Elected Second Chambers and Their Powers: An International Survey

In May 2011, Britain's Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government published proposals for reform of the House of Lords. In a White Paper and draft bill they set out detailed plans for a largely or wholly elected second chamber. These marked the latest stage in a long‐running debate on Lords reform. The government's proposals aim to change the composition of the second chamber, suggesting that there will be no change to its powers or the conventions governing relations with the House of Commons. But this expectation has been disputed. The House of Lords presently does not make full use of its powers, and many anticipate that it would if its members became elected. This paper reviews the composition of all second chambers internationally, showing that wholly directly elected chambers make up the minority, and that both mixed chambers and indirect election are common. It then reviews the formal powers of all largely and wholly elected chambers. This shows that amongst parliamentary systems the formal powers of the House of Lords are relatively great. But second chamber powers, as well as their composition, vary widely.     

Ministerial Responsiveness in Westminster Systems: Institutional Choices and House of Commons Debate, 1832–1915

In Westminster systems, governments enjoy strong agenda‐setting powers but are accountable to an inquisitorial opposition. This article provides insights into the origins of this arrangement from the British House of Commons, drawing primarily on a new data set of a half million parliamentary speeches. We show that, according to a novel measure we develop, government ministers became more responsive to opposition members of parliament in the same period that the government's agenda power was most conclusively strengthened—roughly, the two decades culminating in Balfour's “railway timetable” of 1902. We argue that this increase in responsiveness helps to explain why opposition members of parliament acceded to reductions in their procedural power. We thus highlight a link between government strength and opposition scrutiny in the historical development of the Westminster system.     

Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution

This article examines the paradoxes of parliamentary reform. Focusing mainly on the House of Commons, the first section highlights the contradictory roles of parliament and utilizes a distinction between the 'Whig' and 'Peelite' conceptions of the Whitehall-Westminster model to demonstrate the ambiguities and tensions that exist. This framework is then applied to a case study of parliamentary reform under Labour governments since 1997 in the second section. The third section emphasizes that parliament cannot be studied in isolation. It suggests that the British constitution is at a critical historical, political and institutional juncture in which a number of inter-linked emerging agendas are altering the relationship between parliament and the executive. The significance of these emerging agendas is that, unlike internal reform of parliament, they are largely beyond the executive's control. The combined influence of these factors is likely to impel the executive, at some point, to support a coherent and far-reaching reappraisal of the structure, role and powers of parliament. Consequently the degree to which Britain ( de facto ) remains a parliamentary state will be subject to intense and increasing debate.     

Brexit and the British Constitution: Reflections on the Last Three years and the Next Fifty

The decision to leave the EU provoked the biggest constitutional crisis of recent British history. The referendum—a device for circumventing the parliamentary process—was followed by conflict between a minority government and a majority of MPs unwilling to leave the EU without satisfactory alternative arrangements. The courts, drawn into this conflict, upheld conventions that sustain the authority of Parliament and restrain the despotic power of ministers. The reaction of members of the current government was to take disreputable and anti-democratic positions against both the Speaker of the House of Commons and the courts. They now have a sufficient majority in Parliament to resume adherence to constitutional conventions and restore a political culture of debate and tolerance, but they show little sign of doing so, and there is a risk that they will do irreparable damage to the political culture that underpins democracy.     

Plurality support for democratic decay: the 2019 Polish parliamentary election

Abstract

The 2019 parliamentary election in Poland resulted in continuity of the incumbent PiS party-coalition. The election saw, for Poland, an unprecedented turnout of 62%. The 44% support for PiS translated into a 51% majority in the Lower House. The ability of the three opposition blocs (KO, SLD and PSL) to coordinate their political campaign for the upper chamber resulted in their victory – PiS lost the majority in the Senate. This post-2019 period thus starts as parliamentary cohabitation. The preceding four years had witnessed repeated violations of the constitution by the government (including attempts to dismantle the separation of powers and to turn public media into a partisan propaganda machine) accompanied by a general anti-liberal and anti-European stance. The electorates of the two major party-blocks have polarized in terms of their socio-demographic features. The new government does not differ much from the pre-election one, with the same PM and most ministers. The first weeks of its governing indicate that the government’s general as well as sectoral policies will be continued, including the controversial, illiberal ones. Finally, the election though free, was unfair, if for no other reason than the simple one of the partisan nature of the public media.     

Estimating Ideal Points in the British House of Commons Using Early Day Motions

This article develops a new method for estimating the ideological preferences of members of the British House of Commons. Existing methods produce implausible results due to high levels of party cohesion and strategic voting on the part of opposition parties. To circumvent these problems, this article estimates MP preferences using Early Day Motions (EDMs) as an alternative to roll‐call votes. The Bayesian ideal point model for the decision to sign an EDM takes into account both policy preferences and signing costs. The estimates obtained have greater face validity than previous attempts to measure preferences in the House of Commons, recovering the expected order of parties and of members within parties. The estimates successfully predict voting behavior in the House of Commons. As with other Bayesian ideal point methods, this approach produces natural uncertainty estimates and allows for easy calculation of quantities of interest such as member ranks.     

Beyond committees: parliamentary oversight of coalition government in Britain

Abstract

A legislature’s ability to engage in oversight of the executive is believed to derive largely from its committee system. For example, powerful parliamentary committees are considered a necessary condition for the legislature to help police policy compromises between parties in multiparty government. But can other parliamentary instruments perform this role? This article suggests parliamentary questions as an alternative parliamentary vehicle for coalition parties to monitor their partners. Questions force ministers to reveal information concerning their legislative and extra-legislative activities, providing coalition members unique insights into their partners’ behaviour. In order to test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010?2015 coalition. As expected, government MPs ask more questions as the divisiveness of a policy area increases. Legislatures conventionally considered weak due to the lack of strong committees may nevertheless play an important oversight role through other parliamentary devices, including helping to police the implementation of coalition agreements.     

Politicians,voters and democracy: The 2011 UK referendum on the Alternative Vote

At the 2010 UK election, Labour proposed a referendum on changing the House of Commons electoral system from single member plurality to the Alternative Vote. Subsequently, a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, yet it was Labour's policy on electoral reform that was implemented. The paper explains why this proved to be politically convenient for Labour's opponents. At the same time, however, holding the referendum reflected an emergent de facto convention that significant constitutional change should only be introduced after it has secured popular endorsement. The paper assesses whether the dynamics of public opinion during the AV referendum suggests that voters' eventual decisions about constitutional questions reflect their views about the merits of the relevant arguments.     

Parliament on its Knees: MPs' Expenses and the Crisis of Transparency at Westminster

In May 2009, revelations made in The Daily Telegraph about the way that MPs had used and abused the House of Commons expenses and allowances regime threw the British political system into turmoil, forced the resignation of the Speaker of the Commons along with a number of implicated MPs, and ignited talk about a crisis in parliamentary democracy and a collapse of public trust in politics. This article explores the events that led to this situation, from the structure of MPs pay and allowance system, the Freedom of Information context that framed the disaster, and the crisis of transparency which the House of Commons has itself precipitated. It argues that, talk of parliamentary reform aside, MPs must radically rethink the way that they approach their representative role and the nature of their broader engagement with the public they claim to serve.     

A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords

The disproportional electoral system of the House of Commons is increasingly contested, while the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords has been criticised for a century. I first argue that simultaneous reform of both chambers creates the opportunity for far more optimal outcomes than possible under attempts to reform just one chamber. I then argue that bicameralism should continue so that the UK can be represented in two, currently convoluted, ways: as a singular polity in partisan terms and as both an aggregate of constituencies and union of nations, in geographic terms. The former would best take place in a reformed House of Commons, responsible for government formation, and composed of around 300 MPs elected by ‘pure’ proportional representation. The latter would best take place in a reformed House of Lords of around 300 peers, elected by plurality voting from single-member constituencies. Together, these reforms would improve governance, representation, legitimacy, accountability and the robustness of the union, while retaining celebrated facets of the status quo such as simplicity and the direct constituency link.     

Elected or Selected? The Continuing Constitutional Conundrum of House of Lords Reform

The 1911 Parliament Act decreed that Lords reform was ‘an urgent question which brooks no delay’, yet the subsequent 112 years have witnessed only sporadic and inchoate reforms. The issue has invariably suffered both from interparty disagreement between the Conservatives and Labour and, more importantly, intraparty disagreements owing to the divergent views and irreconcilable disagreements among Labour MPs over ‘what is to be done?’, and recognition that any reform which enhanced the legitimacy of the second chamber would threaten the pre-eminence of the House of Commons and a Labour government therein. A similar fate is likely to befall the Labour Party's latest proposal for replacing the current House of Lords with an elected second chamber. Meanwhile, the Conservative peer, Lord Norton, is seeking to place the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) on a statutory basis and impose stricter criteria on prime ministerial nominations for peerages. Yet, this would still leave any Prime Minister with considerable powers of patronage in appointing members of the second chamber. This article therefore suggests that a Prime Minister should only be permitted to nominate 20 per cent of the membership, with the rest appointed via HOLAC itself, thereby depoliticising the process as far as practicably possible, and imbuing it with greater public trust.     

An Elected Upper House and Other Fallacies

All fashionable political talk is of an elected House of Lords. Doing this smart, new unthought‐out thing, says Edward Pearce, means dissolving the reliably rebellious upper house regularly rejecting bad bills from Tory and Labour governments, for a House as submissive as the Commons. Second‐line politicians will replace the difficult individual people, soldiers, doctors, academics, scientists, assorted and distinguished experts who, by lucky muddle, go there today. Far better, he says, to abolish actual titles which create a false idea of privilege, but continue drawing upon independent professional specialists. Also, Ministers should be barred from the pernicious Mandelson Effect, of making an instant Minister by life‐ennoblement, huge powers conferred without a voter in sight. An upper house called ‘The Upper House’, chosen as now for competence, will be a House of Commoners, of Independence, of Contradiction. Elected Party‐liners under guidance would be a House of Sheep.     

Bicameralism in the European Union: parliamentary scrutiny as a tool for reinforcing party unity

During recent years, the European Union has increasingly been portrayed as a bicameral political system in which political parties build bridges across the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. From this perspective, national parties’ representation in the Council should affect their members’ voting behaviour in the EP. Survey evidence reveals that most members of the EP (MEPs) frequently receive voting instructions from ‘their’ ministers. Accordingly, these MEPs should have a higher likelihood of defecting from their European Political Group. The observed voting instructions imply that the voting preferences of MEPs and their ministers differ. This article argues that parliamentary scrutiny may be one way effectively to coordinate on a common position at an early stage and, consequently, reinforce party unity at the voting stage. However, effective scrutiny depends on national parliaments being strong enough. On the empirical side, this article studies the voting behaviour of MEPs from eight member states during the Sixth EP. We include four national parliaments which the literature conceives of as being strong (DK, DE, SF, SK) and four parliaments conceived of as being weak (FR, IE, IT, UK). Overall, the results support the theoretical argument, thereby demonstrating how domestic-level scrutiny affects EU-level voting behaviour.     

The relationship between government and opposition in the bundestag and house of commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty

This article analyses modes of interaction between government and opposition in the German Bundestag and the British House of Commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty, and the implications of co‐operation or a lack thereof for the parties involved. The article is based on the premise that the government—opposition relationship is not derived solely from power relationships and institutional factors, but is also a matter of democratic legitimacy. Three indicators are used to ascertain the level of government—opposition co‐operation: the creation of parliamentary committees, information exchange and incentive management. Based on an institutional analysis and interviews with legislators, the finding is that although parties in Germany and the UK have created parliamentary committees dealing with European affairs, only in the former did the government utilise the new tool for co‐operation with the opposition, in terms of information exchange and incentive management. Consequently, informal co‐operation in Germany brought about an outcome compatible with the interests of the parties involved. By contrast, the lack of co‐operation with opposition parties in Britain led to an extreme parliamentary crisis.     

A Tale as Old as (Devolved) Time? Sewel,Stormont and the Legislative Consent Convention

Interparliamentary relations do not attract much in the way of public or even academic attention. However, they are an aspect of parliamentary life in which there has been a series of experiments by select committees in the House of Commons. While one of the more prominent examples of such experimentation was the international grand committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy spearheaded by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, this article will look at another example of select committee-led interparliamentary relations, namely the ‘joint inquiry’ conducted by the House of Commons Defence Committee and the Assemblée nationale’s Standing Committee on National Defence into Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Missiles in 2018. This article, written by an official involved in the inquiry, offers the first reflections on the experience of this joint inquiry, demonstrates how the model undertaken for the inquiry differed from the approaches taken by other select committees involved in interparliamentary working, and explores whether it might offer a blueprint for future joint inquiries.     

Responsible, Representative and Accountable Government

As an evaluation of the health of Australia's political system, this article offers a perspective different from the lament over the loss of responsible government. It finds that responsible government is not compatible with representative democracy. Peculiar to Australia is conflict between 'responsible party government' and 'responsible parliamentary government'. Nevertheless, the system is healthy. A parliament-as-a-whole approach identifies key holistic functions of manifest and latent legitimation and accountability that bolster legitimacy. Political accountability is enhanced by the watchdog role of the media. Public accountability is enriched by the links between citizens and administrative review. Critical changes include the guarantee of senate independence and the removal of senate power over supply. These changes would confine the theory and practice of responsible government to the House of Representatives, promote accountability, and thus increase the legitimacy of Australian parliamentary democracy.     

Parliamentary questions as strategic party tools

This article shifts the analysis of parliamentary oversight tools to the level of the political party, asking how political parties make use of written parliamentary questions. It theorises that the use of parliamentary questions is related to the ideological and electoral competition between political parties, borrowing from theories on issue competition and negative campaigning. It provides an empirical test, using data on written questions from the lower house in the Netherlands (1994–2014). The analysis shows that parties tend to put questions to ministers whose portfolios are salient to them, in line with issue ownership theories. Moreover they ask questions of both ministers from parties that are ideologically distant and those with whom they have considerable electoral overlap in line with studies of negative campaigning.     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

Does It Matter If the House of Lords isn't Reformed? Perspectives from a Symposium at Trinity Hall,Cambridge

In May 2011 the Coalition government published a draft bill for reform of the House of Lords, proposing an upper chamber composed of 80% elected and 20% appointed members serving for single 15‐year terms. These plans reflect aspects of the stated positions of the main political parties, votes in the House of Commons, and broader political and scholarly debates over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is significant opposition from across the political spectrum, and there is a significant possibility that the proposed reforms will not be enacted before the next general election. This article draws on the views of participants (including three current peers) in a Symposium at Trinity Hall, Cambridge to argue that the likely failure of the reforms may be less disastrous than many suppose. Especially since the 1999 reforms, the House of Lords is in many ways a more active and legitimate chamber than is commonly realised.     

Choosing between Impossible Alternatives: Creating a New Constituency Map for Wales, 2004

The allocation of at least 35 parliamentary constituencies to Wales in the 1944 House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act meant that Wales was over-represented in the House of Commons. Subsequent decisions by the Boundary Commission for Wales, operating within a set of mutually contradictory rules, increased the number of Welsh seats to 40 and exacerbated the country's over-representation in the House, relative to the situation for England.
In its Fifth Periodic Review, the Boundary Commission has determined not to recommend any further growth in the number of Welsh constituencies, but its method of doing this has created substantial inequalities within the country, with the area around Cardiff significantly under-represented relative to the situation in North Wales. These inequalities will also apply to the Welsh Assembly. The political parties did not challenge these recommendations, presumably because they felt that their interests were best served by the inequalities. Analysis shows that alternative sets of recommendations would have been somewhat more egalitarian, but within an overall structure of unfairness guaranteed by the unworkable rules under which the Commissions must operate.