The Possibility of Deontic Logic

A recent series of papers, sparked off by a note by Robert Walter (1996), has rekindled the debate over the possibility of creating a logic of normative concepts. The debate correctly centres on ways in which Jørgensen’s dilemma might be resolved (Jørgensen 1937–8), since a means of resolving that dilemma is the only apparently available way in which to establish that a logic of norms is possible. Two separate questions require answers: (i) what is the correct way in which to regard Jørgensen’s dilemma; and (ii) how should one face that dilemma? I shall argue that traditional responses to the first question are inadequate, and I shall then try to expose as flawed two recent attempts to resolve the dilemma. Finally, I shall relate my conclusions in the earlier part of the paper to the wider question of whether a logic of normative concepts is, after all, a possibility.     

Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems

Abstract .
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "legal norm" is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "systemic legal validity" is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.     

Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation*

Abstract. The current literature in the Artificial Intelligence and Law field reveals uncertainty concerning the potential role of deontic logic in legal knowledge representation. For instance, the Logic Programming Group at Imperial College has shown that a good deal can be achieved in this area in the absence of explicit representation of the deontic notions. This paper argues that some rather ordinary parts of the law contain structures which, if they are to be represented in logic, will call for use of a reasonably sophisticated deontic logic.     

On the Logic of Deontic Conditionals*

Abstract. The paper outlines the approach to the analysis of deontic conditionals taken in earlier work by Jones and Pörn, compares it very briefly with two main trends within dyadic deontic logic, and then discusses problems associated with the augmentation principle and the factual detachment principle. The author then modifies Jones and Pörn's previous system, using a classical but not normal (in the sense of Chellas) deontic modality to provide the basis for an alternative analysis of deontic conditionals. This new analysis validates neither the factual detachment nor the augmentation principles. However, influenced by the approach of James Delgrande to default reasoning, the author tries to show how a restricted form of factual detachment may be accommodated within the revised system.     

Normative Systems,Permission and Deontic Logic*

Abstract. The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic - supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics - according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong permission.*     

The Meanings of the Logical Constants in Deontic Logic

If deontic logic is to cast light on any of the normative sciences, such as legal reasoning, then certain problems regarding its logical constants must be faced. Recent studies in the area of deontic logic have tended to assume that it is our responses to the paradoxes of deontic implication which are fundamental to resolving problems with the use of deontic logic to investigate various branches of normative reasoning. In this paper I wish to show that the paradoxes are of secondary importance; that they are merely by-products of the central issue, namely the ability of certain syntactic forms to embody natural language structures used in reasoning about norms. An investigation of modal syntax is proffered as the best starting-point from which to tackle the questions that still dog the legitimacy of deontic logic. Part I provides some philosophical background to the discussion of deontic logical constants. Part II addresses in greater detail issues concerning the representation of normative concepts; and Part III offers a few remarks on the general issue of deontic logic's fruitfulness as an analytical tool.     

我国刑法中罚金刑适用之我见

罚金刑具有主刑和其它附加刑不可替代的作用。随着刑事立法的发展, 罚金刑在刑事制度中的作用越来越大。本文拟就修订的刑法中罚金刑的适用谈些看法。     

英汉道义情态跨文化研究

从英汉两种语言的句法分布、不同的文化价值取向和情态主观性的体现特点出发,可以对英汉道义情态进行跨文化对比研究。英汉道义情态的语言表达受到各自语言特点和超语言因素的影响。汉语因句子结构和词性变化的局限,多用情态助动词表达道义情态,在表达方式上要比英语单一,并因此而凸显其主观性。英汉民族文化心理特征和文化价值观的不同对英汉道义情态的表达也有影响。     

一个结合时态的法律规范推理系统TDWL’0

义务冲突问题的存在，使法律规范推理的应用功能受到限制，让其成为规范逻辑研究中必需解决的问题。通过对义务的具体语境进行分析，提出结合义务的时态因素建立法律规范推理系统TDWL’0的新主张，这不但可以有效处理义务冲突问题，并且有利于增强规范逻辑在法律实践领域中的应用价值。     

从许霆案和刘涌案看人格与人身危险性

人身危险性是影响量刑的因素,是实施宽严相济刑事政策的重要依据.而许霆案与刘涌案正好是根据人身危险性大小从宽与从严的典型案例.人身危险性的大小主要依靠人格特征来判断,人格具有整体性和可测性,共同性和差异性,自然性和社会性,稳定性和可变性,内隐性和外显性.     

Detachment and Deontic Language in Law

Some legal philosophers regard the use of deontic language to describe the law as philosophically significant. Joseph Raz argues that it gives rise to ‘the problem of normativity of law’. He develops an account of what he calls ‘detached’ legal statements to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, Raz’s account is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox semantics of deontic language. The article offers a revised account of the distinction between committed and detached legal statements. It argues that deontic statements carry a Gricean generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the rules in question reflect the speaker’s own commitments. Detached legal statements are made when this implicature is either explicitly cancelled or when the conversational context is sufficient to defeat the implicature. I conclude by offering some tentative reflections on the theoretical significance of deontic language in the law.     

宪法正当性视野下的人格尊严保障

人格尊严的规范被誉为现代宪法的核心价值,保障人格尊严既是规范宪法的必然要求,也是判断宪法正当性的重要基石。规范宪法要求涉及人格尊严的宪法规范必须完备、充分,并积极吸收国际条约中的人格尊严条款;宪法的正当性可以通过人格尊严保障的主体广泛性、标准复合性以及方式多样性等途径得以体现和证明。     

Promises,Rights, and Deontic Control

Law and Philosophy - This article argues that the notion of a promissory right captures a central feature of the morality of promising which cannot be explained by the notion of promissory...     

“无意入镜者”个人信息权益的保护——以公共场所的个人信息权益为视角

随着科技的发展,公民更加频繁地用镜头记录其日常生活。在公共场所,拍摄者有可能也将他人摄入镜头之中,构成了"无意入镜者"的情形。我国《民法典》与《个人信息保护法》并未将"无意入镜者"在公共场所中的个人信息权益与非公共场所的个人信息权益进行区分对待,无论个人信息是否属于私密,都可以得到保护。在"无意入镜者"个人信息权益与拍摄者权益平衡的问题上,应对我国《民法典》与《个人信息保护法》确立的关于个人信息保护的告知同意规则进一步做出解释。公共场所本身的属性,意味着"无意入镜者"存在自行公开个人信息的可能。对于被认定为自行公开的个人信息,拍摄者无需再取得"无意入镜者"的同意。除此之外,在公共场所中,履行告知同意义务既应当像服务提供商或者公权力机构采集民事主体个人信息一样严苛,同时可以适用默示同意的推定行为的空间而无需取得"无意入镜者"的明示同意。     

混沌理论的心理治疗观

混沌理论给我们理解真实、复杂的人的心理提供了一个新的视角。将混沌理论应用于心理治疗,不仅是对传统心理治疗观的突破,同时对心理治疗的方法也产生了重大影响。按照混沌理论的观点,人的心理的本质是非线性的,而心理的混沌状态则是导致更高阶段有序结构出现的动力学基础。     

网络有害信息法律管制之我见

互联网在促进社会进步的同时,也大大方便了有害信息的传播。由于互联网本身的特点,法律管制网络有害信息的难度大大增强。因此,要形成法治的系统功能,立法、政府监管、行业自律和技术控制要形成整体的合力。