The Anatomy of the Finnish Power Elite

The article discusses the main results of a study of the power structure of Finnish society. The purpose of the study was to investigate whether Finland is controlled by one closed, cohesive and unanimous power elite, by several rival elites, or whether, instead, the power structure is so decentralized that there is no justification for referring to a power elite in the first place. The working hypothesis was that Finnish society is controlled by one power elite. The study was based on a positional approach, using a survey questionnaire to collect data both from members of the power elite and from the population at large. The main conclusion of the study is that, with certain reservations, it is legitimate to speak of a fairly cohesive and unanimous, single power elite in Finland. Interaction among elite groups is close, and their attitudes are similar. In terms of recruitment patterns the Finnish power elite is fairly closed: the top social stratum is clearly overrepresented and the lowest underrepresented. On the other hand, no single stratum has a dominant position in the power elite.     

The New Elites in the Baltic States: Recirculation and Change

Regime change is closely connected to elite change. although classical theories of elite rule would predict considerable elite continuity. The basic question is how the downfall of communist regimes and introduction of democracy have affected elite patterns in the three Baltic states. The data indicate a combination of continuity and change: circulation of indigenous elites has taken place, while Russians are excluded from power in important state institutions. Elite continuity is explained by lack of "alternative elites" and a need for competent leaders in the state building process. Elite change is explained by ethnic cleavages which raise the issue of indigenous control over power positions.     

Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization

Influential recent scholarship assumes that authoritarian rulers act as perfect agents of economic elites, foreclosing the possibility that economic elites may at times prefer democracy absent a popular threat from below. Motivated by a puzzling set of democratic transitions, we relax this assumption and examine how elite uncertainty about dictatorship—a novel and generalizable causal mechanism impacting democratization—can induce elite support for democracy. We construct a noisy signaling model in which a potential autocrat attempts to convince economic elites that he will be a faithful partner should elites install him in power. The model generates clear predictions about how two major types of elite uncertainty—uncertainty in a potential autocratic successor's policies produced by variance in the pool of would‐be dictator types, and uncertainty in the truthfulness of policy promises made by potential autocratic successors—impact the likelihood of elite‐driven democratization. We demonstrate the model's plausibility in a series of cases of democratic transition.     

中国的精英决策模式及发展趋势

概述了西方精英模式的基本观点,论述了中国公共决策模式为精英模式的理论依据与现实依据,分析了改革开放前中国精英决策模式的构成是政治权力精英主导的决策模式,具体表现为政治权力精英与一般政治精英的合作决策模式。阐述了改革开放后中国精英决策模式演变的过程,指出随着社会精英的崛起,中国精英决策模式逐渐向政治精英与知识精英、经济精英合作的模式演变。并从多角度比较分析了中国精英决策模式与西方国家精英决策模式的区别:指出我国的精英构成、社会精英的实际政治地位与西方国家的精英构成及社会精英的实际政治地位存在差异;我国精英决策不只代表精英的观点,也反映人民的声音;我国的经济精英影响政策的能力远逊于西方国家的经济精英;我国政治精英与知识精英的合作决策不同于西方国家的精英合作决策。分析了中国精英决策模式的优缺点,指出了中国决策模式的发展趋势是精英决策与大众民主的调和。     

Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites

This article examines the prevalence and consequences of authoritarian attitudes among elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We focus on the connection between antidemocratic elite attitudes and support for democracy; the causes and effects of authoritarian attitudes among elites and their implications for authoritarianism; and the impact of authoritarian attitudes beyond social policy preferences to other policy areas that have indirect implications for order. Contrary to some of the literature, we find that antidemocratic attitudes affect elites' support for democracy. Our analysis also speaks to the debate on the origins of authoritarianism. Much of the evidence supports Altemeyer's notion that perceived threat raises levels of authoritarianism, rather than Feldman's contention that threat strengthens the influence of authoritarian attitudes. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a broader influence of authoritarian attitudes on economic policy preferences, but only where those policies appear to have implications for social order.     

Integration of the Swedish Local Elite: The Role of Professional and Private Networks

This article uses social network data to study the integration of local elites in four Swedish municipalities. Four research questions are asked. First: How integrated are the elites? While the results modify the picture that there are two rather distinct elites in Sweden – that is, a political elite dominated by the labour movement and an economic elite dominated by business and the large business organizations – it is interesting to note that integration between elite spheres is lowest for the relation between politicians and business representatives. To a considerable degree, integration between political and economic elites is indirect, mediated through the administrative elite. The second question is: Are the inner elite circles dominated by the political, economic or administrative elite? The study indicates that local elites in Sweden are strongly dominated by political elites, and also by administrative elites. This is reassuring, since it would indicate a democratic deficit if the structural power of decision making in municipalities resided predominantly in economic actors and administrators. The third question is: What is the role of friendship relations in creating elite integration? The study indicates that private relations among elites both reinforce professional networks and extend them in important ways. The final question is: Is elite integration contingent on political stability and/or the structure of local business? The results are surprisingly stable across the four municipalities, even though the largest distinction was found between elite core and periphery in the politically most stable municipality, which was also the one with the lowest economic diversity.     

Changing Regulation and Governance of Finnish Energy Policy Making: New Rules but Old Elites?

Energy policy making is commonly seen as a sector dominated more by experts and technocrats than politicians. Regulation of Finnish energy policy, which was traditionally characterized by state‐centeredness and detailed governmental control, was step by step annulled in the mid‐1980s on, and a deregulation policy was introduced. The return of regulation can be timed to in the beginning of the twenty‐first century, being the result of the global debate and measures dealing with climate change. The purpose of this study was to assess the extent to which the changes of operational environment have transformed the power structure of Finnish energy policy making and whether the key actors constitute a coherent energy elite in terms of attitudinal unanimity and interaction networks. Methodologically the study was based on three sets of elite interview data collected in 1987, 1997, and 2009 and a postal survey conducted among the citizenry in 2007. The major finding was that despite fundamental changes in the operational environment the power structure of the energy sector policy making has been fairly stable from 1987 to 2009 and the old cohesive energy elite is still in power.     

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves. We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions. We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.     

In the right place,at the right time: Opportunity structures and candidates’ chances of getting elected for the first time

The foundational principle of representative democracy is that legislative elites can be replaced in elections. Yet, first-time parliamentary entries have received little attention. We present the first systematic attempt to examine the conditions of first-time parliamentary entry in multimember district PR systems. We introduce an overlooked explanatory factor, candidates' short-term opportunity structure. While controlling for personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs), we examine how competitive context shapes newcomers' chances in a pure OLPR system where party elites cannot skew competition between candidates. Our register-based analysis of candidacies in seven Finnish parliamentary elections (1995–2019, n = 7548) shows that while personal qualities enhance candidates’ chances, first-time entry is restricted by the competitive context, especially the decisions of incumbent MPs. The strong impact of exceptional PVEAs suggests that other “big fish” candidates may also shape competitive contexts. Overall, the study indicates that electoral competition can be rather restricted even in the most competitive electoral systems.     

Run,Jane, Run! Gendered Responses to Political Party Recruitment

Many researchers point to gender inequities in party recruitment practices to explain women’s underrepresentation on the ballot. However, there has been little systematic research about how men and women respond to recruitment, so we do not know whether gender-balanced recruitment would actually lead to gender-balanced outcomes. We conduct two studies to address this question. First, in cooperation with a county Republican Party, we identically recruited 5510 male and 5506 female highly active party members to attend a free candidate training seminar. Republican women were half as likely to respond to the invitation as men. Second, we conducted a survey experiment of 3960 voters on the Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Republican men’s level of self-reported political ambition was increased by the prospect of elite recruitment significantly more than Republican women’s, thereby increasing the gender gap vis-à-vis the control. The gender gap in the effect of recruitment on political ambition among Democrats was much smaller. Together, these findings suggest that to fully understand the role recruitment plays in women’s underrepresentation, researchers must understand the ways in which men and women respond to recruitment, not just whether political elites engage in gendered recruitment practices.     

Environmental belief systems among Japanese and American elites and publics

This paper compares the environmental belief systems of elites and publics in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, and Spokane County, Washington State. The central question posed is whether the shared forces of postindustrialism generate similar belief structures among elites in nations with quite distinct cultural, political, and historical backgrounds. As a prototypical postindustrial policy area, natural resource/environmental politics is used as the specific issue domain of study. The results emerging from this comparative inquiry reveal substantial differences between the Japanese and American local area elites in the structuring of environmental beliefs, especially in the role of postindustrial orientations. The results also suggest much larger differences in belief system content and structure between elite and general public samples in the Spokane area than in Shizuoka Prefecture.     

Portugal's administrative elite: Social origins and political attitudes

The primary purpose of the research reported in this paper was to determine if the purge of high‐level civil servants associated with the Salazar‐Caetano dictatorship carried out after the Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1974 was actually effective in changing the social origins and political attitudes of individuals composing this elite group. Using an abbreviated version of a questionnaire developed at the University of Michigan to study administrative elites in Western Europe, data on careers and political attitudes were gathered. Statistical analyses of these data revealed, inter alia, that there has been some, but not overwhelming, change in recruitment patterns of high‐level civil servants and some change toward greater tolerance for democratic politics and less elitism.     

Explaining cross‐national variation in the relationship between priority congruence and satisfaction with democracy

Previous research has shown that citizens tend to be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy when their ideological positions are more proximate to representatives'. This article argues that congruence in policy priorities between citizens and political elites should have a similar effect: citizens whose concerns are shared by elites should perceive them to be more attentive and responsive to public concerns and societal needs. Yet, the relationship might vary with differences in expectations towards democracy and representation. Specifically, it should be stronger in more democratic countries and older democracies. The hypotheses are empirically tested in a multilevel regression framework, where voter survey data from the 2009 European Election Study is linked with candidate survey data. The results indicate that citizens are indeed more satisfied with democracy if elites share their concerns, and the effect increases with democratic experience.     

State of the field: What can political ethnography tell us about anti-politics and democratic disaffection?

This article adopts and reinvents the ethnographic approach to uncover what governing elites do, and how they respond to public disaffection. Although there is significant work on the citizens’ attitudes to the governing elite (the demand side) there is little work on how elites interpret and respond to public disaffection (the supply side). It is argued here that ethnography is the best available research method for collecting data on the supply side. The article tackles longstanding stereotypes in political science about the ethnographic method and what it is good for, and highlights how the innovative and varied practices of contemporary ethnography are ideally suited to shedding light into the ‘black box’ of elite politics. The potential pay-off is demonstrated with reference to important examples of elite ethnography from the margins of political science scholarship. The implications from these rich studies suggest a reorientation of how one understands the drivers of public disaffection and the role that political elites play in exacerbating cynicism and disappointment. The article concludes by pointing to the benefits to the discipline in embracing elite ethnography both to diversify the methodological toolkit in explaining the complex dynamics of disaffection, and to better enable engagement in renewed public debate about the political establishment.     

Election campaigns and the cyclical nature of emotions—How politicians engage in affective polarization

Do politicians get emotional during an election campaign? We examine the existence of changes in partisan in-group favoritism and partisan out-group hostility among political elites by evaluating the degree to which they fluctuate before, during and after election campaigns. The lack of elite level panel data has prevented scholars from studying the dynamics of politicians' emotions around the most emotionally intense political event in democracies: elections. We focus on Sweden around the 2014 election and follow more than 700 Swedish politicians before, during and after a national election campaign using a unique three-wave panel survey. The results reveal that politicians' emotions towards other parties are affected during the election, but less so for their own party. Our study adds to the body of recent evidence that campaigns mobilize partisan identities and increase partisan animus.     

Sport,civil society and social integration: The case of Norwegian voluntary sport organizations

Abstract

Voluntary sport organizations make up the largest part of voluntary sector in many countries. Yet, in light of the renewed social and political interest in civil society, we do not know very much about how sport organizations operate and function. Accordingly, this article addresses the question of how voluntary sport organizations contribute to social integration through differences in community structures. First a theoretical framework making it possible to distinguish between various forms of community structures—strong, weak, mediated and pragmatic communities—is developed. Then, the first empirical part describes how members in sport organizations belong to such various forms of communities. Next, the article explains differences in social integration through social background, variation in participation in sports and various recruitment channels. Finally, the article explores how differences in community structures matters for the experience of sport activity, for organizational democracy and social capital (trust and political interests).     

Direct Democracy and its Critics: Support for Direct Democracy and ‘Stealth’ Democracy in Finland

In this article support for direct democracy and for stealth democracy in Finland is analysed. Stealth democracy represents a step towards a democracy in which there would be even less citizen involvement than in the representative form of today's democracy. The authors found that both options gained significant support among the Finnish electorate. Additionally, they found that it is mostly the same variables that contribute to the probability of citizens being supporters of either direct democracy or stealth democracy. It is the people with less education, who do not know much about politics and who feel that the current system does not respond to citizens' needs, that want change. The direction of change appears to be a matter of secondary interest. Political ideology affects which of the two options respondents favour. Right-wing citizens are more likely to favour stealth democracy. Citizens leaning to the left are more interested in direct democracy.     

Elite executives in issues management: the role of ethical paradigms in decision making

The perspectives of elite (or top‐level) issues managers on ethics are explored in this paper. From these elites we can learn how issues were managed at their global organisations and how questions of ethics were addressed in issues management. The organisations in this study were chosen because of their superlative rankings in measures of ethics and reputation. Research questions explored ethical decision making and the predominant paradigm of ethics in each organisation through six elite interviews and observation. Although both organisations attempted to address ethics, the elite issues managers at one organisation did so more thoroughly and effectively than did the managers at the other organisation. This efficacy was due to the depth of ethical study and training engaged in by the elites, the intense ethical analysis of issues, and the choice of a deontological approach to ethics. This paper argues that ethics should be concerted, codified, consistent, trained and rigorously analysed. A deontological paradigm of ethical decision making fits all of these criteria, and this research shows that a deontological ethical paradigm can contribute to effective issues management. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables

A central question in the study of democratic polities is the extent to which elite opinion about policy shapes public opinion. Estimating the impact of elites on mass opinion is difficult because of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. This article proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of elite messages on public support for European integration employing changes in political institutions as instrumental variables. We find that more negative elite messages about European integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe. Our analysis suggests that OLS estimates are biased, underestimating the magnitude of the effect of elite messages by 50%. We also find no evidence that this effect varies for more politically aware individuals, and our estimates are inconsistent with a mainstreaming effect in which political awareness increases support for Europe in those settings in which elites have a favorable consensus on the benefits of integration.     

Elite communication and affective polarization among voters

How does elite communication influence affective polarization between partisan groups? Drawing on the literature on partisan source cues, we expect that communication from in- or outgroup party representatives will increase affective polarization. We argue that polarized social identities are reinforced by partisan source cues, which bias perceptions of elite communication and result in increased intergroup differentiation. Further, we expect that the effect of such source cues is greater for voters with stronger partisan affinities. To evaluate our hypotheses, we performed a survey experiment among about 1300 voters in Sweden. Our analyses show that individuals who received a factual political message with a source cue from an in- or outgroup representative exhibited higher affective polarization, especially when they already held strong partisan affinities. This suggests that political elites can increase affective polarization by reinforcing existing group identities, and that this occurs in conjunction with biased interpretation of elite communication. The results improve our understanding of how political elites can influence affective polarization and add to previous research on party cues and attitude formation by demonstrating that such source cues can also increase intergroup differentiation.