Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture: Making Sense of ‘Dignity’ Talk

The right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is invariably associated with ‘human dignity’. The idea of dignity plays some role in this right’s interpretation, although the content of the idea in this context, as in others, is unclear. Making sense of the dignity idea involves a number of challenges. These challenges give rise to the methodological-type question at the heart of this article: how should human rights lawyers go about articulating the content of ‘dignity’? The article proposes, and models, a methodological approach in response. Its core argument is that human rights law needs the vocabulary provided by theorizations of dignity but that these theorizations should be anchored in authoritative human rights jurisprudence. It argues that this approach can help make sense of the dignity idea in a way that facilitates a richer understanding of its influence on interpretation.     

Human Rights,Personal Responsibility,and Human Dignity: What Are Our Moral Duties to Promote the Universal Realization of Human Rights?

According to the orthodox or humanist conception of human rights, individuals have a moral duty to promote the universal realization of human rights. However, advocates of this account express the implications of this duty in extremely vague terms. What does it mean when we say that we must promote human rights satisfaction? Does it mean that we must devote a considerable amount of our time and resources to this task? Does it mean, instead, that we must make occasional donations to charities working to advance human rights realization? In this essay, I argue that this duty can only be constructed as imperfect. This means that it confers agent-relative discretion on us to decide when, how, and to what extent to advance the human rights of others. It also means that it is neither correlative with rights nor enforceable. As I will explain, the main reason for this is that any attempt to construct it as a perfect duty would infringe the dignity of the potential duty bearers and thereby undermine the very values that human rights practice aspires to serve. Finally, I will conclude by providing some guidelines for those who wish to comply with their imperfect duties to improve the situation of those whose human rights are in peril.     

Henry Shue on Basic Rights: A Defense

In light of the many recent criticisms of Henry Shue's philosophy, this article provides a defense of Shue's philosophical argument for basic rights. The author demonstrates that the latest criticisms made by Thomas Pogge, Michael Payne, and Andrew Cohen misconstrue Shue's position, and therefore fail to overturn the soundness of Shue's argument. Against those who contend that basic rights demand too much, both logically and morally, the author argues that basic rights serve as the minimal threshold for human dignity and the foundation for all other rights. Consequentially, the overall moral landscape is skewed if basic rights are absent.     

Ageing with Dignity: Old-Age Pension Schemes from the Perspective of the Right to Social Security Under ICESCR

The ‘dignity and worth of the human person’ emphasised in international human rights instruments resonate strongly in relation to the world’s ageing population, which is projected to be the fastest growing population group in the world and often among the most vulnerable. While elderly persons as a group are heterogeneous and their socio-economic life situation varies significantly between individuals, the need for universal support mechanisms such as non-contributory old-age benefits have been recognised by many states, and currently, over 100 countries around the world provide some form of social pension targeted towards the elderly populations. This article appraises a sample of these old-age pension schemes from the perspective of the right to social security, with particular emphasis on the dignity and worth of the human person as espoused within the international human rights regime.     

The Honor of Human Rights: Environmental Rights and the Duty of Intergenerational Promise

The idea of human rights either as a moral system or as a set of legal practices does not sit well with the concept of honor. This is true for both ontological reasons and because of some reprehensible misuses of the term in constructs such as “honor killings.” Yet the absence of honor as an argument for human rights comes with a high cost in the defense of human rights generally. As Hobbes made clear in his early theory, rights—and dignity—are grounded in the human capacity to make promises and in the necessity of honoring them. In his view then, honor is an essential feature of human rights and one closely linked to the human capacity for dignity. In this article, I explore how environmental human rights place a renewed emphasis on honor as a requirement for the protection of the rights of future generations. In the process, I explore the general relationship between honor, dignity, and human rights.     

Fifty years of human rights: An emergent global regime

The emergent human rights regime includes three distinct elements; international and domestic laws; government and corporate policies that deny or affirm rights; and norms of behavior that are applied against groups and individuals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its successors were milestones in international law that sprang from the euphoria of victory in World War II. When policies violated these precepts, they came under intense international scrutiny, which produced highly visible, though not universal, improvements; and it was not long before governments and other organizations adopted positive policies that improved access to these rights. Policy scientists can analyze these rights as demands or claims that enjoy various degrees of legitimacy within both the civic and the public order. Behind the laws and policies lies a widespread awareness of the standards of human dignity. This awareness is gradually taking on a life of its own and human rights begin to function as a system of expected behavior that is becoming a global regime that reflects the preferences of nongovernmental players acting under customs and rules of their own making. Behavior that respects essential rights is increasingly taken as an obligation transcending national borders and subtly enriching the decisions and transactions of states, corporations, and special purpose organizations.     

The Biopolitics of Policy-Making: Medical Activism in the Century of the Brain

This article argues that advances in biotechnology and the life sciences, particularly the ongoing neuro-revolution, have changed the relationship between science and politics. Since the “Decade of the Brain” project of the 1990s, new neuroscientific terms and biological understandings of the self have given rise to what Paul Rabinow refers to as “biosociality,” that is, groups that organize around, and identify with, a specific disease or disability to lobby for recognition, better treatment options, access to resources, and, in some cases, equal rights. This biopolitical relationship between citizens and scientific experts in the policy-making process can be seen in the current debate between the neurodiversity movement and anti-autism groups over the needs of autistic people. However, this article shows that within policy discussions, both groups have been (re)constructed by competing medical discourses and illness narratives in a way that has limited their ability to voice their needs and effectively evoke policy change.     

Mainstreaming disability in the United Nations treaty bodies

As of the beginning of this century, the United Nations (UN) human rights system had comprehensively elided persons with disabilities from its purview. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) responded to this lacuna in 2006. The CRPD obligates states parties to mainstream disability by protecting and promoting the human rights of persons with disabilities in all policies and programs and intersects disability with other discriminated-against populations. This article investigates the success of the UN in mainstreaming disability throughout its human rights treaty bodies over the period 2000–2014 by comparing the seven years before and the eight years after the CRPD's adoption for six core UN treaty bodies. In doing so, the article provides initial and unique insight into how well the UN implements human rights norms into treaty bodies and provides a template for future research on the inclusion of vulnerable group-based rights in the UN and beyond. Despite some significant variations between treaty bodies, we find an overall dramatic increase in the quantitative incidence of disability rights being referenced. Nevertheless, a closer look into the practices of two treaty bodies shows that the human rights of persons with disabilities, while noted by those bodies, are included fully only on occasion. For the UN to truly mainstream disability (or other) human rights, those rights must go beyond mere formal references and also be substantively integrated.     

Reproductive responsibilities: Rethinking the fetal rights debate

The fetal rights debate has grown increasingly vitriolic in recent years. The animosity between those who attribute rights to the fetus from the moment of conception and those who argue that the rights of citizens can bestowed only upon those who have been born has created an impasse in a range of important public policy arenas. This article attempts to demonstrate that neither side of this debate provides a satisfactory answer to the question of what limits the state may legitimately place on the medical and behavioral choices of pregnant women. To move beyond the impasse created by the intransigent rhetoric of competing rights, this essay explores the related responsibilities of the expectant mother, the emergent family, and a liberal democratic state. It also applies this conception of reproductive responsibilities to policy issues pertaining to privacy, abortion, regulation of fertile women, and state intervention into parental decision-making.     

A critical legal conception of human dignity

In this article, I argue for adopting a specific conception of human dignity centered around the argument that human dignity flows from an individual's capacity for self-authorship as defined by the set of expressive capabilities they enjoy. I also develop a corollary argument for a specific model of fundamental rights which flows from adopting the conception of dignity presented here.     

Institutions and Morality Policy in Western Democracies

This article investigates whether different political institutions such as executives, legislatures, parties, party systems, judiciaries, decentralization, constitutionalism, and referendums across 24 Western democracies are venues for debate across five individual morality policies. Using data since 1945, the article compares three theories of morality policy—(1) Policy Type leading to different institutional venues; (2) Two Worlds of religious/secular party systems; and (3) U.S./European exceptionalism. In order, the most frequently debated issues are abortion, same sex marriage, euthanasia, stem cells/assisted reproductive technology (ART), and capital punishment. There is considerable variation in the institutions and country groups that debate them although fewer differences in the Two Worlds model. Abortion, euthanasia, and same sex marriage are the most convergent issues across institutions, party systems, and country groupings while capital punishment and stem cells/ART show the most diverse patterns of deliberation. The general Policy Type model of morality policy is upheld, but varies institutionally by specific issues. The Two Worlds model is of some importance, but only on three issues. There also are regional differences between the United States, Europe, and non‐European democracies.     

Rethinking Dignity

The concept of dignity is widely debated as to its efficacy as a ground upon which to base respect particularly in relation to human rights. Traditional concepts of inherent dignity associate dignity with the possession of rationality and autonomy, which consequently excludes non-rational humans from being viewed as possessing inherent dignity and therefore equal and inherent worth. This paper offers a theory of inherent dignity based on an account of a common humanity within which all humans might be seen as possessing inherent worth and, therefore, deserving of being recognized and respected equally as ends in themselves. The theory is based on the communal practice and expectation of moral accountability, a practice that can be viewed as taking place universally both between and within human communities.     

Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of Rights

The antidemocratic tendencies of rights appear to be numerous. As trumps, rights are denounced for shutting down political debate and undermining the common good. As disciplinary, rights are attacked for reinforcing a politics of exclusion. I argue that an appreciation of the democratic potential of rights requires conceiving of them as political claims, as claims that represent a perspective that we seek to persuade others to adopt and through which we can create and contest community and identity. I cull a political conception of rights from the work of John Stuart Mill by rethinking the meaning of and connection between his ontological commitments and his politics. Paying careful attention to his notion of "character" and its cultivation, I argue that Mill embraces a conception of the socially constituted subject who is both disciplined and enabled by rights.     

Administration of human rights

It is puzzling that although human rights pervade nearly all actions that affect the public, so little attention is devoted to their administration. The absence of books, chapters or even courses describing human rights administration is a silent reproach to our profession. To suggest how such a study might proceed, this article considers three questions: (1) how rights like those outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are converted to policies; (2) how human experiences can suggest priorities in their administration; and (3) how to improve the performance of the ‘virtual bureaucracy’ that is carrying the related administrative responsibilities. Serious studies of human rights administration must deal with three critical problems: their complexity as they infuse other public policy issues; their universality as they interact at all levels of public and private society; and their ubiquity, which renders coherent bureaucratic structures and reforms difficult. Such studies are justified because large‐scale efforts to provide education in rights administration can make important contributions to the realization of human dignity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bridging the human rights—Sovereignty divide: Theoretical foundations of a democratic sovereignty

Human rights and sovereignty are generally construed as disputatious, if not entirely incompatible; the liability of the former constrains the license of the latter. This article challenges the certitude of that notion and argues that democratic, isocratic, and humanistic elements, or what may be thought of as precursors of human rights, are actually embedded in early theories of sovereignty, including what I call Bodin’s hierarchical, Althusius’ confederative, Hobbes’ singular, and Hegel’s progressive/constitutional sovereignty. Despite the differences in governmental structure to which each attaches sovereignty, each disassociates sovereignty from its agents (who does the work of supreme authority) and aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). From them I derive eight theses to ground a democratic, human rights friendly conception of sovereignty, which aids in bridging the divide between human rights advocacy and sovereign defenders.     

Economic liberalisation,market institutions and labour rights

What effect do pro‐market economic policies have on labour rights? Despite significant debate in policy and academic circles about the consequences of economic liberalisation, little is known about the labour rights effects of pro‐market policies. Extant literature has focused only on the possible outcomes of market‐liberalising policies, such as trade and investment flows, rather than directly assessing market‐friendly policies and institutions. Moreover, this line of research has found mixed results on how these outcomes influence labour conditions. To provide a comprehensive assessment of this linkage, this article combines data on five distinct policy areas associated with economic liberalisation with data on labour rights for the period 1981–2012. The results indicate that pro‐market policies – except the ones involving rule of law and secure property rights – undermine labour rights. Thus while there are some positive economic and political outcomes associated with market‐supporting policies, economic liberalisation comes at the cost of respect for labour rights.     

Self-determination as a universal human right

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. However, many recent international human rights documents include rights of peoples in their lists of basic human rights. In this paper, I defend including at least one people’s right, the right to self-determination, in the list of basic rights. Recognizing that self-determination is a constitutive element of human dignity casts state sovereignty in a different light, with interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about the rights of minorities.     

Human Rights Enjoyment in Theory and Activism

Despite being a seemingly straightforward moral concept (that all humans have certain rights by virtue of their humanity), human rights is a contested concept in theory and practice. Theorists debate (among other things) the meaning of “rights,” the priority of rights, whether collective rights are universal, the foundations of rights, and whether there are universal human rights at all. These debates are of relatively greater interest to theorists; however, a given meaning of “human rights” implies a corresponding theory of change and through that can be an important guide to the practice of human rights activists and their funders. In practice, any organization can describe their work as “rights based.” This article clarifies the practices of human rights activists and their funders that are consistent with a theory of human rights as (1) universal, (2) interdependent across groups and categories of people, (3) indivisible across issue areas and claims, and (4) measured by the enjoyment of rights.     

An African Conception of Human Rights? Comments on the Challenges of Relativism

The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to develop more plausible conceptions of human rights whose philosophical foundations are closely aligned with culture-specific ideas about human nature and/or dignity. This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. Along the way, it distinguishes between two meanings of the term African contending that to the extent that the practice of prizing the ‘community’ higher than any other value is definitive of African, the idea of African human rights remains suspect.     

Human rights and future people — Possibilities of argumentation

Questions of sustainability will be of crucial importance for the twenty-first century. But do we have to think about questions of responsibilities regarding future people in terms of human rights? And if duties regarding sustainability fall outside the scope of human rights, what would this imply for the moral and political importance of human rights in general? This article investigates conceptually how we should see the relationship between human rights and long-term global ecological challenges. We will discuss how a human rights approach to questions of sustainability would be different from other approaches and what would be required to see those ecological challenges as human rights questions. We will discuss the possibilities for conceptualizing the relationship between human rights and sustainability. And we will briefly draw some conclusions in terms of topics for further debate.