You Can't Fix What You Don't Measure: How ALICE Can Help Rebuild the Middle Class

Seventy percent of Americans identify as middle class, but one in three middle‐income households do not earn enough to support their family at the most basic level, and four in five do not earn enough to afford a sustainable budget. This incongruity explains the increasing frustration of many workers. Yet official government measures do not capture this reality, and as a result, policy makers continue to create economic policies that perpetuate the structural mismatch between wages and costs. This Viewpoint essay addresses these shortcomings. After reviewing alternatives to the federal poverty level, it argues that the most realistic and accurate floor to the middle class is the ALICE (Asset Limited, Income Constrained, Employed) Household Survival Budget. The essay then turns to policies that help realign wages and cost of living and presents initiatives that are being implemented in states across the country. Four policy areas would enable more workers to support their families and fulfill the promise of being middle class in America: meaningful work with stable and sufficient wages, upskilling and digital retooling, fiscal cushion for periods of financial instability, and affordable credit.     

Revitalize the Public Service,Revitalize the Middle Class

The reinventing government movement of the 1990s reshaped the public sector in significant ways. Creating a government that worked better and cost less was accomplished through streamlined federal middle management ranks and privatized service delivery, which contributed to the emergence of a “hollow state.” Workforce reductions that addressed short‐term economic realities effectively threatened the long‐term sustainability of governmental organizations and the communities they serve. A variety of forces are now ushering in a new era of hollow government, including a changing context for public work, shifting bureaucratic expectations, and reduced capacity for workforce management. The public sector and its employees represent an important contributor to the vitality of our economy and communities. Revitalizing the public sector workforce is critical for revitalizing the middle class, and both represent urgent policy priorities.     

Class and social policy in the knowledge economy

Recent studies of welfare state attitudes in the knowledge economy find very high generalized support for generous welfare state policies, both among the working and the middle classes. Has class become irrelevant as a predictor of social policy preferences? Or do we simply mis-conceptualise today's class conflict over social policy? To what extent has it changed from a divide over the level of social policy generosity to a divide over the kind of social policy and – more specifically – over the relative importance that should be given to different social policies? Answering these questions is not only relevant to understand welfare politics in the twenty-first century, but electoral politics as well: only when we understand what working- and middle-class voters care about, can we evaluate the role distributive policies play in electoral processes. We use original survey data from eight West European countries to show that middle- and working-class respondents indeed differ in the relative importance they attribute to social investment and social consumption policies. Middle-class respondents consistently attribute higher absolute and relative importance to social investment. We also show that this emphasis on investive policies relates to the middle class expecting better future economic and social opportunities than the working class. This divide in anticipated opportunities underlies a new kind of working- versus middle-class divide, which contributes to transforming the class divide from a conflict over the level of social policy to a conflict over the priorities of social policy.     

Taking Nonprofit Intermediaries Seriously: A Middle‐Range Theory for Implementation Research

The federal government often works through nonprofit intermediaries to reach and empower communities in the United States. One increasingly popular policy strategy is to offer grant funding to intermediary organizations in an effort to strengthen communities. Funded intermediaries are tasked with building the capacity of faith‐based and community organizations at the local level, but the policy theory that informs these programs does not specify how these capacity‐building efforts will lead to stronger communities. Missing is a middle‐range implementation theory that links inputs to community‐level changes through the actions of an intermediary. Derived from empirical case study evidence using process‐tracing analysis, the theory of the community‐integrated intermediary posited in this article helps fill that gap.     

To Bridge the Divide between Evidence and Policy: Reduce Ambiguity as Much as Uncertainty

Policy makers cannot consider all evidence relevant to policy. They use two shortcuts—emotions and beliefs to understand problems and “rational” ways of establishing the best evidence on solutions—to act quickly in complex, multilevel policy‐making environments. Many studies only address one part of this problem. Improving the supply of evidence helps reduce scientific and policy maker uncertainty. However, policy makers also combine their beliefs with limited evidence to reduce ambiguity by choosing one of several possible ways to understand and solve a problem. We use this insight to consider solutions designed to “close the evidence–policy gap.”     

Advancing Public Policy for High‐Growth,Female, and Social Entrepreneurs

Findings from a large and growing body of entrepreneurship research offer insights for public policy and public officials and managers. Entrepreneurship policy is defined as measures undertaken to stimulate entrepreneurship in a region or country. The authors discuss generalizations from empirical research on three types of entrepreneurship activity that are vital for inclusive, sustainable economic growth: high‐growth (stressing economic impact), female (inclusive impact), and social (sustainable impact) entrepreneurship. High‐growth firms make up a small share of all entrepreneurial activity but create the majority of economic growth. Compared to their male counterparts, female entrepreneurs are fewer in number (one‐third of all entrepreneurs) and tend to start ventures with lower financial capital and growth expectations. Social entrepreneurs generally have high levels of education and pursue social objectives, often remedying market failures with innovative solutions. For each entrepreneurship type, the authors provide a definition, empirical generalizations, and implications for public policy.     

Do Poor Citizens Vote for Redistribution,Against Immigration or Against the Establishment? A Conjoint Experiment in Denmark

What is the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and vote choice? The literature on this question is fragmented and points to motivations based on welfare policy, immigration policy or anti‐establishment sentiments. To test which of these motives explains differences in voting behaviour between classes, a conjoint experiment in which fictitious candidates present randomly assigned positions was designed. The experiment evaluated the relative importance of the position on welfare, immigration and anti‐establishment as well as candidates’ occupational background. By splitting the analyses into lower, middle‐ and upper class voters, it was found that lower class voters are most distinct from other voters in their preferences for anti‐establishment candidates. Strikingly, lower class voters even support welfare retrenchment, as long as it is an anti‐establishment candidate proposing it. The experiment also found a general tendency to vote against career politicians across classes and remarkably few differences regarding immigration preferences.     

Bureaucratic politics and the translation of movement agendas

Research on social movement outcomes focuses on the publicly visible stages of government policymaking. It rarely opens the black box of government's translation of movement demands beyond the agenda‐setting stage and before their materialization into legislative bills. Using a bureaucratic politics perspective, we suggest that bureaucrats play a central role in translating movement agendas into concrete problems and policy solutions, which they tend to link with their bureaus' missions and existing programs. We further suggest that relative consensus among bureaucrats when coupled with politicians' disinclination to intervene in the translation process tends to advantage conservative interpretations of movement agendas. Conversely, interbureau confrontation and political intervention are associated with more radical policy responses. Empirically, we examine the responses of the Israeli government to the large‐scale mobilization, in 2011, surrounding the rising costs of housing and living. We build on archival research and interviews with senior bureaucrats located in 11 central‐government ministries.     

“The Color of Money” revisited: Racial lending patterns in Atlanta's neighborhoods

Abstract

In 1988, the Atlanta Journal‐Constitution published “The Color of Money,” an influential series examining mortgage redlining in Atlanta. The articles documented wide lending disparities between white and black neighborhoods of similar income levels. Given sweeping changes in housing finance since 1988, we seek to determine whether Atlanta's racial geographic disparities in mortgage lending have changed.

Analysis of 1992 to 1996 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data reveals slight improvement. Atlanta's depository lenders made 4.2 times as many conventional home purchase loans per owner‐occupied unit to middle‐income white neighborhoods as they did to middle‐income black neighborhoods; a decade earlier, this ratio was 5.2. Nondepositories post lower ratios, particularly for Federal Housing Administration‐insured loans, but this market segment raises concerns because of potential abuses. By the indicator of most enduring theoretical and policy interest—conventional home purchase lending by depositories—the patterns that aroused concern a decade ago are still evident today.     

“Editorials at a Glance”: Cultural Policy,Gender, and Modernity in the World War I Bureau of Cartoons

Cultural policy during the Great War, rather than radiating from the central government, evolved from contemporary culture—propaganda, movies, and mass media. The state was a player, but quasi‐public organizations such as propaganda agencies, non‐state actors like the YMCA, and “public opinion” played important roles. The Committee on Public Information (CPI)—the government's propaganda committee—influenced Americans through books, advertisements, posters, and cartoons. This essay examines two of the CPI's efforts: the Bureau of Cartoons and the Division of Pictorial Publicity. In these materials, we can see the intersection of class‐based notions of gendered idealism and a developing media state's use of a sentimental culture of the Victorian middle‐class to represent and motivate the nation. With staff drawn primarily from advertising agencies and newspapers, the Committee's work shows how the formulation of cultural policy is the result of complex negotiated processes involving state interests, cultural liaisons, and ideological assumptions.     

Pay for Success: Diffusion of Policy Innovation for Social and Economic Stability

Across the United States, communities struggle with numerous social and environmental issues, while the funding to address these issues continues to diminish. Therefore, actors inside and outside of government are seeking new policy solutions to persistent social problems. Significant hurdles to new policies exist, however, including a lack of funding and a reluctance to take on the risks inherent in implementing new programs. A recent innovation in the policy sphere, pay‐for‐success (PFS) financing, has been able to overcome these hurdles. Policy innovation does not come easily, though, and change within government is often slow and methodical. What catalyzes jurisdictions to engage with PFS? By developing an understanding of the mechanisms and processes of PFS, diffusion scholars and practitioners can facilitate innovation within jurisdictions. Such innovation, which the federal government has an opportunity to facilitate, is necessary to shift business‐as‐usual service provision and enable greater social, environmental, and economic stability.     

Preemptive strikes and the war on Iraq: a critique of Bush administration unilateralism and militarism

Bush administration foreign policy has exhibited a marked unilateralism and militarism in which US military power is used to advance US interests and geopolitical hegemony. The policy was first evident in the Afghanistan intervention following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and informed the 2003 war against Iraq. In From 9/11 to Terror War, I sketched out the genesis and origins of Bush administration foreign policy and its application in Afghanistan and the build‐up to the Iraq war. In this study, I update and develop my critique of the Bush doctrine of preemptive strikes and its application in the 2003 Iraq invasion, concluding with a critique of unilateralism and militarism, and defense of multilateral and global solutions to problems such as terrorism, so‐called “weapons of mass destruction,” and “rogue regimes.”     

Who protests? An exploration of the class dimensions of anticorruption mobilization

This article examines the role of economic class in mobilizing against corruption. Across several countries, recent anticorruption movements have been attributed to the growing urban middle class. Yet, existing studies have not examined how citizens view their own agency and how their views may be affected by their class position. We use Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey and a case study of India to critically examine the class dimensions of anticorruption mobilization. We find that citizens in middle‐income countries are most concerned with corruption. At the same time, those who identify as middle class are only slightly more likely than low‐income individuals to indicate a willingness to mobilize. In contrast, people who identify as high income are much less willing to engage with the issue. Our findings suggest that successful and sustained mobilization against corruption might require a coalition of middle‐and lower‐income groups.     

Status polarization of social welfare attitudes

This paper tests two competing theories of status polarization of social welfare attitudes. One theory, which can broadly be termedsocial-psychological, sees status polarization as a function of identification with social groups. The other, which can be termedeconomic, sees policy preferences as a function of the individual's expected utility from various policies. Using CPS data for the years 1956–1984, we find that the utility maximizing hypothesis has much more explanatory power for the middle and late 1970s. Social class identification, on the other hand, rivals utility maximization as an explanation of policy preferences during the years 1956–1964 and shows a slight resurgence in 1982 and 1984. These results suggest little prospect for a revival of the New Deal party coalitions, barring strong political leadership that defines issues in class terms and polarizes the electorate.     

How Governments Respond to Business Demands for Tax Cuts: A Study of Corporate and Inheritance Tax Reforms in Austria and Sweden

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle‐class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low‐income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business‐friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.     

A New Era for Think Tanks in Public Policy? International Trends,Australian Realities

Although the powerful have always sought advice from the knowledgeable, it took the appeal of the policy sciences movement of the late 1940s and onward to build and consolidate a veritable industry of policy analysis and advice. ¹ One of the hallmarks of this development was the advent of institutes that were exclusively devoted to produce research‐based policy arguments and to inject these into the policy‐making process. These organisations were referred to as ‘think tanks’. Half a century later, the project of the policy sciences movement has been amply criticised, and has mutated into various philosophies of policy analysis, each harbouring distinct and often conflicting perspectives on the nature and role of (scientific) knowledge in the battle of arguments that is public policy‐making. The first wave of the policy sciences movement's privileging of science‐based policy has not disappeared. In fact it is currently experiencing a revival under the banner of ‘evidence‐based policy’. But it has to compete with other views of public policy‐making which deconstruct the authority claim of scientific knowledge, emphasising instead its contestability. Yet there are now more organisations that refer to themselves, or can be labelled, as ‘think tanks’ than ever before. Why? And what does it mean to be a ‘think tank’ in the post‐positivist era and in the increasingly boundary‐less, highly networked societies of today? This article first surveys recent developments in the world of think tanks as reported by the international literature on the subject, and then examines the implications for understanding the nature and role of Australian think tanks.     

Look to Sweden: The Making of a New Renewable Energy Support Scheme in Norway

Two renewable energy support schemes have spread across Europe: green certificate schemes (GCSs) and feed‐in tariffs (FITs). After a decade‐long policy‐making process, Norwegian decision makers decided in 2011 to adopt a GCS compatible with the already existing one in Sweden and thereby establish a joint Norwegian‐Swedish GCS. The article explores this process of policy transfer, and asks to what extent competition and policy learning contributed to Norway's choice of a GCS. It finds that competition was a barrier to a joint Norwegian‐Swedish GCS rather than (as predicted by some scholars) a driver of policy transfer. In terms of policy learning, it finds that Norwegian bureaucrats systematically were searching for information about renewable energy policy instruments in a process characterised by rational learning. However, this information was not taken into account by elected policy makers, whose learning was unsystematic and almost exclusively influenced by Sweden – making it a process of bounded learning. Finally, domestic factors that facilitated and constrained the policy transfer process are identified in the article. A reluctant bureaucracy defending the status quo policies constrained the policy transfer process. GCS as a market‐based instrument independent of yearly allocations over the annual national budgets facilitated the process by securing strong support in a broad coalition of stakeholder groups and thereby cross‐partisan support. The latter finding may contribute to the literature by underscoring the importance of domestic political factors.     

Targeting the suburban urbanites: Marketing central‐city housing

Abstract

This article explores target marketing as a means to identify which middle‐income suburbanites may relocate to central cities. The most targetable populations reside near central cities and lead urban lifestyles. We term such people “suburban urbanites.” Geodemography, a method combining population and location, is used to classify suburban urbanites using data from Claritas Inc., a target marketer. Claritas divides the nation's neighborhoods into lifestyle clusters by linking population density to demographic and consumptive patterns.

A case study of metropolitan Washington, DC, illustrates how target marketing works. We find that more than half the region's middle‐class, Claritas‐defined urbanites live outside the District of Columbia. Thus, a large market of potential city dwellers lives in Washington's suburbs. Target marketing enhances the statistical approaches traditionally used in policy making and may help cities understand and develop their comparative advantages.     

Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House

We explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel, as theorized by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) , to determine how majority‐party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership's use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement. First, we identify formally the group of majority‐party members who are net policy losers. We find that those members occupying the initial 30% of the space within the majority‐party blockout zone—that space closest to the floor median—are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel arrangement. Second, we find that members in this “30% zone” are rewarded disproportionately by majority‐party leaders (relative to members in other intervals on the same side of the floor median) via side payments in the form of campaign contributions. In addition, majority‐party members within the 30% zone receive side payments commensurate with their particular policy loss.     

Comment on Sandra J. Newman and Ann B. Schnare's “'… And a suitable living environment’: The failure of housing programs to deliver on neighborhood quality”

Abstract

Newman and Schnare provide a useful portrait of where housing assistance ends up geographically. The evidence that certificate and voucher holders are less likely than public housing residents to live in the poorest neighborhoods is encouraging, as well as important for policy decisions. Unresolved in the article, and unresolvable with the data, as the authors themselves note, is the matter of how neighborhood quality is affected by housing assistance. The least popular housing developments have long been relegated to neighborhoods of least political resistance, a fact that constrains most local efforts to deconcentrate poverty. Futhermore, through the tax code, America spends about three times as much on housing assistance for middle‐ and upper‐income households as it does on assistance to low‐ and moderate‐income households. Thus far, we have not applied “fair share” principles either to the location of housing assistance or to its allocation across the income spectrum.