Positioning Norm, Principle and Interest in Chinese Foreign Policy —— The Case of the Myanmar Issue

There are different driving forces behind Chinese foreign policy decision-making. Norms, principles, and interests and the subtle combinations of them, I argue in this paper, are the major driving forces on the input side, while the domestic situation of a specific country and international pressure undercut China’s policy deliberations. By contrast, the form of government of a specific country under discussion is not an important variable. In this paper, I use China’s policy toward Myanmar as a case study. The findings prove that the integration of norms, principle and practical interests has formed the powerful impetus that drives China’s policies toward Myanmar. Among these factors, the interests China has identified in general and stability on its “doorstep” in particular play a dominant role, while the norm of human security and the principle of non-interference are embedded in its policy deliberations.     

中国经略周边的机制化路径探析——以中缅经济走廊为例

在美国的战略压力下,周边国家对于中国崛起的重要性越来越凸显,经略周边也成为中国崛起的重要战略支撑。中美战略竞争的阶段性与中国和周边国家关系的密切程度,影响着中国经略周边的模式和路径。在现阶段,中国经略周边的机制化路径能够统合中国有限的外交资源,借助机制激励、约束及塑造等功能提升中国经略周边的质量和成果,维持在周边部分国家已经取得的优势地位。本文以中缅经济走廊建设为案例,从中国经略周边的机制化视角分析其对提升中缅两国内在合作动力、维持中国在缅甸影响力优势地位的重要性和可行性,进而就中缅经济走廊机制化建设可能面临的问题和挑战提出若干对策。     

大国博弈、双层均势的亚洲时刻--俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦的认知与政策立场

俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦有着独特的认知和期待,并与克里姆林宫的官方立场互为表里。总体上,俄方智库的观点是,在经贸摩擦的背后,是中美两国对军事、政治、科技、地区和全球领导权的竞争;两国的国内议程和对外政策,将因此受到深远影响并产生溢出效应--在亚洲区域内形成两极结构。即使两国会因国内和国际政治因素,在经贸问题上达成妥协,但中方不会放弃获得世界科技领导者的雄心,美方也不会打消遏制中国发展动能的战略意图。俄罗斯应与中国继续保持经济与军事合作,避免与美国和西方关系的继续恶化,并在亚太地区推动"大欧亚伙伴关系"倡议。俄罗斯政策分析界基于自身利益的演绎,将中美经贸摩擦定性为大国博弈,相应的政策建议反映出俄罗斯以在全球和亚洲分别制衡美中为目标的双层均势策略。俄罗斯将在有亚洲其他国家参与的情景下扮演战略平衡手角色,借中美全面对抗之势,在中美俄三边关系之外扭转不利的外部发展环境。俄罗斯对亚太国际局势的盘活作用,将催生双边和三边竞合新模式的建立。     

后军人时代缅甸的“双头政治”及其外交影响

缅甸进入后军人时代后,国内呈现由军人集团和文官政府组成的"双头政治"权力格局,这种格局是前军人集团政治设计的结果,对现在缅甸的外交政策有很大影响。在外交政策的制定、落实和应对国际压力的过程中,"双头政治"的博弈因少数民族的政治参与而变得更加复杂,体现为军人、文官政府和少数民族的"三方博弈"。在缅北民族和解进程中,各方政治力量的博弈使得缅甸陷入既需要外部帮助斡旋而又让外部难以有效参与的困境。在中资大项目问题上,这些博弈导致缅甸对华政策出现"依赖"与"反依赖"纠葛,而中缅关系无法有效推进的局面。在若开罗兴亚人问题上,各方博弈更使缅甸陷入国际道义、政治与法律围攻的窘境。究其根本,缅甸仍停留在"求稳定"与"求发展"的初级阶段,而国内长期存在的政治认同分歧与族群割裂,使其在后军人时代可能进入另一个"乱局"。军人势力仍然强大、文官政权软弱、少数民族各自进行不同程度的国际动员,各方"自助"而"不得助"的客观形势,使得民盟政府初期良好的外交环境日益恶劣。因国内政治而不断引发外交危机,缅甸孜孜以求的独立自主、中立主义和韧性外交受到极大影响,缅甸的复兴梦与发展梦未有穷期。     

Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

This article analyzes China’s use of issue-linkage strategies in its approach to nuclear proliferation. It highlights that China has used its ties to nuclear proliferators as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the United States. The United States is dependent on Chinese cooperation to secure nonproliferation objectives such as a non-nuclear Iran, and China has used this dependency to extract side-payments for its cooperation. Moreover, Beijing has used non-cooperation on nuclear proliferation as retaliation when the US has hurt its interests in unrelated policy areas, such as through arms sales to Taiwan. In contrast with past studies, the article claims that China’s approach to nonproliferation remains partly transactional to this day.     

“A Cat’s Paw of Indian Reactionaries”? Strategic Rivalry and Domestic Politics at the India–China–Myanmar Tri-Junction

ABSTRACT

Ostensibly driven by concerns over a military standoff with China similar to Doklam, India increased military deployment at the Myanmar tri-junction. This article assesses the inevitability of systemic factors such as rivalry with China in determining India’s approach on border issues. It asks why India sought formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967. Given its territorial disputes with China, resolving the Burma boundary should have been high priority. Still, it took India two decades after independence to broach the subject. Based on fresh archival and interview data, this article answers the question by examining the India–Burma Boundary Agreement. A three-party territorial dispute, the making of this agreement witnessed simultaneous interplay between states with visible power differentials, and various stakeholders within India’s polity and bureaucracy. The article argues that even when inter-state competition is apparent, domestic factors may be more important in triggering foreign policy change.     

Maple Leaf Zeitgeist? Assessing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Policy Changes*

In the October 2015 elections, the charismatic Justin Trudeau led the Canadian Liberal Party to its first majority government in 15 years, overturning nearly a decade of conservative government. His premiership is generally considered to have begun well. This article examines Trudeau’s conduct of the election campaign, his choice of a young and diverse Cabinet, his courtship of the media and image making, and assesses changes in foreign and domestic policy. These have yet to prove substantive but Trudeau has signalled a reversal of Stephen Harper’s conservative policies and especially in regard to migration has tapped into images of ‘compassionate Canadians’. In foreign policy, this has been evidenced in relations with the United States and with a re-engagement with the Commonwealth especially in its soft power aspects. Trudeau’s green credentials and stance on Climate Change are a contrast to those of his predecessor but he has yet to confront the different environmental profiles and policies of the Canadian states. Canada’s Strategic Partnership with the European Community and the ratification of CETA are priorities and he has to come to terms with the implications of Brexit.     

俄罗斯与美欧关系变化及对中国的影响

2014年初乌克兰危机爆发后,俄罗斯与美欧关系降到冷战结束后的最低点。但是,具有战略忍耐力的俄罗斯调整对外政策,先是在叙利亚战场打开局面,接着在2019年与美欧的关系也出现缓和。俄美领导人举行会晤,两国外长互访,两国开始就是否延长《新削减战略武器条约》进行谈判。同时,俄美在军备竞赛、地区冲突、人文限制等领域的争斗依旧激烈。随着2020年美国总统大选临近,"通俄门"阴影是否可能再度影响俄美关系,存在较大的不确定性。俄与欧盟关系相对来说比较稳定,双方都有改善关系、加强合作的愿望。乌克兰问题是影响俄欧关系的重要因素之一,2019年乌克兰总统选举后乌俄关系出现某些松动与对话端倪,这将使俄欧关系在2020年继续朝着缓和与合作的方向发展。美国对俄政策调整对俄中关系也许会产生某种影响,但是对整个俄中关系不会发生大的作用。俄乌关系打破僵局、俄欧加强合作则符合中国的立场和利益,中国乐观其成。     

The Abraham Accords and Religious Tolerance: Three Tales of Faith-Based Foreign-Policy Agenda Setting

How do religious tolerance and religious freedom affect foreign policy? How are they institutionalized across the signatories of the Abraham Accords? This article examines foreign policy agenda setting of religious tolerance in the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. In the first section, the article analyzes discursive representations of the common roots of the three monotheistic religions and identifies recurrent tropes that highlight idealistic undertones in the Abraham Accords Declaration. In the following section, it critically examines the nexus between domestic and international politics and assesses the compatibility between social and public policy and foreign-policy agenda setting centered on interfaith diplomacy and dialogue. While this article acknowledges Donald Trump's and previous US presidents’ contributions to the advancement of international religious freedom, it argues that Trump's conflicting standards and selective approaches to foreign policy and human rights preceding the agreement have failed to promote constructive relations for furthering faith-based diplomacy. This article suggests that while the United States and the UAE laid the groundwork for promoting religious freedom and tolerance leading up to the Abraham Accords, projecting a coherent foreign-policy narrative across these contexts is hampered by institutional, legal, and political considerations.     

Edward Gough Whitlam, 1916–2014: An Assessment of His Political Significance

Gough Whitlam’s political significance lies in the first instance in his leading the Australian Labor Party into office at federal level in December 1972 after 23 years in opposition. As prime minister he instituted wide-ranging domestic reforms expanding the involvement of the Commonwealth government into many areas affecting the lives of ordinary Australians. He faced a declining economic situation and a parliamentary opposition determined to impede his reforms; the blocking of supply in the Senate culminated in Whitlam’s dismissal by the governor-general on 11 November 1975. In foreign policy, Whitlam repositioned Australia as an active middle power. His opening to China coincided with the Sino-American normalisation, leading to a new direction in Australian foreign policy that gained momentum in subsequent years; the fundamentals of the Australian relationship with the United States remained intact. Whitlam was motivated by a vision of ‘positive equality’ in government services as the basis of social democracy. From a contemporary perspective there is less faith in the efficacy of government action than was the case with Whitlam. His government bears comparison with the great reform governments in the Australian Labor tradition, as well as in Canada, the United Kingdom, and even the United States.     

The Development-Insecurity Nexus in China’s Near-Abroad: Rethinking Cross-Border Economic Integration in an Era of State Transformation

Surprisingly, perhaps, China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative expresses a familiar mix of the security–development nexus and liberal interdependence thesis: Chinese leaders expect economic development and integration will stabilise and secure neighbouring states and improve inter-state relations. However, drawing on the record of China’s intensive economic interaction with Myanmar, we argue that the opposite outcome may occur, for two reasons. First, capitalist development is inherently conflict-prone. Second, moreover, China’s cross-border economic relations today are shaped by state transformation – the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of party-state apparatuses. Accordingly, economic relations often emerge not from coherent national strategies, but from the uncoordinated, even contradictory, activities of various state and non-state agencies at multiple scales, which may exacerbate capitalist development’s conflictual aspects and undermine official policy goals. In the Sino-Myanmar case, the lead Chinese actors creating and managing cross-border economic engagements are sub-national agencies and enterprises based in, or operating through, Yunnan province. The rapacious form of development they have pursued has exacerbated insecurity, helped to reignite ethnic conflict in Myanmar’s borderlands, and plunged bilateral relations into crisis. Consequently, the Chinese government has had to change its policy and intervene in Myanmar’s domestic affairs to promote peace negotiations.     

Dollars and democracy in Hong Kong: Understanding the logic of Chinese policy

Recent disputes between China and Great Britain over political reform and airport financing in Hong Kong have helped clarify the logic of Chinese policy toward the territory. Despite appearances to the contrary, the disputes are only partly about democracy and money. For the PRC, they are fundamentally about creating the conditions for the Chinese government to exercise sovereignty after 1997 and about the fear that Great Britain will do anything possible to complicate China’s establishment of authority over the territory. This article thus rejects as inadequate several conventional explanations for China’s Hong Kong policy. Its conclusions hold significant implications for Hong Kong’s future and for our understanding of China’s foreign policy calculations elsewhere.     

Solving south Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic foreign policy making and the ‘two chinas’ question

When President Nelson Mandela abruptly announced on 27 November 1996 that South Africa would no longer recognise the Republic of China but would open official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in its stead, he caught the world by surprise. In what was a fittingly bizarre end to a situation that continued to defy all expectations, the post‐apartheid government made its first significant foreign policy decision. The remarkable level of public debate, the inter‐departmental conflicts, the role of interest groups and party politics which accompanied the decision to switch recognition gave the South African government and the public as a whole its first exposure to the vagaries of conducting foreign policy in a democracy.

This article will examine the decision to recognise the People's Republic of China by investigating the historical relationship between the South African state, non‐state actors and their Chinese counterparts, the debate itself and the role of interest groups ‐ both within and outside the formal policy making process ‐ in seeking to influence the decision and analysing the dynamics of the recognition decision. In so doing, it hopes to shed some light on the policy decision making process in the new democratic South Africa.     

INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY AND THE ‘SINO-INDIAN GREAT GAME’

Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.

The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptions of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.     

China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping

Since taking power, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping has talked of “striving for achievements,” signaling a new theme in Chinese diplomacy. This article first examines the changes in Beijing’s foreign policy structure before moving on to examine the three major schools of thought on China’s immediate relations with its neighbors, implying that the policy focus will lie with the “advance westward” school. Moreover, this article highlights how China is maximizing its influence through economic interaction, whilst noting that economics is also being used to punish hostile countries. Furthermore, it notes that China’s next step is to influence change using the multilateral frameworks of the international system, remolding global rules to China’s benefit. The article concludes by examining Beijing’s leadership role, particularly its commitment to non-alliance, and whether Beijing and Washington can rebuild a more suitable model to reflect both country’s ambitions on the world stage.     

2000年的缅甸外交

重返国际社会是缅甸军政府近年来对外关系的重要目标。在 2 0 0 0年 ,缅甸军政府继续为此而努力 ,并保持了与中国、东盟的传统友好关系 ,与印度关系取得了突破性进展 ,与俄、日等国关系有所恢复和发展 ,但与美国、欧盟以及有关国际组织的关系依然没有明显好转。     

The “Greening” of China: Progress,Limitations, and Contradictions

China’s rapid economic growth in the last three decades has been fuelled by energy-intensive investment and manufacturing, which have become instrumental for China to become the world’s largest economy based on purchasing power parity, and for the United States and the European Union to have access to cheap consumer goods. China’s development strategy, however, has generated a serious domestic environmental crisis, which has also accelerated the global climate emergency. In addition, the 2008 economic crisis led to a collapse of China’s external demand, inducing the leadership to support domestic investment – including investment in environmental projects – as an alternative source of effective demand. By setting ambitious green targets and by adopting strategic policy initiatives, China has become the world’s largest investor in renewable energy. Yet China remains the world’s largest coal consumer and the world’s largest carbon dioxide emitter. The Chinese economy nears a crossroad: will it be able to maintain its commitment to green energies or will it fall back to its historical reliance on fossil fuels to sustain growth? This article evaluates the interplay between China’s economy and environment over the course of the reform period, and investigates the set of forces that impinge upon China’s ecological future.     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

侨务与外交:对中国侨务政策的思考——以中印(尼)关系为例

自20世纪50年代以来,"侨务服从外交"一直是中国处理对外侨务的指导原则。在中国与印度尼西亚的双边关系中,中国为了建立包括印尼在内的国际反帝统一战线,在侨务政策上作出让步,以换取印尼在中国对外战略上的支持。随着冷战后两极体制的终结,以及中国在经济上的崛起,中国实施侨务政策的大环境发生变化,侨务政策也因此出现调整的空间,但中国侨务政策调整的限度和可能性依然受制于一系列因素。     

An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a more assertive China. What happened to China's “peaceful rise” and “charm offensive”? What explains the changes in China's foreign policy? According to interviews with Beijing and Shanghai-based analysts, China's assertiveness between 2008 and 2010 can be divided into two waves, each triggered by a different cause. The first wave seems triggered by a sense in Beijing that Washington, DC was more differential to China's interests, and less committed to East Asia. The second wave seems best explained as China's response to what it perceived as a far more assertive and threatening United States. Both waves were amplified by two domestic challenges: Chinese leaders’ hypersensitivity to popular nationalism and poor bureaucratic coordination among an expanding number of foreign policy actors.