When doctors shape policy: The impact of self‐regulation on governing human biotechnology

This paper investigates the development and adoption of governance modes in the field of human biotechnology. As the field of human biotechnology is relatively new, voluntary professional self‐regulation constituted the initial governing mode. In the meantime, with the exception of Ireland, all Western European countries have moved toward greater state intervention. Nevertheless, they have done so in contrasting ways and the resulting governance modes for assisted reproductive technology and embryonic stem‐cell research vary greatly. Instead of imposing their steering capacity in a “top‐down” fashion, governments have taken pre‐existing self‐regulatory arrangements in the field into account and built up governance mechanisms in conjunction with private actors and pre‐existing modes of private governance. Our analysis demonstrates that the form and content of the initial self‐regulation explain why the self‐steering capacity of the medical profession was largely or at least partially preserved through hybrid governance systems in Britain and Germany, while in France the self‐regulation was entirely replaced by governmental intervention.     

Codes in context: How states,markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards

Transnational business regulation is increasingly implemented through private voluntary programs – such as certification regimes and codes of conduct – that diffuse global standards. However, little is known about the conditions under which companies adhere to these standards. We conduct one of the first large‐scale comparative studies to determine which international, domestic, civil society, and market institutions promote supply chain factories' adherence to the global labor standards embodied in codes of conduct imposed by multinational buyers. We find that suppliers are more likely to adhere when they are embedded in states that participate actively in the International Labour Organization treaty regime and that have stringent domestic labor law and high levels of press freedom. We further demonstrate that suppliers perform better when they serve buyers located in countries where consumers are wealthy and socially conscious. These findings suggest the importance of overlapping state, civil society, and market governance regimes to meaningful transnational regulation.     

Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.     

Out of tune or well tempered? How competition agencies direct the orchestrating state

This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a “logic of the market” to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social objectives. This logic of the market clashes with the ever‐increasing emphasis governments place on enabling firms to enter into such agreements. I analyze this tension through a case study of a pact of Dutch retailers to collectively introduce higher animal welfare standards for poultry. Using regulatory network analysis I trace the governance interactions between the governance triangle on the one hand (government, non‐governmental organizations, and firms), and the Dutch competition authority, Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) and the European Commission on the other hand. Attempts by the Dutch government to instruct the ACM to be more lenient toward private regulation were blocked twice by the European Commission. As a result, the Dutch government abandoned private regulation as the preferred mode and proposed a bottom‐up process that would generate public regulation as a way to avoid conflict with competition policy. I argue that paradoxically enough the intervention of these non‐majoritarian competition agencies against the “will” of the governance triangle has potentially increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration processes.     

Accountability‐by‐Proxy in Transnational Non‐State Governance

Transnational non‐state governance arrangements (NGAs) are increasingly common in areas such as labor standards and environmental sustainability, often presenting themselves as innovative means through which the lives of marginalized communities in developing countries can be improved. Yet in some cases, the policy interventions adopted by the managers of these NGAs appear not to be welcomed by their supposed beneficiaries. This article accounts for this predicament by examining the effects of different configurations of accountability within NGAs promoting labor rights. Most labor‐rights NGAs incorporate “proxy accountability” arrangements, in which consumers and activists hold decision makers accountable “on behalf” of the putative beneficiaries of the NGAs: workers and affected communities in poorer countries. The article shows how and why different combinations of proxy versus beneficiary accountability influence the choice of policy instruments used by NGAs, and applies the argument to three prominent non‐state initiatives in the domain of labor standards.     

Deliberative Democracy and International Labor Standards

Political theorists have argued that the methods of deliberative democracy can help to meet challenges such as legitimacy, effective governance, and citizen education in local and national contexts. These basic insights can also be applied to problems of international governance such as the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of labor standards. A participatory and deliberative democratic approach to labor standards would push the labor–standards debate into the global public sphere. It would seek to create broad discussion about labor standards that would include not only firms and regulators, but also consumers, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and others. This discussion could potentially improve (1) the quality of labor standards by incorporating considerations of economic context and firm capability, (2) their implementation by bringing to bear not only state sanctions but also political and market pressures, and (3) the education and understanding of citizens. Whereas the role of public agencies in state–centered approaches is to formulate and enforce labor standards, central authorities in the decentralized–deliberative approach would foster the transparency of workplace practices to spur an inclusive, broad, public conversation about labor standards. To the extent that a substantive consensus around acceptable behavior emerges from that conversation, public power should also enforce those minimum standards.     

Governing health and safety at lower tiers of the computer industry global value chain

Global brands remain under increasing pressure to ensure labor standards and codes of conduct are met by their suppliers. Little is known about how this is addressed by lower tier suppliers. We investigate whether, and how, occupational health and safety standards permeate down the computer industry value chain. We compare first and second tier suppliers' engagement with a private voluntary industry code, the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct, and the publicly regulated European Union Directive on the Restriction of Hazardous Substances. We find the industry code absent at the lower tier, yet second tier suppliers do implement the European Union Directive. This is achieved without support from public agencies or global value chain linkages. Our findings question the emphasis placed on chain governance in studies of labor compliance in global value chains, and suggest that alternative and complementary approaches may be required for effective labor compliance throughout the value chain.     

Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance

Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.     

Regulating the Internet infrastructure: A comparative appraisal of the legitimacy of ICANN,ITU, and the WSIS

How to generate legitimate forms of governance beyond the nation state is often considered a central question in contemporary world politics. To proceed in theory‐building, scholars need to systematically assign the theory‐driven assumptions on legitimate forms of governance beyond the nation state with the various, already observable, forms of global governance. This article aims to conduct a comparative appraisal of the legitimatory quality of different patterns of governance by applying a framework of indicators for their assessment. The indicators are selected from the scholarly debate within International Relations on the legitimacy of global governance arrangements and structured by a multidimensional concept of legitimacy (input, throughput, and output dimensions). This framework is then applied to international, transnational, and private forms of global governance in the field of Internet regulation in order to show how each of them tries to produce and maintain legitimacy, which strategies it applies, and in how it interacts with its stakeholders.     

Fragmented or cohesive transnational private regulation of sustainability standards? A comparative study

Literature on private regulation recognizes the proliferation of competing regulatory organizations and approaches in various industries. Studies analyzing why fragmentation arises so far focus on single‐case studies, the exploration of single variables, or variation in types of fragmentation. This article analyzes why in certain industries and for certain issues regulatory organizations proliferate, while in others a single regulatory organization emerges which covers the entire industry. Through a comparative case study of private regulation of sustainability standards in the forestry, clothing, IT‐electronics, and chemicals industries, we show how a combination of low industrial concentration, civil society involvement in governance, and stringent standards of a first‐moving regulator offer the strongest explanation for a fragmented private regulatory field, while high industrial concentration, business‐driven governance, and lenient standards of a first‐moving regulator lead to cohesive regulation.     

Democratization,International Knowledge Institutions,and Global Governance

The central problem of democracy has long been theorized as how to place appropriate constraints on the responsible exercise of power. Today, this problem is most acute in global governance. This article examines the rapid rise in the creation of international knowledge institutions, arguing that these institutions reflect a growing effort by nations and publics to assert democratic constraints on the on the global exercise of power through their ability to structure processes of reasoning and deliberation in global society. Specifically, the article argues for the need to attend carefully to processes of knowledge‐making in international institutions, including the roles of international institutions in setting standards for the exercise of reasoning, their contributions to the making of global kinds through their work in classifying and reclassifying the objects of international discourse, and through their roles in opening up and constraining participation in international deliberation. The article concludes that the construction and deployment of policy‐relevant knowledge are a significant source of power in their own right in global governance that need to be subject to their own democratic critique.     

Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologies

This article examines the rise of nanotechnology‐specific codes of conduct (nano‐codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano‐codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano‐codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano‐codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co‐regulation with government. It is likely that nano‐codes will become the “first cut” of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies.     

The effectiveness of NGO self‐regulation: theory and evidence from Africa

Non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in public service provision and policy making in sub‐Saharan Africa, stimulating demand for new forms of regulatory oversight. In response, a number of initiatives in NGO self‐regulation have emerged. Using cross‐national data on 20 African countries, the article shows that self‐regulation in Africa falls into three types: national‐level guilds, NGO‐led clubs and voluntary codes of conduct. Each displays significant weaknesses from a regulatory policy perspective. National guilds have a broad scope, but require high administrative oversight capacity on the part of NGOs. Voluntary clubs have stronger standards but typically have much weaker coverage. Voluntary codes are the most common form of self‐regulation, but have the weakest regulatory strength. This article argues that the weakness of current attempts to improve the accountability and regulatory environment of NGOs stems in part from a mismatch between the goals of regulation and the institutional incentives embedded in the structure of most self‐regulatory regimes. The article uses the logic of collective action to illustrate the nature of this mismatch and the tradeoffs between the potential breadth and strength of various forms of NGO self‐regulation using three detailed case studies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance gaps in eradicating forced labor: From global to domestic supply chains

A growing body of scholarship analyzes the emergence and resilience of forced labor in developing countries within global value chains. However, little is known about how forced labor arises within domestic supply chains concentrated within national borders, producing products for domestic consumption. We conduct one of the first studies of forced labor in domestic supply chains, through a cross‐industry comparison of the regulatory gaps surrounding forced labor in the United Kingdom. We find that understanding the dynamics of forced labor in domestic supply chains requires us to conceptually modify the global value chain framework to understand similarities and differences across these contexts. We conclude that addressing the governance gaps that surround forced labor will require scholars and policymakers to carefully refine their thinking about how we might design operative governance that effectively engages with local variation.     

Fragmented control: Governing contentious labor organizations in China

How does an authoritarian state govern contentious civil society and what are the effects on grassroots mobilization? This article theorizes the relationship between repression and mobilization by examining the case of informal labor organizations in South China that threaten social stability. Findings based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork inside these organizations suggest that the central state's mandate to maintain social stability is refracted through the interests and capabilities of local agencies. This results in “fragmented control”: divergent, even conflicting, forms of state governance over civil society. Local authorities work at cross‐purposes by simultaneously repressing, co‐opting, and neglecting underground organizing. Fragmented control generates political uncertainty on the part of activists and induces them to engage in “censored entrepreneurialism”—a set of tactical adaptations characterized by a mixture of self‐censorship and entrepreneurial experimentation.     

Governing Standards: The Rise of Standardization Processes in France and in the EU

The rise of standardization processes highlights two different paths toward a regulatory state. Within the EU, the New Approach serves as a model for co‐regulation, and European standards have become instruments of supranational governance. In France, standardization is much more part of a renegotiation of the state’s role and influence in a changing society. In both cases, standardization was undertaken with other motives; yet it evolved to answer the strains and constraints exerted upon regulatory processes in the two polities. As such, standards are a case for unintentionality in policy instruments.     

Liberalization as a Development Strategy: Network Governance in the Korean Mobile Telecom Market

This study analyzes Korea's often noted yet seldom studied spectacular rise to become one of the important global players in the mobile telecommunications industry. The Korean “leap frog” occurred in the context of liberalization under the worldwide liberal telecommunications regime. This article finds that network governance—the emphasis on the use of partnerships and network transactions with global firms as well as the local private sector—is the reason for Korea's success. It examines the origins of and driving forces acting upon the liberalization policy, and discusses how the state and telecom firms cooperated to develop the mobile market. It also assesses the new governance that is taking place in Korea's telecom market by focusing on the changing roles of the state in three major aspects: provision, regulation, and foreign entry barriers into the mobile market. While the Korean government promoted a market‐conforming telecom market and private ownership, this article argues, it formulated rather different governance principles from the U.S. model of liberal governance.     

Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm‐Level Diffusion of Labor Standards

Under what conditions does the global economy serve as a means for the diffusion of labor standards and practices? We anticipate variation among internationally engaged firms in their propensity to improve labor standards. Upgrading is most likely when a firm's products exhibit significant cross‐market differences in markups, making accessing high‐standards overseas markets particularly profitable. Additionally, upgrading is more likely when lead firms attach a high salience to labor standards. Therefore, while participation in global production induces “trading up” behaviors among firms overall, the effect strength varies across industries. We test our expectations via a survey experiment, which queries foreign firms operating in Vietnam about their willingness to invest in labor‐related upgrading. We find strong evidence for the effect of markups on upgrading choices and suggestive evidence for the saliency mechanism.     

American standards: definition and differentiation through nonprofit regulation

Nongovernmental organizations are deeply enmeshed in global governance, as promoters and, increasingly, subjects of regulation. Focusing on the proliferation of self-regulatory initiatives, this article asks: Why do NGOs adopt governance initiatives? Do their subsequent regulatory experiences match their expectations? It investigates these questions through the analysis of InterAction, the American international NGO alliance, and its PVO Standards. Based on interviews with NGO leaders, it emphasizes collective meaning over material benefit: American NGOs constitute themselves as American NGOs through standards, with which they underscore their professionalism and market orientation. These gains do not accrue equally, however, with large, central organizations perceived to benefit most from regulation.     

ANALYZING SELF‐ORGANIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES: ARE THERE INSIGHTS FOR DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS?

In spite of the great enthusiasm and arguments supporting decentralization in Africa, its performance has frequently fallen well below expectations. However, a number of self‐initiated, local governance efforts have been quite successful. The article finds that all governance initiatives face a number of collective action problems that they must overcome to succeed. These include issues of collective choice, free riding, principal–agency, and constitutional design. The article explores two cases of locally initiated self‐governance initiatives where smaller population size, the ability to focus on only a few services, and the ability flexibly to redesign their institutions were important in their success in overcoming these governance challenges. In one case, challenge by and negotiation with formal governance institutions furthered their success. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.