The Norwegian Supreme Court and Equitable Considerations: Problematic Aspects of Legal Reasoning

Legitimacy, confidence and autonomy in the court system are dependent on people trusting the institution to make decisions based on predefined legal rules. Simultaneously, confidence in the system is also dependent on the system's capability to adjust to changes in values in society. The Norwegian courts appear to be increasingly basing their rulings on ‘equitable considerations’. This involves the making of decisions by reference not only to predefined rules – as expressed in structures or pre‐existing legal practice – but also to policy considerations such as utility and fairness. Judicial decisions made with reference to political considerations imply that the courts are arrogating a role that democratic theory reserves for legislators. What happens when ‘equitable considerations’ play a large part in the decisions of the Supreme Court? Does the institution have capabilities and mechanisms that sustain such a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement? I argue that the capability to adjust to changes in society only seems possible if the judges act beyond the domain of traditional judicial competence. Through different kinds of mechanisms, elements of ‘equitable considerations’ over time become hidden and difficult to grasp. On the one hand, this makes it possible for the Supreme Court to sustain a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement, but simultaneously it creates problems of confidence and legitimacy because the premises for the decisions are not explicated.     

Friends of the Court? Why EU governments file observations before the Court of Justice

The preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views (‘observations’) to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states’ subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe.     

Strategic interaction among courts within the preliminary reference process – Stage 1: National court preemptive opinions

Abstract.  While scholars today are well-acquainted with how the European Community preliminary reference process works, little research has been done to investigate strategic court interaction – that is, intentional, procedural court behaviour employed to influence the substantive direction of legal evolution, within that process. The present investigation, which is part of a larger project examining such court behaviour throughout the referral process, focuses on the initial stage: the decision to refer. Within that stage lies the opportunity for national courts to stack the interpretive deck for the entire decision-making process via a preemptive opinion, the submission of which is neither required, suggested nor prohibited by written procedural guidelines. It is assumed that courts are strategic institutions that seek to maximize their policy objectives, and therefore, national courts submit preemptive opinions to obtain that goal. Such strategic behaviour, however, is influenced by intervening factors – namely the acceptance of European Court of Justice intervention, national judicial procedure, issue complexity and individual court experience.     

Judicial policy‐making and the evolving rotection of human rights: The European court of human rights in comparative perspective

This contribution is a comparative analysis of three attempts to strengthen the supranational protection of human rights in an increasingly transnational world. It focuses on the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter‐American Court of Human Rights. The recent decision by the Inter‐American Court on the forced disappearance of individuals by state or para‐state forces illustrates the important role of cross‐pollenisation from the European Court and the United Nations. It further demonstrates how judges on supranational courts attempt to make law in the face of uncertain government compliance.     

The weakness of strong policies and the strength of weak policies: Law,experimentalist governance,and supporting coalitions in European Union health care policy

The experience of European Union (EU) health care services policy shows the importance of supporting coalitions in any effort to effect policy change and the extent to which the presence or absence of such coalitions can qualify generalizations about policymaking. EU health care services law is substantively liberalizing and procedurally driven by the courts, with little legislative input. But the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been much better at establishing an EU competency in law than in causing policy development in the EU or member states. Literature on courts helps to explain why: courts are most effective when they enjoy supporting coalitions and the ECJ does not have a significant supporting coalition for its liberalizing health care services policy. Based on interview data, this article argues that the hard law of health care services deregulation and the newer forms of health care governance, such as the Open Method of Coordination and the networks on rare diseases, depend on supporting coalitions in member states that are willing to litigate, lobby, budget, decide cases, and otherwise implement EU law and policy. Given the resistance that the Court has met in health care sectors, its overarching deregulatory approach might produce smaller effects than expected, and forms of experimentalist governance that are easy to deride might turn out to have supporting coalitions that make them unexpectedly effective.     

The European Court of Justice as a Federator

The European Court of Justice is often seen as the motor ofEuropean legal integration because it "constitutionalized "the treaties establishing the European Communities (EC) throughits jurisprudence. In reality though, the Court's role has ratherbeen that of a promotor or provocateur because the member statesand the national courts have been, by and large, cooperativepartners in this process, and many of the political consequencesof the Court's rulings have been hidden in its legal language.The Court will likely be careful in the future about continuingits judicial activism with the same vigor. Since the Treatyon European Union, many politically divisive issues are potentiallyopen to the Court's interpretation. In addition, the cooperativeattitude, by member states and the national courts, is no longerguaranteed.     

National Responses to European Court Jurisprudence

The power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to promote European integration through law has been broadly acknowledged, but the court’s domestic impact has received less attention and remains contested. In particular, the ambiguity of many ECJ judgments is said to have two opposed effects: According to one logic, legal ambiguity enables national policy-makers to contain the impact of court rulings, i.e. to ignore potentially broader policy implications. According to another logic, ambiguous case law provides opportunities for interested litigants to pressure national policy-makers into (anticipatory) adjustments. Which of these two logics prevails, it is argued, depends on the distribution of legal uncertainty costs between supporters and challengers of the regulatory status quo. The argument is supported by two in-depth case studies on the domestic responses to series of ECJ rulings concerning the free movement of capital (golden shares) and services (posted workers).     

Courts and the politics of secrecy: national security,human rights and the importance of supranational oversight

Abstract

The article examines the use of state secrecy in court litigation concerning alleged gross human rights violations committed in the struggle against terrorism, focusing specifically on cases of extraordinary rendition and comparing the performance of courts in the United States, in Italy and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The article explains that national courts have validated the assertion by national governments of the state secret privilege in litigation involving cases of extraordinary rendition, ensuring de facto immunity to individuals involved in gross human rights abuses. On the contrary, it underlines that the ECtHR has pierced the veil covering these ‘deep secrets’, undertaking a strict scrutiny of acts of extraordinary rendition to torture committed by governments in the name of national security. As the article argues, the success of the ECtHR can be explained by a number of reasons, including distance, time and institutional design. In conclusion, the case law of the ECtHR on secrecy and national security confirms the continuing importance of supranational courts as instruments of external oversight on the human rights practice of European states.     

Supreme Court Justices’ Economic Behaviour: A Multilevel Model Analysis

Supreme Court justices are overlooked, but important, national policy‐making players who render final and consequential decisions in cases on economic conflicts. The research question asks what forces explain the decisional behaviour of Supreme Court justices in economic rights cases between a private and a public party. Theoretically, the decisional behaviour of an individual justice is a function of his or her notion as to what makes ‘good’ law, pursued in a cultural‐collegial setting that is oriented by majoritarian requirements, while constrained by the legal nature of the case being considered. Empirically, all economic decisions made by Norwegian Supreme Court justices in five‐justice panels from 1963 to 2012 are analyzed. Our multilevel model demonstrates that individual, collegial and case‐level forces all contribute to explain the justices’ votes. These results suggest that case‐related dynamics, such as who the plaintiff is or the amount of disagreement between justices, matter, but also that ideology – via appointment mechanisms – matters when a nation's high court justices decide economic cases. Understanding the foundational assumptions and the institutional procedures is vital when transporting judicial behaviour models across polities.     

General courts,specialized courts,and the complementarity effect

Among the major decisions any legal system must make is deciding whether to establish general courts with broad jurisdiction, or specialized courts with limited jurisdiction. Under one influential argument—advanced by both judges and legal theorists—general courts foster coherence within the legal system. This Article identifies a distinct effect of establishing general courts: the “complementarity effect.” In the case of complementarity, general courts strategically apply different principles in different fields, such that litigants losing in one sphere (e.g., public law) are compensated in another (e.g., private law). We support this conjecture by analyzing three case studies.     

Judicial Use of Foreign Law in Human Rights Cases: Illegitimate and Unacceptable Practice?

The use of foreign law by national courts when deciding cases that concern fundamental rights has provoked a debate on the legitimacy of the judiciary to resort to this practice. Indeed, many arguments have been made by legal scholars to support the proposition that judges should not take account of unincorporated international human rights instruments or the decisions of foreign courts when they decide cases that concern fundamental rights. This article puts these arguments to scrutiny, and discusses whether this judicial practice should be resorted to.     

Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy

Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed “split-intolerance,” and with uncertain preferences over policy. Lower courts may compete by investing costly effort in legal quality to make their rules more attractive. In equilibrium, lower courts may initiate conflict even when the odds of success before the high court are remote. Surprisingly, lower courts grow more likely to create conflict as the high court's split-intolerance increases; however, split-intolerance can also incentivize greater lower court effort. I present qualitative evidence illustrating the model's explanatory power.     

Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Why do lower courts treat Supreme Court precedents favorably or unfavorably? To address this question, we formulate a theoretical framework based on current principal‐agent models of the judiciary. We use the framework to structure an empirical analysis of a random sample of 500 Supreme Court cases, yielding over 10,000 subsequent treatments in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. When the contemporary Supreme Court is ideologically estranged from the enacting Supreme Court, lower courts treat precedent much more harshly. Controlling for the ideological distance between the enacting and contemporary Supreme Courts, the preferences of the contemporary lower court itself are unrelated to its behavior. Hence, hierarchical control appears strong and effective. At the same time, however, a lower court's previous treatments of precedent strongly influence its later treatments. The results have important implications for understanding legal change and suggest new directions for judicial principal‐agency theory.     

Punishing environmental crimes: An empirical study from lower courts to the court of appeal

We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case‐specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by lower criminal courts, as well as their follow‐up by the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of the courts has proven to be varied as well as consistent. Judges carefully balance effective and suspended penalties, most often using them cumulatively, but in specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. Overall, both judges in lower and appeal courts balance environmental law and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.     

Power to the legal professionals: Is there an Americanization of European law?

Twelve years ago, Robert Kagan asked “Should Europe worry about adversarial legalism?” He answered this question with a qualified “no,” and identified a number of sources of resistance to such a trend. More recently, he broadened the issue in this journal by asking whether European countries experience an “Americanization” of their legal systems. The articles in this Symposium on the Americanization of European Law all revisit that question. The present article introduces the topic, discusses the elements that make up adversarial legalism, and summarizes and compares the findings of the articles in the Symposium. The articles find an increase in one dimension of adversarial legalism, namely, more legalism, that is, more litigation, more formalism, and more verdicts interfering with politics, but hardly any increase in adversarialism. Tenacious pre‐existing national legal and political cultures and institutions resist a further move in the direction of American style adversarial legalism. The mix of more litigation, more legalism, and more politicization, overlaid on the pre‐existing hierarchic authority of courts and legal functionaries has, however, strengthened the societal and political power of the judiciary vis‐à‐vis other powers. A professional elite is increasingly making the political choices that in a democratic society ought to be made by democratic representatives. Perhaps Europe should worry about this.     

The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics

With its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has handed over another landmark ruling on European integration. The ruling made Germany's ratification of the Treaty conditional upon the passage of a new law giving the Bundestag greater oversight of European affairs. This and the consequences of stronger parliamentary oversight for the German government and the way it conducts negotiations at European level have been the focus of most early comments on the decision. No less important, however, are the ruling's potential repercussions on European judicial politics. Coming after a series of highly controversial judgments by the European Court of Justice, the FCC's Lisbon decision is clearly meant as a warning to Brussels and, above all, Luxembourg. The decision could undermine the Court of Justice's authority and encourage non-compliance on the part of national courts, thus bringing about a constitutional crisis at European level. Alternatively, the decision may compel the Court of Justice to reconsider some of the most controversial aspects of its activist jurisprudence and to exert more restraint in the foreseeable future.     

Federalism Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S. Supreme Court and Preemption Cases

The record of the U.S. Supreme Court in decisions affectingfederal-state relations has been one of inconsistency betweenstates' rights and national supremacy. This inconsistency hasperplexed both legal and political science scholars who havehad great difficulty placing decision-making regarding federalismoutcomes by the Court in any sort of theoretical context. Contraryto much conventional wisdom, ideological preferences do notautomatically translate into federalism outcomes. We extendmodels of judicial decision-making in political environmentsby including state policy. State policy outcomes may be eithermore liberal or more conservative than the policy would be underfederal control. Thus, the ideological preferences of the justicesmay contradict their preferences toward nationalism or statesrights. Testing the model using 94 preemption cases, we findthat individual justices and most Courts are willing to sacrificetheir federalism values in the pursuit of some other policygoal. This finding has implications for both the federalismliterature and strategic models of Court behavior, as well asfor cases the Court is currently reviewing.     

Where Judicial Politics Are Legislative Politics: The French Constitutional Council

Judges on France's ordinary and administrative courts make law and policy by interpreting and applying statutes, but the Constitutional Council is overtly involved in policy‐making. The Council serves as a type of ‘third’ chamber of the French parliament, where it may annul unconstitutional legislation, ‘constitu‐tionalise’ various legal principles, and sometimes even prescribe the precise terms of legislation. This ‘court‐like’ body, thus, plays a significant and growing role in French policy‐making.     

The Legal Order and the Administration of Federal and State Courts

The Nigerian Constitution of 1989 establishes a system of federaland state courts, but within a structure of unified federal-statejurisdiction from the federal and state high courts, to thefederal Court of Appeal, and to the national Supreme Court.Thus, both sets of courts exercise jurisdiction with respectto federal and state laws. Although this system mitigates certainfederal-state jurisdictional conflicts, it does not eliminatesuch conflicts. At the same time, however, the Constitutionalso provides for Sharia courts of appeal under Moslem law andfor customary-law courts of appeal, thus establishing a tripartitesystem of justice. Although this system seeks to accommodateNigeria's ethnic and religious diversity, it does raise problemsfor national unity, judicial uniformity, and equity in the administrationof civil and criminal justice.