Long-term associative issue ownership change: a panel study in Belgium

Issue ownership has gained a prominent position as one of the key theories to understand how voter’s issue perceptions affect their electoral behavior. Yet, whereas the original theory assumed that party reputations were relatively stable, various studies have shown that issue ownership perceptions fluctuate over time. Despite the growing evidence that ownership perceptions are dynamic, we know surprisingly little about the determinants of change, especially at the individual level. This paper develops an individual-level framework to understand how issue ownership perceptions change over time, arguing that mediated party communication is a key driver of change. It also incorporates individual features of voters, most notably their political predispositions – as determinants of changing issue ownership perceptions. We test our model on unique longitudinal panel data from Belgium, spanning a five-year period. The results suggest that party communications, government participation, party size and voter’s party preferences determine changes in ownership perceptions.     

How pre‐ and postrecruitment factors shape role perceptions of European Commission officials

Individuals' role perceptions are central guides to their behavior and choices as members of an organization. Understanding organizational dynamics thus requires knowledge about the determinants of such role perceptions, as well as whether—and when—organizations can influence them. This article brings forward a theoretical framework allowing for both prerecruitment (extraorganizational) and post‐recruitment (intraorganizational) determinants of individuals' role perceptions, and examines its empirical implications using a large‐N data set of temporary officials in the European Commission. We find that intergovernmental and epistemic role perceptions are strongly linked to pre‐recruitment factors (such as educational and professional background), whereas postrecruitment factors (such as length of affiliation and embeddedness within the Commission) are the main driving force behind supranational and departmental role perceptions. This heterogeneity in the importance of pre‐ and postrecruitment factors for distinct role perceptions has important consequences for conceptualizing organizational change.     

Consistency and change in American perceptions of China

The cold war dominated American perceptions of the People's Republic of China during the 1950s and 1960s, and opinions of China were correspondingly negative. Improved Sino-American relations, accompanied by domestic reforms in China, led to a gradual improvement in American attitudes toward China during the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1980s, Americans held positive perceptions of China and its relations with the United States, but continued to view the People's Republic as communist and undemocratic. This sort of inconsistency is characteristic of periods of cognitive transition: some established perceptions are slower to change than others, and this results in structural imbalance. The Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 interrupted this transitional process and sent perceptions of China shooting back toward balanced, cold war stereotypes. The massacre set the Chinese government in a clear symbolic struggle against freedom and democracy. This rekindled latent cold war images of China and elicited disapproving rhetoric from American leaders. The result was a quick reversion to negative perceptions of China, structured by a lingering cold war schema. These processes are demonstrated through the presentation of a study that explores the cognitive structure of perceptions of China both before and after the massacre.     

Determinants of State Economic Perceptions

Despite a greatly increased emphasis on state economic development, citizens' perceptions of state economic conditions have been infrequently studied, leaving a serious question as to how well citizens distinguish between national and state economic performance. We investigate the sources of state economic perceptions using data from 1990 Voter Research and Surveys exit polls of 23 states along with measures of state economic conditions. We find strong support for the proposition that perceptions of state and national economies are distinct phenomena. We also find that state economic perceptions are well grounded in economic reality—that is, in the conditions of the state economy. Finally, we show that state economic perceptions are based on a variety of indicators, including measures that have not heretofore been included in models of economic voting.     

How can leaders’ perceptions guide policy analysis in an era of governance?

One of the challenges facing policy analysts is how to improve policy processes in the era of governance. The present article examines how “perceptions analysis,” i.e. the identification of perceptions of different leaders in a specific policy field, may contribute to policy analysis. The article focuses on two questions: What explains leaders’ support for different policy options? Can the examination of leaders’ perceptions help in identifying potential bases for collaboration? Based on mixed methodologies, the study includes interviews with 103 people who influence the policy process and policy discourse in Israel. The findings reveal the importance of the perceptions of causes in explaining leaders’ policy preferences and suggest that identifying their perceptions may help analysts distinguish bases for promoting collaboration and trust among different actors in the policy process, as well as enhancing the legitimacy of the policy process as a whole.     

Perceptions of Immigrant Threat,American Identity,and Vote Choice in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Among the central tenets of social identity theory are the arguments that individuals’ attitudes and behavior are shaped by (1) perceptions of threat by out-groups toward individuals’ in-group(s) and (2) the strength of individuals’ identification with the in-group perceived to be under threat. In this paper we explore how American identity and Americans’ perceptions of immigrant threat work together to shape their vote choices in the 2016 presidential election. With the presidential campaign of Donald Trump characterized by strong rhetoric that emphasized immigrant threat and American identity themes, we suggest that the effects of immigrant threat perceptions are amplified by individuals’ American identity, with those who have a strong American identity more likely to translate immigrant threat perceptions into support for Trump than those with weaker levels of American identity. Moreover, we consider whether the effects of American identity on vote choice are activated and moderated by individuals’ perceptions of immigrant threat. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Study, we find that the effects of immigrant threat perceptions and American identity on vote choice are magnified by each other: the effects of immigrant threat perceptions are enhanced among individuals with a strong American identity, and the effects of American identity are activated and magnified by perceptions of immigrant threat.

     

Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment? An Analysis of Mass‐Elite Linkages on European Integration

Recent studies analyze how citizens update their perceptions of parties’ left‐right positions in response to new political information. We extend this research to consider the issue of European integration, and we report theoretical and empirical analyses that citizens do not update their perceptions of parties’ positions in response to election manifestos, but that citizens’ perceptions of parties’ positions do track political experts’ perceptions of these positions, and, moreover, that it is party supporters who disproportionately perceive their preferred party's policy shifts. Given that experts plausibly consider a wide range of information, these findings imply that citizens weigh the wider informational environment when assessing parties’ positions. We also present evidence that citizens’ perceptions of party position shifts matter, in that they drive partisan sorting in the mass public.     

The Current Status and Future Direction of Nanotechnology Regulations: A View from Nano‐scientists

This article presents an up‐to‐date view of leading U.S. nanoscientists' perceptions about the regulation of nanotechnology. Our analysis draws from the results of a 2011 mail survey with 444 of the most prolific nanoscientists in the United States to explore their perceptions about existing nanotech policies, the development of new nanotech policies, and mandatory policies about the implementation of safe lab practices for federally funded nanoresearch. In addition to exploring the scientists' perceptions about these pressing policy issues, we also test relationships between their perceptions about regulation and control variables such as gender, disciplinary affiliation, and political ideology. Last, the results of the 2011 data collection are compared with a similar mail survey that was conducted in 2007 with leading U.S. nanoscientists to explore any changes over the four‐year time period in scientists' perceptions about nanotechnology policy making, and governmental involvement in nanotechnology research.     

Left-right perceptions,partisan preferences,electoral participation,and partisan choice in France

An analysis based on survey data shows that electoral participation at the second ballot in France can be accounted for by partisan preferences but not by left-right perceptions of party locations. This finding runs counter to the work of Rosenthal and Sen (1973), who validated a spatial model of participation at the second ballot employing left-right perceptions and partisan preferences interchangeably. Because they use aggregate data, Rosenthal and Sen (1973) are restricted in two ways that, operating interactively, lead them to an unwarranted conclusion concerning the power of left-right perceptions. Later work by Rosenthal and Sen (1977) indicating that left-right perceptions can account for shifts in partisan choice between the two ballots by voters who have decided to participate is confirmed, but partisan preferences account even better for second-ballot choices. Left-right perceptions and partisan sympathies are related, but discrete partisan attitudes are a more powerful factor than left-right perceptions in French second-ballot electoral behavior.     

When do Economic Perceptions Matter for Party Approval?

Do economic perceptions influence partisan preferences or vice versa? We argue that the direction of influence between government approval and economic perceptions is conditional on the state of the economy. Under conditions of economic crisis, when economic signals are relatively unambiguous, perceptions of the economy can be expected to exogenously influence government approval but this is not found when the economy is experiencing a more typical pattern of moderate growth and economic signals are more mixed. We test these arguments using British election panel surveys covering electoral cycles of moderate economic growth (1997–2001) and dramatic and negative disruption (2005–2010). We examine the most commonly employed measures of retrospective economic perceptions and estimate a range of models using structural equations modelling. We demonstrate that when the economy is performing extremely badly economic perceptions have an exogenous effect on government approval and provide a means of electoral accountability, but this is not the case in under more normal circumstances.     

Perceptions of economic performance and voting behavior in the 1983 general election in Britain

The evaluation of voters' perceptions of economic performance and their relationships to voting behavior has been a relatively neglected topic in British politics. A model of these relationships is specified and estimated using data from a survey of the electorate carried out at the time of the general election of 1983. The model demonstrates strong underlying links between partisanship, perceptions of economic performance, and salient noneconomic issues during the election. The latent construct underlying these variables is a highly significant predictor of the probability of voting Conservative in that election. By contrast, perceptions of personal economic conditions are not a significant predictor of voting behavior at all. Overall, these results show that perceptions of national economic performance played a highly significant role in determining the outcome of the election in 1983.     

Institutional Stimuli and Individual Response as Explanations of Turnout: The 2009 EP Election

This article sets out a social psychological theory of voting behaviour that integrates stimuli from institutions; perceptions of stimuli from such institutions as the media and government; and individual predispositions to respond. It thus clarifies the confusion caused in the classic Michigan model, which treats perceptions as individual attributes without regard to institutional stimuli. Multi-level statistical analysis of turnout at the 2009 European Parliament election shows that, after controlling for individual predispositions, institutional stimuli have a substantial effect on behaviour both contextually and by shaping individual perceptions.     

Building Ethical Capital: Perceptions of Ethical Climate in the Public Sector

This article examines influences on public servant perceptions of ethical climate in the public sector. The array of beneficial outcomes produced by perceptions of a positive ethical climate, the existence of government programs aimed at improving ethical climate, and implications for government accountability and trustworthiness all argue for a better understanding of the sources of these perceptions. Empirical analyses of survey responses from employees of the U.S. federal executive branch show that individuals in leadership positions perceive the ethical climate more positively. Conversely, work tenure tends to worsen perceived ethical climate, although supervisory status attenuates this negative effect. Ethics training, interaction with ethics officials, and perceived knowledge about ethics topics consistently influence perceptions of ethical climate and advice‐seeking behavior in a positive way. A set of results related to advice‐seeking behavior serves to reinforce the important role of ethics officials.     

The Formation of Economic Perceptions in Post-Communist Countries of East Central Europe

In the early transition phase in post-communist Europe, citizens’ perceptions of the national economy appeared more favorable than objective economic indicators would suggest. With triple and quadruple digit annual inflation rates and a severe economic contraction, there was a substantial portion of the population in these countries who still thought that the national economy had been and would be improving. Thus, sociotropic economic perceptions in the wake of the democratic transformation appeared to be disconnected from the real economic situation. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it explores the link between objective economic indicators and public evaluations of the economy. Second, it investigates the microfoundations of economic perceptions. And finally, it tests a well-established proposition that political sophisticates are more accurate in their perceptions than their less informed counterparts. The findings of the study can be generalized to any political and economic system undergoing transition.     

What Are the Sources of Political Parties’ Issue Ownership? Testing Four Explanations at the Individual Level

Political parties’ issue ownership—their perceived competence in handling issues and problems—is a major ingredient explaining voting behavior. Yet, our understanding of the sources of issue ownership is limited. This study is the first to bring together and evaluate four different explanations of voters’ perceptions of parties’ issue ownership: partisanship, attitudes, perceived real-world developments, and constituency-based ownership. Using novel measures implemented in a national survey, we show that all four sources exert independent, if varying, influences on voters’ issue ownership perceptions. Even though voters’ partisanship tends to dominate issue ownership perceptions, attitudes and performance evaluations also matter. Moreover, the hitherto mostly neglected constituency based component of ownership has a substantial, independent influence on ownership perceptions. These findings indicate that issue ownership is more than merely an expression of partisanship and attitudes.     

When Do Welfare Attitudes Become Racialized? The Paradoxical Effects of Education

Recent research suggests that welfare attitudes may be shaped by negative perceptions of blacks, suggesting an implicit racialization of the policy. But what might inhibit the racialization of welfare? In this vein, research indicating that education facilitates tolerance suggests that negative racial perceptions and welfare attitudes may be less related among the educated. However, education may also be associated with a greater ability to connect general predispositions with specific policy attitudes. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests that the association between racial perceptions and welfare attitudes may be stronger among the college‐educated, despite their lower overall levels of racial hostility. Study 1 shows that education attenuates negative racial perceptions, while strengthening their impact on public‐assistance attitudes—but only when assistance is described as “welfare.” Study 2 extends and qualifies this finding, showing that education strengthens the relationship between perceptions of welfare recipients and global welfare attitudes only when recipients are black.     

The fact remains: Party ID moderates how voters respond to economic change

Recent research suggests that party identification biases voters' economic perceptions in general, but that all voters respond to economic change at the same rate. This implies that voters update their economic perceptions in parallel and are able to hold governments to account. But this has two problems. First, it contradicts evidence of partisan-motivated information processing. Second, parallel-updating does not imply unbiased information processing and is normatively less appealing than if partisans' economic perceptions were to converge at economic extremes. In this article, I argue instead that party identification does moderate how voters' economic perceptions respond to economic change. I test my argument on data from one ordinary and one extraordinary period in Britain's recent economic history using competing Bayesian multilevel ordered-logit models. I show that economic change does lead to changes in voters' economic perceptions. But I also show that party identification moderates this process. As such, voters update their economic perceptions along separate, not parallel, paths.     

How America and China see each other: charting national views and official perceptions

Based on the premise that perception operates either as a catalyst or a constraint for a hegemonic war, this study examines ‘national perceptions’ (i.e. how the citizens of the two states view each other) and ‘official views’ (i.e. how the two governments perceive each other) between the US and China of the post-Cold War period. As for the national views, (1) American perceptions of China have generally become more negative than Chinese perceptions of America; (2) little congruence is found between the two powers on key values and norms; and (3) perceptions are generally getting far ahead of the realities. As for the official views, formal documents do not fully reveal their real state of minds. Diplomatic courtesy and strategic self-esteem runs through them. Yet, America’s strategic concern and growing will to manage China from a position of strength is increasingly more discernible. From the Chinese documents, on the other hand, signs of inferiority have gradually disappeared. In sum, perceptions between the two are working more as a catalyst for strategic competition than a constraint on it.     

Organizational Pathology Compared to What? Impacts of Job Characteristics and Career Trajectory on Perceptions of Organizational Red Tape

Early studies of organizational red tape emphasized that worker perceptions of organizational rules and procedures are dependent on workers’ frames of reference. However, most prior studies do not account sufficiently for how and why these reference points vary across employees, even if they work within the same or similar organizational contexts. While the effects of contemporaneous employee attitudes on perceptions of red tape have been considered in prior analyses, how do perceptions of organizational rules and procedures as red tape relate to workers’ prior career trajectories and occupational contexts? Variable norms and expectations across organizations as well as across the public and private sectors may produce different attitudes toward rules and procedures. Of equal import, current occupational characteristics are relatively unexamined in studies of worker perceptions of red tape. Using a survey of state level public managers, this paper examines how employees’ perceptions of red tape are mediated by their prior career trajectories and experiences, as well as by their occupational context. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Can public information programs affect risk perceptions?

This article provides the first controlled evaluation of how different information materials explaining the risks from radon influenced people's perceptions of these risks. Using a panel study, it was possible to observe how stated risk perceptions responded to information about indoor radon concentrations and brochures explaining the radon readings. The findings indicate that risk communication policies can be effective in modifying risk perceptions. Moreover, they have three specific implications for radon policy: (1) Public officials should not adopt strategies that provide minimal risk information to the public as a means of avoiding undue alarm, for this can have the reverse effect; (2) measures of the effectiveness of risk communication will depend on how education and behavior change are defined; (3) categorical guidelines about risk without quantitative information can lead people to treat the levels as thresholds, creating an artificial discontinuity in their responses to small changes in risk perceptions.