The Legitimacy of New Risk Governance—A Critical View in Light of the EU's Approach to Nanotechnologies in Food

The objective of this article is to draw attention to legitimacy concerns raised by tendencies in EU risk regulation to supplement legislation with alternative regulatory options that are commonly captured under the umbrella term of ‘new governance’. To this end, the risk regulation of nanotechnologies in food serves as an empirical test case. The rise of nanotechnologies affects various societal actors and constitutes a highly controversial development due to the persistence of scientific uncertainties. To reach a compromise in the legislative process is, given the contradicting knowledge claims, a contentious and time‐consuming undertaking. This article, hence, shows that controversial decisions are not necessarily taken through the legislature—the European Parliament and the Council—but are settled, outside the political arena, in guidance documents or via non‐legislative acts. This article argues, relying on an understanding of legitimacy borrowed from Habermas and Scharpf, that despite ‘new governance’ ambitions in this direction the legitimacy of these measures is at best controversial.     

Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance—GMO Regulation and Its Reform

The article analyses the problems of EU risk regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through the lens of deliberative theories of EU law and governance, such as deliberative supranationalism and experimentalist governance. Previous research had suggested that the GMO issue is not conductive to deliberation within EU institutions because of its high politicisation. This article argues that another equally salient factor is the scientification of the GMO authorisation process. Scientification stands for the Commission's overreliance on epistemic legitimacy as the basis for risk management. Given the deadlock of comitology in this field, scientification is exacerbated by a reversion to top‐down regulation by the Commission. As a result, political responsibility for GMO authorisations gets lost. This article argues that both scientification and politicisation are mutually accelerative processes ultimately leading to a break down of dialogue at the EU level. This contradicts the assumption that deliberation is fostered by technocratic ‘behind closed door’ decision‐making. In the GMO case, the top‐down imposition of epistemic authority has only increased politicisation contributing to the de‐legitimation of all EU institutions involved in GMO regulation. The recent EU reform on national opt‐outs is not sufficient to address this problem. A successful reform should mitigate the negative effects of both politicisation and scientification.     

我国地方立法权扩张的政治后果分析

本文以建国以来中央——地方立法权限演变的历史说明地方立法存在的必要性。认为市场化发展和民主化改革是地方立法权扩张的动力,并以事实和数据剖析了我国地方立法发展的现状,从社会影响角度分析了地方立法权限扩张的政治后果,从保证中央立法权威、党政关系以及国家在经济发展中的作用三个方面论证了目前我国立法分权的发展还不能影响到国家的单一制结构形式,因此,应将注意力从关注"到底放不放立法权"的问题转向"如何放好地方立法权"的问题。     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.     

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.     

Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment

The object of this article is to consider the democratic legitimacy of the structure of legislative authority which exists within the EC. The analysis draws upon the work of Joseph Weiler, and accepts that different conceptions of democracy may best explain different aspects of the Community. The present article addresses only what Joseph Weiler terms the supranational aspects of the Community and suggests that a replication model of democracy can help us to understand the division of competence in this area. While changes can undoubtedly be made which will improve the operation of democracy within this sphere of the Community, and such changes are suggested in the subsequent analysis, it is argued that the republican model provides a sound basis on which to build.     

Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence

This article argues that the way EU competences are defined plays an important role in the social legitimacy problems of the EU. The fact that its powers are purposive compels the EU to privilege narrow functional goals and act in a highly focused way. This has the consequence that politics cannot be meaningful within the EU, since essential choices of direction are pre‐empted. It also has the consequence that EU law is over‐instrumental and lacks expressive qualities, alienating the public. Now that EU law is so broad, the same defects are being imposed increasingly on Member States. Without another form of conferred power, the legitimacy of the EU, and of law and government in Europe, will be increasingly undermined. The constitutional DNA, which has been a functional success for Europe, may also be its political nemesis.     

立法过程中专家咨询制度的多维面相

我国正处于全面建设小康社会的关键时期,利益多元化与利益失衡现象并存。如何有效地回应社会需求,避免立法疏误,提高立法品质,增强立法的正当性是立法主体必须面对的问题。专家咨询制度具有多维面相,从政治民主的角度看是立法民主的表现,从科学决策的角度看是立法科学的保证,从法治的角度看是立法合法的要求,从公共治理的角度看是立法正当的期待。全面认识和把握专家咨询制度的多维面相,有助于充分发挥其在立法过程中的功能和作用。     

Applying Precaution in EU Authorisation of Genetically Modified Products—Challenges and Suggestions for Reform

In this article, I endeavour to examine concrete challenges that arise with regard to implementation of the precautionary principle in the field of European Union regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Developed by the European courts into a general legal principle, precaution requires EU regulators to strike a balance between scientific and political legitimacy when taking decisions on risk‐entailing products. Following this understanding, the current GMO legislation creates precautionary governance structures that allow for a broad input into the authorisation process, not only of scientific, but also of ‘other legitimate factors’. At the same time, it can be criticised for narrowly defining precaution as a decision rule, which, if applied correctly, will lead the decision maker to the ‘right’ decision. I argue that this misconception is one of the reasons why, in the current authorisation practice, the EU institutions fail to apply the principle in a balanced way, falling into the extremes of either purely science‐based decision making or a highly politicised precautionary rhetoric. I suggest that in order not to be paralysing, precaution should be understood as a procedural principle that provides for precautionary governance, thus enabling regulators to make appropriate risk choices.     

Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government? New‐ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU

The way the EU is governed and the way such governance is perceived contributes centrally to the legitimacy of the European enterprise. This legitimacy underpins both the acceptance and the effects of EU activity. Legitimacy is a product of the way in which decisions are taken, and the nature and quality of such decisions. Pressures created by concerns about both forms of legitimacy affecting EU decision making partially explain the turn in legal scholarship away from the more traditional preoccupation with the analysis of legislative instruments and case-law, towards a more broadly based conception of governance which involves the examination of a more diverse range of processes and instruments. This article offers an analysis of the parameters of newness in governance. The overall argument is that some of the more innovative governance modes are not so new, whilst more recent and celebrated modes, although displaying elements of newness, are, perhaps, not that innovative. The focus of the new governance in the EU is largely on governing without law, rather than the more radical governing without government; hence the suggestion that we are experiencing only 'new-ish governance'. The article asks whether a limited conception of new governance is inevitable given the legitimacy constraints within which the EU operates, or whether the potential for developing a broader conception of governance, through wider participation and involvement of non-governmental governing capacities, might bolster legitimacy through both better processes and better outcomes.     

刑法修正案立法功能及其矫正

全国人大常委会制订并颁布刑法修正案,是符合我国《宪法》和《立法法》规定的,但全国人民代表大会也应成为刑法修正案的立法权主体,且拥有主要的、基本的立法权限,而全国人大常委会的立法权限则应当是次要的、部分的,由此决定两者的立法功能有着主次之分。刑法修正案应与其他刑法体例相互结合,发挥其系统性功能。因此,国家立法机关应针对呈现立法扩张态势的刑法修正案（八）草案进行功能矫正,由全国人大依法行使刑法修正案的立法权,由全体人大代表半数通过,并将现行刑法典重新公布。     

The Quiet‐Loud‐Quiet Politics of Post‐Crisis Consumer Bankruptcy Law: The Case of Ireland and the Troika

A decade after the Global Financial Crisis, many developed economies continue to strain under excessive household debt. This article presents evidence suggesting that the failure of policymakers to enact debt relief measures may lie in the superior influence of the coordinated and concentrated financial sector over legislative processes, as compared to the diffuse and disorganised interests of consumer debtors. Post‐crisis popular interest in technical issues of personal insolvency law created only a narrow space of political opportunity. Soon these questions returned to the domain of technocratic actors and corporate influence. The article examines this situation through an inter‐disciplinary case study of consumer bankruptcy reform in Ireland under ‘Troika’ supervision. Proposals initially billed as assisting over‐indebted households developed into increasingly creditor‐friendly legislation in ‘quieter’ stages of technocratic decision‐making. The stark implications of these findings highlight obstacles to resolving household debt problems and consequent risks of economic and political instability.     

WTO规则下完善我国反倾销立法的对策分析

WTO反倾销规则为各成员的反倾销立法提供了基本框架 ,我国有义务保证本国的立法与其一致。本文揭示我国在反倾销立法上的改进和仍存在的不足 ,并对入世后进一步完善我国的反倾销立法提出建议。认为完善反倾销立法 ,不能只是对原条例的简单修补 ,而应在更新立法理念的前提下 ,由最高立法机关制定既符合WTO反倾销规则又适合中国实际情况的反倾销法律。     

The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case

There is little doubt that the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit. However, the causes of this deficit and, as a consequence, the remedies are contested. This article wants to show that an important, but often overlooked, cause for the legitimacy deficit lies in the overconstitutionalization of the EU. The European Treaties have been constitutionalized by the ECJ, but are full of provisions that would be ordinary law in states. Constitutionalization means de‐politicization. What has been regulated on the constitutional level is no longer open for political decision‐making. Thus, in the EU political decisions of high salience are not only withdrawn from the democratically legitimized institutions, but also immunized against political correction. Therefore, the consequences from the constitutionalization have to be drawn: The Treaties should be reduced to those norms that reflect the functions of a constitution, whereas all the other parts have to be downgraded to the level of secondary law.     

The Symbiosis of Property and English Environmental Law – Property Rights in a Public Law Context

This article argues that environmental regimes entailing considerable administrative discretion are now serving to contextualise and partly to constitute property rights in English law. In particular, rights to use land are ‘democratised’ to varying degrees through the administration of environmental regulation, and are adapted to land‐use problems on an evolving basis. In return, property rights affect environmental regulation, through legal protections for property interests, although the nature of the discretion exercised within environmental regimes seems to determine the kind and extent of this symbiotic influence. As a result, environmental law challenges property scholars to reflect on the impact of administrative decision‐making on property rights, conceptually, doctrinally and in terms of its legitimacy. At the same time, environmental lawyers need to take seriously the nature and legal treatment of property rights in the application and analysis of modern environmental law.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

Lawyers' Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a “Political” Institution?

Do legal elites—lawyers admitted to federal appellate bars—perceive the Supreme Court as a “political” institution? Legal elites differentiate themselves from the mass public in the amount and sources of information about the Court. They also hold near‐universal perceptions of Court legitimacy, a result we use to derive competing theoretical expectations regarding the impact of ideological disagreement on various Court perceptions. Survey data show that many legal elites perceive the Court as political in its decision making, while a minority perceive the Court as activist and influenced by external political forces. Ideological disagreement with the Court's outputs significantly elevates political perceptions of decision making, while it exhibits a null and moderate impact on perceptions of activism and external political influence, respectively. To justify negative affect derived from ideological disagreement, elites highlight the political aspects of the Court's decision making rather than engage in “global delegitimization” of the institution itself.     

Developing Administrative Principles in the EU: A Foundational Model of Legitimacy?

This paper argues that administrative legitimacy has been neglected as having the potential to provide a foundation for the legitimacy of the EU institutions. The development of the administrative law‐type mechanisms within the EU is almost exclusively focused on the activities of the Member States as the main implementers of Union law. This has left an administrative gap at the level of the EU institutions, with little evidence of determinative horizontal administrative principles to be found in either the Treaties or the case‐law of two European courts. Where the courts have acted, they have adopted a sectoral and highly circumscribed approach to the development of administrative norms. The paper examines whether administrative principles can be harnessed as a mechanism for increasing the EU's legitimacy and, if so, how these principles fit with the institutions' approach to the legitimacy question. Post Lisbon, can evidence be found within the Treaties that the administrative route to legitimacy has not been entirely foreclosed? This paper proposes a model of administrative legitimacy for the EU level of administration that provides a foundation for the interconnected concepts of good governance and political legitimacy.