The Impact of Competing Institutional Pressures and Logics on the Use of Performance Measurement in Hybrid Universities

Abstract

This study contributes to the current debate on competing institutional pressures and logics and performance measurement practices in hybrid universities and examines how shifts in logics have affected performance measurement practices at the organizational and individual levels. It draws upon the theoretical lenses of institutional theory and adopts a longitudinal case study methodology based on participant observations and retrospective interviews. The findings show that universities and academic workers are affected by external pressures related to higher education that include government regulations and control of the state (state pressure), the expectations of the professional norms and collegiality of the academic community (academic pressures), and the need to comply with international standards and market mechanisms (market pressures). Academic workers operate in an organizational context in which conflicting conditions from both academic and business logics co-exist. The results indicate that institutional pressures and logics related to the higher education field and organizational context shape the use of universities’ performance measurement practices and result in diverse solutions. While previous literature has focused mainly on competing logics and the tensions they may generate, this study shows that, in a university context, potentially conflicting logics may co-exist and create robust combinations.     

Overestimating the Shift from Government to Governance: Evidence from Swiss Metropolitan Areas

There is an oft‐stated claim in political science research that public sector reforms in Western democracies are consistent with a shift from government to governance. This article challenges that claim. Based on a comparative analysis of governance reforms in Swiss metropolitan areas, the article reveals that what seems to be a shift to governance may turn out to be a path to government, however, including a change either from the local to the metropolitan level or from general‐purpose authorities to task‐specific jurisdictions. Further, the article analyzes the political dynamics behind governance reforms. It shows that exogenous pressures put existing governance schemes under strain. Its impact, however, is mediated by the initial institutional setting and the narratives responding to case‐specific political dilemmas.     

Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries

Work on good governance implies a one‐best‐way model of effective government. This has isomorphic influences on development, whereby governments are influenced to adopt a one‐size‐fits‐all approach to get things done. This article challenges whether such an approach exists, proposing that models actually do not hold even for the so‐called effective governments. Governments look different, even if they are similarly called models of good government. This proposition is examined through a study of public financial management practices in a set of Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) and non‐OECD countries. The study shows that effective governments are not more likely to exhibit better practice characteristics implied in one‐best‐way models. Good public financial management means different things in different countries. The article concludes by suggesting that good governance models give way to menus and the development community invest more time in examining why different countries select different menu items.     

Regulatory Agencies—The Challenges of Balancing Agency Autonomy and Political Control

In this article we focus on the dynamic interplay between increase in autonomy of regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade‐off between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of deregulation and reregulation, the problems of role‐specialization and coordination, and the questions of “smart practice” in regulatory policy and practice. The theoretical basis is agency theories and a broad institutional approach that blend national political strategies, historical‐cultural context, and external pressures to understand regulatory agencies and regulatory reform. This approach is contrasted with a practitioner model of agencies. Empirically the article is based on regulatory reform in Norway, giving a brief introduction to the reform and agency context followed by an analysis of the radical regulatory reform policy introduced recently by the current Norwegian government. We illustrate how regulatory reforms and agencies work in practice by focusing on two specific cases on homeland security and telecommunications.     

TESTING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF CAPITAL CONTROL LIBERALIZATION*

The literature on why restrictions over capital flows have been liberalized is filled with alternative causal stories (the pluralist, statist and systemic model, and economic explanations). In this article, we provide a test of these models of capital control liberalization within the context of 18 OECD countries from 1967 to 1995. We have avoided the usual practice of aggregating multiple governments in one country within one year into one country‐year observation, and use the country‐year‐government as the unit of analysis instead to correctly test the relationship between government characteristics and liberalization policy. We find that when the government considers lifting or imposing restrictions over capital flows, it responds to both systemic pressures and the key supporters of free capital flows. Governments also consider the current account balance and are heavily influenced by the prior policy choice regarding restrictions on capital transactions. We fail to find support for such explanations as the impact of government ideology, government strength, and central bank independence.     

Private and public authority interactions and the functional quality of sustainability governance: Lessons from conservation and development initiatives in Tanzania

The changing shape of sustainability governance has been a key academic and policy concern in the past two decades, as part of a wider debate on the interactions between public and private authority in governing the economy, society, and the environment. In this article, we contribute to these debates by examining how these interactions operate locally and across jurisdictions in three conservation and development initiatives in Tanzania and what impact they have on the functional quality of sustainability governance. We find that clear division of responsibilities, coupled with material incentives for communities and equal and transparent distribution of benefits, are key positive contributors to functional quality. These factors underpin the complementary interactions (collaborative at the local level; institutional layering across jurisdictions) that are needed to successfully negotiate and implement the compromises needed to balance conservation and development goals. We also find that competitive dynamics are harmful to functional quality, especially those taking the form of local institutional duplication and of dominance by central government across jurisdictions. These tend to appear especially when sustainability initiatives involve multiple stakeholders with wide discrepancies in resources, interests, and power, which leads to compromises determined in a top-down manner.     

The successful use of consultancies in aid‐financed public sector management reform: a consultant's eye view of some things which matter

Independent consultants, often contracted through consultancy firms, are important players in donor attempts to trigger and guide institutional change processes in recipient government structures and practices. However, little is known about the efficacy or ‘success’ of such consultancies. This article explores some of the issues involved. Following a discussion of the problems of defining ‘success’, we present an analytical framework which can be used in all kinds of contexts to generate information relevant to institutional change programmes, and to the design of consultancies to help carry the change processes along. Such information can be used to predict the likely success of intervening at all, for designing the elements of an intervention, and for ongoing monitoring of implementation. We apply the framework to eight consultancies which were undertaken in three different change contexts: post‐communist regimes in the early transitional period; aid‐dependent regimes committed to ‘politics‐as‐usual’ and the longer‐term highjacking of donor funds by patron – clientelist structures. We summarize the main lessons which emerge from our case studies in the form of criteria for judging whether and how (responsible) donors and/or consultants should get involved in change projects. Donors, consultancy companies and consultants should all be thinking of ways to exclude irresponsible parties and behaviour from aid‐financed institutional transformation processes. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.     

Economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity: Some cross-country evidence

While much attention has been devoted to analyzing how the institutional framework and entrepreneurship impact growth, how economic policy and institutional design affect entrepreneurship appears to be much less analyzed. We try to explain cross-country differences in the level of entrepreneurship by differences in economic policy and institutional design. Specifically, we use the Economic Freedom Index from the Fraser Institute to ask which elements of economic policy making and the institutional framework are conducive to the supply of entrepreneurship, measured by data on entrepreneurship from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. We find that the size of government is negatively correlated and sound money is positively correlated with entrepreneurial activity. Other measures of economic freedom are not significantly correlated with entrepreneurship.     

Eyes wide shut? Reforming and defusing checks and balances in Argentina

How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinising government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there anything Left? The politics of social spending in new democracies

The evolution of public social expenditures displays divergent patterns across non‐western countries. This exploratory article argues that in order to understand the domestic sources of this divergence, institutional and structural explanations should be complemented with an actor‐oriented perspective. Analyses of the role of party politics in non‐OECD democracies, through multivariate fixed‐effect regressions using data from 46 countries between 1995 and 2015, reveals a robust positive association between shifts towards Left party government and increases in total public social expenditures, also when controlling for structural and institutional factors. This association however seems potentially conditional on sufficient levels of economic growth. While indicating an impact of partisanship, further research is arguably needed regarding the origins, organization and policy outputs of parties in more recently democratized countries, as well as regarding the conditions under which the ideological orientation of parties in government are actually consequential.     

Judicious Incentives: International Public Policy Responses to the Globalization of Environmental Management

Public policymakers and regulators worldwide are grappling with the desire to improve environmental quality through appropriate regulation of business, while also streamlining government. Concurrently, environmentally conscience consumers are calling for improved environmental performance by industry. As a result of these pressures, regulators and lawmakers worldwide are attempting to craft effective policies that create adequate incentives for environmental protection on the part of firms, in the face of decreasing budgets and an increased demand for the use of market‐based incentives. To aid decision makers as they struggle with these concerns, this study provides a detailed case examination of the dilemmas and responses of national‐level regulators as they try to develop appropriate responses to the rise of international and “voluntary” management regimes. To accomplish these goals, this article compares the public policy responses of governments around the world to one such voluntary international environmental regime: ISO 14001. ISO 14001 is a form of industry self‐regulation in response to market forces calling for harmonization in environmental management and as a result of consumer and trade‐partner demands. This study examines the relationships between regulators and the regulated in order to understand if ISO 14001 certified firms are receiving regulatory relief or other forms of public policy/regulatory benefits as a result of their certification. It will also examine the impact that government incentives (or their absence) are having on the certification decisions of firms around the world. This information helps us to begin to understand how the trends toward smaller government and voluntary environmental regimes are affecting one another.     

Inheritance regimes: Medieval family structures and current institutional quality

This study highlights the impact that medieval patterns of intrafamily inheritance practices wield on contemporary institutional quality. We argue that regions that practiced inegalitarian inheritance developed stronger institutions than regions that practiced egalitarian inheritance, for two reasons. First, we argue that transmitting land to a single heir resulted in a sense of personal ownership and, by extension, encouraged individual property rights. Second, we argue that the fact that disinherited children were incentivized to seek training and employment outside the family domicile in regions practicing inegalitarian inheritance resulted in trust‐building social interactions. We test our argument using data on medieval inheritance patterns and modern‐day institutional quality in European subnational regions and across countries globally. Our results show that historical inegalitarian inheritance practices are strongly positively associated with contemporary institutional quality. We conclude that historical norms at the family level are still affecting important modern‐day societal functions.     

Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors

This article tests functional and institutional explanations for the different levels of formal independence of regulatory agencies in Latin America. The analysis is grounded in an original database of the formal independence level of 104 regulators in 8 countries and 13 regulatory sectors. The results challenge a central claim of the credible commitment hypothesis as they indicate that privatization is not a significant determinant of agency independence nor are utility regulators more likely to be independent than other economic regulators. Veto players are positively correlated with formal independence, indicating that in developing countries they operate together as credibility‐enhancing mechanisms, rather than as functional equivalents, as previous studies on developed countries have shown. Democratization is positively correlated with formal independence, whereas trade opening and vulnerability to international pressures has no significant impact. Hence, this article enhances the understanding of the delegation of regulatory powers to formally independent agencies in developing countries.     

Stay or exit: How do international nongovernmental organizations respond to institutional pressures under authoritarianism?

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are increasingly important players in global politics and development. However, they are undergoing significant adaptations as governments worldwide have instituted restrictions to regulate their activities. What explains the various ways in which they respond to these institutional pressures? In our study of INGO responses to a new restrictive law in China, we identify four strategic responses with varying levels of compliance: legal registration, provisional strategy, localization, and exit. The institutional pressures—strategic responses link is influenced by INGOs' adaptive capacity, which is in turn shaped by an organization's issue sensitivity, value-add, government ties, and reputational authority. The integrated framework we develop for INGO strategic responses can shed light on state-INGO relations in other countries, many of which are subject to increasingly stringent regulations and a closing political environment.     

Political Trust,Individual‐level Characteristics and Institutional Performance: Evidence from Finland, 2004–13

Several scholars agree that low political trust has fundamental negative implications for society at large. This study tests the power of institutional performance theory in explaining the differences between individuals in political trust (cross‐sectional) and fluctuations of political trust over time (longitudinal). Indeed, the dominant scholarly debate has concerned whether political trust is stable and dependent of endogenous factors such as political socialization and social trust, or whether it is exogenous (i.e., in constant fluctuation due to later experiences with institutions and the outputs they produce). In terms of cross‐sectional differences, the aim is to assess the relative impact institutional performance on political trust of a citizen. As regards the longitudinal approach, political trust varies over time and from an explanatory perspective it is important also to understand how well the institutional performance theory predicts over‐time variation of political trust. The study employs repeated European Social Survey data for Finland between 2004 and 2013. The results show, first and foremost, the strong impact of evaluations of institutional performance on political trust: satisfaction with government and economy explains differences both between individuals and over time. Social trust and welfare state performance are also strong predictors, but they explain differences only at the individual level and do not predict over‐time variations.     

Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.     

Creating Public Value and Institutional Innovations across Boundaries: An Integrative Process of Participation,Legitimation, and Implementation

Public value creation has become a critical challenge, but existing approaches have limitations and it is unclear how they can be integrated. This article addresses this issue by analyzing four best‐practice cases in which public value was created through the integration of community indicators and government performance management. It identifies an iterative process of participation, legitimation, and implementation, with institutional innovations across boundaries between civil society, politics, and administration. These institutional innovations help integrate the often fragmented arenas of participation, legitimation, and implementation.     

How Authoritarianism Intensifies Punctuated Equilibrium: The Dynamics of Policy Attention in Hong Kong

The punctuated equilibrium theory contends that government attention allocation is universally leptokurtic in that long periods of stability are punctuated by bursts of rapid and radical change; the empirical evidence in support of this claim is however exclusively drawn from democratic systems. The absence of electoral politics and institutional decentralization in authoritarian regimes could presumably affect institutional friction; whether and how this might pose as a qualification to the thesis is of major interest. By analyzing four streams of government actions in Hong Kong from 1946 to 2007 straddling the colonial and postcolonial regimes, we have found that government processes are generally leptokurtic even under authoritarian regime institutions, with the degree of the dispersion of decision‐making power across the streams of actions affecting the magnitude of punctuation. We have also found that punctuation was greater when the political system was more centralized but declined as the political system democratized.