All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.     

Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States,Civil Society and Union Citizens

Abstract: How does the quest for legitimacy of the European Union relate to the view the European Court of Justice(ECJ) accords to Union citizens, civil society and to private actors? It is submitted that the ECJ is currently developing a jurisprudence under which citizens, as well as their organisations and corporate private actors, are gradually, and in almost complete disregard of the public/private distinction, being included in the matrix of rights and—a crucial point—obligations of the treaties. The ECJ incorporates civil society actors and citizens, beyond notions of representative (citizenship) and participatory (civil society) democracy, into the body of law and thereby reworks its own and the Union's identity. Two core aspects are explored: the first is the reconfiguration of Union citizenship as a norm which triggers the application of the substantive norms of the EC Treaty. The second aspect of this evolution is the creation of ‘private governance’ schemes, i.e. processes in which, as a rule, private action is regarded as action that has to meet the standards of the Treaty. The analysis shows that the court is disentangling itself from the State‐oriented Treaty situation and drawing legitimacy directly from citizens themselves so that judgments should be pronounced ‘In the Name of the Citizens of the European Union’.

1 European Court of Justice 20 September 2001, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‐6193, para. 31.

     

‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation doctrine. Second, the European legislator has also insisted on political safeguards within delegated legislation. Under the Rome Treaty, ‘comitology’ was the defining characteristic of executive legislation. The Lisbon Treaty represents a revolutionary restructuring of the regulatory process. The (old) Community regime for delegated legislation is split into two halves. Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power.     

Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union

Abstract:  The article establishes three propositions. First, if a constitution establishes the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as legal principles, questions of competencies are closely tied up with questions of regulatory policy. This means that the Treaty carves out a powerful role for the Court of Justice to assess the jurisdictional reasonableness of market intervention when reviewing whether the EU was legally competent to act. Second, general scepticism about courts being able to play such a demanding role in policing jurisdictional boundaries in federal systems are unjustified in the EU. The new procedure established in the Constitutional Treaty, which is likely to be included in any renegotiated constitutional settlement, involves national Parliaments and the Commission building a written record addressing the relevant policy issues on which the court can base its review. Additionally national courts serve as an external check on the Court of Justice, disciplining the Court of Justice to focus on taking competencies seriously or facing the prospect of national courts disapplying EU law on the grounds that it was enacted ultra vires. Third, even though there are some promising points of departure in its case law, the Court of Justice has not yet adopted a doctrinal framework that effectively operationalises the Treaty's commitment to subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of the common market.     

Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 'Social Deficit' of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval

The judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of December 2008 in Viking and Laval on the compatibility of national collective labour law with European prerogatives have caused quite a heated critical debate. This article seeks to put this debate in constitutional perspectives. In its first part, it reconstructs in legal categories what Fritz W. Scharpf has characterised as a decoupling of economic integration from the various welfare traditions of the Member States. European constitutionalism, it is submitted, is bound to respond to this problématique. The second part develops a perspective within which such a response can be found. That perspective is a supranational European conflict of laws which seeks to realise what the draft Constitutional Treaty had called the 'motto of the union': unitas in pluralitate. Within that framework, the third part analyses two seemingly contradictory trends, namely, first, albeit very briefly, the turn to 'soft' modes of governance in the realm of social policy and then, in much greater detail, the ECJ's 'hard' interpretations of the supremacy of European freedoms and its strict interpretation of pertinent secondary legislation. The conflict-of-laws approach would suggest a greater respect for national autonomy, in particular, in view of the limited EU competences in the field of labour law.     

The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day

Abstract: The trade union movement faces a challenge to the legality of transnational collective action as violating economic freedoms in the EC Treaty. How are disparities in wages and working conditions among the Member States to be accommodated? Are national social models protected? Does the internal market allow for trade union collective action? How does EU law affect the balance of economic power in a transnational economy? What is the role of courts in resolving economic conflicts? This article analyses the responses to these questions as referred to the European Court of Justice by the English Court of Appeal and offers some conclusions. The purpose is to highlight the different positions adopted by the old Member States and the new accession Member States as regards the underlying substantive issues, and the options available to the Court of Justice in answering the questions posed.     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

On the Role of Normative Hierarchies in Constitutional Reasoning: A Survey of Some Paradigmatic Cases

This article examines the role of normative hierarchies in constitutional argumentation. A threefold distinction between formal, material, and axiological hierarchy is employed. The correlative concepts of formal validity, material validity, and applicability are also briefly described. Within this framework, four cases are analysed: Decisions 1146/1988 and 10/2010 of the Italian Constitutional Court, and Kadi I and Opinion 2/2013 of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As a result, it is argued that axiological hierarchies are frequently used to reshape certain fundamental legal arrangements, namely, the hierarchy of sources (Decision 1146/1988 and Kadi), competence clauses (Decision 10/2010), and interpretive methodologies (Opinion 2/13).     

对作品保护平等待遇原则的研究——欧盟法院第五法庭第C-360/00号初步裁定评析

欧盟成员国意大利著作权规定,对于作品的保护期限一直持续到作者死亡后的56年.但是,另一成员国德国规定对于作品的保护期限一直持续到作者死亡后的70年.意大利籍作者的作品在德国的保护期限究竟应当为多长时间?对此,欧盟法院作出了初步裁决:如果一个成员国对其他成员国作者的著作权保护的期限少于对本国作者的著作权保护期限,则是为《欧洲联盟条约》所禁止的.换言之,欧盟成员国国民的著作权应当受到同等的保护.     

The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on numerus clausus: A matter for Community law

This article discusses the recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the numerus clausus issue, containing the first relevant pronouncement by the highest jurisdiction on the constitutional legality of the measures adopted so far by the Ministry. The Constitutional Court considers these measures in conformity with the Constitution to the extent that they implement Community law, and especially certain directives on the recognition of qualifications. Thus, Community law is deemed to provide the proper legal framework to adopt certain regulations, amongst which restrictions to access. This article argues that, in the context of litigation on access to university, Community law has been used improperly and that, in any event, a convenient solution to the issue could have been found in national law. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures—The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance

Abstract:  In the Yusuf and Kadi judgments of 21 September 2005, the Court of First Instance endorsed the Community practice of sanctioning individuals blacklisted by the United Nations (UN). It accepted that the Community uses its competence to adopt state sanctions in combination with Article 308 EC to freeze the assets of civil persons, including European citizens. The court also reduced its jurisdiction to a basic scrutiny of whether jus cogens was violated. The Court of First Instance's decisions can be criticised on various grounds. First, the application of these Articles is contrary to the wording of the Treaty and the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Further, as a consequence of the Court of First Instance's judgments, decisions of the UN Sanctions Committee become the supreme law within the EU, provided they meet the requirements of jus cogens as defined by the Court of First Instance. In addition, the individual is deprived of all fundamental rights guaranteed under European law.     

The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement

Abstract:  The Maastricht-Urteil of the German Constitutional Court of October 1993 has left a deep mark on EU law. Although some may consider it as part of legal history, the decision has never been overruled, and the ideas behind it are very much alive. This article tries to examine the legacy of that decision. From a practical point of view, the article focuses on the following issues: the current situation in Germany; the influence on other constitutional or supreme courts and on constitutional reforms in some Member States; the influence on the European Court of Justice and on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Regarding theory, three sections of the article discuss a number of widespread ' idées reçues ' contained in the Maastricht-Urteil on notions such as the state, constituent power ( pouvoir constituant ), and democracy. The next section presents the movement of legal pluralism as an attempt to come to terms with the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy. It criticises the radical versions of legal pluralism in view of the damage they may cause to essential dimensions of the rule of law. The final section reflects on the real motives behind the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy, and on possible future developments.     

How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

This review essay analyses two significant recent contributions to the debate over the reasoning of the Court of Justice (CJ). These contributions highlight the impossibility of a wholly scientific and deductive approach to attributing ‘correct’ outcomes to the Court's case‐law. At the same time, their analysis adds significant findings for the debate over the Court's possible ‘activist’ or political role. Following from these contributions, this essay makes two arguments: firstly, that the inability of the Court to anchor its reasoning solely in a deductive form of legal reasoning should encourage the CJ to engage in a more advanced ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the EU's political institutions; and secondly, that truly understanding the Court's reasoning involves a closer analysis of the institutional and personal dynamics influencing Court decisions. Understanding European judicial reasoning may require a closer look at the social and political—as well as doctrinal—context within which European judges act.     

Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Consequences of the Court's Extended Jurisdiction

Despite the explicit exclusion of its jurisdiction, the Court of Justice of the European Union exercises judicial control over Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article examines and explains how the Court's extended jurisdiction contributes to the juridification, judicialisation and constitutionalisation of the EU's compound CFSP structures. It first lays the groundwork by explaining the link between constitutionalisation and democratic legitimation and setting out the Court's formal jurisdiction over CFSP under Article 40 Treaty on European Union and Articles 218(11) and 275(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The centre piece of the article then identifies how the Court's jurisdiction has expanded since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, points at additional ‘substantive’ avenues of judicial review on the basis of access to information and access to justice, and analyses the effects of the Court of Justice of the European Union's extended jurisdiction for CFSP.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Transnational constitutionalism – conflicts-law constitutionalism – economic constitutionalism: the exemplary case of the European Union

Transnational constitutionalism is both a sociological given and a legal challenge. We observe the emergence of ever more legally framed transnational arrangements with ever more power and impact. Do such arrangements deserve to be called legitimate rule in Habermasian terms? Is it at all conceivable that the proprium of law can be defended against the rise of its informal competitors? This article opts for a third way that listens to neither the siren songs on law beyond the state nor to the defences of nation-state constitutionalism as the monopolist of legitimate rule. The proposed alternative suggests that transnational legal ordering of the European Union should build on its reconceptualization as a ‘three-dimensional conflicts law’ with a democracy-enhancing potential. This reconceptualization operationalizes the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004, preserves the essential accomplishments of Europe's constitutional democracies, provides for co-operative problem solving of transnational regulatory tasks, and retains supervisory powers over national and transnational arrangements of private governance.     

Sisters in Arms: European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces

Abstract: Recently the European Court of Justice has been shedding a new light on the limits of Community competence for defence. This article analyses the rulings in Sirdar, Kreil, and Dory with regards to two interrelated issues. First it discusses the effect of Community law on the equality of men and women in the armed forces of the Member States. Second, it deals with the impact of these decisions on the constitutional order of the European Union. The article argues that Community law has a considerable impact on defence‐related national law. Therefore the analysis ultimately contributes to a narrow aspect of the constitutional debate: the demarcation of competencies between the Member States and the Community in matters related to defence.>