The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law

According to the principle of full compensation, tort law seeks to put the victim in the position he was in before the tort. This position is generally considered to be the situation where the victim does not suffer any harm at all. We consider an alternative interpretation. If an injurer takes due care, the victim is faced with expected harm. This can be considered the victim's expected harm in the situation he was in before the tort. Thus conceived full compensation requires a negligent injurer to pay damages which bring the (potential) victim ex ante in the same position as the victim was in the case where the (potential) injurer takes due care. We investigate the consequences of this restated negligence rule. For due care levels larger than efficient care, the standard negligent rule may lead to excessive care, whereas the restated negligent rule always leads to efficient care. Furthermore, the activity level under the restated negligent rule is greater than the activity level under the standard negligent rule, which itself is greater than the efficient activity level. Social welfare under the restated negligence rule can either be higher or lower than social welfare under the standard negligence rule.     

Comparative Vigilance

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juriesare inclined toward division of liability between two strictlynon-negligent or "vigilant" parties. In this paper, we explorethe economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparativevigilance. We devise rules that are efficient and that rewardvigilance. Commonly used liability rules have discontinuousliability shares. We develop a liability rule, which we callthe "super-symmetric rule," that is both efficient and continuous,that is based on comparative negligence when both parties arenegligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties arevigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care.     

过失相抵与无过错责任简

过失相抵是损害赔偿法中的一项基本规则,适用于所有的损害赔偿之债。在适用无过错责任的侵权行为中,除非法律另有规定,可以适用过失相抵,这是法律之公平精神与自己责任原则的要求。在可以适用过失相抵规则的无过错责任中,对该规则的适用也应有一定的限制。首先,只有当受害人对损害的发生或扩大有重大过失时,才能适用过失相抵,减轻侵权人的赔偿责任。其次,如果受害人是不完全民事行为能力人,无论是受害人本人还是其监护人对于损害的发生或扩大有过错,对侵权人赔偿责任的减轻都不得低于全部损失的一定比例。     

法国法上的重大过错——兼论对中国法的参照意义

法国法上的重大过错包括重大过失、不可原谅之过失以及故意或欺诈性过错。重大过失主要意义在于部分场合下排除责任限制条款的适用;不可原谅之过失主要适用于劳动事故及职业病、运输损害、交通事故领域,用以加重行为人责任或削减受害人权利;故意或欺诈性过错之意义在于一般性地排除责任限制条款的适用。三种过错的识别,从侧重客观因素的考察到侧重主观因素的考察。基于法国法的相关经验,我国《合同法》第113条及《工伤保险条例》相关规定均有值得检讨之处。     

Victim interdependence in the accident setting

This paper considers the case in which potential victims affect each other by taking care. Analyzing standard liability rules, we show that the rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is in the best position to induce the efficient outcome, i.e., this liability rule ensures efficiency if victims affect each other negatively, that is care by one victim increases the accident exposure of other victims. This rule also makes attainment likely if victims affect each other positively, that is if care by one victim decreases the accident exposure of other victims. In contrast, other standard liability rules fail to induce first-best care.     

Comparative Causation

This article examines the criterion of comparative causationaccording to which an accident loss is apportioned between afaultless tortfeasor and an innocent victim on the basis oftheir relative causal contributions to the loss. To explainthe rule's structural features, we consider a scenario whereliability is allocated on the basis of causation, regardlessof fault. While this model brings to light several interestingfeatures, it also unveils the limits of such a criterion withrespect to induced activity and care levels. Next we extendthe model to consider the comparative causation rule in conjunctionwith negligence rules. Applying the comparative causation ruleunder a negligence regime induces a combination of incentivesthat is not provided by any known liability rule.     

注册会计师的过失责任:连带责任抑或比例责任

对于注册会计师的过失责任应适用连带责任还是比例责任,目前理论界存在争议,而这一问题对于注册会计师的法律风险具有相当大的影响。从西方来看,更多地采用连带责任,但近年来,以美国为代表,正表现出逐渐从连带责任向比例责任的转变的趋势。我国目前有关法律亦采用连带责任,但从我国注册会计师的执业环境来看,连带责任将使注册会计师承担过高的法律风险,因此,对于注册会计师的过失责任采用比例责任可能更为合适。     

The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence

This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, thevalidity of the efficiency justifications for the comparativenegligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests thatcomparative negligence is the superior rule in the presenceof court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flawin this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a formof synthetic "empirical" tests — that prove the potentialsuperiority of other rules. The second argument in the literaturein favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on itsalleged superior ability to deal with private information. Thisarticle develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanismsthat induce self-selection among actors. It then shows thatself-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence,but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusionsweaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal ofthe "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond.     

Contractor selection problem under extended liability

This paper solves the problem of a principal firm's choice of contracting agents under extended liability, where agents have the possibility of causing an accident and also are at risk of becoming insolvent. The analysis shows that the negligence rule for contracting agents enhances the price competitiveness of the agent who takes proper precautions and thus that the liability rule consisting of the negligence rule on contracting agents that extends liability to the principal firm is superior to other types of liability rules.     

风险自负原则在我国学校体育伤害中的合理适用

作为一项重要的减免责事由,风险自负原则更适应体育活动的特点,适合解决体育运动伤害归责问题。当前,我国学校体育伤害面临着过失认定不明、责任划分不清、公平原则过度适用等问题,以风险自负解决学校体育纠纷,具有特别意义。在学校体育伤害中正确适用风险自负原则,需分清固有风险的范围,明确各方责任,采用以客观标准为准则、辅之主观标准的过失认定方法,并将公平责任类型化,进而平衡学校、家长、学生三方的权益。     

Scope of liability: the vanishing distinction between negligence and strict liability

The duty-of-care requirement cannot be used anymore as the touchstone to differentiate negligence from strict liability because it can be found in many forms of the latter. Duty of care is smuggled into strict liability hidden under the scope of liability requirement (traditionally called “proximate causation”). As far as the scope of liability requirement is common to negligence and to many forms of strict liability, there is a fairly large common ground to both liability rules, and consequently the marginal Hand formula is applied to both rules. Indeed, under a negligence rule, the marginal Hand formula is applied twice: first to assess whether or not the defendant did breach his or her duty of care, and, second, to delimit whether or not the defendant’s behavior was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim. However, under a strict liability rule, the Hand formula is applied only once when the proximate causation question is raised. Traditional law and economics analysis has almost always taken the normative question raised by the causation requirement as given, which is a potential major problem due to the importance of scope of liability or proximate causation in legal practice. Defining the scope of liability, that is to say, the boundaries of the pool of potential defendants, is the basic legal policy decision for each and every liability rule. In the normative model presented in this paper, the government first chooses efficient scope of liability, and given the scope of liability, the government then decides the liability rule and damages that guarantee efficient precaution. In the article, most known scope of liability rationales developed by both common law and civil law systems are discussed in order to show the substantial common ground between negligence and strict liability.     

论医疗过失损害赔偿责任的适当限制规则

医疗过失损害赔偿责任与一般的人身损害赔偿责任不同,具有一定的特殊性,因此,应当确立医疗损害赔偿适当限制规则。具体的限制方法,应当限制精神损害抚慰金的赔偿数额、应当对医疗过失引起的财产损害赔偿运用原因力规则合理确定、应当特别强调定期金赔偿在医疗过失损害赔偿中的适用和应当借鉴排除间接来源规则在医疗过失损害赔偿中实行损益相抵规则。     

Proving liability for highly and fully automated vehicle accidents in Australia

This article considers how liability questions will be resolved under current Australian laws for automated vehicle (‘AV’) accidents. In terms of the parties that are likely to be held responsible, I argue that whether the human driver remains liable depends on the degree to which the relevant AV is automated, and the degree of control the human driver had over the events leading up to the particular accident. Assuming therefore that human drivers would not be held liable for the majority of highly and fully automated vehicle accidents, plaintiffs will have to establish liability on part of those who manufacture, maintain or contribute to the operation of AVs, under the claims available in Australia's product liability regime.This article then turns to the problems of proof that plaintiffs are likely to face in establishing AV manufacturer liability in negligence, or in a defective goods claim under Part 3–5 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’). Firstly, it may be difficult to determine the cause of the AV accident, due to the technical complexity of AVs and due to ongoing concerns as to the explainability of AI-decision making. Secondly, plaintiffs may struggle to prove fault in a negligence claim, or that the vehicle was defective for the purposes of Part 3–5 of the ACL. Essentially, under both actions, manufacturers will be held to a duty to undertake reasonable testing of their AVs. Given that it is currently impracticable to completely test for, and eliminate all AV errors, and due to the broader social utility the technology is likely to offer, plaintiffs may face evidentiary challenges in proving that the manufacturer's testing was unreasonable.     

侵权法上的原因力理论研究

在数人的分别加害行为不构成一个整体原因但致受害人同一损害后果之情形,需要解决多数加害人的责任分配问题。在受害人有过错而减轻或免除行为人责任之情形以及共同侵权责任人在承担连带责任后内部分割责任份额之情形,也需要相应的规则来分配责任。过去的理论比较侧重于从过错中寻找答案,而作者认为对这些情形的责任分配之基本规则主要应当是原因力,即主要依据各当事人的分别行为对同一损害后果之发生所起作用之大小确定其责任,但是这并不否认比较过错规则在一些案件中的作用。     

美国侵权法中的纯粹经济损失解读

纯粹经济损失问题是美国侵权法领域的热点问题之一,它的解决主要依据一般过失侵权规则和经济损失规则两种方法。作为占主导地位的规则,经济损失规则源于法院对缺陷产品引起纯粹经济损失案件的判决,现在已经广泛适用于一般过失侵权领域。经济损失规则的理论依据主要包括维持侵权法与合同法的界限、合同优先理论、＂诉讼洪闸＂理论和社会成本理论。经济损失规则在服务合同、过失误述等特殊情况下的适用例外,在不同的州得到不同程度的承认。总体而言,美国侵权法在纯粹经济损失问题上达成了尚不稳定的一致,相关的判例及学说仍在不断发展之中。     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.     

现代侵权行为法中过错责任原则的发展

过错责任原则是侵权行为法中一项基本归责原则,但是随着社会的发展,从近代侵权行为法到现代侵权行为法的发展中,过错责任原则也出现了一些值得注意的新发展,主要表现为过失的客观化、过失推定以及违法视为过失。     

英美法对医疗过失的判定原则及对我国的启示

过失是医疗损害责任认定中最为重要的条件,如何确定过失是医疗纠纷和诉讼中最为关键的问题。我国在该问题上的研究及实践均存有欠缺之处,而英美国家在过失判定原则中,其注意义务标准的设定和认定具有一定的合理之处,对我国医疗过失理论研究和司法实践均有借鉴作用。     

The Relationship of Alternative Negligence Rules to Litigation Behavior and Tort Claim Disposition

Recently most states have abandoned the traditional tort defense of contributory negligence and substituted a form of comparative negligence. Using an extensive data set of auto accident injury claims, we provide evidence on the relationship between negligence rules and claimants' litigation decisions to retain attorneys, file lawsuits and litigate versus settle out of court. Litigation choices appear to be rational responses to the varying incentives created by alternative tort standards. We find that in contrast to comparative negligence, claims arising under comparative negligence are associated with greater probabilities of attorney involvement, higher average award levels, and longer delays in securing payment. Only 37% of claims involving attorneys in contributory negligence states result in a lawsuit being filed compared to 49% and 47% under the pure and modified forms of comparative negligence, respectively. The study provides the first statistical evidence on the litigation costs of the new forms of comparative negligence.     

On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm

This paper defies the widely held belief concerning the unambiguous superiority of negligence in settings of judgment proofness. We analyze a set-up with bilateral harm, bilateral care, and potential judgment proofness by one party to the accident. We establish that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence can perform better than simple negligence and negligence with a defense of contributory negligence. It is shown that the former liability rule can better establish a discontinuity in individual costs conducive to inducing efficient care than the other rules.