论城市群府际管理

城市群是当今城市组团式发展的一个新模式。城市群府际管理是为了实现公共政策目标和治理任务,以问题解决为取向,通过协商、合作等方式协调与管理政府间关系的一种行政视野。城市群府际管理的目标是发挥城市群的整体效应、实现城市群内公共事务的有效治理、协调城市群内府际竞争和冲突。为此城市群府际管理应该树立相互依赖、政府间共赢、平等的理念。城市群内府际管理可以通过创新政策法规、建立跨政府管理组织、构建城市群内利益整合机制、实施以城市群发展为目标的政府绩效考核制度来实现。     

府际合作中的困境及对策研究

加强府际间的合作是公共行政改革的趋势.当前,我国府际合作中的现存困境主要体现在利益博弈、组织设置、协调机制设置、相关法律和制度缺失以及当前考核机制激励效力等五个方面.借鉴国外府际合作的经验,解决合作困境的途径主要是形成合作共识,明确政府是区域合作的重要推动力量;建构多元合作主体、多中心治理的合作格局;制定区域合作的法律法规;实施科学的激励机制;大力推动非政府组织的发展.     

建构与融合:区域一体化进程中地方府际间的利益关系协调

区域一体化的本质是实现对资源和生产要素的无障碍跨界流动,这与地方政府间因自利性而引发府际利益冲突并运用行政权力对资源配置的市场化造成的阻滞,构成了现阶段我国区域一体化实现进程中的主要矛盾。区域经济一体化实现的过程也是对复杂的利益关系进行调整建构和协调融合的过程。区域一体化进程中地方政府的主导与阻滞表现在:地方政府是区域一体化实现的主要推动者和参与者;地方府际间利益冲突是区域一体化实现的主要障碍;地方府际间利益协调是区域一体化实现的关键要素。基于地方府际间利益协调视角的区域一体化实现路径是:形成地方府际间的利益协调系统;运用内外联动的网络协调模式;构建地方府际合作的内生传导机制,优化地方府际间利益协调的基础环境。     

跨区域行政合作:类型、困境与合力机制研究

跨区域行政合作是地方政府对社会资源进行跨地区配置并对公共事务进行跨地区治理的一种新型府际关系模式,在现实中形成了"资源整合、利益共享","互通有无、优势互补","吸纳辐射、强弱共进","责任分担、利益补偿","区域压力、共同回应"等合作类型,取得了一定的合作效益,但同时面临着集体行动逻辑影响、政府体制障碍、信任危机考验、官员政绩博弈、监督奖惩机制缺乏等多重困境。为此,需要加快中央政府层面的主导机制、地方政府自身的内驱机制、地方政府合作的保障机制以及区域社会力量的推动机制等合力机制等建设,才能突破当前困境,推动跨区域行政合作的良性和持续发展。     

地方政府间跨区域合作治理的行政制度供给

随着跨区域公共问题和公共事务的大量兴起,地方政府间的开放和合作趋势不断深入,但由于制度惯性、市场竞争、资源稀缺等原因,府际间的合作治理出现一定的路径依赖,如何突破行政区划界限,克服区域发展所导致的负外部性效应,以合作治理的形式提供优质的区域公共产品和公共服务,成为地方政府所面临的新课题。因此,地方政府间应构建新型的跨区域合作治理的行政制度克服集体行动的困境,增强跨区域合作的动力,以实现地方政府间跨区域的合作治理。     

府际治理视野下的区域治理创新

地方政府间关系的处理和协调作为区域治理创新的重要内容日益受到学界的重视。自然无关联机制、市场机制、科层制和府际治理机制等是协调地方政府间关系的四种基本制度。自然无关联机制早已过时,必须摒弃。市场机制和科层制在协调政府间关系时具有积极效应,但却存在着＂市场失灵＂和＂科层制失灵＂的治理困境。府际治理机制是解决上述困境的正确选择,也是当前区域治理创新的重要内容和基本发展方向。     

区域公共管理的制度与机制创新探析——以山东半岛城市群为例

城市群已经成为我国区域发展的主要形式,如何构建城市群间的合作机制是实现区域整体利益的关键.本文选择从区域公共管理的视角,分析了山东半岛城市群发展过程所出现的各种非合作困境及其原因.城市群的合作应该着眼于区域公共问题的解决和区域公共利益的增进,寻求利益互惠基础上的平等合作机制,走出以往单纯依靠行政权力分割和行政区变更的思路.论文提出以复合行政的理念,构建城市群合作的组织平台和合作机制.     

法政时代的中国"斜向府际关系"探究——建构中央部委与地方政府之多元行政主体间关系

条块基础在网络时代日趋落伍,僵化的管理体制难以弥合纵横交错的动态府际争议.斜向府际关系倡导"能量场"的作用,打破上级政府自说自话的垄断地位;重视行政主体间协商对话和信息交换,破除政府间一对一反馈困境,实现回应的多多互动;培养政府与社团乃至个人的共生价值观念.实现多元主体间全方位协调发展.     

政务服务跨域治理府际合作的现实基础、动力机制及优化路径——基于长三角S市“跨省通办”实践的调研分析

跨域治理是应对跨域政务服务需求的有效治理理念，可以为市场要素跨地区流动，区域协调发展提供行政支撑。“以人民为中心”的政务服务价值导向，数字化技术的赋能增效，区域协调发展进程中的地方政府合作基础，为政务服务跨域治理府际合作提供了可行性。科学且高效的府际合作动力机制是政务服务跨域治理效能实现的重要保证。基于APT-R模型，构建起政务服务跨域治理府际合作动力机制。通过对长三角S市“跨省通办”实践的调研分析，发现其府际合作动力机制存在运行梗阻，表现为引力有限、压力不均、推力式微和阻力难消。这是地方行政系统内外部的利益、组织、制度、理念等因素综合作用的结果。优化政务服务跨域治理府际合作动力机制，需要从提升引力、平衡压力、强化推力和消减阻力入手，调适四个作用力的方向和力度，形成府际合作的动力合力，切实增强政务服务跨域治理效能，助推政府公共服务能力提升和区域协调发展的实现。     

纵向介入何以破解地方政府间协商的责任困境？——基于案例比较的探索性研究

受属地管理体制、地方保护主义和宏观治理情境等因素制约,地方政府间协商存在一定程度的议而不决、决而不行和行而不果等责任转化难题。针对地方政府间协商的责任困境,现有研究多围绕横向府际关系进行分析,较少关注纵向治理体系对地方政府间协商的规范价值与约束作用。运用案例比较法,通过对纵向介入促进地方政府间协商合作的责任转化机理进行探讨,研究发现：上级政府的介入选择和干预力度,显著影响地方政府间协商的文化情境、制度架构与行动过程,对破解地方政府间协商的责任困境具有积极意义,具体表现在三个方面：一是上级政府通过政策文件、领导参与等方式开展话语建构,引导地方政府在协商合作中树立收益共享、风险共担的集体负责观念;二是上级政府凭借组织权威完善地方政府间协商的制度架构,以制度化的方式明确地方行政主体在集体行动中承担的差异化治理职责;三是上级政府的绩效考核与过程监督,能够有效约束地方行政主体的治理实践,增强地方政府的自我管理能力和职责履行效力。     

论我国地方政府间合作存在问题及解决途径

加强地方政府间合作是公共行政改革的趋势,也是当前行政科学研究的热点。有关地方治理的理念,由旧地方主义向新地方主义转变。回顾了相关的研究文献,总结了地方政府间合作存在问题的宏观分析框架,认为本位主义下的地方保护、尚未建立有效的合作协调机制、缺乏相关法律与制度的保障、财政经费分担问题是地方政府间合作的主要现存问题。针对这些问题,就完善地方政府间合作的途径与措施,从政治、管理、法制3个层面进行设计与创新,并系统介绍和总结了美国地方政府间合作的几种典型管理模式。     

Intergovernmental Challenges of the 1984 Olympic Games

Planning and managing the 1984 Olympic Games presented uniquefinancial and intergovernmental challenges for city officialsin Los Angeles, but governmental cooperation and an innovativepublic/private partnership to finance and run the Games provedto be successful. Under strict restrictions against spendinglocal tax dollars, the City of Los Angeles assigned managementof the Games to a non-profit committee which raised privatefunds to finance the Games. In cooperation with surroundingjurisdictions and the federal government, the city providedkey services (such as police and fire protection, transportationplanning, and visitor services) under contract to the OlympicCommittee and used two Olympic-related taxes to pay for theseservices, with the Olympic Committee paying for additional expenses.The 1984 Olympics resulted in an estimated economic impact of$3.3 billion on Southern California and left Los Angeles witha number of new and refurbished sports and cultural facilities.Moreover, the Olympic Organizing Committee accrued a surplusof over $215 million, 40 percent of which was targeted to benefityouth sports organizations in southern California.     

The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy

We evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Portugal, as it matured from a young to an established democracy. Using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system, and that their importance changed over time. While tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy, opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years. We argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate’s lack of information on intergovernmental grants.     

Homeland Security Preparedness: The Rebirth of Regionalism

The homeland security mission has placed many new demands onthe U.S. system of federalism. The successful implementationof homeland security policy requires cooperation among all levelsof government—federal, state, and local. Regionalism offersa powerful tool for encouraging greater intergovernmental cooperationand improved homeland security preparedness. We assess the impactof regionalism on intergovernmental cooperation and the implementationof the homeland security mission in Florida, an early proponentof the regional approach. From a regional perspective, we evaluatehow intergovernmental complexity, the quality and quantity ofintergovernmental networks, and security vulnerabilities contributeto perceived improvements in intergovernmental cooperation andhomeland security preparedness. The results of a 2004 mail surveyof city and county officials suggest that regional organizationalstructures are most effective in promoting intergovernmentalcooperation and preparedness where the intergovernmental landscapeis the most complex and where security vulnerabilities are themost intense.     

Same Governance,Different Day: Does Metropolitan Reorganization Make a Difference?

This commentary focuses on three points related to the debate about urban governmental restructuring: existing conflicts in the literature regarding the outcomes of local government consolidation; insights about consolidation based on an assessment of the amalgamation of twelve municipal units creating the new city of Ottawa; and, a discussion of a variety of methodological and political factors that may well account for the continuing inconsistency in academic assessments of structural change in local government. One possible explanation for the latter conflict is that governmental reorganization does not really make things substantially different in terms of taxes and services, that is, those outcomes most directly experienced by the average citizen. Over the long term other forces, such as intergovernmental relations and the economy, will tend to negate most of the initial effects of change. While there are likely to be winners and losers related to power in government or regime, it will be argued that in large part, for most citizens, governmental reorganization produces the same governance on a different day.     

Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security

Scholars and practitioners agree that homeland security policy implementation is contingent on a strong system of intergovernmental relations. The responsibilities associated with the homeland security mission, often mandated, cut across federal, state, and local boundaries. Local-level stakeholders are especially important players in the implementation process. This article presents a local perspective on the way intergovernmental relations have changed—and the reasons for those changes—since 9/11. Results of a survey of county and city officials in Florida provide evidence that intergovernmental cooperation has improved as a result of federal and state mandates. These results are refined by an analysis of the effects of specific local characteristics and the quality and quantity of vertical and horizontal networks on intergovernmental cooperation and local preparedness. Homeland security appears to be a policy area in which mandated cooperation and coordination—in a time and place of urgency—have actually strengthened the intergovernmental system.     

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them?

Fiscal, administrative, and political tensions among the partners in the federal system have not eased, and perhaps have grown, since the demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, deliberation, and policy formulation.     

French Center-Periphery Relations and Science Park Development: Local Policy Initiatives and Intergovernmental Policymaking

This article focuses on new patterns of territorial governance in the aftermath of the 1982 decentralization reforms in France. The traditional "cross regulation" model developed by the Crozier school is wrong to assume culturally grounded stalemate and to suggest that local political power is nothing more than the informal access of local elites to national policymaking. Analyzing the policy of technopoles or science park development, both nationally and by way of detailed local case studies of Montpellier and Rennes, we demonstrate that, on the contray, French local and regional authorities have risen progressively to independent loci of governmental power and policymaking. Local policy initiatives are, however, embedded in a multi-level institutional fabric ranging from the local to the European level. These developments in center-periphery relations need to be placed into the context of the general decline of the traditional French public policy model, which has been stiffly challenged by the norms of market, Europe and subsidiarity. In conclusion, a comparative and interorganizational perspective suggests that France is moving toward a territorial system increasingly characterized by the dynamics of intergovernmental conflict and cooperation and best described as "quasi-federalism in unitary disguise."     

AFTER REAGAN'S DEREGULATION: STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT OVER ENERGY POLICY

President Reagan's New Federalism has promised to redistribute the political power within the fcdcral system through a concerted program of deregulation and decentralization. Through such an approach, the Administration holds that intergovernmental policy making will reap the benefits of increased cooperation, efficiency, and effectiveness. This paper examines Reagan's New Federalism in energy policy, finding a continued presence of state-federal conflict in intergovernmental implementation decisions. This conflict emerges as the President's priorities of deregula- tion and decentralization often combat one another. This analysis, then, suggests that New Federalism's emphasis on deregulation, rather than decentralization, carries the greatest weight in explaining the politics on intergovernmental energy policy implementation in the 1980s.     

How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization

This study empirically examines the roles of gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups in vertical fiscal imbalances across US states via a two-step generalized method of moments estimation during a 22-year period (1987–2008). States' share of intergovernmental transfers and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are often affected by interaction between governors and interest groups, as are expenditure centralization and revenue/expenditure centralization. Revenue decentralization and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are frequently influenced by cooperation between governors and interest groups via mutual support. Long-term cooperation and gridlock each influence expenditure centralization, revenue/expenditure centralization, and revenue decentralization. Long-term cooperation is not statistically significant in terms of the state and local shares of intergovernmental transfers; that is, governors and interest groups cooperate in pursuit of short-term benefits rather than long-term results. Long-term political influence also has no impact, affirming a short-term-oriented political viewpoint.