Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions for Congressional Lawmaking

Scholars generally agree on the doctrinal significance of theRehnquist Court's post-1990 federalism decisions, but thereis less agreement about the consequences of these decisions.A previous study examined the direct consequences of these decisions,by inquiring into the extent to which Congress was able to reviseand reenact statutes that were struck down by the Court, butit left unexamined the effects on Congress's ability to legislatein other areas. This article assesses the indirect consequencesof these decisions by tracing their effects on the draftingof and debate over bills other than the ones directly invalidatedby the Court. It turns out that these decisions have had onlya limited effect on Congress's ability to draft constitutionallyacceptable legislation, but they have had an important effecton the debate over the passage of several pieces of legislation,whether by handing opponents arguments to oppose the bills orby providing members of Congress with means to explain volesthat would otherwise be difficult to defend.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

The Congress and fiscal policy

Although the common belief is that the Congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy, the same kinds of political-economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior. The Congress' fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors. Changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy. As for political factors, the President's lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side. The electoral cycle, in particular the off-year congressional election year, is also important; inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues. When the influences on congressional fiscal behavior are compared with those on presidential behavior, the sources of the generally more expansionary congressional fiscal policy are identified. Congressional budget deficits increase in response to increased rates of unemployment but are insensitive to increases in inflation. In contrast, presidential budgets are heavily influenced by inflation and the growth in personal income — increases in each resulting in smaller proposed deficits — as well as by unemployment rates. In years in which both unemployment and inflation are increasing, the combination of the two (assuming a one percentage point change in each) implies an increase in the congressional deficit of $6.7 billion but a decrease in the president's proposed deficit of $2.5 billion. The implications of this study are a challenge to the literature which makes the President the central actor in macro-economic policy.     

Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power

The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power.     

The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining, and Policy Consistency

Political science can offer few theoretical generalizations about the exercise of presidential power. From one perspective, this is no disadvantage: there are few presidents, and presidential leadership so intrinsically involves the interplay of ideas and persuasive deliberation that success depends on personal traits and the fit of the president's ideas with the times. Striving for inductive generalizations in such a case would mistake rote scientific method for the pursuit of knowledge. Others argue, however, that the dearth of theoretical generalizations is a temporary weakness, remediable by shifting to a deductive approach. Deductive theorizing can claim insights in other areas once typified by historiographic methods, notably in studies of Congress, and formal models of legislation have been extended to generate hypotheses about transactions between president and Congress. I suggest that neither side of the dilemma offers a satisfactory and complete approach to the puzzle of presidential leadership; it then goes on to specify how the contributions from each side fit together. Rational choice models, based on bargaining as the mode of influence and the repeated game as the image of process, show how institutional structures can produce stable decisions where majority rule tends toward endless cycling. But the cost is that the resulting decisions are typically ad hoc and disjointed. Achieving consistent and coherent policy requires more subtle coordination of individual expectations than legislative organizations can manage, and it is this limitation of bargaining that establishes the potential for presidential leadership. Presidents can attempt to capitalize on this opportunity either by intervening as an additional (but situationally advantaged) bargainer, or by employing persuasion, the explicit appeal to collective goals rather than particularistic trades. I develop the distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.     

Why Public Employees Rebel: Guerrilla Government in the Public Sector

Employee recalcitrance and employer reprisal are ever-present conditions in public service. Yet we have limited knowledge of the forces that move administrators away from acquiescence and toward antagonism. The authors follow the theoretical thrust of behavioral public administration to better understand administrative behavior by targeting the determinants of guerrilla government actions. They do so by presenting the results of a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of federal bureaucrats. Findings show that decisions to pursue guerrilla activities are conditional on a multitude of factors—namely, the bureaucrat's personal views of the directive as a policy solution, the compatibility of the directive with the bureaucrat's ethical framework, the status of the person issuing the directive, and the probability that the directive might cause harm to others. Notably, these decisions generally are not affected by the probability of retribution or the expected type thereof. However, they are affected by the magnitude of harm that may ensue if orders are obeyed and not resisted.     

Whom do you trust? An analysis of executive and congressional economic forecasts

Economic forecasts play an increasing role in U.S. budgetary and fiscal policies. This paper analyzes the accuracy and bias of economic forecasts prepared by the Executive Branch and Congress. Short-run forecasts by the Executive Branch for the forthcoming year do not appear biased. They are as accurate as private forecasts and the forecasts of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); they are not sensitive to political factors such as the size of the deficit. At the same time, the accuracy of Executive branch's short-run economic forecasts has not improved over the period from 1962 to 1984, and the forecasts themselves can be well approximated by simple, single-equation models that use a small number of variables. In contrast to short-run forecasts, long-run economic forecasts of both the Executive branch and CBO are consistently optimistic. The degree of optimism increases with the length of the forecasting horizon and the degree of fiscal pressure the year in which they are issued. The Reagan Administration's long-run forecasts, while typically optimistic, have not been rosier than those issued under previous administrations.     

The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability

Since 1975, lawmakers have displayed four responses to the call for greater intelligence accountability on Capitol Hill. Some have taken the approach of ‘ostriches’, content to bury their heads in the sand and continue the earlier era of trust when members of Congress deferred to the decisions of the executive branch within the domains of intelligence. Others – indeed, a majority – have chosen to become unalloyed boosters for intelligence –‘ cheerleaders’ who view their job primarily as one of explaining the value of intelligence to the American people and supporting intelligence missions with robust funding and encouragement. Taking the opposite approach, another set of lawmakers – the ‘lemon-suckers’ – have consistently found fault with America's attempts to spy on adversaries or overthrow regimes that fail to accommodate US interests. Finally, some lawmakers have been ‘guardians’, striking a balance between serving as partners of the intelligence agencies on Capitol Hill and, through a persistent examination of budgets and operations, demanding competence and law-abiding behavior from these agencies. The guardian model fits best into the framework of democratic theory.     

A dynamic test of the marginality hypothesis

The marginality hypothesis is an attempt to relate the voting margins of members of Congress to their subsequent legislative behavior. A major corollary of the hypothesis is that members of Congress with small victory margins will be more responsive to constituents than those with large victory margins. This has been assumed to mean that electorally secure representatives can afford to be more loyal to their congressional parties, since they have less cause to worry about their chances for reelection. Previous empirical studies have produced mixed results. We ask the question in a different way: Do changes in marginality affect party voting within Congress? If so, major shifts in the electorate potentially can have a fundamental impact on the behavior of Congress itself. We find that this is not true. Electoral margin is simply not related to party loyalty.     

India,Brazil, and public health: Rule-making through south–south diffusion in the intellectual property rights regime?

This article analyzes the domestic drivers of regulatory state formation in India and Brazil and its consequences for the global rules governing pharmaceutical patents. We first analyze Indian and Brazilian politics of regulatory state formation; then, in light of the extent to which the two countries have built regulatory capacity and capability in the field of patent regulation, we explore whether and how they have been able to influence the existing intellectual property regime in health. We look into India's Section 3(d) and Brazil's prior consent requirement. Whereas India's Section 3(d) regulation has gained international regulatory influence by diffusing to other developing countries, the same cannot be said for Brazil's prior consent regulation, which has been caught by policy-reversals. The transition toward regulatory states in emerging countries is a bulky road and does not progress in linear ways. However, once regulatory capacity and capability have been solidified, domestic policy innovations can become internationally influential.     

Discourses of popular politics,war and authenticity in Turkish pop music

Turkey and the United States (US) have had a close mutually beneficial political and military relationship since the end of World War Two. However, this relationship came under pressure when the US government and Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) tried to cooperate closely in the 2003 military invasion of Iraq. AKP's leadership failed to persuade Turkey's parliament to accept the deployment of US troops and equipment in Turkey partially due to public opinion. Despite Turkish media and its government being intertwined to the extent where subversive discourses are all but silenced, some popular music videos were able to articulate discourses which questioned AKP's military policies. This paper analyses lyrics, visuals and sounds of one of these songs to look at the way war and political issues become articulated through a form of simplified popular politics, despite being presented as serious and authentic by a number of key signifiers across the different modes. A number of scholars have addressed the issue of subversion in music both as actual political challenge and as popular counter culture. This case study is used to assess subversion in music in these terms in order to consider its likely place in political debate in Turkey.     

Administrative Management: Does Its Strong Executive Thesis Still Merit Our Attention?

Tasked with the responsibility of finding new and innovative ways of improving administrative management, Arthur W. Macmahon, James W. Fesler, and Herbert Emmerich creatively enriched the final report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management with their analyses. But that is not the only reason for celebrating this work today. These documents still merit attention because they are historical landmarks that draw attention to the continuing tensions between Congress and the president over which branch of government should have control over executive branch agencies. This study makes the case for a strong executive in a manner that has rarely been as clearly and forcefully stated as it was in 1937. It reminds the field that policy decisions remain nothing but aspirations until they are turned into action. Reading this study is like reading any classic treatise on government—it generates thought.     

Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators

Why are people more willing to accept some governmental decisions than others? In this article, we present results from a series of original experiments showing that people's reactions to a given outcome are heavily influenced by the procedure employed to produce the outcome. We find that subjects react much less favorably when a decision maker intentionally keeps a large payoff, thereby leaving the subject with a small payoff, than when that same payoff results from a procedure based on chance or on desert. Moreover, subjects react less favorably to outcomes rendered by decision makers who want to be decision makers than they do to identical outcomes selected by reluctant decision makers. Our results are consistent with increasingly prominent theories of behavior emphasizing people's aversion to being played for a “sucker,” an attitude that makes perfect sense if people's main goal is not to acquire as many tangible goods as possible but to make sure they are a valued part of a viable group composed of cooperative individuals.     

The New President Makes a Budget: From Eisenhower to Bush

Beginning with Eisenhower in 1953, newly elected presidents have proposed revisions to the budgets their predecessors submitted just before leaving office. Only Eisenhower and Reagan enjoyed substantial success in these efforts; the other four soon found that Congress has become increasingly determined to work its own will in budgetary matters. While we have only six cases of new presidents who tried to revise their predecessors' budgets, it seems clear that the two most significant determinants of success have been the personal popularity of the president and a favorable ideological (not partisan) balance in Congress.     

Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000

Compared to U.S. political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their copartisans in legislative divisions. Yet in Italy in recent years, legislators switch parties with seeming abandon. Between 1996 and spring 2000, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only 20 switches in the U.S. Congress from 1947 to 1997 ( Nokken 2000 ). We examine the relationship between switching and observed party unity in Italy by focusing on individual legislators' switching decisions and voting behavior. Overall, switchers move out of highly disciplined parties, suggesting that they switch partly in order to escape strong discipline.     

The congress for cultural freedom in Denmark

The Danish section of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was established in 1953 by Arne Sejr, a former wartime resistance leader. The Society for Freedom and Culture was formed as a part of Sejr's private anti-communist intelligence network, called the Firm. But Sejr did not understand the methods or goals of the CCF's work, since he was more concerned with political propaganda and information rather than cultural issues. During its early years the special circumstances of the Danish branch were ignored by the Congress HQ, but in 1957 Jorgen Schleimann, a Danish employee at the Congress office in Paris, set out to reform the Danish Society's work. Denmark's experience with the CCF provides a good example of the tension that could exist between the universal agenda of the Congress and particular national conditions. It also demonstrates the limitations of the CCF's purpose and therefore also the ‘boundaries’ to Cold War cultural manipulation in the West.     

Majority representation and legitimacy: Survey-experimental evidence from the European Union

What can policy makers do in day-to-day decision making to strengthen citizens' belief that the political system is legitimate? Much literature has highlighted that the realization of citizens' personal preferences in policy making is an important driver of legitimacy beliefs. We argue that citizens, in addition, also care about whether a policy represents the preferences of the majority of citizens, even if their personal preference diverges from the majority's. Using the case of the European Union (EU) as a system that has recurringly experienced crises of public legitimacy, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in which respondents assess the legitimacy of fictitious EU decisions that vary in how they were taken and whose preferences they represent. Results from original surveys conducted in the five largest EU countries show that the congruence of EU decisions not only with personal opinion but also with different forms of majority opinion significantly strengthens legitimacy beliefs. We also show that the most likely mechanism behind this finding is the application of a ‘consensus heuristic’, by which respondents use majority opinion as a cue to identify legitimate decisions. In contrast, procedural features such as the consultation of interest groups or the inclusiveness of decision making in the institutions have little effect on legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that policy makers can address legitimacy deficits by strengthening majority representation, which will have both egotropic and sociotropic effects.     

Ernest S. Griffith: A Renaissance Man,a Pioneering Public Administrator

In the 1940s and 1950s, Ernest Stacey Griffith was well known on Capitol Hill and frequently featured in major newspaper and magazine articles about the work of Congress. He was also recognized as an influential scholar. Today, few members of Congress and only a handful of the thousands employed by the legislative branch have ever heard of him. Even at the Congressional Research Service—Congress's think tank—which he headed for 18 years, Griffith is mostly an unfamiliar name. During his century‐long life, this Rhodes Scholar left an indelible legacy in several arenas. Griffith was not only a pioneering advisor to the nation's legislators and an astute observer of American democracy, he also achieved acclaim as a public administrator, an innovative teacher and educator, an early supporter of the conservation movement, a prominent community and religious leader, and a record‐setting mountain climber.     

Small state diplomacy: Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam

Cambodia's foreign policy behavior towards Vietnam can be characterized as using a strategy of ‘hedging’, whose nature is different from the one suggested in the existing literature. Such a strategy can be discerned from Cambodia's omni-directional policy responses, ranging from economic pragmatism, limited bandwagoning, binding engagement and soft-balancing. Furthermore, the case of Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam suggests that non-state actors, such as the opposition party and the population (voters) play a significant role in shaping the state's foreign policy, even though it is formed under the authoritarian ruling party. This study also suggests that the foreign policy decisions of an authoritarian state are not solely shaped by the personal attributes of their leader.     

Effectiveness of Connected Legislators

Important work has been done to measure legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and to explain the individual characteristics that drive it. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to study the extent to which legislative effectiveness depends on the legislators' social connections. We address this issue with a new model of legislative effectiveness that formalizes the role of social connections, and we test its predictions using the network of cosponsorship links in the 109th–113th Congresses. We propose a new empirical strategy that addresses network endogeneity by implementing a two-step Heckman correction based on an original instrument: the legislators' alumni connections. We find that social connections are a significant determinant of legislative effectiveness. We also study the influence of legislators' characteristics in shaping the network effects. In doing so, we provide new insights into how social connectedness interacts with factors such as seniority, partisanship, and legislative leadership in determining legislators' effectiveness.