Legitimacy is Not Authority

The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, I believe they both misunderstand the nature of legitimacy. In this essay I argue that the legitimacy of a law is neither necessary nor sufficient for its normative authority, and I argue further that the need for legitimacy in law arises regardless of whether the law is coercively enforced. I thus articulate a new understanding of the legitimacy and authority of law.     

Politics in a State of Nature

Aristotle thought we are by nature political animals, but the state‐of‐nature tradition sees political society not as natural but as an artifice. For this tradition, political society can usefully be conceived as emerging from a pre‐political state of nature by the exercise of innate normative powers. Those powers, together with the rest of our native normative endowment, both make possible the construction of the state, and place sharp limits on the state's just powers and prerogatives. A state‐of‐nature theory has three components. One is an account of the native normative endowment, or “NNE.” Two is an account of how the state is constructed using the tools included in the NNE. Three is an account of the state's resulting normative endowment, which includes a (purported) moral power to impose duties of obedience. State‐of‐nature theories disagree about the NNE. For Locke, it included a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Recent social scientific findings suggest a quite different NNE. Contrary to Locke, people do not behave in experimental settings as one would predict if they possessed a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Moral reproof is subject to standing norms. These norms limit the range of eligible reprovers. The social science can support two claims. One, is that the NNE is (as Aristotle held) already political. The other is that political authority can be re‐conceived as a matter of standing—that is, as the state's unique moral permission coercively to enforce moral norms, rather than as a moral power to impose freestanding duties of obedience.     

Legal Truths and Falsities*

This paper has a two‐pronged thesis. First, laws should be understood as making factual claims about the moral order. Second, the truth or falsity of these claims depends as much on the content of the law as on whether the lawmaker has political authority. In particular, laws produced by legitimate authorities are successful as laws when they guide subjects' behavior by giving subjects authoritative reasons for action. This paper argues that laws produced by legitimate authorities accomplish this task (i) by being on their own sufficient to change the moral state of affairs, which (ii) thereby generates for people new moral reasons to act that they can read right off of the legislation.     

Trial by Slogan: Natural Law and Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex

Norman Kretzmann's recent analysis of the natural lawslogan ``lex iniusta non est lex' (an unjust law is nota law) demonstrates the coherence of the slogan andmakes a case for its practical value, but I shallargue that it also ends up showing that the sloganfails to mark any interesting conceptual or practicaldivision between natural law and legal positivistviews about the nature of law. I argue that this is ahappy result. The non-est-lex slogan has been used toexaggerate the extent of disagreement about the natureof law and has diverted critics of natural law theoryfrom recognizing that the main disagreement betweennatural lawyers and legal positivists centres ontheories of practical reason and how they affect ourunderstanding of the relationship between law andmorality. This extends the debate about the nature oflaw somewhat beyond the traditional boundaries ofphilosophy of law, but these boundaries are due inpart to the diversion created by debate over thenon-est-lex slogan. Recognizing that the non-est-lexslogan fails on its own to mark any interestingpractical or conceptual division between natural lawtheories and legal positivism should therefore focusand encourage debate on matters of genuine substancebetween these outlooks. The disagreement, however, mayturn out to be primarily metaphysical and explanatoryand not normative in nature.     

Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law

Legal positivism dominates in the debate between it and naturallaw, but close attention to the work of Thomas Hobbes – the``founder' of the positivist tradition – reveals a version ofanti-positivism with the potential to change the contours of thatdebate. Hobbes's account of law ties law to legitimacy throughthe legal constraints of the rule of law. Legal order isessential to maintaining the order of civil society; and theinstitutions of legal order are structured in such a way thatgovernment in accordance with the rule of law is intrinsicallylegitimate.I focus on Hobbes's neglected catalogue of the laws of nature.Only the first group gets much attention. Its function is tofacilitate exit from the state of nature, an exit which Hobbesseems to make impossible. The second group sets out the moralpsychology of both legislators and subjects necessary to sustaina properly functioning legal order. The third sets out the formalinstitutional requirements of such an order. The second and thirdgroups show Hobbes not concerned with solving an insolubleproblem of exit from the state of nature but with theconstruction of legitimate order. Because a sovereign is bydefinition one who governs through law, Hobbes's absolutism isconstrained. Government in accordance with the rule of law isgovernment subject to the moral constraints of the institutionsof legal order.     

The Regular Practice of Morality in Law

Abstract. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.     

Secret Law and the Value of Publicity*

Abstract. Revelations in the United States of secret legal opinions by the Department of Justice, dramatically altering the conventional interpretations of laws governing torture, interrogation, and surveillance, have made the issue of “secret law” newly prominent. The dangers of secret law from the perspective of democratic accountability are clear, and need no elaboration. But distaste for secret law goes beyond questions of democracy. Since Plato, and continuing through such non‐democratic thinkers as Bodin and Hobbes, secret law has been seen as a mark of tyranny, inconsistent with the notion of law itself. This raises both theoretical and practical questions. The theoretical questions involve the consistency of secret law with positivist legal theory. In principle, while a legal system as a whole could not be secret, publicity need not be part of the validity criteria for particular laws. The practical questions arise from the fact that secret laws, and secret governmental operations, are a common and often well‐accepted aspect of governmental power. This paper argues that the flaw of secret law goes beyond accountability and beyond efficiency to the role that law plays, and can only play, in situating subjects’ understanding of themselves in relation to the state. Secret law, as such, is inconsistent with this fundamental claim of the law to orient us in moral and political space, and undermines the claim to legitimacy of the state's rulers.     

自然法抑或实证法——理性与意志视野下的美国宪法

在看待美国宪法观念中,一种观念将美国宪法视为自然法或高级法的摹本,认为美国宪法的特征在于人类凭借理性发现和宣布了自然法或高级法;另一种观念则将美国宪法视为纯粹的人民主权的意志表达。这两种观念都存在一定的曲解:美国宪法其实和古典自然法之间存在着巨大的断裂,是一种现代自然权利体系之下的人为宪法,但这种宪法并不是未经筛选的人民意志的表达,而是理性引导之下的意志表达。美国宪法的这种特征要求当代的法律人政治家既不能神话宪法,也不能轻视宪法,而是要求将宪法视为政治科学的教材,通过理解与对话来提升理性,从而思考宪法在当代的挑战。     

A Reasonable Balance of Law and Sentiment: Social Order in Democratic Taiwan from the Policeman's Point of View

Taiwan's political democratization has engendered a contradiction in its legal regime: consolidation of rule of law at the macro-institutional level is matched by the persistent marginalization of legal authority in ground-level social practices. This article uses an ethnographic study of neighborhood police to explore certain practical and structural elements involved in maintaining this contradictory sociopolitical order. I examine some of the processes through which state authority is invoked and applied to the policing of public space, focusing on the ideals of legitimacy that animate these processes. The argument of the article is that historical and cultural factors embodied in contemporary Taiwan's "idea of police"—exemplified in the trope of a balance between reason, law, and sentiment—are crucial to understanding how solidification of the rule of law within state institutions is kept within the boundaries of a social sensibility that does not take law as the last word.     

Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

Legalist Fictions and the Problem of Scientific Legitimation

The author analyzes fictions of legal positivist philosophy and their role in the scientific legitimation of modern law and political domination. The original function of legalist fictions was the establishment of legal science, which would be autonomous and independent of other social sciences and public morality. In the second half of the 20th century, legal positivist philosophy has nevertheless adopted the fiction of the just law as its scientific legitimation fiction and incorporated moral and political discourse into legal science, again.
Legal positivism and its critiques within the discourse of the sociology of law and critical legal science keep the image of a hierarchical and centralized legitimation of law. Paradoxically, current legal philosophy and theory searching for a universally valid legitimation scheme is full of many different legitimations and reveals their growing plurality and the impossibility of establishing one sovereign legitimation scheme in the current social, theoretical and political condition.     

The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation*

According to contemporary legal positivism, law claims to create obligations. In order for law to be able to create obligations, it must be capable of having authority. Legal positivism claims that for law to be capable of having authority, it only has to meet non‐moral or non‐normative conditions of authority. In this paper it is argued that law can only be capable of having authority if it also meets certain normative conditions. But if something must meet certain normative conditions in order to be capable of having authority and if it must be capable of having authority in order to be law, then it is only law if it is conceivable that it meets these normative conditions and this can only be ascertained by means of an evaluation. Therefore, legal positivism's claim that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations (the separation thesis) is incompatible with its claim that law must be able to create obligations. Further, an analysis of Hart's concept of law shows that it is not only possible that the identification of the law depends on moral evaluation, as Hart claims, but that it is conceptually necessary that it does.     

规范性文件行政复议制度

行政复议法第 7条确立了规范性文件行政复议制度。然而 ,该制度在操作过程中存在较大困难 ,导致该制度形同虚设 ,给行政法治实践制造了诸多新的问题。其根本原因在于 ,规范性文件行政复议的理论困乏。有必要在行政法理论上给规范性文件行政复议一个初步的定位 ,如对公民完全诉愿权的肯定、对规范化层级行政监督权的肯定、对全面司法审查的隐含肯定等。通过定位合乎逻辑地建立起理性的规范性文件行政复议制度 ,该制度的实质在于使规范性文件行政复议独立化、全面化 ,并强化复议机关审查的权威性。     

紧急权力法及其理论的演变

紧急权力法律制度是一种内在矛盾的组合,其古代形态是古罗马专政制度和中止一般执法活动制度,近代形态主要是戒严法和围困状态法,现代则以紧急状态和紧急权力的规范形式兴盛于全球。西方的法律与紧急权力理论有例外型和规训型两类,前者主张紧急权力居于法律之外,后者主张紧急权力应受法律的充分规训。法律与紧急权力共有五种理论模式:调适、例外法、惯常、政治动员和权威专政。除惯常模式以外,其他四种模式都在中国出现过。中国现行紧急权力制度遵循政治动员、调适和例外法三种模式,未来发展是建立融合政治动员和例外法模式优点的调适模式制度。     

Law and the Evolutionary Turn: The Relevance of Evolutionary Psychology for Legal Positivism

In the present essay, I consider the relevance of evolutionary psychology (EP) for legal positivism, addressing the two main traditions in the legal positivist family: (1) the tradition I identify with the works of Hart and Kelsen and characterize as “normativist,” as it tries to describe law as a purely or, at least, as an essentially normative phenomenon, while remaining true to the ideal of scientific objectivity and value‐neutrality; (2) the tradition I broadly refer to as “legal realism,” which equates law with adjudication and “legal science” with the task of explaining judicial behaviour.     

Models of Reason, Types of Principles and Reasoning. Historical Comments and Theoretical Outlines

Abstract. The author distinguishes between scientific and prudential reason (practical wisdom) in Aristotle with reference to the nature of the principles assumed as premises, and to the method of inference. In the history of thought these two models of reason are elieved not only to be proper to science and, respectively, ethics, but also, at times, to be the scientific model proper to ethics (for example, in natural law doctrines) and the prudential model proper to science. Mixed models are also given in the history of thought: scientific-prudential (for example, in Thomas Aquinas) and prudential-scientific. Furthermore, some aspects of the relationship between authority and reason are examined.     

The Legality of Law

Abstract. In this paper I outline various different objects of investigation that may be picked out by word “law” (or its cognates). All of these objects must be investigated in an integrated way before one can provide a complete philosophical explanation of the nature of law. I begin with the distinction between laws (artefacts) and law (the genre to which the artefacts belong). This leads me to the distinction between the law (of a particular legal system) and law (the genre of artefacts). Then I discuss the contrast between law (the genre of artefacts) and law (the practice). Finally I comment on legality as the name of an ideal for laws and legal systems to live up to. I commend H. L. A. Hart's explanation of the nature of law for investigating these various objects in an integraed way, while nevertheless respecting the distinctions among them. I also criticise some of R. M. Dworkin's work for failing to respect the same distinctions.