廉洁官僚、政党自律与权力制衡：廉政建设模式的国际比较

各国的反腐败实践都与其特定的政治结构、经济运行以及文化传统密切关联。结合社会基础的特点来观察这些实践过程,可以总结出三种富有代表性的反腐败模式：廉洁官僚模式（代表国家：日本）、政党自律模式（代表国家：新加坡）、权力制衡模式（代表国家：美国）。廉洁官僚模式的优点是利用官僚制恪守规则、服从至上的职业精神减少了行政腐败机会,缺点是反腐理念与制度实践游离于政治腐败与商业贿赂之外,反腐败不彻底。     

审视民粹主义

<正>近年来,从发达的美国和欧洲,到正在快速上升的俄罗斯和印度,再到第三世界的拉美地区,民粹主义都在社会政治舞台上扮演着重要角色,这一思潮和运动正深深地影响着世界政治的发展。时至今日,民粹主义全球化泛滥仍在周期性地进行,而且不仅未有减弱之势,反而愈演愈烈。在欧洲,各种民粹主义政党全方位崛起,竞相在国家、地区以及欧洲议会选举中实现突破,挤压和占领传统政党的生存空间。在欧盟的政治版图上,已出现了北部民粹     

当代英国政党治理模式变迁——从“政党自治”到“法律择要规范”

各国政党治理模式都是国家层面的政党治理模式与政党层面的内部治理模式的复合体。英国作为现代政党发源地,长期以来视政党为私人组织,国家法律对政党奉行默认态度,实行政党自治;但2000年英国《政党、选举及全民公投法》开始全面而严格地规范政党注册、政治捐款、竞选开支与选举活动。这意味着英国政党治理模式的重大转变,标志着英国开始推行政党公共选举活动法制化,对政党进行"法律择要规范",同时保留政党内部自治传统。就英国两大政党内部治理模式与特点而言,工党内部治理奉行多元民主基础上的中央集权,重视党的民主性、整体性、代表性与社会性,依章依规治党;保守党内部治理则犹如公司治理,奉行寡头统治与领袖集权,主要按政治惯例与政治伦理行事。这说明国家法律对政党组织属性定位决定着该国政党治理的基本模式,但政党组织原则、党内关系等决定着该党内部治理模式与特点,世界范围乃至一国之内不同政党的治理模式具有多样性。     

西方民粹主义的话语政治及其面临的批判

建构"人民",定位"人民"的敌人,进而确立"人民"对"其他人"的二元世界观,这是西方民粹主义话语政治的内在逻辑。这种话语政治凸显一种反抗性特质,有其特定的社会性与政治性根源,前者指向各种经济与社会需求的不能满足,后者涉及政治生活的冲突本质。民粹主义政治的孕育发展依赖其标志性的话语动员策略,即诉诸否定性话语动员、简单化政治和激情政治等手段。面对民粹主义的挑战,欧美主流政治全面反击,为其贴上了极权主义、暴民政治和不事建设等标签,但是却对民粹主义的认识论价值缺乏足够理解,对造成民粹主义的制度根源缺乏足够反思。民粹主义的挑战与主流政治精英的围剿周而复始,正是西方政治深陷其中的真正困境。     

西欧主流政党推进党内决策机制创新的主要做法

为适应21世纪政治、经济、社会的变革，西欧主流政党在党的政治理念、组织机构、决策机制等方面进行了不同形式与内容的调整与改革。党的决策机制改革正处于“集中、封闭模式”向“更民主、更开放模式”的转变过程中。首先，强化党员与民众直接参与党的决策进程，不断改革党的议事和决策程序。强调提高党员的参政意识，落实党员直接参与重大决策的权力，增强政党决策的代表性和党员对决策的认同感。     

西文国家对政党制度的完善及启示

现代政党和政党制度最早产生于西方国家。以英、美等国政党制度为代表的西方政党制度建立以来,一直在本国政治生活中长期稳定地发挥作用,并对世界政治发展产生了重要影响,这固然有多种原因,但也与它们在发展和演变过程中始终坚持不断完善是分不开的。它山之石,可以攻玉。西方国家的政党制度与我国的政党制度具有本质的不同,其赖以存在发展的社会基础和文化传统也有很大差别,但作为人类共同探讨社会政治发展的过程和成果,在一些方面肯定会有可以借鉴之处。所以,认真分     

西方极端政党民粹化及警示

近年来,西方国家左右翼极端政党群体崛起。极左翼政党民粹化主张赢得选民支持,民粹主义则加速极右翼政党的兴起。民粹思想说到底是民众不满情绪的聚合反应。要警惕民粹主义对我国的影响。     

列宁早期俄国资本主义矛盾观及对错误思潮的批判

列宁早期在充分肯定俄国资本主义历史进步性的同时,批判了以"合法马克思主义"为代表的资产阶级自由主义思潮及以民粹主义为代表的小资产阶级社会主义思潮的错误看法,从而全面地揭露了俄国资本主义在经济、政治、文化、社会等方面造成的深刻社会矛盾和问题。     

后危机时代：政党提升治理能力的策略与路径

在后危机时代中，一些发达国家的主流政党纷纷陷入生存困境：政党的社会治理方法缺乏有效性，治理能力下降；政党之间缺少稳定的政治联盟；社会的稳定与秩序受到冲击；政党输出的政策与纲领饱受民众质疑。为化解危机摆脱困境，这些政党一方面采取“中间化”战略，寻求新的社会支持力量；一方面积极探索联合执政模式，加强多元治理，以适应社会变迁；同时还积极开展自我纠错与价值“增值”取向，着力推动社会建设，以创建更加平等、公正与充满活力的社会。     

政党执政权力的产生和实现——基于国家与社会关系的研究视角

政党执政是指政党通过一定方式进入国家体系并通过国家体系实现政党意志的政治行为,所反映的是政党外部的政治关系及其运作;在法治条件下,执政党要在国家宪法和法律的框架下行使执政权力;政党执政权力来源于社会,是社会权力的一种实践形式;政党是国家与社会的桥梁,国家与社会关系的状况与政党执政权力的实现有密切关系。非政府组织的蓬勃发展给国家与社会关系带来的新变化,向政党执政权力的职能定位和实现方式提出了更高要求。     

Economic crisis and the variety of populist response: evidence from Greece,Portugal and Spain

Abstract

Greece, Portugal and Spain are among the countries worst hit by the 2008 Great Recession, followed by significant electoral and political turmoil. However, one of the dimensions in which they differ is the presence and varieties of populism in parties’ political proposals. Drawing on holistic coding of party manifestos, we assess the varying presence of populist rhetoric in mainstream and challenger parties before and after the 2008 economic downturn. Our empirical findings show that populism is much higher in Greece compared to Spain and Portugal. We do not find a significant impact of the crisis as the degree of populism remains rather stable in Greece and Portugal, while it increases in Spain, mainly due to the rise of new populist forces. The study confirms that populist rhetoric is a strategy adopted mainly by challenger and ideologically radical parties. In addition, inclusionary populism is the predominant flavour of populist parties in new Southern Europe, although exclusionary populism is present to a lesser extent in the Greek case. We contend that the interaction between the national context – namely the ideological legacy of parties and the main dimensions of competition – and the strategic options of party leadership is crucial for explaining cross-country variation in the intensity of populism and the specific issues that characterise populist discourse.     

Don't call me a populist! The meaning of populism for western European parties and politicians

In recent years a common understanding of the core elements of populist communication has been achieved in academia. Yet, we know less about how the term populism is used by political parties themselves, despite widespread assumptions about the use of populism as a battle term to disqualify competitors. Based on a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Twitter content from mainstream and populist actors in six western European countries, this study finds that populism is indeed used by mainstream parties in a pejorative way in order to label political competitors. Yet, not only populist but also mainstream competitors are labeled populist by the center parties linking a variety of different negative meanings to the term, which are often of a less demonizing nature not questioning the legitimacy of others. Populists in Italy and France refer to the term in a positive way, while Spanish and German populists rather reject the label.     

The rise of post-imperial populism: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain

Abstract.  Recent approaches to contemporary Euroscepticism have explained it in terms of the politics of opposition and peripherality characteristic of competitive party systems. Euroscepticism becomes a central strategy by which non-mainstream parties or factions within mainstream parties attempt to gain political advantage. In the British case, there has been a focus on the influence Eurosceptic factionalism can have within a first-past-the-post parliamentary system. This article challenges explanations of British Euroscepticism in terms of the politics of opposition and the workings of the party system. Instead, it is proposed that a structural crisis of British party politics has allowed Euroscepticism to enter the political mainstream. The author conceives of Euroscepticism as a distinct and powerful national movement asserting conceptions of Britain's exceptional national identity. This is viewed as part of a post-imperial crisis that shifts parties, and factions within parties, towards populist forms of legitimation that have weakened possibilities for stable and coherent political leadership over European integration. Consequently, mainstream parties have struggled to protect themselves against the ideological influence of this populist Euroscepticism. This is particularly evident during periods of Eurosceptic mobilization, and is demonstrated in this article through the examination of the extensive role played by right-wing Eurosceptic forces during the attempt by the Major Government to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.     

The Politics of Unpolitics

Scholars of populism have suggested that it might best be described as ‘unpolitical’, rather than apolitical or anti-political. This term captures the populist claim to stand morally above the sphere of politics (which it deems inherently corrupting), while being simultaneously drawn to engage in it. But such ambivalence towards politics is not limited to populist actors; indeed, ‘unpolitics’ might be considered intrinsic to British political culture. Most obviously, Conservatives historically portrayed themselves as unsullied by ideology, above party competition, and deriving their values from embodied experience rather than political reasoning. But, while traditional Conservative unpolitics emphasised hierarchy, new anti-deferential forms of unpolitics emerged in the postwar period. These were based on claims to be ‘ordinary’, which was defined in opposition to the ‘political’ in ways that made the latter seem necessarily illegitimate. Focussing on unpolitics shows that populism grew out of mainstream British political culture, as well as in opposition to it.     

Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain

The paper inquires critically into Podemos as an instance of left-wing populism in contemporary European politics, putting forward four claims and a major thesis. First, Podemos was started as an original endeavour to ally in a hybrid mix two divergent approaches to democratic politics: the horizontal, open and networked mobilizations of the multitude, and the vertical, hierarchical, formal and representative structures of party formations, on the other. Such an amalgam might serve to combine the virtues of different models of democracy. Second, Podemos’ populism exemplifies a creative version of a ‘politics of the common’, but the terms of the ‘common sense’ are inflected in the direction of social rights, inclusion and egalitarian democracy. Third, Podemos illustrates a unique ‘reflexivity’ in the pursuit of populism. The party leadership has taken its cues from E. Laclau’s hegemonic theory of populism and implements it in its political strategy. Fourth, since the autumn of 2014, Podemos has arguably seen the gradual preponderance of a vertical, ‘hegemonic’ logic, reflecting a particular reading of populist theory which is prevalent among the party’s leadership. The broader thesis is that a dualist politics, which welds together horizontalism and verticalism in a conflictual bind, is a prima facie plausible strategy for renewing democracy in the present critical context. But a political organization like Podemos will be able to redeem its democratic promises as long as it maintains a constructive balance between these two political logics, avoiding the reassertion of centralized leadership and the suppression of pluralism which are typical of the populist tradition.     

Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.     

Right‐wing populist parties in Austria and Switzerland: A comparative analysis of electoral support and conditions of success

This article analyses the electoral support and parliamentary representation of right‐wing populist parties in Austria (FPO) and Switzerland (SD, AP/FPS, Lega dei Ticinesi). Contrary to the empirical evidence in many other fields of the political systems in these two Alpine republics, the analysis reveals strong differences rather than similiarities in the electoral support of right‐wing populist parties in both countries. This is explained by the differences in political culture and historic circumstances, performance of the established (governing) parties, party political penetration of social institutions, structure of the party system and the contrasting importance of direct‐democratic structures in the two countries. The exceptional skill of the right‐wing populist leader in Austria can also be seen as a significant factor. In contrast, neither social and economic variables, such as the economic situation, the unemployment rate and the overall number of asylum‐seekers, nor the strength and performance of green‐alternative parties seem to be important factors in explaining the differing success of right‐wing populist parties in Austria and Switzerland.     

Framing blame: toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences

Although previous research has argued that the media play a crucial role in populism’s success, we know too little about how populist messages affect preferences for populist parties. To advance this knowledge, we conducted an experiment in which the core of populist rhetoric – constructing the people as innocent in-group opposed to the establishment as culprit out-group – was manipulated in news articles. The findings indicate that when political elites are blamed for a salient national problem, people are more likely to vote for a populist party and less likely to vote for the largest party in government. Populist vote intentions are indirectly affected via blame perceptions. These findings offer important insights into the media’s role in the electoral success of populism.     

Economic crisis, party system change, and the dynamics of class voting in Venezuela, 1973–2003

The breakdown of the old catch-all party system in Venezuela, and the sudden rise to power of leftist former coup leader Hugo Chávez provides an instructive case study to examine the sources of party system change, the rise of populism and the politicisation of class. Using nationally representative survey data this paper analyses different models of voting behaviour over time, and examines the extent to which the determinants of electoral choice have changed. It argues that although economic crises during the 1990s undermined support for the existing parties, it did not create a politically salient class-based response. Rather, it created the electoral space for new actors to enter the political stage and articulate new populist issue dimensions. Explanations for the politicisation of social cleavages in Venezuela can therefore best be understood in terms of ‘top-down’ approaches which emphasises the role of political agency in reshaping and re-crafting political identities, rather than more ‘bottom-up’ factors which emphasise the demands that originate within the electorate.