县级政府公共服务能力与其影响因素关系研究——基于江西、湖北两省的调查分析

论文在梳理大量国内外相关文献的基础上,运用政府能力理论和企业能力理论构建县级政府公共服务能力与其影响因素关系结构模型,以获得的江西、湖北二省18县调查数据对模型检验,得出如下结论:县级政府公共服务能力主要受行政环境、政府人力资源、政府回应和行政文化因素影响.其中公共服务规划能力、资源配置能力、危机管理能力受政府人力资源因素影响最大;资源汲取能力受行政环境因素影响最大;执行能力受政府回应因素影响最大.并据此提出建设高素质的政府人力资源队伍是提高县级公共服务能力的关键;促进政府回应与公共服务质量的良性互动是提高公共服务能力有效性的根本途径;深化行政管理体制改革是优化行政环境的重点;构建先进的县域行政文化是提高县级政府公共服务能力的源动力.     

基于模糊综合评价法的公共服务外包风险因素研究

在中央到地方政府大力鼓励社会力量参与公共服务供给背景下,我国的公共服务外包快速发展。虽然推进公共服务外包对加快政府改革、创新公共服务提供机制等有积极作用,但其实施本身也存在较高的风险。通过构建公共服务外包风险因素评价指标体系,利用模糊综合评判法,对政府实施公共服务外包的风险进行定量化评价,分析影响外包成功与否的各种风险因素,进而从公共服务外包前、外包过程中和外包发生后等三个不同时间阶段,探讨进行外包风险控制的措施。     

中国地方政府公共服务合同外包的发展现状——基于二手数据的分析

近年来,合同外包日益成为地方政府提供公共服务的重要机制。本文基于二手数据,在对地方政府公共服务合同外包发展状况(2000~2009)的概括性分析中发现,2000年以来,地方政府公共服务合同外包发展迅猛,其应用的广泛性和深入性均前所未有,并且逐步迈入法制化轨道。由于影响合同外包成效的因素相当复杂,政府显然缺乏相关操作经验,无论是在合同外包的决策当中还是在实施当中,"审慎"是最明智的策略。     

公共服务满意度及其影响因素研究——基于2015年上海17个区县1调查的实证分析

基于对上海17个区县5 100位居民对公共服务满意度的实证分析,本研究发现,上海市居民对公共服务满意度的评价总体较为满意,但在不同区县和不同领域之间存在较大差异。公共服务满意度的影响因素可分为客观因素和主观因素两类,通过多层线性模型分析进一步发现,主观层面的因素对公共服务满意度有着较强的影响,对区县间差异的解释能力较强。其中,居民对政府工作的参与度、居民对政府工作的知晓度、居民的公益活动参与水平等都对公共服务满意度有显著的正向影响,性别也对公共服务满意度有显著影响;客观因素对公共服务满意度影响力较弱。因此,政府要在积极提升居民对政府工作和社会工作参与水平、增加公共服务的财政投入、提高公共服务投入效率等方面努力,以促进改进政府公共服务,提高居民的公共服务满意度。     

公共服务逆向合同外包的理论机理、现实动因与制度安排

现行倡导和支持公共服务合同外包的理论建构了一个看似能够自圆其说的解释框架,这一解释框架得以成立的基本前提包括:一个精明能干的政府、竞争充分的市场以及政府与市场间存在良好的合作关系。事实上,不论是作为需求方的政府,还是作为供给方的市场,均存在着明显的缺陷,加上政府与服务承包商之间合作的复杂性,决定了公共服务逆向合同外包的发生在所难免;与此同时,源自政治层面、经济层面和管理层面的现实动因更是增加了公共服务逆向合同外包发生的可能性。在公共服务改革实践中,为确保公共服务逆向合同外包顺利平稳地发生,需要从决策依据、操作流程、争议解决以及责任追究等方面做好精心的制度安排,以便使公共服务逆向合同外包能够在制度框架内规范有序地运行。     

危机状态下个体抢购行为决策的影响因素研究

研究不同因素影响下个体的抢购行为决策规律,有利于危机篱理部门进行有效的策略构建。从个体对危机环境的主观反应和客观特征两方面因素,提出个体抢购行为决策的影响因素概念模型及研究假设,并运用调查问卷和二二元Logistic回归方法进行实证研究。结果表明,对危机事件越恐惧、对政府越不信任、媒体报道造成的压力越火、对可能危险源的...     

公共服务市场化模式的反思——基于不完全契约与交易成本理论的视角

20世纪70年代末兴起的新公共管理运动至今仍方兴未艾，作为新公共管理的核心——公共服务市场化，在理论界继续占据公共服务供给方式的研究的主导地位。但近年来出现的公共服务市场化失灵与公共服务逆市场化现象引起了人们的广泛关注。在此背景下，本文应用了不完全契约与交易成本理论从公共服务市场化的理论假设入手，分析影响公共服务市场化绩效的相关因素，由于外部不利因素存在的可能性，公共服务市场化模式并不必然能提高公共服务的绩效，市场化改革模式能否取得良好绩效，关键取决于其理论假设能否在实践中得以实现，应对公共服务市场化失灵的策略必须紧紧结合其理论假设来思考。     

地方政府网络治理稳定性影响因素研究

网络治理理论以其整合政府、市场和公民社会的理念而引起越来越多公共管理研究者的兴趣,如何使其顺畅运行,取得稳定的运行状态成为公共管理领域亟待解决的问题。本文对地方政府网络治理及稳定性的概念进行了界定和分析,识别了资源依赖、关系质量、稳定性3个变量,进而提出资源依赖、关系质量、稳定性变量间影响关系的假设,最终形成地方政府网络治理稳定性影响因素概念模型。在调研访谈的基础上,对西安、南京、深圳等地政府部门进行问卷调查,通过SEM分析,结果表明,资源依赖对稳定性具有显著的正向影响关系,同时资源依赖还分别对关系质量具有显著的正向影响关系。关系质量中的信任和沟通也分别对稳定性具有显著的正向影响关系,而承诺对稳定性的直接影响不显著。据此,在地方政府网络治理过程中,需要对主体间的分工进行明确,注重治理主体资源与能力互补的重要性,重视关系质量的维护。     

逆向合同外包:反思中国事业单位改革的新视角

逆向合同外包是政府将已经外包出去的公共服务收回并且重新交由政府提供的公共服务。近年来,这一现象在国内的实践中屡有发生。从逆向合同外包角度出发,系统梳理国内外逆向合同外包现象研究,并结合实际调研所得,分析我国的乡镇事业单位改革中"七站八所"的重置现象,以期为中国事业单位改革的反思提供一种新视角,对政府公共服务职能转变做更深层次的思考。     

新媒体时代政府公信力的决定因素——透明性、回应性抑或公关技巧?

本研究分析了新媒体时代影响地方政府公信力的因素。研究假设为,地方政府的透明性和回应性是影响地方政府公信力的两个最重要的因素,而政府公关技巧则不是。运用人民网舆情监测室的"地方政府网络舆情应对能力排行榜"的数据,对影响地方政府公信力的因素进行了实证检验。根据统计分析结果,政府透明性和回应性的提升对地方政府公信力的增强有着显著的积极影响,而政府的公关技巧水平与政府公信力之间则不存在相关关系,因而认为其对政府公信力的作用尚难确定。根据分析结果,提出了地方政府提升公信力的若干政策性建议。     

Outsourcing in the public services: a comparative analysis of practice,capability and impact

This article analyses thinking and practice concerning privatization and outsourcing in the public services and compares recent trends with the findings of an extensive comparative survey of outsourcing conducted at Cranfield School of Management. Particular attention is paid to the systems and processes being outsourced, their importance to the organization and the impact of outsourcing on public service organizations. The results of the survey suggest that public service managers are more skilful than managers from the private sector at handling the transactional aspects of outsourcing. However, managers from public service organizations, unlike managers from the private sector, assert that outsourcing is damaging the running of public service enterprises. It is concluded that until the political and administrative processes are more closely aligned public service managers will continue to hold a more negative view of outsourcing. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Outsourcing: Uncovering the Complexity of the Decision

ABSTRACT

Outsourcing is a phenomenon that, on the surface, is used to reduce costs and enable an organization to focus on its core competencies. In researching into outsourcing and whether this assumption holds true, this article focuses on public health organizations where outsourcing has been applied to both clinical and non-clinical services. In the cases observed, public sector managers assumed contracting would lower production costs for peripheral services whose outcomes could be easily measured and monitored. Clinical services were not usually outsourced because these core services were more difficult to measure. In implementing contracts for non-core services, decision makers' political and ideological objectives overshadowed management imperatives that are necessary for effective contract design and implementation, leading to poor service outcomes and little cost savings. Choosing the “right” services to contract does guarantee good outcomes such as lower costs and improved labor flexibility, but it is necessary to understand that optimum outcomes are only achievable if the service is clearly non-core, has measurable outcomes, and has low transaction frequency. It is also clear that outsourcing will not remove management problems; it simply adds another layer of complexity on top of managing staff who still provide the service.     

Implementing the Contract State

The term 'contract state' can capture three different types of contractual arrangements:
*employment contracts
*intra public sector service contracts (often used in the health and education fields)
*public-private service contracts or outsourcing.
Victoria, since the election of the Kennett government in 1992, has engaged in all three, but in particular, public sector change has been characterised by significant outsourcing. This article outlines the extent of outsourcing in Victorian state and local government, the managerial challenges of a contract state, and the need for continuous reflection on, and improvement of, the reform process.     

Reconsidering the Revolution? Australian Public Sector Administration in 2000

While the year 2000 was memorable for public administration in Australia it was notable mainly for the unexpected. Success occurred where risk and failure were predicted. Failure emerged where success had been talked-up. Notable examples include the so-called Y2K problem, management of the Olympic Games, the introduction of the GST, and the outsourcing of government services (especially Information Technology (IT)). Also memorable were important shifts in the policy fields of defence and welfare. The Howard government ended the year in decision-making and largese mode—setting the agenda for the following election year. The events of 2000 invite reconsideration of the merits of the traditional bureaucratic model and those of the emerging post bureaucratic models of service provision.     

Outsourcing in China: an exploratory assessment

The increasing demands for public services, growing resource externalisation and decentralisation have driven Chinese governments to seek alternative means of service delivery. This article addresses the largely ignored outsourcing practice in China. Lack of awareness of and research on the widespread outsourcing was a result of the conceptual barriers created by China's economic transition and its choice of incremental reform path. By decomposing national fiscal expenditures, the article finds that from 2002 to 2004, outsourcing accounted for about one‐third of the total governmental services expenditures and demonstrated a trend of continuous growth. Such developments effectively transformed the basic landscape of public service delivery and created significant external dependence. Within just three decades, China has quickly shifted from an omnipotent state to an ‘incomplete’ state. The capacity of the administrative hierarchy has become severely constrained. Nonetheless, the political risks of the macro‐level transformation are largely mitigated at the micro‐level by mechanisms of public–private cooperation. These developments are embedded in informal arrangements that, remarkably, maintain the survival of the current power structure. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Technology Outsourcing by State Governments in Australia

Outsourcing of IT services is being undertaken at a rapid rate within the public sector in Australia. This paper investigates the adoption of this practice by a sample of state government enterprises and departments from South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales which have tendered long-term IT outsourcing contracts.
The motivation, decision-making process and extent of outsourcing are examined in further detail. In addition, the tendering process, contract and risk management are investigated to determine whether consideration has been given to the full economic costs involved in entering into longer term contracts.     

A simple estimation method for aggregate government outsourcing

The scholarly and popular debate on the delegation to the private sector of governmental tasks rests on an inadequate empirical foundation, as no systematic data are collected on direct versus indirect service delivery. We offer a simple method for approximating levels of service outsourcing, based on relatively straightforward combinations of and adjustments to standard statistical series, primarily the National Income and Product Account and the Government Finances series produced by the Department of Commerce. The method permits us to separately estimate state and local from federal service outsourcing and (within the federal government) to distinguish between defense and non‐defense services. Alternative estimates, both including and excluding Medicare and Medicaid, are included, as are estimates of outsourcing from 1959 through 2000. The method confirms the general view that the privately provided share of public services has increased, particularly in the last two decades of the past century. But this increase has been shallower than many observers suggest, and as of 2000 more than two‐thirds of the government's service budget was still devoted to employee compensation. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Contractualism, Democracy and Ethics

Contractualism, as concept and practice, may be defined in different ways (Yeatman 1995, 1998). In this article I am concerned with contracting out or outsourcing as it is otherwise known. That is, I focus upon the process whereby functions undertaken formerly by government are now performed by private or voluntary organisations in a contractual relationship with public service departments and agencies. Whereas departments and agencies once provided a full panoply of services directly, government purchasers now select providers by tendering competitively for an expanding range of employment, education, health, social welfare and local government services. Contractualism, then, involves the recon-figuation of public service provision to favour quasi-commercial rather than bureaucratic forms.     

Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.