公司制度趋同理论检视下的中国公司治理评析

公司治理全球趋同理论是国际公司法学界在上世纪90年代发起的阶段性议题。趋同论与多元论的广泛交锋、股东中心主义模式与利益相关人模式的优劣权衡、竞争压力假说与路径依赖假说的鲜明对比、法律移植假说与境外上市推动假说的切磋琢磨等多处论战令人印象深刻,也广泛检视了现代公司治理领域的多项命题。该理论也是我国公司法近十年来立法演进与理念变革最重要的域外理论背景之一,为2005公司法修订、独立董事制度引入、股权分置改革、并购重组创新、境外上市、公司社会责任理念深化等公司治理标志性探索直接或间接贡献了理论资源。趋同论与本土论相互制约和共同影响下的近十年中国公司治理总体呈现出一定的英美化转向,与此同时,它也将长期接受来自诸如家族文化与官僚文化、习惯性漠视少数股东利益以及股权结构过度集中等与英美经验暂时难以化约的中国本土现实的挑战。跳出趋同或者多元的概念层面的争论,尊重公司治理规则的国际共识,拓展和优化对先进经验的学习路径,专注于本土问题的解决,也许是当下应当持有的态度。     

从现代公司治理理念看新公司法的修改

公司治理是企业公司化进程中由于资本所有人的财产权与企业经营管理权的分离而产生的权力分配与制衡问题.改革开放后,我国致力于企业公司化改革,相关立法也确立了公司治理模式.但受诸多因素的影响,我国原有公司法仅规定了公司的治理结构和简单规则,却未能确立一套完整和科学的公司治理机制.新公司法针对我国公司实践中出现的问题,吸纳了国内理论研究新成果和国外成功的立法经验,在很多方面体现了现代公司治理理念.但从建立一套完整和科学的公司治理机制的角度上看,仍有待进一步完善.     

公司法人财产权与公司治理

从探讨公司法人财产权和公司治理二者关系角度入手,对中国公司法中"法人财产权"的内涵与性质加以阐释和分析。法人财产权是一种综合性的权利,包括对实物财产享有的所有权和对其他财产享有的完整权利,法人财产权的确立与归属是公司治理的基础与保障,是公司治理权力分化与制衡的出发点及归宿,而科学有效的公司治理结构的建构与确立也维系着法人财产权的地位,是实现法人财产权的组织保证。新《公司法》删除了原《公司法》关于公司中的国有资产所有权属于国家的规定,为建立现代意义上的公司制度与科学合理的公司治理结构奠定了基础。     

Company Law and Corporate Governance Renewal in Transition Economies: The Bulgarian Dilemma

The main objective of company law and corporate governance structures is to provide rules and secure efficient functioning of decision-making mechanisms that maximise the value of enterprises and safeguard interests of various stakeholders. Company laws and corporate governance models in different countries have evolved in specific historical, cultural, market and legal conditions that prevent their direct transplantation elsewhere. Assessing available experiences, former centrally planned European economies, engaged in sweeping transformations, are challenged by the need to recreate a delicate balance between investor protection and business discretion of managers to work for corporate value maximisation and social welfare. This essay undertakes an explorative discussion on the possible choices and the costs and benefits related to principalagent problem resolution in economies in transition, with special emphasis on institutions and the case of Bulgaria.     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

Corporate Financial Performance and the Use of Takeover Defenses

This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control, including the legal protection of shareholders.     

Corporate Governance: Towards a Theory of Regulatory Shift

Providing effective corporate governance regulation and controls is a contemporary challenge to all law makers. There exists a need to restore investor confidence while seeking to facilitate and encourage enterprise. This paper reflects on the traditional choice between shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance and suggests that these are inappropriate in the light of emerging news theories of the firm. Instead this paper suggests that law makers should accommodate a shift away from the traditional paradigms of these models in favour of a processual approach of governance. This would require a recognition of the tensions that exist in the regulation of corporate governance and invite the application of a collibratory process to the control of governance. The development and reform of directors’ duties and liabilities, in the UK, is provided as an illustration of the need for the recognised application of a collibratory process. Within that we also consider the application of the economists concept of ‘rent-seeking’ and the conflict between private property rights and public interference.JEL M14, D72, K22, K33     

英国行业性组织在公司治理中的作用

英国公司治理研究致力于解决因所有权和控制权分离而产生的经典代理问题,理论界和实务界分别提出了两种机制:董事会内部监督机制和"要素市场"外部治理机制来约束监督管理层,降低代理成本。在机构化持股时代,机构投资者越来越积极参与所投资组合公司的治理事务,代表机构投资者的行业性组织在一般性参与方面起着举足轻重的作用,机构监督已成为英国公司治理的新机制。     

论破产重整中的公司治理——美国经验及其借鉴

破产重整中公司治理结构在现实上必然会产生一些张力和变化,破产公司治理在宏观上与破产重整的立法目的密切相关,因此构建公司治理结构首先就要受制于破产债务人在破产重整或者破产清算之间所做出的选择。     

萨班斯-奥克斯利法的法律经济学初析

萨班斯法强化对上市公司监管的意图和其中大部分举措是必要的,正确的,类似安然会计舞弊案近年来没有再次发生,但该法是美国国会在有相当社会推助力的公司治理改革思潮的影响下实行的紧急立法,在当时的情势下,美国国会难以依据法律经济学观点对该法进行全面深入的成本效益分析,其结果是大幅度增加遵循成本、代理成本以及社会成本,从几年来实施的情况看,其遵循成本以及与上市公司变化直接和间接相关的可量化与不可量化的成本可能已超过制订者最初的预想.从法律经济学观点,评述该法的成本效益,分析探讨萨班斯法的监管方法,指出其监管方法可能是产生萨班斯效应的根源之一.在该法颁布六年后的今天,我们正面临着这次席卷全球的金融危机的冲击.如何配合经济政策实施有效的金融业法律监管,特别是金融衍生品的法律监管已成为当今的一个中心问题.也许,萨班斯法的实施情况能够给人们提供一些监管上市公司的立法经验,对今后金融业和金融产品的监管具有一定的借鉴意义和现实意义.     

法律视域外的公司犯罪治理路径

公司犯罪的治理既要有法律的对策，还应探索法律视域外的路径。在市场导向上。可采取规制市场无序竞争、完善信息合理流动机制、营建公司信用评价体系与合理分配公司社会责任的路径；在伦理规制上，可针对公司的自身伦理、经济行为伦理与环境伦理采取相应的对策。     

论债权人参与公司治理的模式——基于公司社会责任视角的考察

公司社会责任理论纠正了股东利益至上的片面理念,要求公司在开展经营活动中不仅要遵守法律法规,而且也要遵守一般的商业伦理和社会的善良风俗,尤其要注重对公司债权人的责任承担。当今各国关于债权人参与公司治理的模式主要有两种,一种是以英、美为代表的债权人间接、消极参与模式,另一种是以德国和日本为代表的债权人直接、积极参与模式。我国债权人特别是银行债权人参与公司治理的模式应从内部监督和外部制约两个方面来完善。     

Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance

The debate about corporate governance has brought to the front stage the notion of social interest or interest of the company itself as distinct of its stakeholders. French Law, judges, and CEOs use this notion with different meanings and intentions. The judges refer to it mainly to guarantee the continuity of the firm, especially when the latter faces economic difficulties; the CEOs refer to it to keep a free hand in managing the company. Shareholders see the notion as ambiguous and mostly used against their own interest. Shareholders and company interest do not merge. They differ on the industrial relations policy they induce and in the management freedom bestowed on CEOs. A reform of French Company Law currently under discussion seeks conciliation while trying to comply with the principles of corporate governance best practices.     

公司治理中职工参与制度探析

公司治理中的职工参与是我国建立现代企业制度的一个重要课题。在传统的公司治理理论中，股东是公司唯一的统治，公司的目标定位是股东利益的最大化。而职工参与作为现代公司治理结构的特点之一，在我国有着更为重要的现实意义。管理参与作为职工参与的方式之一，是社会主义市场经济的应有之义，我们不能听任其随着国有经济成分的下降而弱化；股权参与作为职工参与的所有权根据，是保障职工地位的更有效的制度保证，更有推行的迫切需要。     

论公司治理中的职工参与制——以经济民主的视角

完善公司法人治理结构是公司法领域的热点话题，国内法学家、经济学家对其论述颇多，其中职工参与公司治理的问题在近年来引起了学者的广泛关注。我国应以经济民主的视角，参考西方国家公司公司治理中贯彻经济民主的实践，构建中国本土特色的职工参与公司治理制度，完善我国立法，鼓励并保障公司职工积极参与公司治理。     

The New Insolvency Law and Governance of Corporate Legal Person

Start of the insolvency proceedings influences the two basic problems of corporate governance: restriction about the “soft budget” of corporation and “information asymmetry” between the interior and exterior person. In fact, the insolvency law is a mechanism of the potential exterior supervision. In the insolvency proceedings, most of the information is open to the creditor and to the superintendent, who is liable for protecting the interest of the creditor. The key problems of corporate governance are transparency and information disclosure. The insolvency law provides the power of supervision to the creditor when corporation insolvency. Of importance is that power is conducted by collectivity and supported by judicatory and professional organization. In June 2004, the finance committee submitted the new draft of the insolvency law to the standing committee of the national people’s congress. There are many articles about corporate governance. These articles are generally divided into two kinds, one is restriction on conduct of the supervisors in the period of the insolvency proceedings, and the other is examination of the conduct before the start of the insolvency proceedings. Translated from Jurist Review, Vol. 2, 2005 (in Chinese)     

非上市公司的公司治理实践:现状与期待——公司治理问卷调查分析

非上市公司治理实践的抽样调查表明,应进一步改善董事会的决策机制、保障监事会获得信息的权利和途径,以及进一步完善会计监查制度,以保障公司治理的高效性和安全性。     

实践《公司治理规则》的法律途径--论修订后的《德国股份法》第161条

自经济合作与发展组织(OECD)制定了《公司治理结构规则》以后,很多国家都相继制定了自己的公司治理规则。德国不仅制定了《公司治理规则》,而且通过对《股份法》的修订,从法律的角度强化上市公司对公司治理规则的遵行,以期达到完善公司治理的目的。     

公司治理问题的法学思考——对中国公司治理法律问题研究的回顾与展望

对公司治理相关问题的研究是近20年来学术界最为关注的热点问题之一，其研究范围涉及到经济学、法学、管理学、社会学等诸多领域。这一问题的研究成果直接推动了中国现代企业制度的建立和公司法的修改。以法学研究为切入点，从不同的视角，对国内多年来的公司治理相关研究成果予以条分缕析般的冷静审视和详尽评述，其内容涉及到公司治理的范畴与理念、公司治理的路径，以及公司治理研究中广受关注的公司章程、股东会决议瑕疵、董事会与董事、监事会、职工参与、中小股东利益保护等各个方面。并在此基础上，对未来公司治理研究的方法和重点进行了思考和展望。     

Legal Environment,Firm-level Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm-level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.