Occupancy rights: life planners and the Navajos

ABSTRACT

This Comment focuses on the limitations of Stilz’s individualist conception of occupancy rights. Her account of occupancy is critical to her attempt to answer the question of where one holds territorial rights as well as related place-related rights like the right of return. Her account appeals to the geographical location of individual life plans. This Comment argues that this fails to distinguish between Indigenous People who are connected historically and in many other ways to a place and individual Life-Planners: it treats the two as equivalent, which I argue is counter-intuitive. I also argue that Stilz’s occupancy account fails to explain the scope of occupancy rights in a number of cases that she appeals to in her examples, such as the Navajos’ expulsion from the area in which they lived. What she needs, I argue, is a group based conception of occupancy rights, in addition to the idea of individual rights of residency.     

Self-determination,group identity and the common will

ABSTRACT

Anna Stilz defends a political autonomy account of self-determination that, she argues, best explains our intuitions about why colonization, annexation and foreign occupation are wrong. These are wrong, on Stilz’s view, because they unilaterally coerce individuals living under those systems of government. I argue that Stilz does not show that her account of self-determination explains our intuitions about autonomy in these kinds of cases, because she does not have a separate argument for the value of belonging to particular political groups.     

Legitimacy,self-determination,and conditional cooperators

ABSTRACT

This article critically examines the account of collective self-determination and state legitimacy developed by Stilz in her book. Central to this account is the idea that for a state to be legitimate it must reflect the shared will of the people over which it governs. I argue that the normative taxonomy Stilz employs to develop this criterion of legitimacy ignores the possibility of conditional cooperators: groups who are alienated from society due to the injustices they experience but are willing to affirm their participation in state institutions if these injustices are rectified. I then demonstrate that since there are no grounds for discounting the dissent of conditional cooperators, their presence significantly increases the threshold for state legitimacy that follows from Stilz’s theory. As a result, Stilz is forced to abandon her claim that basically just states generally enjoy a qualified ‘right to do wrong’.     

Property without authority? Between natural law and the Kantian state

ABSTRACT

In Territorial Sovereignty, Anna Stilz seeks to combine a Kant-inspired moral justification of the state with a natural law-inspired account of ‘foundational title’. The aim of my essay is to show that the contrasting ways in which these two frameworks conceptualize the relation between property (or rights over objects more generally) and authority lead to tensions on two levels of Stilz’s own argument. Concerning individuals’ occupation of land, the question is why some rights over objects can be acquired pre-politically (i.e. occupancy rights), while others cannot (i.e. property rights). And concerning states’ claims over territory, it is unclear whether state entrance basically ‘absorbs’ our political obligations, or whether states have a duty of justice to establish more ambitious (and possibly coercive) forms of global government. The underlying question is whether, or to what extent, Stilz remains committed to Kant’s unconditional justification of territorial sovereignty and, if so, how the very idea of natural rights (over objects in particular) can be made to fit into such an account.     

Individual integrity,freedom of association and religious exemption

ABSTRACT

Of the many questions Cécile Laborde addresses in her magisterial Liberalism’s Religion, several relate to what she describes as ‘the puzzle of exemptions’. I examine some of the issues raised by her efforts to solve that puzzle: whether her ideal of moral integrity squares with the nature of religious belief; whether we should find the case for collective religious exemptions in freedom of association and the ‘coherence interests’ of associations; how much significance we should give to the ‘competence interests’ of organised religions; and by which criteria we should assess individual claims to religious exemption.     

Towards cultural citizenship? Cultural rights and cultural policy in Taiwan

This article reviews existing literature on the construction of cultural citizenship, and argues that cultural citizenship expands the concept of ‘citizenship’, promotes citizens' consciousness and ensures the protection of minority rights. Since the 1990s, three cultural policies have arisen related to cultural citizenship in Taiwan: ‘Community Renaissance’, ‘Multicultural Policy’ and the ‘Announcement of Cultural Citizenship’. ‘Cultural citizenship’ has expanded the concept of citizenship in two ways. First, it has led to the consideration of the minority rights of Taiwanese indigenous peoples, the Hakkas, foreign brides and migrant workers in ‘citizenship’; and second, it has placed emphasis on ‘cultural rights’ in addition to civil rights, political rights and social rights. This article begins by exploring what approach to cultural citizenship is used in cultural policy, and what approach is suitable for practising cultural citizenship in Taiwan. I argue that minority groups practise their cultural rights with the public participation of Community Renaissance. Taiwan's case bears out Stevenson's view: a society of actively engaged citizens requires both the protection offered by rights and opportunities to participate. Finally, this article shows the challenges and contradictions of cultural citizenship in Taiwan: the loss of autonomy and the continuation of cultural inequality.     

Unequal but fair? Cultural recognition and self-government rights

This review of Patten’s Equal Recognition suggests that minority rights can be grounded either in cultural accommodation rights or collective self-government rights. I defend four propositions: (1) individuals’ interests in membership in political communities cannot be reduced to their interests in being able to pursue their own conceptions of the good; (2) liberal states do not have to extend neutrality as equal treatment to self-government claims that intersect with their own jurisdiction; (3) claims for the establishment of public languages and territorial autonomy need to be justified on the basis of self-government rights rather than on grounds of equal treatment of cultural identities; (4) as a condition for their admission, immigrants can be expected to waive collective self-government rights rather than cultural protection rights.     

Justice as a claim to (social) property

Abstract

Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French political theory, known as ‘solidarism’. Solidarism recognises private property as legitimate, but at the same time argues that the collective nature of economic production gives rise to a claim to social property. It is social property that should underlie the case for social justice and social rights, not the standard liberal claims to individual autonomy. This paper provides an appraisal of Kohn’s recovery of solidarism, taking as its main theme the relation between property and social justice. The paper first offers a typology of four theories of justice (right- and left-libertarianism, luck and relational egalitarianism) and discusses the relation of each of these to the concept of property. Then it argues that solidarism is akin to left-libertarianism in the way it formulates justice as a claim to social property. Finally, it argues that solidarists cannot escape grounding their theory in a non-property based fundamental principle, which makes the theory much less distinctive from egalitarian theories of justice than may appear at first sight.     

Rethinking Human Rights in York as a Human Rights City

Human rights is in crisis in the UK. It lacks significant political backing and public support. This ‘insider account’ of York becoming a human rights city suggests that there is a need to rethink approaches to human rights. The article looks at the strategies adopted in the city; the annual city‐based indicator report which provides the key reference point for all local activities; and the declaration of York as a ‘human rights city’ in 2017 alongside its subsequent impact. The discussion is linked to two debates within human rights: how to define and build a culture of human rights, and what it means for human rights to be truly relevant at a local level. The new approach advocated can be summarised as participatory, locally informed, and related to everyday concerns.     

Voters should not be in prison! The rights of prisoners in a democracy

In Hirst v UK, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK must end its blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting. In this paper I argue that the court’s reasoning undermines collective political self-determination by assuming away the essential connection between political citizenship and civil liberty in a representative democracy. I outline a democratic theory of imprisonment and argue that the democratic citizenship of imprisoned offenders is suspended not by their disenfranchisement but by their imprisonment. While many aspects of the UK’s penal practice are inconsistent with democratic self-government, the voting ban is not one of them. I conclude by outlining the numerous rights that prisoners should enjoy in a democracy.     

Fairness and equal recognition

An important contribution of Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is the conception of neutrality that grounds his defence of minority cultural rights. Built in to his conception of neutrality of treatment is a notion of ‘fairness’ whose effect is to provide an upfront, across the board limitation on the demands cultural minorities may legitimately make on the rest of society. There must be limits on the duty to accommodate, but it obscures more than it illuminates to build this into the content of the right to equal recognition itself. We see more clearly what is at stake in these conflicts by articulating the value of self-determination independently and taking account of necessary limits to its satisfaction as part of a second-stage analysis of what duties may be claimed and against whom. Familiar principles of discrimination law exemplify this alternative model. This presents the interest in self-determination more robustly, while acknowledging that the claims of duty arising out of it are defeasible. The result is a more flexible and nuanced exploration of the complex moral issues involved when fundamental interests clash.     

Defending a cosmopolitanism without illusions. Reply to my critics

This essay engages with several critiques of my project a ‘cosmopolitanism without illusions.’ Who is the subject of rights? What are the objects of rights? Is there a distinction between human and moral rights? Furthermore, what is prior in this cosmopolitan account: democracy or human rights? Do democratic iterations exhaust the meaning of principles of rights? Finally, does the ‘scarf affair’ really signify the return of ‘political theology’ or have not such disputes always accompanied secularization and modernity? I argue that moral rights comprise more than human rights and that non-human beings such as animals can have moral rights claims against us. Democratic iterations and rights complement one another; neither is prior and that although debates about religion and secularization have been endemic to modernity, the return of references to Carl Schmitt’s ‘political theology’ is rather new.     

Citizenship and disability: incommensurable lives and well-being

This paper explores a new political consensus promoting ‘active’ as opposed to ‘passive’ conceptions of citizenship, emerging from the late 1970s onwards, and marking the post-settlement/post-Marshellesque era of the welfare state. Reflecting this consensus, the disability rights movement critiques ‘passive’ conceptions, which are, it is claimed, supported by the medical model of disability and so-called objective accounts of ‘special needs’ and well-being – that is, accounts provided by non-disabled professionals and carers who frequently diminish the rights of disabled people to live autonomously. In contrast, ‘active’ conceptions cohere with the social model of disability supporting the values of agency and self-determination – derived, in part, from equalizing opportunities for disabled people’s social participation compared with non-disabled people; but also by promoting subjective accounts of well-being which are often incomparable or incommensurable, both between persons and across one person’s life.     

The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, human rights have been a contentious issue for relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), especially in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). It is an issue that has constantly led to tensions in interregional cooperation. However, the ASEAN–EU dialogue on human rights has, in fact, had a significant impact on regional dynamics by stimulating the process of regional identity formation, especially in Southeast Asia. The core mechanism through which this development takes place is that of interaction, the process in which the two regional groupings engage while negotiating human rights policy. It can be argued, therefore, that interregional and intraregional human rights interactions are mutually dependent. ASEAN's rather confrontational mode of interaction with the European Union in relation to human rights has served as a catalyst for the dynamic growth of a collective definition of self in ASEAN. It has led to an ‘essentialization’ of ASEAN's idea of self as opposed to a common other, something which has undermined the possibility of maintaining an interregional dialogue that is not confrontational. However, it has also contributed to the development of a regional space for communicating about human rights and has thus played a central role in the gradual transformation of ASEAN's collective identity formation.     

Post-capitalist property

When writing about property and property rights in his imagined post-capitalist society of the future, Marx seemed to envisage ‘individual property’ co-existing with ‘socialized property’ in the means of production. As the social and political consequences of faltering growth and increasing inequality, debt and insecurity gradually manifest themselves, and with automation and artificial intelligence lurking in the wings, the future of capitalism, at least in its current form, looks increasingly uncertain. With this, the question of what property and property rights might look like in the future, in a potentially post-capitalist society, is becoming ever more pertinent. Is the choice simply between private property and markets, and public (state-owned) property and planning? Or can individual and social property in the (same) means of production co-exist, as Marx suggested? This paper explores ways in which they might, through an examination of the Chinese household responsibility system (HRS) and the ‘fuzzy’ and seemingly confusing regime of land ownership that it instituted. It examines the HRS against the backdrop of Marx’s ideas about property and subsequent (post-Marx) theorizing about the legal nature of property in which property has come widely to be conceptualized not as a single, unitary ‘ownership’ right to a thing (or, indeed, as the thing itself) but as a ‘bundle of rights’. The bundle-of-rights idea of property, it suggests, enables us to see not only that ‘individual’ and ‘socialized’ property’ in the (same) means of production might indeed co-exist, but that the range of institutional possibility is far greater than that between capitalism and socialism/communism as traditionally conceived.     

The international rule of law

ABSTRACT

The rule of law is a moral ideal that protects distinctive legal values such as generality, equality before the law, the independence of courts, and due process rights. I argue that one of the main goals of an international rule of the law is the protection of individual and state autonomy from the arbitrary interference of international institutions, and that the best way to codify this protection is through constitutional rules restraining the reach of international law into the internal affairs of a state. State autonomy does not have any intrinsic value or moral status of its own. Its value is derivative, resulting from the role it plays as the most efficient means of protecting autonomy for individuals and groups. Therefore, the goal of protecting state autonomy form the encroachment of international law will have to be constrained by, and balanced against the more fundamental goal of an international rule of law, the protection of the autonomy of individual persons, best realized through the entrenchment of basic human rights.     

Paradoxical individualization: ideological polarization in the U.S. in historical-comparative and theoretical perspective

ABSTRACT

Beginning with Karl Marx, theorists have seen individual autonomy and ideology as opposing elements. Ideology was considered the product of mental, cultural or social constraints. People did not choose their world view – they fell victim to it. With the increase of individual autonomy, however, ideology would wither away. In the late 20th century, the advocates of individualization theory have similarly predicted the vanishing of clear-cut ideological divisions in a world in which any form of collective identity was difficult to sustain. Political eclecticism and the mixing of different political world views would become the new norm. Politics was now ‘beyond left and right’, as Anthony Giddens once famously argued. In my article, I show that this understanding of the relationship between individualization and ideological polarization is flawed. By discussing the extreme ideological polarization in the U.S., I disprove the notion that our need for ideology vanishes the more our freedoms expand. On the contrary, precisely the increase in individual autonomy – in terms of mobility patterns, media use and lifestyle differentiation – has helped to turn the country into a series of closed echo chambers and to deepen the ideological fault lines of American society.     

Exploring citizenship spheres of inclusion/exclusion: rights as ‘potential for power’

ABSTRACT

Ariely examines the logic of inclusion/exclusion involved in the allocation of social, political and cultural rights to minorities. He argues that the unequal allocation of rights is determined by the degree of potential power inherent in the various types of rights, and that rights with more potential power, such as political and cultural representation rights, challenge the dominant group's position more strongly than rights to social welfare and cultural autonomy. Minorities are included at a higher level in spheres of rights with low potential power, and at a lower level in spheres of rights with higher potential power. He uses the case of the Arab citizens of Israel to illustrate the thesis, reviewing institutional practices of inclusion/exclusion as well as the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards the allocation of different rights as reflected in three attitudinal surveys.     

Politics and the Political in Castoriadis

This paper explores the distinction of politics and the political in Castoriadis’ work. Whereas the political refers to the instituted as the management of society in accordance with established laws, politics refers to the instituting as the capacity of the imaginary to constantly challenge established laws on the basis of individual and collective autonomy. The politics of autonomy identify with the regime of direct democracy, established first and foremost at the level of economy and expanding accordingly in all spheres of society. Democracy contains both a psychoanalytical and educational perspective inasmuch as it aims at the conscious self-reflective harmonisation of individual and collective autonomy by means of collective deliberation.     

Political space in Vietnam: a view from the ‘rice-roots'

Abstract

Single-party, authoritarian states such as Vietnam are frequently characterised as having ‘closed’ political opportunity structures and ‘un-free’ socio-political systems. The validity of this observation depends, however, on the viewer's frame of reference. Seen from the perspective of active citizens, Vietnamese political structures offer increasingly greater space for collective action than a state-centred institutional analysis would predict. Episodes of contentious politics surrounding land disputes and public parks during 2007 provide evidence of the changing dynamics of participation in politics. Actors involved in these and similar campaigns are broadly optimistic about the future prospects for an opening of political space within the existing system. These findings are contrasted with international reports of violations of political rights and with the Vietnamese government's own efforts at legal reform. Although signals remain mixed, to some extent Vietnam might be becoming a ‘rice-roots democracy’ in practice, while remaining a single-party state. The voices and experiences of civil society actors will continue to shape opportunities and risks in the expansion of political space.