水权与水权的界定--水资源利用的产权经济学分析

在公有水权基础上实行可交易水权制度涉及到三个重要环节,即水权的界定、水价以及水权运作规则和水资源管理,其中水权的界定是水资源市场形成和运行的前提条件,没有排他性水权的确立,水权的让渡和交易是不可能的.本文从产权经济学的理论出发,分析水权的清晰界定与水资源市场的关系,并在此基础上分析水资源利用中的各种水权关系,指出进一步界定和明晰水资源的配水量权是实现水权制度创新的前提条件.     

应当坚持调水、节水两条腿走路

我国年均水资源总量有限,分布又不均衡,南水北调工程势在必行,并应坚持调水和节水两条腿走路,这样才能把可持续发展的国策真正落到实处。     

Institutional Impediments To Efficient Water Allocation

Current water institutions were developed for conditions of water penty rather than scarcity and are unable to allocate water resources efficiently under conditions such as those in the arid West. This paper reviews riparian, appropriation and correlative water law as well as existing admin- istrative rules governing water use in California and finds that all of these institutions violate norms of economic efficiency. The review suggests that decentralized water systems such as mutual irrigation companies with their appropriate laws are more flexible than centralized federal or state systems in promoting water movement to higher valued use. The paper concludes that institutional mechanisms which promote rather than inhibit water trades and transfers are more appropriate to arid areas and that these institutions will become increasingly popular as water becomes increasingly scarce.     

Water privatization,hegemony and civil society: What Motivates Individuals to Protest About Water Privatization?

The article takes the case of protest against water privatization in Ireland to show that protestors with high levels of instrumental motivation as opposed to ideological motivation are more likely to protest. In order to explain this we uniquely combine Klandermans’ social psychology of protest with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. By bridging these two bodies of theory, we provide an interdisciplinary account of the reason why protestors serve to uphold the exact power structures they intend to challenge. We argue that for water movements to be successful they must focus equally on both their instrumental and ideological motivations to ensure that power structures are confronted. This would enable movements to devise a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse, which is essential to contest the dominant global hegemony of water marketization.     

Water and Federalism in the 1990s

Federalism has always been an issue in water management. Thephasing out of grants for the construction of sewage treatmentplants, the reduction of the federal contribution for constructionof water development projects, the decrease in federal expendituresfor basic water data collection, and the lack of federal fundsfor state dam-safety programs have all had an impact on watermanagement and intergovernmental relations. This article summarizescontemporary issues in intergovernmental relations and waterpolicy. First, the relationship between water, environmentalprotection, and federalism is examined. Then, the shifting financialresponsibility for water pollution control from the federalto state and local governments is reviewed.     

Land and Water Institutions in the Blue Nile Basin: Setups and Gaps for Improved Land and Water Management

This study undertook an assessment and gap analysis of the institutional arrangements for improved land and water management in the Tana and Beles Sub‐basins highlands of the Blue Nile Basin. We explored the mandates and design features of the major land‐ and water‐related institutional arrangements. Focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and a literature review were used in the analysis. The results of our work reveal that a lot of progress has been made in creating an institutional framework for improved land and water management and the policies and laws hitherto developed reflect global policy changes consistent with the widespread adoption of the integrated water resources management (IWRM) principles. There are also cases where informal institutions replace formal institutions. Judged by their enforcement, the water resources management, pollution control standards, and regulations and land use rights are not enacted effectively because of poor enforcement capacity. Overall there is a tendency to focus on command‐and‐control type policies. There is a need to strengthen traditional institutions by drawing lessons from their strengths and establish the legitimacy of these institutions. There is also a need to improve formal policy design, developing policies with specific objectives, goals, targets, and overall institutional changes and resources through active adaptive management to maximize the level and effectiveness of institutional learning. Finally, more focus needs to be given to incentive‐based policies through increased use of positive incentives and more emphasis needs to be given to self‐enforcement rather than third‐party enforcement.     

Evidence for Tackling the Complexities of Water Governance

Water policy and management decisions are increasingly challenged by uncertainties associated with climate change, changing demographics, and social values. This article discusses how research by water governance scholars supports and complements Rob M. Skinner's arguments about the complexities of water planning and policy making and the importance of stakeholder engagement. Specifically, it focuses on how this decision‐making context shapes the ways in which evidence is used and understood in water governance. To conclude, this article draws lessons for practitioners about the limitations of using evidence in water governance.     

中东地区水资源问题的全球治理分析

随着近年来全球范围内非传统安全问题的凸显,通过全球治理来解决非传统安全问题逐渐成为国际社会的共识。本文就以全球治理的视角来探讨中东地区的非传统安全问题,集中考察了中东地区比较突出的水资源问题,对于其现状和治理情况以及阻碍治理的障碍性因素进行了分析,意在为新治理路径的选择提供有益的参考和借鉴。     

Water law and the American West(s)

Donald J. Pisani: To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848–1902. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992.

John Hart: Storm Over Mono: The Mono Lake Battle and the California Water Future. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Arthur L. Littleworth and Eric L. Garner: California Water. Point Arena, CA: Solano Press Books, 1995.     

Running the Risks: The Rationalisation of Australia's Water

This article analyses the categories comprising the relationship between productivity and rate-of-return reporting in the context of water infrastructure. It examines the categories and relations comprising rates of return, showing how each can fail to capture real productivity gains. Theoretically, high returns may be obtained despite low real productivity and vice versa. This has implications for 'corporatisation', since the restructuring of Australia's water systems has entrenched rate-of-return reporting as the pre-eminent measure of performance. The problem is, if water's rate-of-return is continually increased without ensuring commensurate real productivity improvements, eventually Australia's water systems must break down. The issue is acute as neither the theory of corporatisation nor the logic of 'economic rationalism' supplies a means for ensuring profitability does not outrun productivity. I conclude the rationalisation of Australia's water has exposed citizens to new, fundamental and otherwise unprotected social, environmental and economic risks.     

Water transfers,irrigation districts,and the compensation problem

Despite statutory reforms and potentially large economic gains from water trades, water markets have been slow to develop throughout the West. This article examines an institutional impediment that has not received adequate attention: How can irrigation districts structure water trades to benefit their customers? It shows how this question can be satisfactorily answered by organizing a proposed water trade like a friendly corporate tender offer. While seemingly a radical procedure, the method conforms with a simple economic interpretation of statute and case law that (1) describes the trustee relationship between irrigation district boards and their customers and (2) defines the equitable and beneficial interest of landowners in the district's water supply.