论我国过失共同正犯的规范前提——以《刑法》第25条第2款的规范构造为中心

我国过失共同正犯的理论与实务都是以《刑法》明确否定过失共同正犯的成立为前提的。在此前提下,既不利于实践问题的解决,也不利于过失共同正犯理论自身的发展,因此有重新审视的必要。通过言语行为理论可以发现,《刑法》第25条第2款的规范构造既是行为规范也是制裁规范。作为行为规范,该条所禁止的是引起法益侵害结果的过失共同犯罪行为。而作为制裁规范即是要对违反行为规范的行为作出评价。因此,法官在依照该制裁规范裁判案件时,是以过失共同犯罪行为为评价对象的。在具体定罪量刑之前,需要确定是否成立过失共同犯罪,进而将结果归责于各行为人,这就为过失共同正犯的解释论展开提供了规范前提。     

注意规范保护目的与交通过失犯的成立

交通过失犯的本质应是结果回避义务,判断该义务之有无应以预见因果关系为内容的结果预见可能性为前提;注意规范保护目的是判断此种因果关系成立与否的理论,只有当行为人违反了注意规范保护目的而致损害法益结果发生时才能成立交通过失犯。注意规范保护目的是以作为刑法规范下位规则的交通法规为基础的可普遍适用于交通过失犯的判断标准,它属于交通过失犯中的违法要素,使用它无须通过客观归责理论。注意规范保护目的理论能合理限定交通过失犯的成立范围,有效克服我国司法实践中普遍存在的以交通事故责任书直接作为刑法上交通过失犯成立依据的不妥做法。     

共同正犯“部分实行全部责任”的法理及适用

根据因果共犯论,共同正犯"部分实行全部责任"归责原则的法理根据在于各行为与法益侵害结果之间的因果性。我国立法明确否定共同过失犯罪,故解释论上难以肯定过失共同正犯,但司法实务中所讨论的过失共同正犯的实例,常常存在回避结果发生的义务违反,因而完全可以以过失的同时犯对结果承担责任;肇事"逃逸"的罪过形式是故意而非过失,故指使"逃逸"可以成立共犯。只要片面行为与结果之间存在物理的因果性,就应肯定片面共同正犯的成立。承继共犯正犯否定说是因果共犯论的当然归结,因而利用被害人不能反抗的状态中途参与取财的,仅成立盗窃罪共同正犯,而非抢劫罪共同正犯;未参与盗窃仅事后参与暴力的,不成立事后抢劫的共犯。     

The Good,the Bad,and the Klutzy: Criminal Negligence and Moral Concern

One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal negligence. Although not interested in legal issues herself, Arpaly has a well-developed theory of moral agency that explains moral concern in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons. Introducing her work to the ongoing scholarly debate will be helpful for two reasons. First, while a definition of negligence in terms of moral concern is recognized as one proposed solution to the negligence–blameworthiness problem, authors promoting it have yet to give a systematic account of moral concern and its relation to blame. Borrowing Arpaly's account will help clarify the idea of moral concern so that both proponents and critics of a concern approach to negligence can have a better-defined debate. Second, her theory of blameworthiness is especially suited to defending the blameworthiness of negligent actions, because it does not have recourse to a special quality of choice or self-control that must be active to render conduct blameworthy. To make this second advantage clear, the article argues that reliance on choice or self-control problematizes blameworthiness for negligence. Those who wish to defend blameworthiness for negligent acts should base their work on an account of moral agency that does not rely on either choice or self-control to explain when an action is blameworthy.     

论管制规范在侵权行为法上的意义

一个加害行为违反或者没有违反相关管制规范的事实,对于侵权行为的判定会产生什么样的影响?从公法与私法相互关系的视角来思考可以深化对此问题的理解。管制规范中的防止侵害型规范,是以保护他人利益为目的,对侵权行为法具有直接意义。在侵权行为法的适用过程中,此种类型的管制规范作为私法规范的一种补充,其评判与裁判功能将有机会得以显现,并主要体现在侵权裁判的论证负担上。     

Conduct and its Consequences: Attempts at Debiasing Jury Judgments

Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her conduct and not by the consequences of that conduct. But several studies have shown that a cognitive heuristic known as hindsight bias can skew post hoc judgments of some prior behavior. Thus, jurors who must evaluate the actions of a defendant may be influenced inappropriately by the consequences of those actions. A complementary problem arises when jurors must evaluate the injuries incurred by the plaintiff. Here, jurors' knowledge about the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct can proactively influence their assessment of the plaintiff's injuries and determination of damages. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of two procedural techniques intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight bias in negligence cases—multiple admonitions from a judge about the proper use of evidence—and bifurcation (actually withholding irrelevant evidence from jurors). We presented a re-enacted automobile negligence trial to 355 jury-eligible adults drawn from the community, varied the evidence and instructions that they heard, and measured liability judgments and damage awards from individual jurors both before and after deliberating, and from juries. Results showed that admonitions were generally ineffective in guiding jurors to the proper use of evidence but that bifurcation was relatively more effective. Deliberations had no curative effect on jurors' misapplication of evidence.     

The Limits of the Harm Principle

The harm principle, understood as the normative requirement that conduct should be criminalized only if it is harmful, has difficulty in dealing with those core cases of criminal wrongdoing that can occur without causing any direct harm. Advocates of the harm principle typically find it implausible to hold that these core cases should not be crimes and so usually seek out some indirect harm that can justify criminalizing the seemingly harmless conduct. But this strategy justifies criminalization of a wide range of conduct on the basis of the fear, worry, and anxiety it generates among those who are not the direct victims of the conduct, and thereby undermines the limiting role of the harm principle by permitting the very move it was meant to prevent: the criminalization of harmless conduct on the ground of others’ feelings about it. The best way to avoid this dilemma is to recognize that people have rights, operating independently of the harm principle, to be treated in certain ways just because they are persons. The existence of such rights provides a ground for both criminalizing conduct and limiting the scope of criminalization because these rights point both to conduct that people must be permitted to engage in (regardless of its harmful effects) and conduct that might well be criminalized (though it is not harmful). A complete account of criminal law will therefore require the harm principle to work together with an independent account of rights.     

过失犯的构成要件构造及其适用

如何适用刑法对过失犯予以处罚,虽然在刑法理论上有各种不同学说,然而均缺乏从过失犯整体构成要件的角度进行思考。本文认为,过失犯的注意义务之未规定属于立法者未能详尽地描述出的犯罪行为构成要素,这样,根据条文对犯罪构成要件的规定还无法推断行为的违法性,还必须由法官对注意义务作出必要的补充判断,因此其在构成要件构造上属于开放性的。分析过失犯的构成要件构造是对过失犯理论研究领域的拓展,有利于我们明确过失犯的类型性意义,以提倡法官对超出立法技术限度的注意义务进行补充。过失犯注意义务之未规定不属于法律漏洞,对之应该采用狭义的法律解释方法适用之。     

过失危险犯之存在性与可存在性思考

决定某类过错行为 ,包括过失危险行为在内可以犯罪化的基础不是主观过错 ,而是危险行为本身所具有的社会危害性。过失危险犯只能存在于危害公共安全法益的犯罪中 ,由于公共安全法益本身的特殊性 ,这类法益价值的外延已经突破其本身的价值而及于它的安全性 ,即威胁它的安全就是侵犯它的价值 ,而使过失危险行为具有直接侵犯公共安全法益价值的本质 ,进而具备犯罪化的报应基础。设立过失危险犯与刑法谦抑原则不冲突 ,反而有利于刑法诱导和刑法忠诚。     

论过失犯形态的原因自由行为

相对于认定故意犯形态的原因自由行为有诸多疑难而言,在过失犯形态的原因自由行为之中承认原因行为的实行行为性并没有太多争议。但无论如何,过失犯形态的原因自由行为至少在表象上有别于一般的过失犯,其特点就在于可以划分为原因行为和结果行为这两个阶段,而在结果行为阶段又的确是丧失了责任能力甚至是行为能力。相关判例印证了在自陷无责的情形中构成要件模式的正确性,即原因自由行为实质上并不是一种需要特殊归责的构造,而只是一种现象上有独特之处,但完全可以被包括在一般的归责形态(无论是过失犯还是故意犯)之中的说明形式(说明实行行为到底在何处)而已。要成立过失犯形态的原因自由行为,关键在于如何在具体情况下认定行为人的过失心理,它可能有三种表现形式。     

实体与程序之调和：证明妨碍的客观要件探究

证明妨碍是指当事人因可归责于对方当事人或第三人诉讼中或诉讼外、故意或过失的作为或不作为,致使自己的证明行为陷入困难或不能。构成证明妨碍的客观要件相对较为复杂,而且在实体法和程序法中均有规定。不论是诉讼前或诉讼中的作为或不作为,均可以构成证明妨碍行为。证明妨碍行为的结果,应当达到当事人证明不能或证明困难而使案件事实无法查明的状态。而且,证明妨碍行为与待证事实证明不能或证明困难的状态之间应当具有因果联系。     

论合同法第43条对商业秘密的保护

理论界一般认为,合同法第43条规定的是非法泄露或者使用缔约过程中知悉的商业秘密行为的缔约过失责任,笔者认为该条规定的不仅仅是一种缔约过失责任,而且是一种侵害商业秘密的侵权责任,所以该条的实质是缔约过失责任与侵权责任的竞合。在救济方法上,该条存在重大缺陷,该缺陷极不利于保护商业秘密权利人的权利,亟待完善。     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.     

以罪过理论检视我国过失犯罪的法定刑配置

故意与过失的区分之间应有一个衔接的问题,而这个衔接点应体现在间接故意和有认识的过失之间,即有认识的过失与间接故意在法益侵害程度上相互衔接。正是这种衔接,造成了间接故意和有认识的过失在理论与实践中的区别之难。基于这种相互衔接,过失犯罪的法定刑之最高刑,就应和侵犯同类法益的故意犯罪之最低刑之间保持一致,以解决司法实践中的区别不能之谜。     

共同过失犯罪行为理论研究——兼论行为理论的重构

两人或者两人以上基于相同的过失共同造成损害结果即为共同过失犯罪,但现有的共同犯罪理论和行为理论并不能合理解决这类行为的定罪量刑问题。重构行为理论,将行为理解为"行为人运用一定的主客观条件作用于特定的人或物的存在状态的过程",过失共同犯罪就是行为人之间在相互利用对方行为之际,应当控制而没有控制,最终造成了实际损害结果,所以应当分别按照过失犯罪定罪处罚。     

The Closeness Problem and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Way Forward

A major challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is the concern that an agent’s intention can be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from a putative example of an intended harm, and yet, the resulting case appears to be a case of impermissibility. This is the so-called “closeness problem.” Many people believe that one can address the closeness problem by adopting Warren Quinn’s version of the DDE, call it DDE*, which distinguishes between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency. In this paper, I first argue that Quinn’s DDE* is just as vulnerable to the closeness problem as the DDE is. Second, some might think that what we should therefore do is give up on intentions altogether and move towards some kind of non-state-of-mind, victim-based deontology. I shall argue against this move and explain why intentions are indispensable to an adequate nonconsequentialist theory. Finally, I shall propose a new way of answering the closeness problem.     

Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory

Contemporary theories of criminalisation address, with varying emphasis, themes concerning the harmfulness and the wrongfulness of the conduct. In his article for the present issue, Antony Duff relies chiefly on notions of wrongfulness as the basis for his proposed criminalisation doctrines; whereas in their 2011 volume on criminalisation, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch invoke both wrongfulness and harmfulness as prerequisites for prohibiting conduct. The present article assesses the comparative merits of these approaches, and argues in favour of the latter, two-element perspective. In this article, the author puts forward a number of reasons suggesting why the two-element approach (of wrongfulness and harm) is preferable. These reasons include, firstly, an inductive argument—that the kinds of wrongful conduct for which criminalisation seems a plausible response are those that include an element of harm or risk of harm. Secondly, a defining role for the state is one of resource-protection: of safeguarding the means and resources through which citizens can live good lives. Thus the concept of citizens’ living resources—and the related conception of harm—should be made a constitutive and explicit element of criminalisation theory, rather than subsuming resource-protection under a general rubric of wrongfulness. Thirdly, a two-element approach provides reciprocal limiting principles concerning the scope of criminalisation. One can, for example, employ wrongfulness requirements to limit the criminalisation of conduct that has remote harmful consequences; and, conversely, use a harmfulness requirement as means for restricting the criminalisation of wrongful acts.     

罪过形式的确定——刑法第15条第2款“法律有规定”的含义

确定具体犯罪的罪过形式时,不能以“事实上能否出于过失”的归纳取代“法律有无规定”的判断,而应当充分考虑并贯彻刑法第15条第2款“过失犯罪,法律有规定的才负刑事责任”的规定。将某种犯罪确定为过失犯罪的法定标准,是法律有文理规定。根据尊重人权主义的原理,对于法益侵害并非严重的行为,不宜确定为过失犯罪;按照责任主义原理,不能出现某种犯罪只能由过失构成而不能由故意构成的局面;依循刑法的谦抑性原理,罪过形式的确定,不能以其他法领域规定的过错形式为标准。     

防卫意图是正当防卫理论的短板

正当防卫理论中的防卫意图,对于认定防卫人的行为是否成立正当防卫以及认定防卫过当行为的性质具有重要意义。然而,防卫意图这个主观要件已经成为正当防卫理论中的薄弱环节,司法实践也长期忽视防卫意图的评价功能。防卫意图不要说具有重大缺陷,在认定行为人的行为是否成立正当防卫时,仍应将防卫意图作为必不可少的构成要件。应将防卫意图理解为对意志因素的表达,即指行为人主观上制止不法侵害的愿望或追求。当防卫人制止不法侵害的行为明显超过必要限度时,若防卫人对此有明确认识,则不成立防卫过当,应以故意犯罪认定;反之,成立防卫过当。正当防卫意图的本质决定了防卫过当的行为属性是过失犯罪而非故意犯罪。     

Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces

This article addresses the termination of employment because of the conduct of the employee in her leisure time, in the light of the right to private life. It explores the impact on the retention of employment of activities taking place outside the workplace and outside working hours, and argues that the approach of UK courts and tribunals, which is based on a primarily spatial conceptualisation of privacy, is flawed. A fresh approach to privacy, resting on the idea of domination, is proposed, which is sensitive to the particularities of the employment relationship. Considering the fairness enquiry in dismissal, it argues that off‐duty conduct may lead to lawful termination of employment only if there is a clear and present impact or a high likelihood of such impact on business interests; a speculative and marginal danger does not suffice. It further proposes that a particularly meticulous test is appropriate when certain suspect categories, such as the employees' sexual preferences, are at stake.