Modes of UK Executive–Legislative Relations Revisited

Anthony King's 1976 article ‘Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany’ is a classic in legislative studies. It argued that it is simplistic to analyse relations between ‘the executive’ and ‘the legislature’ in parliamentary systems, because parliaments are complex organisations comprised of competing actors. Instead, we must consider the various ‘modes’ through which these actors can interact to challenge the executive. As King pointed out, the classic view of the British Parliament was of a dominant ‘opposition mode’ and yet, in fact, the most important relationship was the ‘intraparty mode’: between the government and its own backbenchers. Other options, such as the ‘non‐party mode’ or ‘cross‐party mode’ were considered weak in Britain. This article revisits King's modes in the light of changes at Westminster during the intervening forty years. Developments such as the establishment of the select committee system and a more confident and party‐balanced House of Lords require significant changes to his conclusions. But his central insights, encouraging readers to focus on the multiple relationships inside legislatures, including those within political parties, remain fundamentally important.     

Government survival in semi‐presidential regimes

As semi‐presidentialism has become increasingly common in European democracies, so have the debates about the consequences of several of its political and institutional features. In particular, in those regimes, cohabitation between presidents and cabinets of different parties and cabinet dismissal powers on the part of presidents are thought to be a source of inter‐branch conflict and government instability. However, so far, most empirical work on government survival has failed to confirm any of these expectations. This article addresses this disjuncture between theory and empirical results by making a twofold contribution. First, it takes into account the internal diversity within semi‐presidentialism, modeling the implications for government survival of different configurations between presidential powers’ of cabinet dismissal, parliament dissolution and cohabitation in European semi‐presidential systems. Second, it reconsiders traditional government survival using the competing risks framework by adding a distinction between two different types of non‐electoral replacement: those where replacements imply a change in the party of the prime minister and those where they do not. Once such an approach is adopted, that presidential powers of parliamentary dissolution and cabinet dismissal indeed emerge as highly relevant for explaining government survival in these regimes.     

The search for the centre: Pivot parties in West European party systems

The central question is whether or not in multiparty systems the so‐called parties of the ‘centre’ can be defined and observed in isolation. We start from the assumption that party‐life in the centre‐space of a political system has distinctive features. Centre parties must therefore be conceptualised and analysed as phenomena sui generis and do not belong to either the left‐wing or the right‐wing of a party system. The second assumption is that every party in a parliamentary democracy is a vote seeking and policy guided actor. This means that a centre party depends on its capacity to compete with both ‘wings’ of a party system whilst occupying the centre‐space. It is then capable of becoming the ‘pivot’ of the system: its ‘centrality’ and ‘dominance’ represent ideological distinctiveness and electoral/legislative weight. The cross‐national analysis demonstrates that only a few parties are genuine pivot parties. The paper concludes with a discussion about the issue whether or not the existence of a pivot party is a blessing in disguise for the working of a democracy.     

The council political system: Its concept,historical rooting,and its distinguish from other parliamentary systems

The council's political system (CPS) is based on a basic idea that the legislative authority dominates the executive authority as the sole representative of the people, it authorizes the executive authority to carry out executive activities on its behalf with the latter remaining subordinate to the former and operating under its supervision and direction. CPS is considered one of the few systems of Parliament in application compared to other parliamentary systems and was often used by countries in times of crises experienced by them in an attempt to overcome those crises, given that this system limits the power of actual decision‐making to the legislative authority. CPS can be distinguished from other parliamentary political systems both presidential and parliamentary through several things, the most prominent of which is based on the idea of the relationship between its powers being included in favor of the legislative authority, and not on the basis of cooperation as is the case in the parliamentary system, or on the basis of complete separation as it is the situation in the presidential system. The results indicated that the success of the implementation of the council system depends on the nature of the ruling system that will be adopted and the philosophy that is based on it, in addition to the necessity of a high degree of political awareness. Through these results, we recommend the application of the CPS in light of the outbreak of the COVID‐19 and the subsequent political and societal changes.     

Notes on contributors

International comparisons of new radical right‐wing parties usually focus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organisations and leadership. This article uses a different angle by focusing on public policy impact and the role these parties play in the parliamentary and executive arenas. The research is driven by the hypothesis that under the conditions of stable democracy, holding office produces a net result in a ‘taming effect’ on radical right‐wing actors rather than a sharp ‘right turn’. Evidence f rom four countries (Germany, France, Italy and Austria) shows that parliamentary presence alone does not result in policy effects. When the radical right holds executive office, a ‘right turn’ occurs primarily in cultural policies. Overall, real effects of radical right‐wing politics occur largely as a result of the interaction between the radical right and established actors ‐regardless of the radical right's assuming power.     

Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction

Abstract. The role of the president is presumed to vary amongst presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. However, there are a variety of subtypes within semi-presidential systems. Debate often hinges on the prime minister and government, and to whom they are more accountable. However, the accountability of prime ministers and governments to presidents can be rather 'fuzzy'. This article looks through the prism of the president rather than that of the government. After examining definitions of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, several dispositional categories of political regimes will be established. Then presidential power will be assessed through a series of dichotomous measures, and for all electoral democracies with a president. Finally, the character of each category will be assessed. The concept of 'semi-presidentialism' is rejected in favour of more meaningful labels: presidential systems, parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective and parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents.     

Centre parties and anti‐system oppositions in polarised systems

This article seeks to show the connection between the ‘positive’ integration of anti‐system oppositions and governmental coalitional strategies in four European polarised democracies (the French Fourth Republic, the Weimar Republic, Finland and Italy). It tests the possibility of a stabilisation of some polarised systems (Finland and Italy) through the extension of co‐operation between anti‐system oppositions and centre parties in government. The aim of this research is therefore to locate some of the factors which can halt the ‘enfeeblement of the centre’ in polarised systems, namely through the ‘conversion’ of at least part of the anti‐system oppositions into loyal or semi‐loyal ones, and the extension of the centre area of the party system.     

The presidential party and the fifth republic

Until 1986 the prevailing interpretation of the French Fifth Republic was one of encroaching presidential domination; notwithstanding some welcome revisionism occasioned by ‘cohabitation’, presidentialism continues to permeate analysis of contemporary French politics. This article attempts a comparative assessment of the presidential party as it has functioned under the first four presidents of the French Fifth Republic: de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand. It is contended that each presidential party has shared certain attributes, resulting from systemic influences in France's semi‐presidential system; while retaining distinct characteristics derived from its identity as a particular type of party, and from the experience of a varying political context. The opportunities and constraints faced by successful presidential parties outweigh in importance their dissimilarites, inherited from their experience of different models of party organisation and ideology. No presidential party that has fallen from grace has managed to survive unscathed, nor to recover its position of former influence.     

Dodging the bullet: How crises trigger technocrat‐led governments

Governments led by nonpartisan, ‘technocratic’ prime ministers are a rare phenomenon in parliamentary democracies, but have become more frequent since the late 1980s. This article focuses on the factors that lead to the formation of such cabinets. It posits that parliamentary parties with the chance to win the prime ministerial post will only relinquish it during political and economic crises that drastically increase the electoral costs of ruling and limit policy returns from governing. Statistical analyses of 469 government formations in 29 European democracies between 1977 and 2013 suggest that political scandals and economic recessions are major drivers of the occurrence of technocratic prime ministers. Meanwhile, neither presidential powers nor party system fragmentation and polarisation have any independent effect. The findings suggest that parties strategically choose technocrat‐led governments to shift blame and re‐establish their credibility and that of their policies in the face of crises that de‐legitimise their rule.     

National Character and Governance Styles: A Comparison between Parliamentary and Presidential Styles of Government with Reference to Walter Bagehot (1826–1877)

Walter Bagehot's nineteenth century comparison between the American presidential system and the English parliamentary system gives good insight into how political regimes may be the result of the specific character of their nations. Both nations had fought to create a government based on the main features of their national temperaments: egalitarianism on the one hand and deference on the other. This insight leads in turn to what Bagehot believed were two distinct definitions of liberty and democracy. His original sociopolitical theory enables us to consider the steps developing countries should take in order to evolve peacefully.     

Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered

Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political‐institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context‐specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.     

India: Searching for a Consensus by Amending the Constitution?

Two major themes have dominated the debate over India's constitutional destiny since the 1980s: parliamentary versus presidential government and federalization of its predominantly parliamentary system. India will do well to continue with its parliamentary form of government. Besides familiarity with it through British colonial experience and practice for nearly half a century, India's social diversity and fragile democracy are better served by a “collective” parliamentary/cabinet system than a “singular” presidential one. The latter may prematurely centralize the system and promote executive aggrandizement and adventurism. But India's continental diversity and complexity cannot be adequately represented solely along the parliamentary axis; they require the additional — and more vigorous — federal axis for democratic accommodation and national integration. The impact on India's parliamentary/federal system of the changing nature of the party system and premiership styles is also analyzed. Six phases of party system evolution are identified: (1) predominant party system-I (1952–1969); (2) multi-party system-I (1969–1971); (3) predominant party system-II (1971–1977); (4) two-party system (1977–1984); (5) (a stillborn) predominant party system-Ill (1984–1989); and (6) multi-party system-II (1989–to date). Three styles of prime ministerial leadership are delineated: (1) pluralist, (2) patrimonial, and (3) federal. Federal forces and features of the political system were generally accentuated when the party system was not a one-party dominant one and the prime ministerial leadership was not a patrimonial one. Some viable constitutional amendments designed to promote federalization are considered. The two particularly promising avenues of federalization that combine “responsible federalism” with “responsible parliamentary government” are those that establish a series of autonomous federal instrumentalities recommended by the Sarkaria Commission and create a President-in-Council interlocked with the Inter-Governmental Council that takes away the power of proclaiming president's rule in a state from the federal Home Ministry.     

Refusing to be Sidelined: The Engagement of the Finnish Eduskunta in Foreign Affairs

It is often argued that foreign and security policy is dominated by the executive, with parliaments wielding marginal influence. However, as legislative‐executive relations in the realm of foreign and security policy have attracted remarkably little scholarly attention, there is a demand for subjecting the alleged executive drift in foreign affairs to careful empirical scrutiny. There is also a need to examine whether and how parliamentary politics in foreign affairs differs from domestic or European matters, both regarding control mechanisms and party competition. The notions of ‘executive dominance’ and ‘politics stopping at the water's edge’ certainly point in the direction of less active control and casting aside public partisan differences in favour of providing domestic support for the government. A case study of the Finnish Eduskunta forces us to reconsider such arguments. This article examines the multiple instruments members of parliament (MPs) have for becoming involved in foreign affairs, from participating in the formulation of the national ‘grand strategy’ document to ministerial hearings in the committees. It also provides strong evidence of the Europeanization of national foreign policies, with matters relating to the foreign policy and external relations of the European Union (EU) in a central role in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Parliamentary culture is consensual, especially in security policy, but there is nonetheless greater room and willingness for party‐political contestation in foreign affairs.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

Costs of taxation and the size of government

Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories.     

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.     

Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies

Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? This paper attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems influence macroeconomic performance. We find that presidential regimes consistently are associated with less favorable outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, higher and more volatile inflation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is sizable. For example, annual output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inflation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher under presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The difference in distributional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 12 to 24% worse under presidential systems.     

Power and Democracy in Norway: The Transformation of Norwegian Politics1

The Norwegian Power and Democracy Project concluded that the parliamentary chain of government is weakened in every link; parties and election are less mobilizing; minority governments imply that the connection between election results and policy formation is broken; and elected assemblies have been suffering a notable loss of domain. Popular participation has moved from long‐term organisations and political parties to short‐term action groups and associations with immediate concerns. The judicialisation of politics has strengthen the legal system and weakened the autonomy of local democracy, while the expansion of market forces further affects the span of parliamentary rule. The mass media has become politically more independent, while adapting more closely to economic forces and the quest for return of investment. There has, accordingly, been centralisation of economic power through mergers and acquisitions following the globalisation of the Norwegian economy. The so‐called ‘Scandinavian’ (or ‘Nordic’) model is increasingly strained, while corporatism is partly weakened and partly restructured. After the end of the Cold War, there has also been a consistent strategy in foreign policy for the branding of Norway as a champion for peace and human rights. There is a cluster of corporate bureaucratic agencies around the high‐profile peace mediation and humanitarian engagement.     

Parliament without Government: The Belgian Parliament and the Government Formation Processes of 2007–2011

Parliamentary systems are characterised by strong links between the executive and the legislature. While the importance of executive–legislative relationships is well-known, the extent to which executive dominance affects parliamentary behaviour is hard to grasp. This study uses the recent institutional crises in Belgium to study parliamentary behaviour in the absence of a government with full powers. Cabinet formation in Belgium has proved to be protracted in recent years, leading to long periods of government formation in both 2007–2008 and 2010–2011. Such circumstances provide a unique comparison between normal situations of parliament in the presence of government, and exceptional situations of prolonged periods of caretaker government. In particular the article looks at three aspects of parliamentary behaviour that are usually linked to executive–legislative relations: legislative initiatives, voting behaviour and party unity. The general hypothesis is that prolonged periods of government formation gave parliamentarians more opportunities to influence the legislative process and more (ideological) freedom. The results show a nuanced picture: parliament became more pro-active, the salience of the government–opposition divide declined, while party unity remained as strong as ever. It is concluded that government formation processes did not lead to drastic changes in the legislative–executive relationship, but rather permitted a modest correction to the extremely weak position of parliament.     

Throwing the rascals out? Problems of accountability in two‐party systems

This article critically examines the concept of ‘accountability’ as it is understood in two‐party systems and majoritarian democracy – namely the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters’ capacity to ‘throw the rascals out’ is one of the main normative appeals of two‐partism and the single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this article uses a spatial model to show that in at least two types of situation voters are left in a bind when confronted with a mandate‐breaking governing party: (1) when both major parties undertake unexpected non‐centrist shifts in opposing directions after an election, leaving centrist voters with an unappealing choice; and (2) when a governing party that had won an election on a non‐centrist platform undertakes a post‐election shift to the centre, leaving its more radical supporters dissatisfied. In each case, voters have four imperfect options: punish the governing party by throwing the rascals out, but in doing so vote for a party that is ideologically more distant; abstain, and withdraw from the democratic process; vote for a minor party that has no hope of influencing government formation, but which might detach enough votes to allow the ideologically more distant major opposition party to win; and forgive the governing party its mandate‐breaking. All of these options represent accountability failures. The problems are illustrated with two case studies from two‐party systems: the United Kingdom in the mid‐1980s and New Zealand in the period 1984–1993. In both instances, many voters found it difficult to ‘throw the rascals out’ without harming their own interests in the process. The article concludes that accountability may sometimes be better achieved if voters can force a party to share power in coalition with another party in order to ‘keep it honest’ instead of removing it from government completely, as can happen in multi‐party systems based on proportional representation. Thus, although two‐partism based on plurality voting is normally regarded as superior to multi‐partism and proportional representation on the criterion of accountability, in some instances, the reverse can be true. The article therefore undermines a core normative argument advanced by supporters of majoritarian democracy and SMP.