Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict

Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.     

From Peacekeeping to Stabilisation: Interorganisational Co-operation,Challenges and the Law

ABSTRACT

Global complexity and limitations in the United Nation's legal framework necessitates collaboration with regional organisations, creating tension between the legal frameworks guiding peacekeeping, the use of force, and intervention practices within the increasing complexity of peace enforcement and stabilisation missions with a Protection of Civilians mandate. With the UNs lack of impetus in clarifying stabilisation as a concept, the use of force required for stabilisation cannot be justified, necessitating the use of regional organisations' more flexible legal frameworks. The continued complexity of contemporary peace and security requires a reassessment of peacekeeping doctrine that, if left unaddressed, risk condemnation for illegal ‘peacekeeping'.     

Humanity,military humanism and the new moral order

The post-WWII period has been characterized by an endless process of international humanitarian law-making, aimed at protecting people from their governments. After the collapse of communism, human rights have allegedly transcended their Eurocentrism and have become the first truly universal moral justification for the use of force. This essay explores the meaning and scope of humanity and questions the range of normative resources mobilized in its name. In view of these doubts, it argues that the recent combination of humanism and military force is the outward sign of an emerging moral world order, which is criticized from a number of pragmatic, principled and realist perspectives.     

Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities

Free riders and holdouts are distinct market failures that potentially impede the completion of otherwise beneficial transactions. The key difference is that the free rider problem is a demand side externality that requires taxation to compel payment for a public good, while the holdout problem is a supply side externality that requires eminent domain to force the sale of land for large scale projects. This paper highlights the distinction between these two problems and uses the resulting insights to clarify the meaning of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.     

Institutions, Ideology, and the Tragedy of the Commons: West Texas Groundwater Policy

West Texas is the setting for an unintended experiment in commonsresource management. Dispersed, autonomous, local groundwaterdistricts use nonregulatory strategies to promote conservationand groundwater quality. The central force driving this organizationalform appears to be ideological. West Texans seek alternativesto state management of groundwater pumping. This study useskey-informant interviews to evaluate the strength of ideologyin explaining West Texas groundwater policy and to provide atheoretical framework for discussing the importance of the "localsolution.’ Time-series data substantiate the claim thatlocal groundwater districts succeed in slowing depletion rates.     

Perspectives on Space Operations

The debate over military uses of space generally and the weaponization of space in particular is as old as the space age itself. Most recently this debate has been re-invigorated in Canada within the context of Ballistic Missile Defence. This article provides an overview of the legal framework governing the use of force in space, concluding that military activity including, in limited circumstance, the use of force, is not prohibited. The article then addresses the policy debate that arises around issues of weaponization, use of force, and space security. It concludes that while the deployment of certain weapons in space and the employment of force in from and through space might be permitted, a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of such decisions is required to ensure the objective of enhanced security will in fact be achieved.     

Do White Law Enforcement Officers Target Minority Suspects?

The debate over possible bias in the use of deadly force has recently been exacerbated by highly publicized killings of African American males around the country. While much research has been conducted examining police behavior, little has been done to investigate the impact of race on police behavior. This article aims to answer this question: are white police officers more likely to use lethal force on minority suspects or people of a specific race? To answer this question, the authors construct a data set of all confirmed uses of lethal force by police officers in the United States in 2014 and 2015. They find that although minority suspects are disproportionately killed by police, white officers appear to be no more likely to use lethal force against minorities than nonwhite officers.     

Is Representation Enough? Racial Disparities in Levels of Force and Arrests by Police

The research in representative bureaucracy that examines the extent to which racial congruence impacts bureaucrats’ decisions is mixed. This study adds to this literature by examining the impact of representative bureaucracy on the level of force that police officers use and whether they make an arrest in use of force encounters, while taking into consideration key situational conditions. Using individual-level data from New Orleans to estimate this impact, the authors find that racial congruence and incongruence impact policing outcomes even in the presence of situational shortcuts that cue decision-making. The findings show that the benefits of representation are conditional on the outcome. Black officers are less likely to use higher levels of force on Black civilians. Yet both Black and White officers are less likely to arrest White civilians in use of force encounters. This suggests that interactions in which bureaucrats have less discretion (e.g., arrests) may offer limited opportunities for active representation.     

DEADLY FORCE AS A POLICY PROBLEM IN LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: DO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This article examines the impact of six administrative practices on the use of deadly force by police officers in American cities with a population greater than 50,000. Generally, departmental policies demonstrate little association with the frequency of shooting incidents per police officer, or in the number of incidents resulting in fatalities or injuries. It does appear that police departments which issue more traditional sidearms tend to experience fewer incidents than departments which issue heavier firearms. This same lack of association between administrative practices and the use of deadly force is discovered when controlling for city population size arid state legal codes. Notwithstanding that some of the relationships are in the expected direction, their lack of statistical significance suggests that the use of deadly force has its antecedents in sources other than the administrative policies of local police departments.     

Structural Change in U.S. Presidents' Use of Force

Has there been a structural change in the way U.S. presidents use force abroad since the nineteenth century? In this article, I investigate historical changes in the use of force by U.S. presidents using Bayesian changepoint analysis. In doing so, I present an integrated Bayesian approach for analyzing changepoint problems in a Poisson regression model. To find the nature of the breaks, I estimate parameters of the Poisson regression changepoint model using Chib's (1998) hidden Markov model algorithm and Frühwirth‐Schnatter and Wagner's (2006) data augmentation method. Then, I utilize transdimensional Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to detect the number of breaks. Analyzing yearly use of force data from 1890 to 1995, I find that, controlling for the effects of the Great Depression and the two world wars, the relationship between domestic conditions and the frequency of the use of force abroad fundamentally shifted in the 1940s.     

Citizenship and preemptive war: The lesson from Iraq

This paper argues that citizens should be wary of a policy of Reformed Preemption such as is found in the National Security Strategy of the United States. This policy is too permissive with regard to the use of force and it suffers from epistemological difficulties. The war in Iraq is examined in an effort to see how the new policy of Reformed Preemption will be employed in practice. This case shows us two risks of the new policy: it permits wars even when the threats are vague and merely potential; and it allows for disproportionate use of force.     

Social Media and Value Conflicts: An Explorative Study of the Dutch Police

The use of social media produces new value conflicts in public governance. The police force is a public organization directly confronted with these changes. However, there is no systematic understanding of these conflicts in daily police practice or of the coping strategies used. This article presents an explorative understanding of the value conflicts and coping strategies within the police force by combining the literature on social media use in the public sector and the literature on value conflicts and by conducting a case study within the Dutch police. The empirical findings show, first, a growing emphasis on conflicts related to the values that are strongly embedded in social media use—specifically, conflicts between efficiency and participation and between transparency and lawfulness. Second, although dynamic coping strategies were expected, the research reveals that the police often use a conservative coping strategy to deal with these rapid changes.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.     

Rigging elections with violence

In most developing countries even today, political parties spend a substantial fraction of their resources in attracting voters through ideological exhortation as well as force. In this paper we present a model of political contest between two parties that compete in two distinct arenas though the goal of the contest in both arenas is the same-to garner more political support. In the first, which we call “ideological”, the contest involves no use of force. In the second, which we call “conflictual”, party activists use violence either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their favor or restrain them from voting. We show that a party with lower initial political support will resort to more political violence, ceteris paribus and as the fraction of undecided voters goes up, elections will tend to be less conflictual. We also show that if there is an incumbency advantage, then the resources devoted to creating political unrest increase in equilibrium and political competition is more violent. We also provide some historic and journalistic evidence that supports our results.     

The Feedback Effects of Controversial Police Use of Force

Political Behavior - Controversial cases of police use of force against minority civilians have become a ubiquitous feature of news headlines, and videos of these interactions between citizens and...     

Partisan Discourse,Polarization, and the Politics of Military Fatalities in Iraq

Public deliberation on the costs of war is important to democratic decision-making. This article explores congressional rhetoric about military fatalities within the U.S. House of Representatives and in television news media interviews from 2004 to 2006. In the House, the results are consistent with the “ideological opportunism” model of congressional rhetoric, which suggests that politicians–particularly the president’s partisan opponents–will be highly communicative about combat deaths in an effort to express ideological perspectives on war and criticize opponents’ positions. The results also show that as local combat fatalities accumulate, the president’s partisan opponents tend to become increasingly vocal about these deaths. The results do not support the “newsworthiness” model of congressional rhetoric in TV media interviews, which expects opposition party support and presidential party criticism of the president. Politicians on the far ends of the ideological spectrum dominate discussions about the loss of troops in the House, and politicians in both the House and TV news interviews advance largely unwavering partisan positions on the conduct of war. The findings suggest members of Congress reinforce political polarization in debates over the use of force.     

The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics

Why did President Bush attempt to acquire a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force before the war with Iraq, even though there was a substantial risk that his request would be rejected? This article presents a game‐theoretic model to investigate how international institutions can shape the behavior of democratic leaders by influencing domestic politics. While it seems unsurprising that unbiased leaders who are truly concerned about foreign policy outcomes would consult international institutions, the results show that biased leaders with private agendas can also be forced to behave like the unbiased type because of their electoral concerns. The equilibrium results are illustrated with the cases of U.S. use of force in international crises.     

Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory

According to a growing tradition in International Relations, one way governments can credibly signal their intentions in foreign policy crises is by creating domestic audience costs: leaders can tie their hands by publicly threatening to use force since domestic publics punish leaders who say one thing and do another. We argue here that there are actually two logics of audience costs: audiences can punish leaders both for being inconsistent (the traditional audience cost), and for threatening to use force in the first place (a belligerence cost). We employ an experiment that disentangles these two rationales, and turn to a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology to bring the audience into audience cost theory. Our results suggest that traditional audience cost experiments may overestimate how much people care about inconsistency, and that the logic of audience costs (and the implications for crisis bargaining) varies considerably with the leader's constituency.     

To revise or not to revise: the ‘peace constitution’, pro-revision movement,and Japan's national identity

Why do conservative nationalists in Japan continuously seek to revise the constitution despite the past failures, and what is the likelihood of successful revision and its impact on Japan's norm of pacifism and its use of force? The article offers an analytical framework for the issue based on national pride and national security, and argues that the ‘revisionists’ seek to create a new national identity, one that infuses a greater sense of national pride among the public and enables the exercise of collective self-defense, thereby removing Japan's postwar psychological and institutional limitations on nationalism and military activities. The LDP's 2012 draft is most explicit and ambitious in this regard, with the current revision attempt under Abe having the highest chance of success since the 1950s. Successful revision would significantly expand Japan's security activities, particularly within the framework of the US–Japan Security Alliance, and entail the end of Japan's unique postwar institutionalized pacifism, although the norm of pacifism will linger on as a constitutional principle. For a smoother return to the international military scene, the Japanese government must distance itself from historical revisionism and utilize its enhanced military role to promote regional public goods rather than merely protecting its narrow national interests.     

On the road to serfdom? An analysis of Friedrich Hayek's socio-political manifesto as a pending narrative

In this article, I analyse Friedrich Hayek's (1944) book The Road to Serfdom by arguing that it is founded upon the pending narrative. The pending narrative is a semiotic macrostructure that is used to arouse passion for a specific goal of action. The rhetorical force of the pending narrative comes from its sudden interruption: as soon as identities have been established for the actors involved in the action, the narrative is brought to a halt. However, to leave the story open does not alone guarantee the force of the pending narrative. Its impetus is also based on the rhetorically capable use of three discursive elements: truth discourse, morally loaded binary discourse, and ‘utopian’ discourse.