Visualizing Estonia

The concept of "Estonia" is constituted in different sign systems. Each such sign system models and communicates various aspects of "Estonia", adding simultaneously its medium specific signs to the concept. The dominating visual representations circulating internationally about Estonia are photo albums, postcards, films, web pages and other iconic items. Photo albums in particular are constituted by the orthoscopic parameters of painting and the innocent notion of ‘picturesque’. In Estonia these albums present hardly anything else than architecture and weirdly empty environment. The reason for this might be a long-term impact of ideology of the past that still tends to constitute an idealist kaleidoscopic overview of the country with no social dimension and its problems as a part of it. The modest level of visual literacy is obviously another reason of the endencies of representation that we observe in this research. The scenes offered in the visual façade menu mostly come from the past that refersto the vitality of the "national" model of culture in Estonia. Hence we haveCorrection Form file:///C:/Workdir/PROG/recfolder/111113/STY39736/Correction for So... 1 of 2 11/11/2013 3:39 PM the concept of a city/state as first of all an open-air museum. The status of "visual Estonia" would be more interesting with inclusion of first: heterotopic environment in the visual representations; second: shifing the "orthoscopic parametres" of representations; and third: diversifying scopic positions.     

Alternative forms of the Shapley value and the Shapley-Shubik index

We prove the validity of an alternative representation of the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of voting power, based on the following model. Voting in an assembly consisting of n voters is conducted by roll-call. Every voter is assumed to vote "yea" or "nay" with equal probability, and all n! possible orders in which the voters may be called are also assumed to be equiprobable. Thus there are altogether 2 ⁿ n! distinct roll-call patterns. Given a simple voting game (a decision rule), the pivotal voter in a roll-call is the one whose vote finally decides the outcome, so that the votes of all those called subsequently no longer make any difference. The main result, stated without proof by Mann and Shapley (1964), is that the Shapley-Shubik index of voter a in a simple voting game is equal to the probability of a being pivotal. We believe this representation of the index is much less artificial than the original one, which considers only the n! roll-calls in which all voters say "yea" (or all say "nay"). The proof of this result proceeds by generalizing the representation so that one obtains a value for each player in any coalitional game, which is easily seen to satisfy Shapley's (1953) three axioms. Thus the generalization turns out to be an alternative representation of the Shapley value. This result implies a non-trivial combinatorial theorem.     

Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal

The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.     

Variations in appointment delays for physicians' services: Theory and empirical evidence

Waiting times for physician appointments have been used in past studies as a measure of access to, or excess demand pressure on, local ambulatory care systems. This paper offers an alternative view—that short appointment delays are one of several types of amenities produced by physicians in combination with health services. Empirical evidence is presented that illuminates some previously unknown relationships between appointment delays, patient diagnosis, site of care, and family income. A model is developed with the capability of predicting short-run responses to changes in demand for physicians' services. The model and empirical evidence are used as the basis for interpreting recent experience in Canada with its system of national health insurance (NHI) and for predicting potential consequences regarding the production of amenities of NHI in the US.This research has been supported in part by a grant (HS—00825) from the Center for Health Services Research, US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the University of Florida. We are indebted to John B. Wayne and to Paula Sloan for their assistance and to University of Florida colleague Gary Shannon for comments on an earlier draft.     

Correction to: Rigid Religious Faith Promotes Selective Exposure to Attitude-Congruent Political Information

Political Behavior - The original version of this article unfortunately missed to add the "Dependent Variable" note is Table 3 footnote. The note is given below: "The dependent...     

A Profile of Discontinuity between Citizen Demand and Willingness to Pay Taxes: Comprehensive Planning for Park and Recreation Investment

Growing alienation between citizens and government represents an important challenge to democracy. Resistance to taxation is one of the manifestations of this alienation. The issue is further complicated by citizen demands that exceed their willingness to pay taxes, referred to here as tax-demand discontinuity. This article uses a survey of over 700 citizens designed to provide an information foundation for comprehensive park and recreation planning to test for and profile tax-demand discontinuity. Using combined scores on summated measures of willingness to pay taxes and demand for public investment, citizens are typologically classified into nine groups that are then consolidated under three classifications of tax-demand discontinuity. Citizen-assignments include traditionalists, or those with continuity or balance between willingness to pay taxes and demand; philanthropists, those who are willing to pay taxes in excess of demand; and free-riders, citizens with demands that exceed willingness to pay taxes. Differences in assessments of local government performance are examined in relationship to tax-demand discontinuity classifications indicating that productivity alone will not resolve issues of tax-demand discontinuity. The results indicate differences in citizen subpopulations in tax-demand discontinuity.     

Random errors, dirty information, and politics

Rational voters' assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased, but affected by random errors. "Clean" information decreases these errors, while "dirty" information increases them. In politics, most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically. Thus, such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate. They systematically affect politics. This illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups. It helps to explain various puzzles in Public Choice, e.g., the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments. Institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians' incentives to produce dirty information.     

Public School Music: Notes on the Public Provision of a Quasi-Private Good

This paper uses a version of theBergstrom/Goodman median voter model toexamine whether there are aspects ofpublicness to public school music. It alsoexamines whether the provision of publicschool music is an example of the abilityof small groups to seek benefits forthemselves at the expense of larger groups. School music programs provide a uniquesetting in which it is possible to separatethe demand for school music programs by theconsumers of school music (the privatebeneficiaries) from the demand for schoolmusic programs by those who do not directlyconsume the product. If those who are notdirect consumers of music programs appearto value school music programs as a publicgood, their valuation cannot be confusedwith a jointly consumed private good, orconsumption of a private good with scaleeconomies, because they are not themselvesconsuming it as a private good. Using datafrom the 1987 Schools and Staffing Survey,the results from a logarithmic, normative,demand model show that (parents of)nonmusic students appear to value musicprograms as a public good. Once it isprovided for music students, additionalproportions of nonmusic students do notdemand additional music classes. In thatmodel, music students appear to value musicclasses as a private good. In thepositive, additive, demand model, moremusic students mean that more music classeswill be provided. Further, since music isvalued as a non-subtractable public goodwhose costs can easily be spread,increasing numbers of non-music studentsalso result in (slightly) more musicclasses. The method can be used to estimate thepublicness of publicly provided goodswhenever it is possible to separate thedirect beneficiaries of the good from thosewho could only value its externalities. The model seems particularly applicable tostudying the extent to which defense isvalued as a quasi-private good by theconcentrated defense industry; and whetherit is also valued as a public good bycitizen/voters with no connection to thedefense industry. It may also be usefulfor investigating still unsettled questionsregarding the publicness of publiclyprovided education.     

EMS-based Environmental Regimes as Club Goods: Examining Variations in Firm-level Adoption of ISO 14001 and EMAS in U.K., U.S. and Germany

This paper examines variations in firm-level adoption of environmental management systems (EMS) – ISO 14001 and the European Union's Eco-Audit and Management Scheme (EMAS) – in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. Drawing on insights from club theory, institutional theory, and stakeholder theory, it argues that despite the fact that these EMS are created by supranational organizations (one regional and one international), firms' perceptions of their costs and benefits are largely determined by domestic factors. In particular, these perceptions are shaped by how EMS are promoted and information about them is disseminated in each country (supply aspects) and how the constellation of stakeholders (suppliers, environmental groups, regulators, general public) support their introduction (demand aspects). The paper concludes that there are numerous ways governments and interested stakeholders can encourage companies to adopt voluntary environmental codes. The key is to find the right mix of incentives for specific national contexts.     

On the Edge of Solidarity: The Burqa and Public Life

Dislike among European publics for the Islamic full veil and the desire to ban it are often ascribed to nativist "Islamophobia." This article questions that assumption. It argues that, in political terms, the wearing of the burqa and niqab is inconsistent with Western norms of equality, the backbone of the citizenship ideal; and that, in social terms, the full veil erects a partition to interpersonal understanding and reciprocity. While the constitutional duty to protect religious freedom is a good argument in favor of tolerating the full veil, the practice of wearing it is at the edge of solidarity and injurious to the democratic public sphere.     

Political Positions,Hierarchies and Political Markets: Towards a New Theory on Political Recruitment*

This article adresses itself to the problem of political recruitment. Most recruitment studies are based on models of recruitment where the model presupposes more candidates than positions. Studying local committees we cannot presuppose excess demand for political positions. The article tries to introduce economic theory into the study of political recruitment. With concepts of market, supply, demand and prices, the article discusses recruitment to various types of positions. When we have extreme market conditions with either excess demand or lack of demand, the recruitment processes can best be understood in terms of hierarchical forces. The sales of less important positions in a situation with low demand for these positions could best be understood in terms of market mechanism. Comparing an economic market with a political market, the article finds variation in the transaction structure. The economic markets have a specific transaction structure, with specific obligations linked to transactions, while the political markets have a more unspecified transaction structure with more unspecified obligations linked to the transactions. A less specified transaction structure has lower transaction costs in a hierarchy than in a market. This, the author believes, could explain why some transactions take place in markets while others take place in hierarchies.     

Tradable Permits for Common‐Pool Resources: An Assessment

Scholars often attribute deterioration in common‐pool resources (CPRs) to ill‐defined property rights and suggest privatization and tradable permit markets as a solution to the commons problem. CPRs are heterogeneous, differing in physical characteristics and use patterns. Regulating their use requires tailored policy solutions that cohere with these characteristics. This paper examines factors that contribute to a well‐performing tradable permit market. While the literature offers rich empirical analyses of individual tradable permit markets, it has not provided an analytical framework enabling comparative analysis of these markets. This paper develops and employs an analytical framework for comparing across markets. The comparative analysis of market performance suggests that markets are not successful in all environmental problems and all demand situations. Further, it shows that even some markets frequently cited as exemplary successes have been that for nonmarket‐related reasons. On the other hand, this comparative analysis identifies sources of success for markets that partial analytical frameworks would have predicted to fail.     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

Democracy and decentralisation: local politics,marginalisation and political accountability in Uganda and South Africa

While democratic decentralisation is viewed as an important vehicle for development in sub‐Saharan Africa, its viability in practice is often doubted. Lack of resources, expertise, marginalised populations and the inexperience of local electors are all barriers to successful decentralisation. However, often overlooked are the diverse ways in which local people use the opportunities provided by democratic decentralisation to engage local authorities and demand accountability. Using examples from Uganda and South Africa,¹ this article demonstrates how local people use democratic openings to meet the challenges of marginalisation and demand accountability. While the data is from the mid to late 1990s, the evidence presented here is relevant to the continuing debate over democratic decentralisation for it reveals something that is not always recognised: lack of resources is not necessarily the problem; developing political capacity for demanding accountability for existing resources is what is important. The implication is that for decentralisation to be effective, practitioners must develop a better understanding of local political engagement so that their efforts may strengthen rather than thwart emerging political relations of accountability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side-payments.     

How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy

Beliefs about normative economics appear to be primarily determined by sociotropic rather than egocentric variables. (Sears & Funk, 1990; Citrin & Green, 1990) Using the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, the current paper finds that the same holds for positiveeconomic beliefs in most – but not all – cases. This hinges on whether a question is “causal” or “non-causal”: Causal beliefs depend on sociotropic variables, especially education and ideology; non-causal beliefs, in contrast, depend on egocentric variables, with income growth playing the leading role. This is consistent with a cognitive model where actors answer easier questions using personal experience, and harder ones with ``off-the-shelf" theories.     

The costs of collectivization,per se

The question of collectivization becomes relevant in the post-financial crisis years as characterized by growing criticism of market organization. Collectivization, the social structure distinguishable from the market or central planning agency, can be costly from overspending. In our analytical framework, the political order remains polycentric. The most widely acceptable institutional solution may be budgetary outlay sufficient to meet all demand, and especially when it is recognized that public criticism of market alternatives is often concentrated on moral goods, e.g., health care. The excess burden of collectivization, per se, is the excess of costs over benefits if the collectivity meets individual demand for the good beyond plausible efficiency levels. The costs of collectivization, per se, can be reduced by separated budgets, showing both revenue and outlay for individual budgetary line items, that bring collective spending decisions closer to the accompanying levy of taxes.     

Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges

The regression results of this paper show that bureaucrats act to maximize both their outputs and their discretionary budgets as predicted by Niskanen for demand constrained conditions. But the evidence does not confirm the Niskanen hypothesis concerning chronic oversupply by bureaus. Further, the evidence here shows that the discretionary budgets of bureaus may not fall to zero as suggested by Niskanen. Instead, it would appear that, given severe budget constraint bureaus may not produce an excess supply of output and may cut costs in an effort to maintain a positive discretionary budget balance.     

The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods

In this paper, we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods. Specifically, we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control. Intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo-classical economic theory. In this research, the ‘flypaper effect’ is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences. We empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods. Competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect. The implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed.     

M3 money demand and excess liquidity in the euro area

Recent empirical studies have found evidence of unstable long run money demand functions if recent data are used. If the link between money balances and the macroeconomy is fragile, the rationale of monetary aggregates in the ECB strategy has to be doubted. In contrast we present a “stable” long run money demand relationship for M3 for the period 1983–2006. To obtain the result, the short run homogeneity restriction between money and prices is relaxed and a break in the income elasticity of money demand after 2001 is taken into account. Measures of excess liquidity do not show significant inflation pressures.