social challenges. Refusing to support Russia in circumventing sanctions or taking a stand against the invasion could expose these countries to retaliatory measures. But aligning with Moscow could lead to international isolation and the imposition of secondary sanctions. This article explores the ways these countries are navigating the new geopolitics, with Azerbaijan gaining but Armenia seeking new allies. It then examines the economic benefits to these countries of Russia's desperation, though this leaves them vulnerable to US and European penalties. It concludes with an analysis of how these states are dealing with the tensions caused by migration out of Russia. In all of these areas, the post-Soviet South must weigh the risks of aligning with the weakening great power or the West.     

No Moscow stooges: identity polarization and guerrilla movements in Donbass

Abstract

The paper argues that the grounds for the conflict in Donbass were prepared when different sections of Ukraine’s population developed conflicting perspectives of the past, the role of Russia in Ukraine’s history, and of how relations with the West should evolve. These differences lay the foundations for what became polarized identities and mutually exclusive ideologies. The study goes on to explore a changing political landscape of a leaderless uprising and formation of a protest movement out of locally available ingredients, the emergence of armed militias in unfolding security vacuum and the developments on the battlefield. As the rebel-held territories drifted away from mainland Ukraine, their new identity was formed by the war. The paper argues that understanding the internal dynamic of the guerrilla war and population’s survival has been key to the resolution, which is increasingly unlikely.     

Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from ‘accidental’ diaspora to rebel movement

Abstract

The article examines different types of macropolitical identities in Ukraine and their interaction in establishing political order in the country. The authors argue that political institutional design was unfavourable to the Russian diaspora in eastern and southern regions. It hindered stable development of post-Soviet identity between Russians in the country. But during the Euromaidan protests, the Russians reacted to unpleasant political situation by exploring who they were and what social and political goals they had. Having been incipient for decades, the identity of the diaspora evolved in a soaring way within three or four months. The violent actions of the newly established government in Kiev radicalized the Russian diaspora. Diasporants started establishing alternative authorities in regions where government had no monopoly on the use of force. The involvement of Russia and international volunteers complexifies the situation in Donbass and the identity formation process in unrecognized republics also known as DNR and LNR.     

Correspondence

Sir Tony Brenton, formerly British Ambassador to Moscow (2004-2008), considers in this article the Asian dimension of Russia. He considers the historical connections and importance of Asia (as opposed to Europe) in the development of Russia and the historical balance between Asian and European influence. This section pays particular attention to the development of Siberia and early encounters between Russia and China. He then examines shifting Russian attitudes towards Asia at significant moments in Russian history including the 19^th century (the Slavophile Movement), the Communist period, the post-Soviet 1990s and the current era under President Putin. The implications of the Ukraine crisis and the current relationship with China is studied. He concludes with a discussion of whether Russia is likely to see its future orientation as more towards China and Asia, and what implications Russia's deliberation about its future direction has for the western powers.     

Russia and the Kurds: A Soft-Power Tool for the Kremlin?

Russia has been the Kurds’ patron for more than two centuries, motivated primarily by the cynical desire to use them against adversaries in broader great-power games while casting itself as a champion of the Kurdish cause. Russia's longstanding and multifaceted relationship with the Kurds demonstrates that when it comes to geopolitics, the United States has more than brute force to contend with. The Russian state also utilizes soft power as an authoritarian state defines it: a tool of pragmatic leverage. While the Kurds are not a monolith, they are anxious about the trajectory of US politics and feel they cannot rely on anyone. The Russian state has opportunities to undermine American interests in places such as Syria and Iraq through its connections with Kurdish groups. This article reviews tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet policies toward the Kurds, including Kurdish communities in Russia. It concludes with a discussion about implications for the United States, given that Moscow will not let go of its Kurdish card, including in the context of the Ukraine invasion.     

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.     

俄罗斯与美欧关系变化及对中国的影响

2014年初乌克兰危机爆发后,俄罗斯与美欧关系降到冷战结束后的最低点。但是,具有战略忍耐力的俄罗斯调整对外政策,先是在叙利亚战场打开局面,接着在2019年与美欧的关系也出现缓和。俄美领导人举行会晤,两国外长互访,两国开始就是否延长《新削减战略武器条约》进行谈判。同时,俄美在军备竞赛、地区冲突、人文限制等领域的争斗依旧激烈。随着2020年美国总统大选临近,"通俄门"阴影是否可能再度影响俄美关系,存在较大的不确定性。俄与欧盟关系相对来说比较稳定,双方都有改善关系、加强合作的愿望。乌克兰问题是影响俄欧关系的重要因素之一,2019年乌克兰总统选举后乌俄关系出现某些松动与对话端倪,这将使俄欧关系在2020年继续朝着缓和与合作的方向发展。美国对俄政策调整对俄中关系也许会产生某种影响,但是对整个俄中关系不会发生大的作用。俄乌关系打破僵局、俄欧加强合作则符合中国的立场和利益,中国乐观其成。     

Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideology à la carte?

The impact of crisis in Ukraine on EU–Russia relations appears twofold. On the one hand, it revealed the high degree of disdain all across Europe to Moscow's neo-imperial approach. On the other hand, it unveiled a great deal of affection and sympathy to Kremlin's policy among a number of non-mainstream but significant groups within the EU. In this article, we mirror the major troubles of today’s Europe, as seen from Moscow’s perspective, with four nodal points of the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse: social conservatism, nation state-based policies, independence from the US influence and the glorification of Russia’s self-inflicted mission of fighting contemporary neo-fascism. Our analysis of non-mainstream political parties in EU member states, sensitive and responsive to the Kremlin’s agenda, suggests that Putin's regime and Russia sympathizers in Europe pragmatically use each other, thereby challenging the classical ideological paradigms. This translates Russia’s policies into a trans-ideological repertoire of different discourses that differently resonate among the groups of Russia sympathizers.     

International capital,Singapore's state companies,and security

Since the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98, the Singapore government has embraced neoliberal globalization to a degree not matched elsewhere in East or Southeast Asia. Yet the consolidation and expansion of Singapore's state companies are also integral to this strategy. These companies are increasingly the objects of critical attention from elements of international capital that are seeking to make inroads into various sectors of the Singapore economy. This includes pressures to reform governance systems from which state companies derive competitive advantages. This article examines the nature and political strength of these challenges, the responses to them by the Singapore government, and the implications of this for the future of the authoritarian regime. The article also analyzes the changing geopolitical context within which such disputes are being played out. Security concerns by the U.S. government in particular, it is argued, are mediating conflict over state companies and presenting new opportunities for the authoritarian regime to consolidate.     

The Political Economy of Welfare Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Ukraine

A British specialist on post-Soviet politics and economy examines public opinion constraints on welfare reform in Ukraine. The article uses extensive survey data gathered in 1998–1999 to examine public views on welfare benefits, distribution, and possible changes in targeting of benefits. Analysis is offered of how the targeting of social and economic benefits may be implemented to alter social outcomes in Ukraine.     

The political economy of Russian higher education: why does Putin support research universities?

This article argues that Vladimir Putin's regime launched support programs for the leading Russian universities in 2005 because of a perceived threat of the political mobilization of youth, similar to the one that triggered “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. The support programs created cleavages in the university community, covered an attack on university autonomy, and made the containment of possible anti-regime student mobilization a part of an implicit agreement between the regime and the universities. The historical coincidence of the “demographic hole,” which caused a shrinkage of the higher education market, and high oil prices, which provided the necessary resources for the regime, made this implicit agreement possible. The article contributes to the research on authoritarianism, youth mobilization, authoritarian backlash after the color revolutions, and the development of research universities in Russia.     

Privatization in Russia's Regions

An American specialist on Russian and post-Soviet politics examines regional variations in the privatization of both large and small industrial enterprises in Russia during 1992-1994. Using regional statistical data, both published and unpublished, interviews with actors and documentary materials from the Russian press, the author finds substantial differences among regions in the pace and strategy of privatization. He concludes that the weakness of the central government led it to make compromises that enabled local elites to retain effective control over enterprises in their regions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P31, L16, L20.     

Russia’s ministry of ambivalence: the failure of civic nation-building in post-Soviet Russia

This article argues that the sources of official and societal ambivalence towards civic nationhood in today’s Russia are found in the institutional instability and personalist dynamics of hybrid regime politics in the 1990s. Successful civic nation-building should institutionalize inclusive criteria for citizenship as a basis for policymaking, which in turn should create incentives for dominant ethnicities to embrace civic nationhood. While the shifting views of Boris Yel’tsin on nationalities policy and the constant turmoil in the government’s nationalities ministry have received little scholarly attention, they illuminate the endogenous sources of regime instability in relation to civic nation-building. Russia’s experience thus challenges the traditional view of ethnic nationalism as fostering authoritarianism and civic nationalism as fostering democracy: rather, competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s confounded the regime’s own efforts toward civic nation-building and laid the groundwork for the “ethnic turn” in Russian politics under Vladimir Putin.     

Deconstructing the myth of the Tatar Yoke

Analysing and comparing the various conventional and revisionist narratives on what is known as the ‘Tatar Yoke’, this article aims to show that Western historiography has long been critical of the dominant negative view on the Tatar–Mongol rule over Russian principalities and that in Russia we find similar revisions in history – with some exceptions – only in post-Soviet times. This article aims to demonstrate how the revisionist views on the Tatar–Mongol rule contributed to the political and cultural transformation of contemporary Russia. In the part which analyses the revisionist discourse in Russia the emphasis lies on the new Tatar narrative. For Tatars the new interpretation of the Tatar–Mongol rule is of outstanding importance because it functions as a means to enhance Tatar national pride, and it contributes to Tatarstan's sovereignty project.     

Continuity and change in instrumentalizing ‘The Precedent’. How Russia uses Kosovo to legitimize the annexation of Crimea

The article contributes to the efforts of understanding Russia’s legitimization endeavours by looking at the policy narratives centred around the so-called Kosovo precedent and the way they were perceived by different actors from Ukraine, Russia, and international experts. The aim of the paper is to scrutinize the process of politicization of contested international norms (in particular, territorial sovereignty and the right to self-determination) in the case of Russia’s legitimacy claims in Ukraine. In assessing the instrumentalization of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ in the Crimea crisis, we focused on three main elements identified in the selected policy narratives: the reinterpretation of history, the humanitarian and ethnic factor and the reinterpretation of Western actions in the Balkans.     

Bringing actors back in: political choices and sources of post-Soviet regime dynamics

One might summarize the state of the field of research into contemporary Russian politics as a “dismal consensus”: most observers believe that durable authoritarianism has consolidated itself, and there is very little chance of democratization in the foreseeable future. However, political regime changes are often launched and developed overtime as side effects of moves made by political actors, and their outcomes are not predetermined. This article aims to go beyond this “dismal consensus,” and revisits some of the arguments on the role of structure and agency in post-Soviet regime dynamics. Apart from the changes in structural variables, it reconsiders the role of the incentives and choices of self-interested political actors, who are not always omnipotent and well-informed strategists. The overall dismal tendencies nevertheless leave some “bias for hope” in the analysis of regime dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond.     

Τhe energy parameters of the Russian–Ukrainian–EU impasse: dependencies,sanctions and the rise of ‘Turkish Stream’

The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy. The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream.