大数据驱动的政府绩效精准管理：动因分析、现实挑战与未来进路

大数据技术是促进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化、提高政府绩效管理水平的重要引擎。基于大数据赋能开展政府绩效精准管理是贯彻落实以人民为中心发展思想的题中应有之义、全面整合政府绩效信息的必然选择、推进多元主体参与绩效管理的有效途径以及实时进行绩效问责与激励的实践要求。我国对大数据驱动政府绩效精准管理的探索,仍面临着基于大数据的政府绩效管理制度缺失、政府绩效信息整合的有效性不高、存在潜在道德风险隐患、大数据相关要素支撑能力不足等制约因素。为进一步推进大数据驱动的政府绩效精准管理,促进政府绩效管理科学化发展,未来应加快大数据驱动政府绩效精准管理的制度建设、推动政府绩效信息的有效整合、构建"回溯性、实时性和预测性"的政府绩效评估模式、强化政府绩效精准管理的大数据要素支撑能力。     

公众参与政府绩效管理的可持续性：一个系统性文献综述

公众参与政府绩效管理既是建构一种更具包容性、有效性与合法性的公共管理实践方式,也是公共服务伦理价值的回归。然而,公众参与政府绩效管理的可持续性令人担忧,具体表现为参与的有限性和非延续性。运用系统性文献综述法,可以厘清公众参与政府绩效管理的价值,公众参与政府绩效管理可持续性的判断标准、影响因素及其改进策略等关键议题,实现对已有碎片化知识的整合,形成完整的认知体系。而实现公众参与政府绩效管理可持续性的有效路径就在于构建政府与公众间的知识共享机制,这就需要关注于官僚理性知识壁垒的形成机理及其超越路径,以及利益相关者间的知识共享能力的构建。     

地方政府数据治理绩效及其提升

对地方政府数据治理绩效要从目标、运行机制、行为和结果等方面进行综合考察,这几个维度从不同层面表达了地方政府数据治理的绩效。地方政府数据治理绩效提升的理论分析框架由"一个中心,四个基本点"构成,其提升过程中具有以下难点和挑战:导引不足,缺乏系统的政策支持;贡献不彰,存在潜在的安全问题;技术系统缺乏协同,存在系统融合问题;公众参与不足,效果不佳;缺乏系统监管,影响治理效能。因此,应加强政府数据治理的战略和政策支持,优化行政生态环境;强化数据信息链的绩效贡献,重视数据的安全风险问题;注重技术平台的系统融合,挖掘技术协同的绩效动能;注重公众的参与和体验,实现政府与民众的良性互动;构建政府数据治理的全方位管控体系,提升数据治理的绩效。     

政府绩效评估的作用如何?——基于公职人员感知的视角

政府绩效评估自兴起至今已历经了一段漫长的历史,但时至今日,"政府绩效评估的作用如何?"无论是在西方还是中国学界,无论是在理论界还是实务界,对这一问题的回答都存在较大的分歧。本研究以广东省一个县级政府为个案,从公职人员感知的视角,对政府绩效评估所发挥的作用进行具体测量,并且构建了一个多元回归分析模型探讨影响政府绩效评估作用发挥的相关因素。研究发现,政府绩效评估作用的14个测量项均值为3.36分(最高5分),其中,其在落实年度目标任务及工作重点、战略规划与目标设置以及强化各部门的责任心上发挥的作用最明显,在确定部门预算资金水平、确定资源分配优先次序以及降低部门运作成本上发挥的作用最不明显。而"绩效沟通与反馈""考核负荷""公众参与的动力与能力""考核指标体系的科学性""所在部门的类型"这五个因素对于政府绩效评估作用的发挥都有显著影响。     

权重结构:公众参与政府绩效评估的核心问题——基于学理与实践的双重演绎逻辑

公众对民主权利的享有除了周期性的殿堂式投票外,还要注重日常生活中对公共事务处理的参与。因此,公众参与政府绩效评估是公民行使民主权利的基本路径之一,其实质是通过参与来监督政府,让其对公众负责,这种互动是政府以服务获取公众信任的交换正义。由此,政府绩效的公众评估是服务型政府和责任型政府构建的必然要求,然而政府绩效的公众评价存在效能低下的现实困境,其原因是多方面的,包括相关主体观念、动力和能力方面的主观障碍;也包括公众参与政府绩效评估机制方面的科学性、有效性问题;相关配套制度也尚需完善。基于对珠海万人评议政府模式和杭州综合考评模式的梳理,从学理与实践的双重逻辑角度看,权重结构是公众参与政府绩效评估的核心问题。在互联网时代,如何运用大数据实现政府对大规模公众参与政府绩效评估所产生的海量信息的处理,也是政府绩效管理无法回避的问题。     

地方政府绩效评估中公众参与有效性困境的破解

公众参与地方政府绩效评估既是服务型政府建设的重要实现路径,也是社会发展和政府绩效评估价值取向变迁的必然结果。由于多种因素的影响和制约,我国地方政府绩效评估中的公众参与实践存在参与深度和广度有限、评估结果准确性欠佳、评估结果落实不力等参与有效性不足的问题。其困境的破解需从培育积极公民资格、明确政府角色定位、注重解决差异性问题、完善评估制度建设和优化评估过程设计等方面入手。     

中国地方政府预算绩效管理改革的组织机制重构——基于CGRs理论的分析

全面实施预算绩效管理是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的内在要求和基本路径。中国地方政府预算绩效管理改革的"棘手问题"属性、碎片化管理现状和协同失灵现象成为影响改革绩效的主要表现。在协同治理机制(CGRs)理论框架下,地方政府预算绩效管理改革的跨部门协同治理机制可以从协同驱动、协同过程和协同结果等三个维度进行构建,通过运用该理论模型对地方政府预算绩效管理改革实践进行分析发现:通过领导力、不确定性和相互依存等驱动要素充分调动和激活各级党委、人大、财政、审计等各方面力量,建构有原则地参与、共享动机和联合行动能力等协同过程,形成交互协同并相互制约的预算绩效协同治理体系与机制,可以有效推进预算绩效管理改革进程。     

公民参与政府绩效评估的过程模型建构

绩效评估可以看作是问责政府的一种工具。那么,在上级问责作为主要问责形式的行政体制下,公民问责能否成为上级问责的有益补充,公民参与政府绩效评估的未来走向可能是什么?本文以此为出发点,首先对行政问责的两种类型——上级问责和公民问责——的协同和冲突关系进行了分析;其次,从公民是否参与政府绩效目标的制定和绩效结果的评价两个维度构建模型,在此基础上对公民参与政府绩效评估的类型、未来发展走向和限制性条件进行分析和探讨,以期为公民参与政府绩效评估的实践提供一些启示。     

政府绩效管理创新及其基本原则

政府绩效管理是指对政府履行“经济调节、市场监管、社会管理、公共服务”等政府职能时所取得的成绩和效益进行过程监控与结果评估的管理活动。它包括四个基本方面的绩效指标 (4E) :经济 (Economic)、效率(Efficiency)、效果 (Effectiveness)和公平 (Equity)。政府绩效管理创新应遵循四条基本原则 :在绩效管理主体上 ,专门机构进行绩效管理与公民评估并重 ,并以人民是否满意为主维度的原则 ;在绩效管理客体上 ,过程监控和结果评估并重 ,以过程监控为主 ,公务员个人评价与政府组织评价并重 ,并以组织评价为主的原则 ;在管理评估标准上 ,经济、效率、效果和公平并重 ,以效果和公平为主的原则 ;在绩效管理价值追求上 ,评估优劣奖惩与政府效能建设并重 ,以政府效能建设为主的原则。     

当前政府绩效评估的影响因素分析

政府绩效评估是一项复杂而艰巨的工作,其结果的客观性、公正性及准确性往往会受多种因素的影响。从我国当前的政府绩效评估看,评估基础较为薄弱,组织体系不健全、制度不完善及评估理论基础薄弱等因素影响着绩效评估;绩效评估目标不确定,绩效目标系统构建的多样性、绩效目标的不确定及绩效目标的难以测量等因素影响着绩效评估;绩效信息不对称及评估路径、运行机制不合理等因素影响着绩效评估的顺利推进。     

Does Involvement in Performance Management Routines Encourage Performance Information Use? Evaluating GPRA and PART

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the George W. Bush administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) established new routines that were intended to foster performance management practices. Using data from two surveys, the authors find that the involvement of agency employees in GPRA processes and PART reviews generally had little direct effect on performance information use once other factors are accounted for. The main exception is that managerial involvement in GPRA processes and PART reviews is associated with the use of performance data to refine measures and goals. This reflects the limits of government‐wide reform efforts that depend on difficult‐to‐observe bureaucratic behavior. The authors also find that a series of organizational factors—leadership commitment to results, learning routines led by supervisors, the motivational nature of the task, and the ability to link measures to actions—are positive predictors of performance information use.     

Performance Management Routines That Work? An Early Assessment of the GPRA Modernization Act

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 provided a well‐studied framework for U.S. federal performance management initiatives. In the aftermath of the update of GPRA in 2010 with the GPRA Modernization Act, the authors offer the first systematic scholarly assessment of the new legislation. Managerial use of performance data was an explicit goal of the Modernization Act, an objective that eluded prior federal reforms. The Modernization Act established a new series of performance routines to encourage performance information use. The analysis shows that as federal managers experience those routines, they are more likely to report using performance data to make decisions. Specifically, routines centered on the pursuit of cross‐agency priority goals, the prioritization of a small number of agency goals, and data‐driven reviews are all associated with higher rates of performance information use. The authors also find that managers in better‐run data‐driven reviews report greater use of performance data.     

Performance‐Based Budgeting: The Contribution of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

Under the President's Management Agenda for performance and budget integration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designed the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to breath new life into performance‐based budgeting as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). This article discusses what PART is designed to do and how the PART process works. Based on recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports addressing implementation of PART in the last four fiscal years, the article answers such questions as: Has PART made a difference in program operations? What is the relationship between PART and GPRA? Has progress been made in improving the evidence base for PART assessments? How well does PART assess programs related to a common goal? What has been congressional reaction to the PART process? Are PART and performance budgeting making a difference in government?     

How Credible Is the Evidence,and Does It Matter? An Analysis of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This research empirically assesses the quality of evidence that agencies provided to the Office of Management and Budget in the application of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), introduced in 2002 to more rigorously, systematically, and transparently assess public program effectiveness and hold agencies accountable for results by tying them to the executive budget formulation process and program funding. Evidence submitted by 95 programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for the PART assessment is analyzed using measures that capture the quality of evidence and methods used by programs and information on characteristics of agencies that might relate to program results and government funding decisions. The study finds that of those programs offering some evidence, most was internal and qualitative, and about half did not assess how their performance compared to other government or private programs with similar objectives. Programs were least likely to provide externally generated evidence of their performance relative to long‐term and annual performance goals. Importantly, overall PART and results scores were (statistically) significantly lower for programs that failed to provide quantitative evidence and did not use long‐term measures, baseline measures or targets, or independent evaluations. Although the PART program results ratings and overall PART scores had no discernible consequences for program funding over time, the PART assessments appeared to take seriously the evaluation of evidence quality, a positive step forward in recent efforts to base policy decisions on more rigorous evidence.     

Implementing the GPRA: Examining the Prospects for Performance Budgeting in the Federal Government

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is the latest in a series of attempts to introduce performance-based management and budgeting techniques at the federal level in the United States. In the past, these attempts largely failed due to administrative complexities, lack of investment in managerial, accounting, and information systems, and the absence of institutional incentives to promote gains in economic efficiency. Whereas we find the objectives of the GPRA laudable, we question whether this current incarnation of performance budgeting can succeed in transforming the traditional focus of federal budgeting from annual appropriations and obligations to multiyear outputs and outcomes.     

Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

The Obama Administration and PBB: Building on the Legacy of Federal Performance‐Informed Budgeting?

The administration of President Barack Obama, like those of his immediate predecessors, is focused on trying to improve the quality of, and use of, performance data. The federal government has been pursuing performance‐informed budget reforms for more than 50 years. Most recently, the Bush administration reforms included the President’s Management Agenda and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The Obama administration reforms include: measuring the effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; reducing or eliminating poorly‐performing programs; setting a limited number of short‐term, high‐priority performance goals; and funding detailed program evaluations. The administration is taking a more agency‐driven approach than the Bush administration, but continues to find it challenging to move beyond production of performance data to its use. There should be opportunities to show how performance information can be used for decision making, given the change in the political climate and the needs to reduce spending and the deficit. Historically, there has been little appetite in the Congress for evidence‐based decision making. The administration, however, can continue to demonstrate how federal agencies can use performance information to more effectively manage programs.     

Playing the Wrong PART: The Program Assessment Rating Tool and the Functions of the President's Budget

The extensive literature about the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) has not emphasized an issue that appears quite clearly in interviews with senior Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional staff. Budget analysis can pursue efficiency in two ways. One, the object of traditional analysis, involves assessing programs to understand the ratio of inputs to outputs within an agency, and thus the effects of more or less funding. Another approach, termed “budgeting for results,” measures program performance so as to allocate funding among programs in a way that increases total welfare. The second approach is much more difficult because it necessitates comparison of measures of unlike phenomena, requires expertise that often does not exist, and is more easily contested as invoking values rather than facts. Both congressional and OMB sources report concerns that PART weakened budget analysis by diverting resources from traditional analysis. If one goal of reformers is for the OMB to provide analysis that will influence Congress, the focus should be on strengthening the capacity to do traditional budget analysis.     

Organizational Learning and the Development of a Networked Company

Through use of an exploratory case study, this research examines the concepts that distinguish a networked company from other organization models. These concepts are then applied in a field case study to a networked company called the Port Arthur Remediation Team (PART). PART was formed in 1996 by an integrated petroleum company, an environmental engineering concern, and a heavy construction firm to manage the remediation of an oil refining facility. How this networked firm learned to organize, coordinate activities, attain goals, and link its operational components in a useful way are described.     

PART in Retrospect: An Examination of Legislators' Attitudes Toward PART

This research adds insight into the congressional reaction to the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) by exploring the influence of individual legislators' personal experiences and ideological position on their attitude toward PART. Specifically, the factors explored include ideological position held by legislators, level of business experience, level of campaign financing received from political action committees (PACs), years spent in Congress, seniority, and congressional chamber. The results indicate that legislators with higher levels of business experience generally were more supportive of PART and that the length of time they had served in Congress and the amount of campaign contributions they had received from PACs were negatively related to PART support. The study also provides insights into legislators' overall exposure and sentiment toward PART. The data indicates that only a small proportion of legislators clearly expressed positive or negative opinions toward PART, despite widespread exposure to the tool. These findings are important in that they contribute toward a more comprehensive understanding of the congressional reaction to PART and offer further insights into the challenges of securing congressional buy‐in for executive performance budgeting initiatives.