Bicameralism and policy performance: The effects of cameral structure in Comparative Perspective

This article addresses the relationship between cameral structure and policy performance in the member states of the OECD for the time period from 1971 to 1996. The empirical analysis shows that bicameral structures act as a significant brake on government intervention and on the expansion of the welfare state. Furthermore, bicameralism is a powerful veto player to block reforms in economic and financial policy. With the exception of the over-representation of small and sparsely populated areas, none of the advantages that classical political theory ascribes to second chambers has actually been confirmed. Bicameral structures pose no barrier to executive dominance, nor do they promote stability within political systems or improve the quality of democracy or economic performance. On the contrary, with regard to social representation, they have a strong negative effect: in comparison to systems with a single chamber, bicameralism significantly reduces women's electoral success.     

Public Support for Term Limits: Another Look at Conventional Thinking

Abstract: Americans are enamored with term limits for elected officials at all levels of government. Explanations of public support for term limits focus on partisanship, group underrepresentation, voter dissatisfaction with specific political institutions, political cynicism, and ideology. We qualify the conventional wisdom that term limits are mostly a Republican issue: Support for term limits is more a function of the incongruence between an individual's expressed partisanship and the party of their representative than of the individual's party affiliation. Further, the effect of unsatisfactory representation is strongly related to a voter's engagement with politics and willingness to monitor political affairs actively.     

Democracy and Press Freedom in Zambia: Attitudes of Members of Parliament Toward Media and Media Regulation

In Africa, colonial rule, followed often by one-party rule, resulted in the creation of authoritarian press systems. The political climate usually required journalists to align themselves with the government as propagandists rather than serve as watchdogs to inform the public. To rule Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda established a government based on a political philosophy he called Humanism, a form of African democratic socialism that valued the community over the individual and defined the role of the press as a tool for national development. Colonialism, Kaunda's Humanism and general resource scarcity have shaped the perspectives from which Zambians view press freedom. Multi-party elections in 1991 produced a democratically elected government and brought increased freedoms for the media, but the values shaped by the experiences of the elected leaders in Zambia are also important to understanding the Zambian system of press freedom. This paper quantitatively investigates support for the press and press freedom among members of the newly democratized Zambian Parliament. Regression models show that perceptions of media accuracy and fairness are not indicators of press support. The article speculates that Zambia's leaders may have to experience intergenerational value changes to overcome the past if they are to view press freedom from a more libertarian perspective.     

Public Broadcast Stations' Exclusion of Candidates from Debates: A Step Toward Political Independence?

Government-operated broadcast stations are in an anomalous situation in their continuing struggle for political independence. Not only must government stations meet the informational needs of their audiences, the stations must address the market-induced failures of commercial broadcasting. Controlling their programming is one facet of meeting these obligations. Nevertheless, government stations have been accused of violating the First Amendment when they have exercised their editorial discretion to exclude candidates from debates sponsored by the stations. This article explores political candidates' rights of access to debates in light of a United States Supreme Court decision that held that government stations may use subjective criteria to exclude candidates from debates. Although the Court's decision reinforced government stations' First Amendment rights to exercise editorial discretion, the decision did not significantly advance public broadcasting's struggle for political independence.     

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.     

Emergencies,Executive Power,and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy

This article reexamines the question of how best to restrain executive power in a political and social context that seems to favor its dramatic expansion. Modern interventionist government amidst a dynamic social environment, where the executive faces a seemingly endless series of “crises” or “emergencies,” provides a heightened scope for executive discretion. At the same time, the US‐style separation of powers, in which an independent president faces a potentially obstinate Congress, offers executives many incentives to exploit crises, real or otherwise. The works examined in this article confront, with varying degrees of success, the seemingly inexorable expansion of executive power within the US version of liberal democracy. We can only hope to deal with the many intellectual and political tasks posed by the symbiotic nexus between executive‐centered and crisis‐oriented government by confronting some tough questions about US constitutional design and the possibility of radical institutional reform. Unfortunately, even those scholars who provide plausible accounts of the US system's fragilities seem hesitant to do so.     

Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary Judiciary in Singapore

Drawing upon interviews in 1995 and 1998 and analyses of judicial appointments from 1975–1998, the article offers a new explanation of judicial-executive relations in Singapore. It attempts to explain how the judiciary in Singapore actually functions, partly by using the concept of the core executive to locate the judiciary more accurately within its political context. The study demonstrates that the judicial system has been hegenomized by a number of political and bureaucratic strategies, and interprets its role in terms of the overall goals of the political executive. The lower judiciary is an amateur judiciary and forms part of the executive government. Despite this, the contemporary superior judiciary is not wholly a creature of the political executive, as is often postulated, but rather the result of a compromise which balances the need for a reputable judiciary with the requirement by the political executive for the judicial system to assist with the control of political opposition. This negotiated balance is qualitatively different from the relationship that characterized that between the Lee Kuan Yew governments and their Supreme Courts until 1991 and reflects the maturing of hegemonic control strategies under Goh Chok Tong. The analysis was completed in 1999.     

The contribution of EU public procurement law to corporate social responsibility

This article argues that while EU public procurement law increasingly allows public authorities to take environmental and social considerations into account in public purchasing decisions, it does impose limits on the possibility for authorities to incentivise corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies through public procurement. These specific limits are the result of the EU legislator's choice to endorse the Court of Justice's ordoliberal approach to public procurement law. This approach is in tension with EU CSR policy, and more broadly, the EU's non‐economic goals such as environmental protection, the fight against climate change, human rights and social policy. It reflects a normative preference for the right of undertakings to compete for a tender over the freedom of government authorities to choose a supplier on public interest grounds even if these choices are based exclusively on a legitimate public interest and should be reconsidered.     

Government Rulemaking as a Brake on Perestroika

The Soviet political system is made up of three major institutions: the Communist Party, the parliament, and the government. Whereas the first two have changed dramatically under perestroika, the government has continued to function in more traditional ways. Most worrying to reformists, the government–the Soviet Union's "executive branch"–has used its broad rulemaking authority to impede the transformation of Soviet politics and society. This essay examines the role of governmental rules in the Soviet political and lead system It concludes, following the lead of Soviet reformists, that without a fundamental restructuring of government making authority, legal, political, and economic reform in the Soviet Union cannot be institutionalized.     

Speaking Softly Without Big Sticks: Meta-Regulation and Public Sector Audit

Australian government has undergone an "audit explosion" in the last twenty years. This article observes, first, that the constitutional function of public sector audit institutions (AIs) gives them a strong cultural commitment to the assessment of the regularity and legality of public expenditure. New functions connected with performance audit and evaluation of nonfinancial performance indicators are liable to be interpreted through the lens of these more traditional concerns. The second observation is that, if we think in terms of "regimes" of financial control, we find that AIs form only part of the overall regulatory regime. This calls into question the coherence and potential for effectiveness of regimes of financial control. However, AIs could also be conceived as "meta-regulators" with the capacity to steer the self-regulatory capacities of public sector organizations in respect of financial controls. Auditors may be effective as meta-regulators through speaking softly, even though they demonstrably lack big sticks.     

Professionals' Contribution to the Legislative Process: Between Self,Client, and the Public

How may professionals be made to contribute to legislative processes so that their expertise redounds to the public interest, despite the legislative product being likely to have a negative impact on their clients' wealth? Drawing on a case study of the legislative process that gave birth to Israel's recent (2002–2008) trusts taxation regime, based on five years of participant observation among the trust professional community, I find that to obtain the benefit of private‐sector professionals' expertise under such circumstances, government should have legislation drafted in a dispassionate, exclusive environment of experts rather than in the political arena; it should build professionals' trust in government by adopting an explicitly collegial approach; it should focus reform efforts on elements of the existing law so clearly inequitable as to make a refusal to contribute difficult to justify; and take care that the new regime creates a compliance practice lucrative enough to compensate for any loss to professionals consequent on its enactment. Once professionals' interests are suitably safeguarded, their loyalty to clients appears surprisingly brittle and government can successfully combine with them in the public interest.     

Delegation and Defensive Legislative Strategies in Brazil

In the course of the legislative process, legislators choose how much policy discretion to delegate to the executive branch. Uncertainty about policy outcomes and bureaucratic intentions weighs heavily in such decisions. In Brazil, executive control over the budget creates uncertainty about the availability of discretionary spending, which results in comparatively high levels of delegation in the legislature's direct‐spending decisions. I demonstrate that sidelining the legislature from the budget in order to insulate government spending from political pressures diminishes the value of legislative work in Brazil and reinforces historical patterns of policymaking centered on the federal executive.     

政府横向权力配置新论——从结构功能主义角度的分析

在＂结构功能主义＂权力分立观看来,政府的立法权、司法权和行政权分别是一种政治性、法律技术性和兼具政治性与行政技术性的权力;为了实现相应的政府职能,这些权力应当由相应的政治性的机关（立法机关）、法律技术性机关（司法机关）和兼具政治性与行政技术性的机关（行政机关）来行使;为了保证各政府机关能够＂称职＂地行使相应的权力,各政府机关的组成人员、运作规则应当具备不同于其他机关和人员的制度设计。尽管当今世界各国存在国家性质和政权体制的不同,但是三种权力的性质却是永恒不变、超越国家界限和超越意识形态的。我国当前权力机关（民意机关）和司法机关（法院）的行政化倾向不利于国家职能的有效实现。     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

Emergency powers,anti-corruption,and policy failures during the COVID-19 pandemic in Puerto Rico

This paper explores how the use of emergency powers by the US and Puerto Rican governments exacerbated the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and manufactured the conditions for furthering the multilayered economic, legal, political, and humanitarian crisis affecting Puerto Rico since 2006. The paper discusses three cases. First, it examines how the multiple declarations of the state of emergency, and its constant renewals, produced contradictory public health policies. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Puerto Rican government has issued over 90 executive orders aimed at addressing the emergency, producing an unclear, contradictory, and unequal emergency management policy. Second, the paper focuses on the impact of the passing of Law 35 on April 5, 2020, which imposed severe penalties on those who disobeyed executive orders. As a result, hundreds of Puerto Ricans were arrested, fined, and incarcerated for violating the issued order. Third, the paper studies how, citing the presence of corruption, the Puerto Rican government implemented anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies that made it more difficult for those most in need of it—mainly poor and racialized individuals, as well as immigrants and working women—to access Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. Thus, the paper argues that emergency policies designed to address the pandemic, punitive governance, and anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies undermined Puerto Rico's capacity to handle the pandemic, exacerbated its impact, and created an unequal recovery scenario.     

Politics in a State of Nature

Aristotle thought we are by nature political animals, but the state‐of‐nature tradition sees political society not as natural but as an artifice. For this tradition, political society can usefully be conceived as emerging from a pre‐political state of nature by the exercise of innate normative powers. Those powers, together with the rest of our native normative endowment, both make possible the construction of the state, and place sharp limits on the state's just powers and prerogatives. A state‐of‐nature theory has three components. One is an account of the native normative endowment, or “NNE.” Two is an account of how the state is constructed using the tools included in the NNE. Three is an account of the state's resulting normative endowment, which includes a (purported) moral power to impose duties of obedience. State‐of‐nature theories disagree about the NNE. For Locke, it included a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Recent social scientific findings suggest a quite different NNE. Contrary to Locke, people do not behave in experimental settings as one would predict if they possessed a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Moral reproof is subject to standing norms. These norms limit the range of eligible reprovers. The social science can support two claims. One, is that the NNE is (as Aristotle held) already political. The other is that political authority can be re‐conceived as a matter of standing—that is, as the state's unique moral permission coercively to enforce moral norms, rather than as a moral power to impose freestanding duties of obedience.     

Government‐operated public broadcast stations and candidates' access to political debates

Under the Communications Act's equal opportunity requirement and FCC interpretations of that provision, licensees can choose which political candidates to include in a broadcast debate. However, a 1994 decision by a federal appellate court has clouded the ability of public broadcast stations licensed to government entities to exclude particular candidates. According to the court, such stations, as a form of state action, generate a limited First Amendment right on the part of candidates to demand inclusion in a broadcast debate. This article examines the unique constitutional questions raised by the court's decision. An assessment of the competing rights and interests of candidates, stations licensed to government entities and the public indicates that such stations should provide access to political debates.     

The economic transformation of Eastern Europe: the case of Poland

This article identifies the main features of Poland's radical transition to capitalism-stabilization program, trade liberalization, and privatization reform. The ‘shock therapy’ adopted by Poland in 1991 is presented as the most effective approach, though not without political risk. In fact, the major threat to Poland's transition process is the emergence of well organized ‘interest groups’ putting increasing demand on the government to relax financial restrictions and re-open large-scale subsidization. These political pressures have already caused a slowdown in the privatization program, so that there is a possibility of the renewal of rapid inflation. Several methods for accelerated privatization, including the distribution of vouchers and setting up investment funds to manage portfolios of shares, are discussed in detail.