Are Public Service Nonprofit Boards Meeting Their Responsibilities?

Public service nonprofit organizations have long been "partners" in the delivery of public services. Such nonprofit organizations are governed by boards, typically composed of citizen volunteers, that are expected to meet substantial standards of accountability and performance. Previous research has raised questions about how well such boards are meeting their responsibilities. A 2007 Urban Institute study, based on the first large representative sample of U.S. public benefit nonprofits, provides important evidence about the extent to which nonprofit boards are meeting certain accountability and performance standards.     

Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics

This article tests a wide range of government activities against requirements for public accountability. The article explores the incentives for ethical behaviour by public officials; the need for more outcome focused performance indicators, tensions between parliamentary and managerial accountability; the standards of accountability applied to public providers of services can be applied to private providers; the utility of spelling out service requirements in advance; the impacts on accountability of the convergence of the public and private sectors; the need, where responsibility for programs is collaborative, for a clear governance framework, tensions between representative and participative democracy, and trends towards more participative and collaborative leadership.     

Contracting Out and Accountability

Governments are increasingly moving to contract out the provision of public services which have previously been delivered by public service departments. Contracting out typically implies provision by private sector contractors. However, it may also include in-house provision by public service departments or other public agencies where the right to provide is won through competitive tendering and is governed by contract. At the Commonwealth level, the trend has been given added impetus by the Coalition government elected in 1996 (Reith J 996; National Commission of Audit 1996).
The main rationale for contracting out is to improve efficiency in service provision by harnessing the virtues of competition, in particular the superior productivity engendered among competitive providers (Industry Commission (IC) 1996, B3.4; Appendix E). At the same time, there is a legitimate expectation that providers of public services paid for by public funds will be publicly accountable (IC 1996, BI). However, contracting out has the potential to reduce the extent of public accountability by transferring the provision of public services to members of the private sector who are generally not subject to the same accountability requirements as public officials. Indeed, reduction in such accountability requirements may be one of the reasons for the greater efficiency of the private sector.     

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR UTILITIES*

Abstract: Profit-based financial measures have been given prominence in the present financial accountability and control systems of public sector utilities in Australia. As a result, periodic evaluation of financial accountability and managerial performance suffers from a lack of objective-orientation. Assessing the financial accountability and controlling the activities of public utilities properly requires information consistent with their operational environment. Neither clear financial policies and targets, nor a set of environment-specific performance measures have been outlined by the government. The paper proposes that, in addition to profit measures, consideration should also be given to non-profit measures if an improvement is really desired in the monitoring of managerial performance and in accountability of those utilities which operate in virtual monopoly or near-monopoly situations.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK OF AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the complexities of accountability for Australian public enterprise and analyses some of the conceptual issues which need to be addressed in developing a framework for reform. The analysis suggests that the matrix of financial accountability relationships is quite complex in terms of its objectives, its concern for both public interest and commercial viability issues and the number of participants. Furthermore, it operates in an intricate environment of political, administrative and control structures. Although the general financial reporting objectives for public and private enterprises may be similar from a conceptual viewpoint, the assumptions underlying the private sector agency model (a simple one-to-one shareholder-manager relationship based on profit maximisation and individual self-interest) may not allow a realistic or suitable modelling of the intricacies of this process at an operational level at least.
The analysis identifies some of the difficulties encountered when modelling the financial accountability processes for public enterprises. It then suggests a framework which takes into account the multi-layered nature of performance objectives and the unique operational environment of public enterprises. The model encompasses performance responsibilities at both the macro- and micro-economic levels, and operates through a linked chain of participants, each with distinct financial accountability obligations and information needs. It identifies several tiers of participants together with the appropriate accountability responsibilities at each level.     

Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What could be achieved with greater public hospital autonomy? Comparison of public and PNFP hospitals in Uganda

The policy of hospital autonomy has been discussed for some time in Uganda. There is little evidence from Uganda or elsewhere that increased autonomy will improve hospital performance. This article compares the performance of three private not‐for‐profit (PNFP) and public hospital pairs to address this question. PNFP and public hospitals have similar management structures but PNFP hospitals had better trained managers and a church affiliated chair in the hospital management committee. Both types have problems with personnel management but these appear more pronounced in public hospitals. Drug supply management appears better in PNFP hospitals. Overall, workloads are similar, but analysis of patterns of utilisation and prices across services suggest that patient choice of facilities is influenced by relative price levels, and that willingness to pay is higher for PNFP services. PNFP hospitals are more successful at generating revenue. There are no clear differences in efficiency between PNFP and public hospitals but there is some evidence of higher quality levels in PNFP hospitals. PNFP hospitals' performance is plausibly related to three areas of managerial autonomy. First, better management of drug supply is facilitated by their freedom to purchase drugs from the open market. Second, greater success with personnel management is plausibly related to their greater autonomy over staffing. Third, higher levels of cost recovery are enabled by their freedom to set fees. However, differences in accountability and competence of hospital management, and population willingness to pay for services may also help to explain differences. Further, the use of PNFP financing strategy by public hospitals has implications for universal access to hospital services. Although there appear to be potential advantages from greater public hospital autonomy, the Ugandan government should ensure it has developed strategies to enhance public hospital management and to protect access to public hospitals before advancing further with hospital autonomy policy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reforming Social Services in Hong Kong: The Role of Contracting and Performance Management in the Non‐Profit Sector

Contracts and performance management, along with the concept of consumerism, have become the fundamental metaphors for New Public Management (NPM) and key changes in the public service. ‘Doing well while doing good’ and finding generally acceptable accountability measures for social services have become the perennial aspirations of planners, service providers and funders. This article examines the contingent factors and rationales behind the quality movement and recontracting exercise in reforming the delivery of personal social service programs in Hong Kong within the framework of New Public Management (NPM). It explains the use of long‐term relational contracts rather than the standard business contracts between the government as funder and non‐profit organisations as service providers. It also deals with the complex relationships among quality issues, quality standards, consumerism, accountability, performance indicators, and performance management.     

The Challenge of Strengthening Nonprofits and Civil Society

The Winter Commission Report was centrally concerned with improving the performance of state and local governments. Since the issuance of the commission’s report in 1993, the delivery of services by state and local government has been substantially changed by the growing role of nonprofit organizations in providing public services and representing citizen interests. As a result, state and local governments and nonprofit agencies are faced with complex governance challenges. The central argument of this paper is that despite the dramatic changes in the relationship between government and nonprofit organizations in recent years, the key tenets of the Winter Commission report—the need for improved training and education, greater transparency and accountability, more emphasis on performance, and improved citizen engagement—remain deeply relevant in improving the governance of the public services in an increasingly complex policy process and service delivery system at the state and local levels.     

Accountability via Performance Measurement: The Case of Child Protection Services

Since the 1980s child protection agencies have been subject to enormous scrutiny about perceived poor performance. Concerns are expressed about the capacity of services to cope with demand, the quality of practice, out‐of‐home care standards, and poor outcomes for children. Enter performance measurement. Using quantitative data to monitor effectiveness and efficiency, performance measurement promises improved resource management and accountability. This article discusses national, Victorian and Queensland child protection performance measurement regimes. It examines the extent to which performance measurement is used to promote accountability, as well as the indirect role of performance measurement in communicating policy intent. It suggests performance measurement is under‐utilised in child protection, but could be enhanced to contribute to better outcomes for children and families.     

From Accountability to Assurance – Stakeholder Perspectives in Local Government

This article reports on research which sought to explore the understanding of accountability for performance amongst constituents of local government in Western Australia. Recent trends to increase the public accountability and financial reporting requirements for local governments underline the need to understand the value and use made of this performance information by local government constituents.     

Entrepreneurship-driven public management reforms in Southeast Asia: Critical implications for public accountability

In recent decades, public management has been restructured worldwide for greater efficiency and innovation based on entrepreneurship-driven models such as Reinventing Governance, New Public Management, and post-NPM frameworks. The primary intent of these business-like models is instilling entrepreneurship, which would encourage risk-taking innovation, managerial autonomy, performance orientation, and customer choice. Such entrepreneurial orientation is embedded in organizational-managerial reforms related to human resource management, budgeting framework, performance benchmarking, and so on. These entrepreneurship-driven reforms have significant impacts on administrative structure, procedures, and norms affecting the process of public sector accountability. In line with such global trends, most countries in Southeast Asia have embraced some of these pro-market business-type reforms in public management to enhance its entrepreneurship, innovation, and competition, which have implications for managerial control, neutrality, regulation, and integrity required for public accountability. This article explores these entrepreneurship-driven reforms in the region and evaluates their critical implications for the long-established institutions, structures, and procedures of public accountability.     

Promoting Public Service Integrity: A Case for Responsible Accountability

We discuss below difference between the concepts of accountability and responsibility, in the context of government administration. We argue that New Zealand's public sector reforms, in particular, have depended on an essentially mechanistic as distinct from an organic interpretation of public organisations. A mechanistic approach focuses disproportionately on notions of organisational accountability at the expense of responsibility, and as a consequence may prove counterproductive over the longer term in maintaining high standards of ethical probity. A concept of responsible accountability needs to be developed further as a means of countering this possibility. We speculate on whether the emphasis on contractualism has enhanced or undermined an integrity-based as opposed to a compliance-based ethics regime, and the possible implications of this for the maintenance of ethical standards.     

PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT AND THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

This article applies a broad theoretical framework identifying factors which provide an understanding of the relationship between electoral politics, organizational reform and institutional change. In focusing upon product i v i t y reforms undertaken in the 1970's and early 1980's. the authors find that political conflicts over measures of public performance may contribute to a life cycle in which organizational structures are reconstituted and subjects of regulation o r services redefined in ways that are potentially inconsistent with the demand for public accountability. The conjunction of such factors may contribute to a crisis of legitimacy resulting in the redefinition of the boundaries between public and private realms of responsibility, as expressed in the electoral process. Today liberal reformers are confronted by a dilemma of productivity and legitimacy involved in the cycle of reform and retrenchment in which the goal of public accountability is undermined by erosion of the rights of the subject. The attempt to break this bind requires, in part, an explicitness on the part of liberals about the presuppositions regarding the subject underpining the measures and strategies by which organizational reforms are undertaken.     

Accountability in the Privatized State

As well as better efficiency and improved services, privatization has also often promised improved accountability. But how does the empirical evidence on this look and what are the lessons here? This article looks at the notion of accountability and the degree to which privatizing public sector activities might improve or worsen such mechanisms. It then looks specifically at the different systems of accountability existing following three privatization activities in Victoria and compares these against that existing previously under public operation. The sale of electricity sector enterprises, the operation of urban rail service franchises, and the implementation of a public–private partnership project to supply transport infrastructure are adopted as case studies. For each case study, accountability systems are articulated and the operation of these systems is discussed. Overall, the article analyses the effectiveness of accountability systems now operating in the privatized state from the perspective of stakeholders. Importantly, the degree to which trade‐offs may have been made under new accountability arrangements is also discussed. Finally, the article draws together some general lessons on accountability for future privatization activities and proposes a conceptual model for a pyramid of accountability.     

Outsourcing Oversight: A Comparison of Monitoring for In-House and Contracted Services

The public sector contracting literature has long argued that outsourced services need to be and, in fact, are subject to a more elevated level of scrutiny compared to internally delivered services. Recently, the performance measurement and management literature has suggested that the twin themes of accountability and results have altered the management landscape at all levels of government. By focusing on performance monitoring, the implication is that monitoring levels for internally provided services should more closely approximate those for contracted services. The analysis provided here yields empirical comparisons of how governments monitor the same service provided in-house and contracted out. We find evidence that services provided internally by a government's own employees are indeed monitored intensively by the contracting government, with levels of monitoring nearly as high as those for services contracted out to for-profit providers. In contrast, however, we find strong evidence that performance monitoring by the contracting government does not extend to nonprofit and other governmental service providers, each of which is monitored much less intensively than when comparable services are provided internally. For such service providers, it appears that monitoring is either outsourced along with services, or simply reduced.     

Support for Performance‐Based Funding: The Role of Political Ideology,Performance, and Dysfunctional Information Environments

As performance‐based mechanisms for accountability have become increasingly commonplace in the public sector, it is apparent that administrative reactions to these reforms are central in determining their effectiveness. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about the factors that drive acceptance of performance‐based accountability by administrative actors. This article employs data collected from an original survey instrument to examine the perceptions of presidents at American public colleges and universities regarding performance funding. The author finds that acceptance of performance as a basis for funding is driven by a variety of factors, including the partisanship of the state legislature, organizational performance (measured by institutional graduation rates), dysfunction in the external information environment, and the political ideology of university presidents.     

Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases

Audits of government entities offer a potential tool to hold public officials to account and to improve the functioning of public administration; however, empirical studies of audit impacts show mixed results. This is largely due to the diversity of audit regimes with different goals and accountability mechanisms, which yield different causal chains. In this study, I compare three distinct audit regimes with distinct casual mechanisms in Honduras. I find that backward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for past behavior or performance, require effective horizontal accountability mechanisms to investigate and prosecute cases. Forward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for future behavior or performance, require independent accountability mechanisms, a systematic follow-up methodology, public dissemination, and pressure from the media and civil society. Complementary initiatives that build on audit recommended reforms are found to strengthen these weaknesses in the causal mechanism linking audits to outcomes.