Studying the reach of deterrence: Can deterrence theory help explain police misconduct?

This article reports the first perceptual deterrence study of a sample of police officers. The study investigated the influence of traditional deterrence considerations, extralegal sanctions, and impulsivity on the intention to commit several hypothesized acts of police misconduct. The results were largely consistent with perceptual deterrence findings from samples of college students, experienced offenders, and corporate managers. In particular, this study found that both legal and extralegal sanction threats potentially deter police misconduct. Further, it found that impulsivity diminished the deterrent influence of both sanction forms. The study also found that some of the effects of the explanatory variables depended on whether officers had prior punishment experience. The article discusses the implications of its findings for combating police misconduct and for deterrence research generally.     

First do no harm: a look at correctional policies and programs today

Objectives

This paper reviews the historical changes in correctional policies and the impact these changes have had on the operations of corrections and correctional programs. Social changes and theoretical perspectives moved corrections away from a focus on rehabilitation to programs characterized by deterrence, incapacitation, and control. Similarly, theoretical criminology encouraged corrections to move away from rehabilitation towards programs designed to provide social opportunities such as employment and housing for offenders. This paper examines whether these changes in policies and programs have been effective in reducing recidivism. The question is: What works in corrections?

Methods

This paper reviews the research examining the impact of correctional policies and programs on the later criminal activities of offenders and delinquents. Research using systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and the Maryland method scores is used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of various types of programs, management strategies, and policies.

Results

Research demonstrates programs based on deterrence, incapacitation and increased control do not reduce the future criminal activities of offenders and delinquents. Nor have programs targeting social opportunities such as employment and housing been effective in reducing recidivism. The most effective programs target individual-level change in thinking and information processing.

Conclusions

In the search for ways to sanction offenders, U.S. correctional policies and programs using control, deterrence, and incapacitation have harmed individuals and communities. Such programs have not been effective in reducing recidivism. While programs that provide social opportunities for offenders do not necessarily harm offenders neither do they decrease later criminal activities. Effective programs bring about a cognitive transformation in offenders and delinquents. Theorists have begun to develop hypotheses about how and why these transformations are effective. The current emphasis on evidence-based programs, the research evidence on what is effective and the need to reduce the cost of corrections suggest we are on the brink of another paradigm change. Where this will take us is still unclear, but the paradigm will have to address the current problems facing the U.S. correctional systems.     

The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of Deterrence

In a survey of Australian citizens (valid N = 1,406), personal and social norms were found to moderate effects of deterrence on tax evasion. Personal, internalized norms of tax honesty were negatively related to tax evasion and moderated the effects of deterrence variables (i.e., sanction severity), suggesting deterrence effects only when individual ethics were weak. Perceived social norms, beyond those internalized as personal norms, were not directly related to tax evasion but moderated the effects of sanction severity. Only when social norms were seen as strongly in favor of tax honesty was sanction severity negatively related to tax evasion. This result held only for respondents who did not identify strongly as Australians. Hence, when internalized, norms delimit effects of deterrence; when considered external to one's self norms boost deterrence effects, giving social meaning to formal sanctions.     

No Evidence of Specific Deterrence under Penal Moderation: Imprisonment and Recidivism in Finland

International literature on prison effects on recidivism tends to find little evidence of specific deterrence. If anything, imprisonment seems more likely to increase than decrease rates of offending. The present study adds to this literature by examining imprisonment and recidivism in Finland, a nation characterized by an exceptionally moderate penal culture. It has been suggested that severe sanctions need to be imposed selectively in order for them to be effective. In this research, we estimated the impact of first imprisonment on recidivism in comparison with offenders sentenced to either suspended imprisonment or community service. Using data from government population registries, we controlled for a large number of legal and extra-legal confounding factors, including criminal history and socio-demographic characteristics. We found no evidence of reduced recidivism as a result of imprisonment. Instead, consistent with prior research, we find evidence of increased recidivism in certain offender categories. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications.     

Deterrence Theory and Peers: Do Close Friends Perceive Sanction Certainty in a Similar Manner?

Although deterrence theory and social learning theory have been linked on many occasions and are compatible theoretical constructs, criminologists know very little about how the elements of deterrence operate among and between friends. The purpose of this study is to evaluate if similarities in the certainty of sanction, a main element of deterrence, are held between close friends in emerging adulthood. Using data from 1,077 friendship pairs, several confirmatory factor analyses are estimated that attempt to define a friendship-level certainty of sanction construct. Results indicate that friends do not share in common any tendency to perceive similar certainties of sanction. Not only does the certainty between friends fail to load unidimensionally, the two friends’ individual certainty constructs are nearly completely unrelated to each other. In terms of policy implications, peer-based programs targeting increases in sanction certainty tentatively appear to be unnecessary.     

Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information

In this paper we discuss the implications of introducing imperfect information on the optimal law enforcement literature. We assume that individuals can be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension and about the sanction.Imperfect information about the probability and the sanction might pose a problem to criminal deterrence. If that is the case, there are clear incentives to disseminate information about law enforcement (probability and severity of sanction). However, note that individuals also have incentives to buy information about law enforcement: they may erroneously decide to become criminals (because they have underestimated the expected sanction) or they may erroneously decide not to become criminals (because they have overestimated the expected sanction).This paper proposed that it is optimal to complement criminal punishment with some disclosure of information.     

Newspaper Coverage of Corporate Price-Fixing

Among the reasons common corporate crimes such as price-fixing lack the "brimstone smell" of common street crimes such as burglary is that newspapers fail to provide frequent, prominent, or criminally oriented coverage of corporate crime. This certainly was true of newspaper coverage of the heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases of 1961. Replicative analysis reveals that this also was true of newspaper coverage of the folding-carton industry antitrust cases of 1976. Reasons for this continued lack of coverage are discussed, including the diffuse harm characteristic of price-fixing, the general lack of recognition that corporations are juristic persons capable of criminal deviance, and the disinclination of large organizations to link other large organizations with criminality.     

Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant.

This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of punishment—the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality.     

Further notes on information,corruption, and optimal law enforcement

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). We are grateful to Mitch Polinsky and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

消费者反垄断诉讼的本源与我国应然之探

对于私人反垄断执行,美国《反托拉斯法》所规定的三倍赔偿制度功不可没,为此,许多学者都认为,在确定消费者反垄断诉讼的制度中,也应确定这种民事惩罚性的机制,才能使消费者反垄断诉讼得到很好的运行。但在私人反垄断践行最好的美国,消费者个人是被排除在私人执行之外的,按照美国《反托拉斯法》的规定,消费者个人并不能获得三倍赔偿的诉讼激励。美国《反托拉斯法》所规定的三倍赔偿机制系基于其责任体系仅有民事责任和刑事责任,没有处于刑事和民事责任之间的行政处罚责任,民事责任的三倍赔偿机制实际起到了落实"应刑罚性"和刑罚"最后手段性"的威慑与嚇阻重任。而在反垄断法责任中存在刑事责任、民事责任和行政责任的国家,行政责任中的行政处罚责任完全担当了刑事威慑和遏制的补充责任,为避免过度制裁和重复制裁而普遍都没有设置三倍的民事赔偿责任。消费者反垄断诉讼必须以维持市场秩序为本,对消费者反垄断诉讼的高热情和高厚望必须回归到理性和现实,在具体制度的设置时也应有所体现。     

RECIDIVISM AMONG PAROLED PROPERTY OFFENDERS RELEASED DURING A PERIOD OF PRISON REFORM*

Data from four successive yearly cohorts and one special early release cohort of parolees are used to explore the question of whether rapid statewide changes in the administration of criminal justice affected the patterns of recidivism among persons on parole for property offenses. Given the earlier broadly constructed research reported by Ekland–Olson et al. (1993), and their conclusion that variation in shifting policies would have different effects on different types of offenses, we decided to sharpen the focus of the research questions posed by concentrating on recidivism patterns among property offenders. Three alternative explanations—compositional effects, administrative discretion, and deterrence—are explored to interpret the differences found across cohorts While suggestive, these alternative explanations remain open to question given the limitations inherent in quasi-experimental research. Conclusions related to issues of prison construction policy suggest that more attention be paid to the “replacement factor,” whereby “vacancies” left by incarcerated offenders are rapidly filled by others. If future research supports the rapid replacement hypothesis, increased levels of incarceration will yield a larger, more experienced criminal “work force” and ironically a heightened collective potential for crime.     

Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection*

Based on interviews with facility managers in the electroplating and chemical industries, this study examines regulated firms’ perceptions of how various instrumental, normative, and social factors motivated their firms’ environmental actions. We found that “implicit general deterrence” (the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity) was far more important than either specific or general deterrence, and that deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to small and medium‐sized enterprises than it was to large ones. Most reputation‐sensitive firms in the environmentally sensitive chemical industry chose to go substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk management and to the perceived need to protect their social license to operate. Almost half our respondents also provided normative explanations for why they complied. Overall, we conclude that there are various, often interwoven, strands that must be taken into account in understanding what motivates corporate environmental behavior, and how they play out depends very much on the size and sophistication of companies themselves and on the characteristics of the industry sector within which they are located.     

The effectiveness of service work: An analysis of recidivism

The Israeli “service work” law of 1987 enables a court to commute prison sentences of up to 6 months to service work in the community. This paper examines the correctional effectiveness of this new sanction by comparing the rate of recidivism (over a period of 14 months) among 407 offenders sentenced to service work to that of 950 comparable offenders sentenced to imprisonment. As the research design is quasi-experimental, an adjustment for confounders is carried out using the propensity score (PS) methodology. The estimation of the odds ratio of recidivism with respect to sanction comprises two steps: (a) the PS, which is the conditional probability of assignment to a particular sanction given a set of confounders, is estimated by a logistic model; and (b) the conditional probability of recidivism, given the PS and other covariates, is estimated by a second model. The findings indicate that before an adjustment for the systematic differences between the two sanctions was carried out, the odds for recidivism among prisoners were 2.4 times higher than the odds for service workers. After the adjustment, the odds ratio was reduced to 1.7. This estimate indicates that the service work sanction has a considerable correctional effect. The need to address additional criteria for the effectiveness of service work (e.g., net-widening) is emphasized.     

Do the experiential and deterrent effect operate differently across gender?

Deterrence research showed that successful criminal episodes tended to erode the effect of sanction risks. In particular, experience with offending—especially offending without punishment—was believed to cause individuals to lower their unrealistically high expectations of sanction risk. At the same time, other research showed that deterrence could work for some individuals such that high perceptions of sanction certainty tended to inhibit future episodes of criminal activity. One unanswered question was the extent to which these ‘experiential’ and ‘deterrent’ effects operated differently across gender. Self-reported survey information on over 2,000 adolescents was employed to examine whether the experiential and deterrent effects varied across gender. Results indicated more similarities than differences linking deterrent and experiential effects to self-reported delinquency. Future research directions are outlined.     

Imminent Capture and Noncompliance: Probing Deterrence in Extreme Environments

Abstract

Understanding how deterrence operates under extreme conditions is both elusive and important. Studying suspect noncompliance in the form of flight during police-involved vehicle chases provides the opportunity to do this. These are crimes where the certainty of detection could not be higher, yet noncompliance is the end result and arguably comes because of the enhanced sanction risk rather than the obverse (deterrence) or in spite of it (defiance). Drawing from a qualitative sample of 25 auto thieves who have fled from the police, we explore their pre-chase perceptions, their motives for flight, and their decision-making processes during flight to probe the theoretical boundaries of perceptual deterrence. To this end, we pay particular attention to the mediating role of ambiguity aversion and belief updating in reconciling two seemingly inconsistent theoretical perspectives: risk framing and rational choice.     

Sanctions,Perceived Anger,and Criminal Offending

In articulating models of offender decision-making, researchers have tended to focus on either deterrence/rational choice or situational/emotional considerations. In this paper, we merge these two lines of inquiry and examine how rational choice considerations and perceived angry reactions inter-relate in predicting assaultive violence. Using data collected on a random sample of young adults, we assess three hypotheses. First, that both rational choice and perceived anger exhibit additive effects on assault. Second, that perceived anger influences how rational choice considerations are interpreted. Third, that rational choice considerations influence assault under different levels of perceived anger, and in particular, that the effect of sanction threats fall apart under high perceived anger. Future theoretical and empirical directions are outlined.     

TOWARD A BIFURCATED THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DETERRENCE

Since Hobbes (1957 [1651] and Beccaria (1963 [1764]), scholars have theorized that the emotion of fear is critical for deterrence. Nevertheless, contemporary deterrence researchers have mostly overlooked the distinction between perceived sanction risk and fear of apprehension. Whereas perceived risk is a cognitive judgment, fear involves visceral feelings of anxiety or dread. Equally important, a theory explicating the influence of deterrence on both criminal propensity and situational offending has remained elusive. We develop a theoretical model in which perceived risk and fear are distinguished at both the general and situational levels. We test this theoretical model with data from a set of survey‐based experiments conducted in 2016 with a nationwide sample of adults (N = 965). We find that perceived risk and fear are empirically distinct and that perceived risk is positively related to fear at both the general and situational levels. Certain background and situational factors have indirect effects through perceived risk on fear. In turn, perceived risk has indirect effects through fear on both criminal propensity and situational intentions to offend. Fear's inclusion increases explanatory power for both criminal propensity and situational offending intentions. Fear is a stronger predictor than either self‐control or prior offending of situational intentions to offend.     

FORENSIC ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON PRICE FIXING

This paper aims at explaining accepted methods of forensic analysisand how forensic economics is used in the context of competition-lawenforcement. Illustrations are drawn from ancient and modernantitrust cases involving price-fixing allegations. The statedgoal of antitrust laws of most nations is deterrence. Optimaldeterrence requires that cartel penalties be based on multiplesof economic injuries. Yet, antitrust authorities are typicallyreluctant to calculate fines on the basis of damages becauseof perceived analytical challenges or because the fact-finderslack needed economic education. However, reasonable estimatesof damages can often be quickly prepared using simpler methodsthan econometric modeling. More often than not, alternativeestimates of cartel overcharges tend to be mutually supportive.The reluctance of antitrust authorities to base fines on damagesseems to indicate an abundance of caution.     

RESTITUTION AND RECIDIVISM RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RESULTS FROM FOUR EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES*

One of the major changes in juvenile justice during the past decade has been the increased reliance on restitution as a sanction for juvenile offenders. Although a great deal has been learned during the past 10 years about the operation of restitution programs, much remains unknown regarding its impact on recidivism rates. This report contains the results from four random-assignment experiments conducted simultaneously in four communities: Boise, Idaho, Washington, D. C., Clayton County, Georgia, and Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. In all four studies, youths were randomly assigned into restitution and into traditional dispositions. On the whole, the results show that restitution may have a small but important effect on recidivism. However, not all programs will be able to achieve this effect, either because of program management and strategy, community circumstances, or other factors. Youths in the restitution groups never had higher recidivism rates than those in probation or detention conditions. In two of the four studies, the juveniles in restitution clearly had fewer subsequent recontacts with the court during the two-to-three-year follow-up.     

Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of Deterrence Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct

This essay reviews the contributions to deterrence theory that Tom Baker and Sean Griffith make in Ensuring Corporate Misconduct (2010) and argues that their work highlights the limits of deterrence theory for shaping corporate conduct. Baker and Griffith extend the deterrence framework to account for the mediating effect of third‐party institutions, like insurers, on deterrence calculations, and they suggest how corporate governance decisions, such as what type of insurance coverage to purchase, encode signals about corporations' compliance motivations and capacity. Although these insights might prove useful for enhancing the efficacy of deterrence regimes aimed at white‐collar crime and other types of corporate misconduct, they suggest the difficulty of shaping corporate conduct that is influenced not only by the norms embodied in securities law, but also by the alternative normative system of shareholder value maximization. I discuss the failure of deterrence theory to address adequately noncompliant behavior that springs not solely from material self‐interest, but from adherence to an alternative set of norms, and I explore the possibility of viewing corporate compliance as a norm‐change project.