The Liberal Democrats and the Coalition: Driven to the Edge of Europe

When the Liberal Democrats joined the Coalition government in May 2010, there was an expectation that they would have a restraining effect on the Conservatives, particularly in the area of European politics. But after almost five years as the junior party in the Coalition, the Liberal Democrats struggle to demonstrate their influence over the government's approach to Europe. Not only did they let the Conservatives lead the Coalition's European agenda, but they will be forever associated with the government that brought the UK closer to the exit door of the European Union. The article argues that this outcome is the result of a series of avoidable if surprising mistakes, such as the choice of ministerial portfolios and the party's attitude to the Coalition's monitoring mechanisms, as well as some unavoidable mistakes that could have not been foreseen when the Coalition was formed.     

The Beecroft Report: Pandering to Popular Perceptions of Over‐regulation

The Coalition government made a commitment to review employment law to ensure flexibility for both parties and enhance business's competitiveness. This led the prime minister to ask venture capitalist Adrian Beecroft to undertake the task of identifying the areas of employment law that presented the greatest burden, and making recommendations for reform. The Beecroft report identifies 16 areas for reform, but the lack of evidence to support his conclusions severely undermines his case. The challenge of increasing employment in a stagnant economy is substantial, and Beecroft's recommendations, if implemented, are unlikely to make a difference. Businesses need to see increased demand and access to finance if they are to take on more workers, but government must also develop a long‐term vision of the UK labour market and address weaknesses that existed before the financial crisis.     

The Coalition and the Decline of Majoritarianism in the UK

The United Kingdom has traditionally featured many aspects of the majoritarian model of democracy: its first‐past‐the‐post electoral system tends towards producing single‐party majorities, while its legislative decision rules concentrate policy‐making power in the hands of the resulting single‐party governments. However, in an unprecedented break with the UK's postwar conventions, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a coalition following the general election of 2010. In this article, we examine some of the Coalition's impacts on governing and constitutional conventions, placing them in a comparative European context. We conclude that the Coalition reflects a shift towards the less majoritarian forms of politics prevalent in continental Europe, and that some of these changes are likely to persist even after the end of the current government.     

The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition

This article studies the ideational underpinnings of the UK Coalition government's ‘liberal conservative’ foreign policy. It begins by suggesting that an Iraq‐centric account of Blair's foreign policy suggests a grand vision on the prime minister's part that was lacking from his earlier foreign policy adventures, which relied on a more conventional form of British statecraft. The second section contends that the Gordon Brown years 2007–10 and, since the end of New Labour, Coalition foreign policy, can be seen as a response both to the substance and style of Blair's highly personalised stewardship of foreign policy post‐9/11. The war on terror and the invasion of Iraq were accompanied by a seemingly open‐ended democracy promotion around the globe which was quite out of character with past British practice. The article argues, therefore, that under Brown and Cameron cautious pragmatism has tended to win out over the proclamation of grand strategic ambition.     

The Future of Public Sector Pensions

The dramatic rise in life expectancy and longer retirement has created serious concerns about the long‐term affordability of public sector pensions. Drawing on insights from a recent inquiry into public sector pension reform, commissioned by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition and led by the author, this article outlines the challenge faced by policy makers and sets out how it should be addressed. It argues that, with 12 million people active in this part of the pensions system, and estimates that the gap between contributions and payments will grow from £3bn to £10bn in the next decade, the government has no choice but to enter the ‘lions’ den’ of pensions’ policy. It contends that any long‐term solution is to be crafted cannot be based solely on economics, but must also answer fundamental questions of ethics and equity.     

The Fountain of Honour: Directing the Spray

Pearce argues that honours do not deserve the earnest linguistic toil of the virtuous PAC. Starting with the peers, he observes that when William the Conqueror/Bastard distributed land stolen with violence to his armed band, it was the simple loot from which ancient chivalry, honour and nobility flows. Such lords developed under the more civilised early Whigs, like Walpole, into rent for sending steady support from owned boroughs into the Commons. Witness Bubb Dodington and his three and a half seats in Weymouth, made a Viscount in the name of one of its suburbs. Harold Macmillan would sack a minister with the wheedling consolation ‘A Little something to wear under your tie’. By inventing the Life Peerage, he helped the slow subversion of elected government by creating unelected, often powerful ministers with no relationship to country or people, candid nominees of the National Leader. The one virtue of the post‐Macmillan upper house lies in the disloyal, which is say minimally or not all party‐attached people of talent reliably voting against ministerial requirements. As for the insignia of all honours, their bars, discs and ribbons are kept on cards in Palace drawers like so much paste jewellery.     

The Contradictory Political Economy of Higher Education in the United Kingdom

The Coalition government's first Comprehensive Spending Review will cut 40% from university budgets by 2014. This will result in an increasingly tension‐prone political economy of UK higher education. As it is, the sector already sits uncomfortably astride the two distinct welfare models currently in existence in Britain. As the fees agenda has taken hold, university degrees have been increasingly susceptible to being rebranded as a strategic investment in the future, thus acting as an exemplar for the move towards an asset‐based system of welfare. Despite this, even in the post‐Browne world students will still not be charged the full market price of delivering degree programmes. Higher education institutions therefore continue to be redistributive mechanisms providing long‐term welfare‐enhancing transfer payments to their overwhelmingly middle‐class student base. The budget cuts and the associated changes to student finance will bring into stark relief the contradictions of serving two welfare masters at once.     

The Road Not Taken and the ‘Bad Faith’ Thesis: Why a Liberal Democrat–Labour Coalition Never Happened in May 2010

This article examines why a Liberal Democrat‐Labour Coalition did not result from inter‐party negotiations after the General Election in May 2010 and whether the coalition which did emerge was based on a marriage of ‘neo‐liberal minds’, as claimed by Andrew Adonis in his <i>5 Days in May</i> (Biteback, 2013). Consideration of the available evidence, however, suggests a more nuanced conclusion. It is expected that the 2010 agreement will be revisited in preparation for a possible hung parliament in 2015.     

The Demise of ATSIC? Accountability and the Coalition Government

ATSIC has been portrayed by the Coalition government as an organisation that is not financially accountable and, because of this, is not achieving positive service delivery outcomes for Aboriginal people. Drawing on documentary material and fieldwork data, this article argues that ATSIC is indeed accountable and that the Coalition is putting the accountability argument forward as a means of justifying the dismantling of ATSIC. Given the past and recent actions taken by the Coalition, it is unclear how much longer ATSIC will be able to survive in its current form.     

Still Causing Trouble: The Conservative Parliamentary Party

There have been relatively few backbench rebellions on the Conservative benches in the Commons since 2001, but division manifested itself on three significant occasions: over the Children and Adoption Bill (when the leadership insisted on applying a whip to a vote that many thought should have been 'free'), over Lords reform (where on a free vote a majority of Conservative MPs voted against their leadership's preferred position) and over Iraq (where the divisions were smaller than on the Labour side of the House but where there was a qualitative dimension to the rebellion). Most importantly of all, the events of October 2003, when Iain Duncan Smith was removed as party leader, showed how much power remained with Conservative MPs: they initiated the vote of confidence, in which they alone participated, and the emergence of Michael Howard as the 'unity' candidate meant that the grassroots were denied any role in the change of leadership.     

The Impact of the Coalition Government on the Public Service: Was Change Inevitable?

Prime Minister John Howard has indicated that he wants to break down the welfare state as we know it and create a society that thrives on innovation and free enterprise. To do this will require a change in culture and attitudes in both the government and the community. The Coalition government argues that the state must withdraw its presence so market forces can be freed up to generate wealth, leading to greater prosperity for all Australians. This article poses the questions: was change in the public service inevitable under the Coalition government? and have the Coalition thought through the consequences of the changes proposed? The evidence to date suggests a negative answer to both.     

David Cameron's ‘Problem’ with Women: Representing Women in the Coalition Government

Prior to the election in 2010 David Cameron pledged that his first cabinet would comprise one‐third women and would be the most family friendly ever. Since forming the Coalition Government, he appears to have a ‘problem’ with women. We argue that this problem stems from: the weak representation of women in cabinet and across government; the diminishing resources available to government actors to support gender equality policy; and women's exclusion from the key Coalition networks, both formal and informal, that determine government policy.     

Investigating the Institutional Norms and Values of the Productivity Commission: The 2011 and 2015 Childcare Inquiries

The Productivity Commission (PC) has a mandate to provide independent advice to government that promotes community wellbeing. Whilst it plays a significant role in social and economic reform, the underlying institutional values and norms of the PC that shape its advice have not been examined. This paper examines policy problematisations (Bacchi 2009, 2012) across two PC ‘inquiries’ into childcare (2011, 2015) between Labor and Coalition governments, and the advice provided by the PC. In doing so, this research demonstrates that PC recommendations are imbued with economic values that are highly institutionalised. These values give preference to targeted social welfare and traditional gender norms, despite current evidence suggesting alternative approaches would have better social and long‐term economic outcomes. Our findings raise questions over the conflict between the traditional economic values of the PC and providing social policy advice that reflects best practice, indicating that further investigation into the PC is urgently needed.     

The Second Time as Tragedy? Welfare Reform under Thatcher and the Coalition

The welfare reforms of the Coalition government are marked by the legacy of Thatcherism. Social security reforms in the 1980s reshaped the system towards reliance on means‐tested benefits. Negative policy feedback created by the opacity and perverse effects of means‐testing has made these benefits an easy target for the Coalition, at least so far as working age people are concerned. Different policy feedbacks affect policy towards old age pensions. The government is locked into promoting private pensions, and is extending this commitment with automatic enrolment. To make private pensions pay, it has to reverse the slide to means‐testing. The implication is that the pronounced bias against the working poor and in favour of older people in Coalition policy is not simply a matter of electoral preferences: rather, it reflects the political effects of previous policy decisions.     

Keeping the rascals in: Anti‐political‐establishment parties and their cost of governing in established democracies

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral ‘cost of governing’. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti‐political‐establishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti‐political‐establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by ‘bringing the party back in’. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.     

'Between a Rock and a Hard Place': The Coalition,the Davies Commission and the Wicked Issue of Airport Expansion

In 2010, the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat Coalition placed a moratorium on airport expansion in the south‐east of England. In office, however, it has faced a sustained political campaign from supporters of the aviation industry and expansion, leading to the appointment in September 2012 of the Davies Commission on airport capacity. This paper critically evaluates this nascent policy reversal in aviation policy, analysing the political backlash in favour of expansion and the political mediation of such demands by the Coalition. It argues that while the shifting political context has placed new pressures on the coalition, its current difficulties cannot be divorced from the continued resonance of the logic of aviation expansion embedded in British institutions at the end of the Second World War. The paper concludes with an assessment of the challenges facing the Davies Commission, the coalition and campaigners, when set against the continued ‘grip’ of aviation on our collective consciousness.     

Did they ‘Read Before Burning’? The Coalition and Quangos

Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue ‘a more sophisticated approach’. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent ‘public bodies reform programme’, assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long‐standing concerns about the day‐to‐day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues.     

Does It Matter If the House of Lords isn't Reformed? Perspectives from a Symposium at Trinity Hall,Cambridge

In May 2011 the Coalition government published a draft bill for reform of the House of Lords, proposing an upper chamber composed of 80% elected and 20% appointed members serving for single 15‐year terms. These plans reflect aspects of the stated positions of the main political parties, votes in the House of Commons, and broader political and scholarly debates over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is significant opposition from across the political spectrum, and there is a significant possibility that the proposed reforms will not be enacted before the next general election. This article draws on the views of participants (including three current peers) in a Symposium at Trinity Hall, Cambridge to argue that the likely failure of the reforms may be less disastrous than many suppose. Especially since the 1999 reforms, the House of Lords is in many ways a more active and legitimate chamber than is commonly realised.     

‘Respect for Law and Sausages’: How Parliament Made Section 31 of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 on the Sale of Employment Rights

The Parliamentary debates on the clause which became section 31 of the Growth and Enterprise Act 2013 (allowing employees to agree to sign away employment rights for shares in the employing company) show that scrutiny by the House of Commons is very poor, and that scrutiny by the House of Lords is intense and very well‐informed. If the Government loses the argument on a Bill in the House of Lords, it will lose the vote. However, during Parliamentary ping‐pong (the back‐and‐forth process of amendment of a Bill between the two Houses) the Commons, and the Government, will normally get their way, however weak the policy proposal, provided that concessions on detail are made, unless the issue is regarded by the Lords as one of fundamental principle.     

Unity and Distinctiveness in UK Coalition Government: Lessons for Junior Partners

Parties in coalition governments must address the ‘unity/distinctiveness’ dilemma: how to maintain governing cohesion, while sustaining individual identities. Within the Cameron–Clegg government this is a challenge for both parties, but it is more so for the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner. This paper considers how the Liberal Democrats negotiated this dilemma in relation to ministerial portfolio allocations. While the Liberal Democrat strategy of placing ministers in almost all departments has served the Coalition well in terms of governing unity, it has limited the extent to which they have been able to assert their distinctive contribution to Coalition policy‐making. This is demonstrated through an examination of the Liberal Democrats' influence on Coalition welfare policy. A lack of clear policy contributions is potentially highly damaging to the Liberal Democrats electorally, as it suggests that they have made little substantive contribution to the Coalition beyond propping up their Conservative partners. Accordingly, the paper reflects on lessons for junior partners in future UK coalition governments, suggesting that concentrating ministers within one or two departments may provide a more viable means of carving out a distinctive governing legacy.