A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003

The Czech Republic's 13–14 June 2003 referendum on accession to the European Union was the seventh of nine held in candidate states due to join the EU on 1 May 2004. Despite the presence of two strong Eurosceptic parties and the perceived Euroscepticism of Czech public opinion, the pro-accession camp scored a convincing victory. This account analyses the historical, political and institutional context of the referendum and the campaign. It concludes that despite high elite contention over the EU and the overwhelming resources advantage of the ‘Yes’ camp, Czech voters were minimally influenced by the campaign. Rather, they took their cue from longstanding positive linkages of ‘Europe’ with democracy, market reform and Czech identity.     

Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015

There are many myths about referendums. The most common one is that voters are inherently sceptical and tend to vote no when given the opportunity. This article analyses some of the commonly held ‘truths’ about referendums on EU matters. Based on a statistical analysis of all forty‐three EU‐related referendums since 1972, it shows that governments tend to lose referendums if they have been in office for a long time, that emotive words on the ballot paper are correlated with a high yes vote and that a high turnout is correlated with a vote against European integration, but campaign spending is inconsequential. Based solely on statistical evidence from the previous forty‐three referendums, the opponents of EU membership will win the Brexit referendum.     

UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum

This article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the ‘Leave’ campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters.     

Direct democracy and regional integration: Citizens' perceptions of treaty implications and the Irish reversal on Lisbon

Analyses of voting in European Union referendums typically distinguish between ‘second‐order’ effects and the impact of substantive ‘issues’. In order to explain change in referendum outcome, two types of substantive issues are distinguished in this article. Focusing on Irish voting in the Lisbon Treaty referendums and using data from post‐referendum surveys, it is found that perceptions of treaty implications outperform underlying attitudes to EU integration in predicting vote choice at both referendums, and perceptions of treaty implications are strong predictors of vote change between the referendums. The findings have broadly positive implications for normative assessments of the usefulness of direct democracy as a tool for legitimising regional integration advance.     

Culture,Institutions and Campaign Effects: Explaining the Outcome of Malta's EU Accession Referendum

This survey examines the background to and the campaign preceding Malta's EU accession referendum. The result of the referendum, which was held on 8 March 2003, and which was the first of the EU accession referendums of 2003, was a 53.65% vote in support of membership, on a turnout of close to 91%. Explaining both the relatively low support for EU accession and the high turnout on referendum day involves weighing up the relative impact of distinctive features of Malta's political culture and institutional framework against more immediate campaign effects. While the conclusion is that the high turnout in the Maltese EU accession referendum can be traced to Malta's political culture, the relatively low but positive vote in favour of membership can only be fully understood by focusing on a range of factors, including campaign-related factors, such as the credibility of the arguments presented by the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps and the balance of resources available. The most important factor explaining the result of the Maltese referendum are, however, the cues provided by the political parties prior to and over the course of the referendum campaign.     

History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum

This analysis explains why Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU and how the 50% turnout requirement was achieved fairly easily. It argues that most Poles appeared to accept the historical significance of the referendum and de-coupled the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in an extremely unpopular government. This occurred because most key political and social actors, including the opposition parties, called for a Yes vote, while, at the same time, a vigorous campaign by pro-EU civic organisations presented a ‘non-political’ face to the campaign. Although the No camp made tactical errors and had difficulties staying focused on its main arguments, lack of both access to the public media and a convincing or attractive alternative made it extremely difficult for them to mount an effective campaign. At the same time, the stability of the opinion polls in the years leading up to the referendum suggested that most Poles had already made their minds up about the issue well in advance. In spite of the low levels of trust in political parties, partisan cues appeared to be a better predictor of referendum voting behaviour than socio-economic and demographic factors.     

Coping with a two-dimensional political space: Party mobilisation in referendums on European integration

European Union referendums invite national electorates to vote on transnational cooperation and regional integration, thereby creating tension between transnational ballot issues and domestic electoral mobilisation. Because of the tension, domestic political parties are forced to confront a two-dimensional political space in EU referendums. In the referendum-generated political space, unless integration issues are more salient than domestic concerns, intra-divided and inter-converged mainstream parties tend strategically to abstain from the campaigns. Yet, explicit inter-party collusion may allow the pro-integration mainstream to form a party cartel in EU referendums. Suggestive evidence is drawn from a case study of the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. Based on a party-candidate survey, Irish parties are mapped onto a latent two-dimensional political space. The findings shed new light on the initial abstention of Irish mainstream parties in the first Nice campaign and their subsequent mobilisation in the second referendum.     

Legitimacy through referendum? The nearly successful domino‐strategy of the Eu‐referendums in Austria,Finland, Sweden and Norway

The end of the Cold War made it possible for some neutral countries to join the European Union. However although the European integration promotes economic co‐operation it also reveals problems concerning national and regional identity. In order to legitimise EU‐membership, the new potential member states Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway conducted referendums on whether or not they should join EU. These referendums, although different in some national aspects, are an example of an international synchronisation of the political establishments. This synchronisation is discussed in light of a ‘Domino‐Strategy’ of the referendums. Furthermore, the article describes some aspects of the referendum campaigns by stressing the importance of geographical differences, organisational standpoints, public opinion and discourse which shows astonishing similarities but also decisive differences.     

Opinion change and voting behaviour in referendums

Abstract. Voters in a referendum obtain information and derive voting cues from a variety of sources. Some of these, such as political parties or ideological orientations, are similar to those also found to be influential in elections. Others can be quite different. In some referendums, the issue may be entirely new and unfamiliar to many voters, initiating a 'learning' or 'cue–taking' process specific to the campaign itself. In referendum campaigns, parties may be internally divided and sometimes send conflicting signals to their electorates. As a result, voting behaviour in referendums often exhibits greater volatility than is found in elections. In the ten papers included in this Special Issue of EJPR , we focus on the process of opinion formation and change which occurred in a number of European, North American and Australia/New Zealand referendums held under a variety of different institutional and political conditions. In this essay, I argue that there are three distinctive patterns of opinion formation and reversal that tend to occur in referendum campaigns, each of which has significant consequences both for voting choice and for referendum outcomes.     

EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus

In May 2003, Slovakia produced the highest percentage of ‘yes’ votes ever in an EU accession referendum, although turnout was only just above the 50 per cent necessary for it to be valid. After deep political polarisation in the 1990s, a consensus had been formed on the overriding need for EU membership, which was supported by all parliamentary political parties. It was the first Slovak referendum ever where not only the answer to the question, but also the propriety of holding the referendum, were not the subject of bitter political argument. However, despite impressive civic voter participation campaigns in the two previous national elections, a low level of contestation made it hard to mobilise all pro-EU voters yet again for the referendum. Lack of leadership, and the hope that turnout would drop below 50 per cent, also encouraged the Eurosceptic minority to abstain.     

The Slovenian EU Accession Referendum: A Cat-and-Mouse Game

This account reviews the background to, the campaign and the result of the Slovenian EU accession referendum. The authors ascertain that the ‘yes’ campaign was outstandingly well organised and synchronised, in stark contrast to the ‘no’ campaign, which was poorly organised and came across as representative of a narrow set of interests. Irrespective of this contrast, the large victory (almost 90 per cent) of the ‘yes’ camp was unexpected (as well as the relatively low turnout of 60.4 per cent). The two most important reasons for such a high level of support for the EU in the accession referendum can be traced back to the broad consensus among the political and social elite and the reorientation of the most well-known anti-EU actors to the NATO accession referendum which was held simultaneously. For this reason, account is taken of the Slovenian NATO accession referendum, but only to the extent that it influenced the campaign and result of the EU referendum.     

Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum

As Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.     

Buying into Myths: Free Movement of People and Immigration

The way in which free movement of people has become the central issue of the British government's renegotiation and referendum campaign on the UK's relationship with the European Union (EU) risks obfuscating at least three central issues: why immigrants are coming to the UK; what impact EU migrants are having on the UK; and what can be done to effectively regulate such inflows. It is, however, not just the eurosceptics and the British government, but also ‘in campaigners’ and other EU member states, who risk perpetuating a number of widely held misconceptions about free movement and immigration for political reasons. Buying into such myths risks undermining attempts to have a more honest and more evidence‐based debate about immigration and migrant integration.     

Taking Cues on Europe? Voter competence and party endorsements in referendums on European integration

Abstract.  One of the criticisms often levelled against direct democracy is that citizens lack sufficient knowledge to vote directly on policy issues. The 'No' votes in the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty have highlighted the importance of examining voter competence in referendums. This article proposes a theoretical framework for evaluating competence in EU referendums. It suggests that competent voting in EU referendums is based on issue-specific preferences and requires political information. Since most voters have little detailed knowledge of European integration, they rely on heuristics and cues when deciding how to vote. The important question is how much and which type of information voters require to make competent choices. This article examines whether and under what conditions the use of party endorsements as information cues can enhance competent voting in EU referendums. These theoretical questions are examined in an analysis of the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership.     

Reading between the lines: party cues and SNP support for Scottish independence and Brexit

Scotland’s future within the European Union (EU) played a prominent role in the 2014 independence referendum. The story goes that latent supporters of independence voted to stay within the UK to maintain EU access. Defeated, Scottish leaders declared the referendum a once-in-a-life-time event only repeated if conditions substantially changed. With the UK now facing a chaotic exit from the EU, proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that a second referendum may occur after Brexit negotiations are completed. Faced with a consensus among Scottish party leaders in supporting EU membership, those hoping for a second independence referendum, we argue, looked to alternate sources of information that saw Brexit as an opportunity to create the conditions that would spur a second referendum. Using panel data from the British Election Study, we examine whether Scottish voters voted tactically to leave the EU. We argue that Scottish National Party voters were likely to interpret statements on the conditions for a second independence referendum as an implicit signal to vote “Leave.” The results have important implications for the role of referendums in representative democracy, strategic voting, and the importance of intra-party division on individual vote choices.     

The Eastern European referendum campaigns on the accession to the European Union–a critical analysis

• This article analyses the communication campaigns organized to increase support for European Union (EU) membership, during referendums held between March and September 2003 in Central Europe. The focus is on the official campaigns, organized and sponsored by the Hungarian, Polish and Estonian governments. The first part of the paper reviews the special characteristics of referendums and information campaigns, followed by the challenges communication planners faced, during planning and implementing the campaigns. The common features and themes of the national campaigns, as well as the differences, are identified and analysed. The article concludes with some important lessons and recommendations to be used by future referendum campaign planners and implementers.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning from the Danish case: A comment on Palle Svensson's critique of the Franklin thesis

Abstract. Palle Svensson in this issue of EJPR has objected to the characterisation of Danish voters made by Franklin and others who, in various publications, expounded the thesis that on issues of low salience, referendum votes tend to follow party lines. Svensson finds evidence that the Maastricht Treaty was not an issue of low salience to Danish voters in the ratification referendums conducted there, and gives other details of the evolution of public opinion regarding Europe that clarify the circumstances in which our thesis should apply. In the light of his arguments, this Comment presents a more nuanced version of the thesis that learns from the Danish case, and should be of greater utility than our earlier version in helping to interpret the role of government standing in referendum outcomes.     

The quality of referendum debate: The UK's electoral system referendum in the print media

This paper analyses the quality of debate surrounding the UK's 2011 electoral reform referendum as represented in the print media. It first considers how debate quality in the context of a referendum campaign may best be conceptualized. It then uses content analysis of media coverage to investigate three aspects of that debate: its quantity; the balance between Yes and No arguments; and the quality of reason-giving. It finds that the quantity of debate was comparable to other recent electoral reform referendums. Coverage was predominantly, but not overwhelmingly, hostile to change. The different indicators of the quality of reason-giving present a mixed picture. The paper concludes by considering how the analysis could be extended through further comparison with other cases.     

Denmark's referendum on the euro: The mouse that roared ... again

Just as they had almost a decade earlier, Danish voters on 28 September 2000 went to the polls and sent Shockwaves through the European Union by rejecting a government‐sponsored referendum on joining the EU's single currency, the ‘euro’. Danes said ‘Nej’ to the embattled currency, casting new doubt on their country's commitment to the European project and emboldening eurosceptics throughout the continent and across the English Channel. The decision to remain outside the eurozone is notable for the humiliation it caused Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his government, as well as for the impetus is gives to a two‐tier EU. The ‘yes ‘ camp's failure to keep the campaign based on economic rather than political logic, the euro's precipitous decline, and the EU's sanctions against Austria contributed to the referendum's dramatic outcome.     

Rebels without a Cause? The Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty

The Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty follows a pattern of class-voting also seen in the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution. However, the poll differed in other respects. Polling in the wake of the vote suggested that the main reason given for voting no was a lack of knowledge about the treaty (22 per cent of no voters holding that view). A further 40 per cent of the voters voted no because they claimed not to understand the Treaty. This is in contrast to referendums in 2005 in Spain and the Netherlands where, respectively 70 and 51 per cent, of those with a self confessed 'very limited ' knowledge of the Constitution voted yes.