Employment service: Public or private?

This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular since a public employment agency lacks the right to reject applicants. While analysis of the necessary optimality conditions yields tentative conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of both types of employment service, empirically testable hypotheses result from the predicted responses to increases in unemployment and in the cost of service, respectively. These predicted behaviors are likely to be considered unfair by society, causing dissatisfaction with both private and public employment agencies.     

Reassessing Privatization Strategies 25 Years Later: Revisiting Perry and Babitsky's Comparative Performance Study of Urban Bus Transit Services

Privatization appeals to citizen and politician desires for more cost-effective methods of service delivery. For this reason, it is important for public administrators to know when gains can be made by contracting out or privatizing services and when it is better to keep service provision in house. This article assesses the viability of contracting out and privatization of transit services. Following up on the 1986 work of James Perry and Timlynn Babitsky, which used data from the early 1980s, the authors revisit whether certain service delivery arrangements are more efficient and effective than others in the provision of transit services. Twenty-five years later, they find results similar to those of Perry and Babitsky's original study. Neither the type of government nor whether an agency contracts out has much impact on the efficiency and performance of urban bus services. The main difference between the two studies is that private transit agencies are no longer more efficient or effective than public providers.     

Tackling unemployment in China: state capacity and governance issues

Abstract

This paper considers China's state capacity and changing governance as revealed through its policies to tackle unemployment. Despite high levels of growth, economic restructuring has resulted in rising unemployment over the last decade. The Chinese state has been able to manage job losses from state enterprises, demonstrating some state capacity in relation to this sector and some persistent command economy governance mechanisms. However both design and implementation of policies to compensate and assist particular groups among the unemployed have been shaped by weak state capacity in several other areas. First, capacity to gather accurate employment data is limited, meaning local and central governments do not have a good understanding of the extent and nature of unemployment. Second, the sustainability of supposedly mandatory unemployment insurance schemes is threatened by poor capacity to enforce participation. Third, poor central state capacity to ensure local governments implement policies effectively leads to poor unemployment insurance fund capacity, resulting in provision for only a narrow segment of the unemployed and low quality employment services. Although the adoption of unemployment insurance (and its extension to employers and employees in the private sector), the introduction of a Labour Contract Law in 2007, and the delivery of employment services by private businesses indicate a shift towards the use of new governance mechanisms based on entitlement, contract and private sector delivery of public-sector goods, that shift is undermined by poor state capacity in relation to some of these new mechanisms.     

Competition and Choice in New York City . Social Services

Privatization is intended to improve public services by introducing competition and choice. Does privatization of social services result in competition? To answer this we studied New York City's experience with contracts for three services: shelters for homeless adults, home care, and employment training. A total of 132 contract awards to nonprofit agencies were examined. The evidence suggests the procurement procedures were competitive and followed good practices. There was significant competition in terms of the number of announcements issued, the number of requests for proposals distributed, and the number of proposals ultimately submitted‐an average of 2.48 proposals per award. Contracting for homeless shelters has produced a voucher‐like system with desirable features. Vouchers are also used for some employment training and could be used for home care. Such systems can introduce even more competition and choice for clients of social services. Problems of contracting with nonprofit agencies are reviewed.     

Workplace Relations and Agreement Making in the Australian Public Service

The Howard government has introduced major change to APS employment relations. The long-established centralised system has been replaced by a new employer agenda. Negotiations now occur at agency level and are regulated, as in the private sector, by the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Freedom of association is emphasised, as is the right for individuals to settle contracts with their employer. While the transformation is not yet complete, government policy is pushing toward a new paradigm for bargaining in the public sector.     

Competition, Marketisation, Public Services and Public Ethics

The topic I address provides an embarrassment of scope. At the same time, it allows the development of a theme that is worthwhile discussing. When in the public sector is it worthwhile to import private sector concepts, principles and practices and when would the adoption of a private sector model be injurious to the state's constituents? The theme is worthwhile discussing, in part because some of Australia's jurisdictions appear to be adopting what they consider to be private sector practices, without an adequate framework to guide them. Because there is no proper framework, mistakes are made which could have been avoided. There is also some evidence that the public is uneasy about the loss of ‘public’ from the term public services. It would not be in the public’s own interests to resist, for no good reason, the adoption of private sector principles where that would allow more cost-effective services. The topic also allows a discussion on the influence on public sector ethics of the trend to place senior public servants on contracts that can be disposed of without a reason or prospect of appeal.     

Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies

By applying the Revelation Principle, we focus on how a sponsor, who possesses political authority, could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts - that is, when they control information about the true costs of public services production. Our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement. In a two-types setting, and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms, we find that the agency is productively efficient. Under certain conditions, the agency is also allocatively efficient, while, under others, the low-cost bureau oversupplies and the high-cost agency undersupplies its output.     

Jobactive and young job seekers: Strengths,limitations, and suggested improvements to current practices

This paper explores the efficacy of current employment services in Australia, jobactive, from the perspectives of young job seekers and their employment officers. As high youth unemployment rates and the efficacy of jobactive employment services are currently areas of priority for the Australian Government, the study offers a timely contribution to the social policy and youth employment literature by exploring the tensions experienced by young job seekers while registered with a jobactive provider, and employment officers when assisting young people to find sustainable employment. The study analyses data from 46 interviews with young job seekers and their employment officers in an outer western Melbourne region. The findings reveal particular concerns about appropriate and adequate service provision for marginalized young job seekers that are similar to those in evaluations of previous marketwise employment service contracts, Job Network and Job Services Australia. Suggestions for tailored employment assistance for young job seekers to gain sustainable employment are offered for future consideration.     

Outsourcing Public Health Laboratory Services: A Blueprint for Determining Whether to Privatize and How

In a continuing effort to reform and reinvent the way public organizations do business, the outsourcing of services has become a popular tool, particularly as resource constraints limit options available to governments. All too often, the decision is made, for reasons of ideology or resource constraints, to outsource services without giving careful consideration to the impact of privatization on the core missions of an agency, or whether privatization, in fact, offers real cost savings. Purchasing tools designed for traditional commodity purchases are often grossly unsuited for making decisions on specialized technical services.
This article suggests a process for the evaluation of an option to outsource laboratory services. It suggests that, prior to contracting or privatizing services, the concerned agency should evaluate:
the impact on the agency's core mission
the availability, stability, and reliability of private sector service providers
the relative costs of internal and external (public or private sector) service providers
the potential impact on regulatory enforcement
the ability to monitor the performance of external providers
potential conflicts of interest
Based on this model, the ongoing internal evaluation of services offers public agencies management tools to obtain the best value for the taxpayer dollar, not only in terms of the raw cost per test, but also in managing the quality of the services.     

Are There Election Cycles in Wage Agreements? An Analysis of German Public Employees

In this article, the possibility of Nordhaus political wage cyclesin the West German public services during 1961–1965 is investigated.Since wage negotiations are centralized, one might expect a systematicallyhigher wage increase shortly before a federal election. A regression ofwage increases from 30 consecutive public sector pay contracts is run onan election variable and several additional explanatory variables. Thenull of no election influence is rejected for worker wage increases. Theestimated increase in wages due to an imminent election is predicted to bein the range of 2.5 to 3 percentage points.     

Dynamics of Public Service Motivation: Attraction‒Selection and Socialization in the Production and Regulation of Social Services

The literature on public service motivation (PSM) has typically focused on the relationship between motivation and public/private sector of employment, while the character of the work being performed has been neglected. Using panel surveys with pre‐ and postentry measures of PSM among certified Danish social workers, this article provides a unique design for investigating PSM‐based attraction?selection and socialization effects with respect to the choice between work related to service production or service regulation (controlled for public/private sector of employment). The article shows that the PSM profiles of social work students predict their preference for one of the two types of work tasks but do not predict first employment in the preferred job. Conversely, postentry shifts in social workers’ PSM profiles result from a complex interplay between influences from both work task and sector.     

Utopian Thinking Under the Sign of Neoliberalism: Towards a Critical Pedagogy of Educated Hope

As the vast majority of people become detached from public forums that nourish social critique, agency not only becomes a mockery of itself, it is replaced by market-based choices in which private satisfactions replace social responsibilities and private solutions become a substitute for systemic change. As the worldly space of criticism is undercut by the absence of public pedagogies and spaces that encourage the exchange of information, opinion and criticism, the horizons of an inclusive and substantive democracy disappear against the growing militarization of public space, the attack on the welfare state, the ongoing commercialization of everyday life, and the growing isolation and depoliticization that marks the loss of a politically guaranteed public realm in which autonomy, political participation and engaged citizenship make their appearance. Drawing upon the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, Zygmunt Bauman and others the author addresses the current crisis of meaning, political agency and pedagogy, and the implications it has for developing a cultural politics that links utopian thinking not only to the complex nature of social agency and the importance of democratic public spheres, but also to the fact that active and critical political agents have to be formed, educated and socialized into the world of politics.     

Political-economic aspects of public employment

Abstract. An examination of public employment and expenditure data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1963–1983 reveals decelerating growth in public employment after 1970, whereas expenditure growth rates have been accelerating. Two contrary tendencies in public sector employment since the early 1970s are apparent: a general decline in goods and market services, and a significant increase in communal and social services. Comparative empirical analysis, using a pooled cross section-time series technique, confirms the important contribution of increasing wealth to public employment growth. Similarly, a strong societal position for organised labour and increasing unemployment rates contribute to public employment growth, thereby suggesting the presence of a discretionary stabilization policy. Contrary to expectations, however, increased trade dependence exerts a negative impact. With regard to the relationship between expenditure and employment, a general increase in the employment creation efficiency of spending can be discerned. Empirical estimates again suggest that the importance of labour in political-economic decision-making has intensified the employment creation effect of public spending.     

Employment,privatization, and managerial choice: Does contracting out reduce public sector employment?

We examine the effects of governments' use of alternative service provision on public employment using panel data from a nationally representative sample of local governments. We model the effects of alternative service provision on the size of the public workforce and hypothesize that alternative provision jointly impacts both full‐ and part‐time employment. We find evidence of an inter‐relationship between these employment types. Our results from seemingly unrelated and 3SLS regressions indicate that full‐time employment in the public sector declines when additional services are provided by for‐profit providers, while part‐time employment increases. The net employment effect in the public sector is negative when government services are moved to the for‐profit sector. These combined effects result in a compositional shift toward more part‐time public sector employment. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Autonomous Agencies,Happy Citizens? Challenging the Satisfaction Claim

Is the delegation of public services to semi‐autonomous agencies associated with increased citizen satisfaction? This article assesses three theoretical routes that might link the two: responsiveness, credible commitment, and blame deflection. The article draws on data from the European Social Survey and an expert survey about delegation of tax and police services to semi‐autonomous agencies in 15 countries. No supporting evidence was found for the responsiveness and credible commitment theories. Yet semi‐autonomous agencies sometimes can absorb or deflect blame for bad performance. In the tax case, dissatisfied service users blame the agency, rather than the government. The presence of an agency worked as a scapegoat for dissatisfied service users and resulted in less dissatisfaction with the government in countries where tax services were delegated.     

Clientelism,corruption, and the allocation of resources

Corruption has been shown to have more serious effects upon allocation than simply drawing resources into rent-seeking activities. If politicians anticipate gains from corruption in the policy making process, sub-optimal policies will be the result. Typical examples include excessive nationalization of industry, excessive regulation of the private sector through practices such as licensing and quotas with a view to extract the rent created by these measures. In addition, further misallocation will result at the execution state. It has been shown that the revisionists were wrong in assuming that licenses and contracts will be allocated to the most efficient producers, that rent will be eliminated in government employment, and that corruption increases the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Moreover, differential access to government services leads to additional allocative losses.     

Prosocial Values and Performance Management Theory: Linking Perceived Social Impact and Performance Information Use

Performance management techniques are presented as control mechanisms to save money and hold bureaucrats accountable, consistent with negative agency theory assumptions of bureaucrats. We propose an alternative theory of performance management that rests on prosocial values. This theory argues that public servants who see the social impact of their work are more likely to use performance metrics. We operationalize performance information use in terms of purposeful use for internal organizational means, and political use for external legitimation. Those who perceive that their work has a strong social impact are likely to pursue both types of uses, to improve both the effectiveness of their services, and to maintain resources. The data come from a cross‐sectional survey of U.S. public and nonprofit employees.     

Public Service Motivation: A Test of the Job Attraction–Selection–Attrition Model

ABSTRACT

Public service motivation (PSM) research suggests that PSM influences employee sector choice, yet relatively little research examines how time moderates this relationship. In this research we examine public service motivation among private and public sector lawyers. Using survey data that measure sector of employment at multiple time periods, we investigate the stability of the relationship between individual reward orientations and sector employment choice over time. Our findings suggest that while PSM may not clearly predict the employment sector of a respondent's first job, it does increase the likelihood that a respondent's subsequent job is in the public sector.     

Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.