Svabhāvavāda and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata: A Historical Overview

svabh??va (own being) and yad?chh?? (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatk??ra?a) in the ?vUp. But in later works, such as A?vagho?a??s poems, svabh??va is synonymous with yad?chh?? and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabh??va is said to be inhering in the Lok??yata materialist system, although in which sense??cosmic order or accident??is not always clearly mentioned. Svabh??va is also a part of the S???khya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabh??va as cosmic order became a part of Lok??yata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century S??ya?a-M??dhava aka Vidy??ra?ya could categorically declare that the C??rv??ka/Lok??yata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabh??va, identical with yad?chh??, continued to circulate along with k??la, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabh??va continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puru?ak??ra (manliness or human endeavour).     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Rāmānuja's theory of Karman

Conclusion Performance of duty [dharma], without attachment to results, eradicates evil action [karman] and thus promotes the growth ofbhakti, which is the sole means of attainingmoksa. Although associated with such internal (mental or intellectual) activity asdhyna, jñna, vedana andvidy, bhakti nevertheless demands the external practice of daily and occasional activity —karman — prescribed by Scripture. If one neglects to perform thekarman enjoined for one's caste and stage of life, one's mind will be corrupted and will be incapable of attaining knowledge (meditation) of the personalbrahman. If one'skarman is associated withbhakti, one can attain the Lord through His grace. In Rmnuja's scheme,karman is thus not only a prerequisite for the origination of meditation on the Lord, but also for acquisition of perfect knowledge (para-bhakti) of Him. Obviously,karman, unlikebhakti, is not a direct means of salvation: it is only an auxiliary. Rmnuja, however, emphasizes thatkarman should be continued as long as one lives. Rmnuja's discussion ofkarman thus provides a theoretical foundation to his position that the karma-mmmsa — the philosophical study and interpretation of ritual activity — is indispensable to the inquiry intobrahman.     

Yogācāra Substrata? Precedent Frames for Yogācāra Thought Among Third-Century Yoga Practitioners in Greater Gandhāra

The connection between early yogācāras, or practitioners of yoga, and later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda philosophy has long preoccupied scholars. But these connections remain obscure. This article suggests that a text that has received little attention in modern scholarship, the Saddharmasm?tyupasthānasūtra, may shed light on aspects of early yogācāra contemplative cultures that gave rise to some of the formative dynamics of Yogācāra-vijñānavāda thought. I show how traditional Buddhist meditative practice and engagement with Abhidharma theoretics come together in the Saddharmasm?tyuasthānasūtra to produce a novel theory of mind that mirrors many of the philosophical problematics that early and late Yogācāra-vijñānavādins confronted and attempted to work out in ?āstric detail.     

The Three Natures and the Path to Liberation in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Thought

This paper provides a new interpretation of the three natures theory of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought by means of an examination of the path theory associated with it, which has not been previously examined in scholarly literature. The paper first examines this path theory in a number of foundational texts to show that the widely accepted pivotal model is not in fact the three natures model that predominates in foundational Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda literature. Second, the paper offers a new interpretation of the three natures theory as providing a new causal model of the arising of suffering, and a corresponding theory of its cessation. This new causal model both makes possible the continued use of the kind of dharma analysis that Abhidharma thought employs to provide a causal analysis of the arising of suffering, and also couches such dharma analysis within the Mahāyāna framework of the emptiness of dharmas.     

Shared Typologies of Kāmaśāstra,Alaṅkāraśāstra and Literary Criticism

This paper brings kāmaśāstra into conversation with poetics (alaṅkāraśāstra) and modes of literary criticism associated with Sanskrit literature (kāvya). It shows how historical intersections between kāvya, kāmaśāstra, and alaṅkāraśāstra have produced insightful cross-domain typologies to understand the nature and value of canonical works of Sanskrit literature. In addition to exploring kāmaśāstra typologies broadly as conceptual models and analytical categories useful in literary-critical contexts, this paper takes up a specific formulation from the kāmaśāstra (the padminī-citriṇī-śaṅkhinī-hastinī type-casting of females) used by a twentieth century literary critic to frame the relationships between canonical poets of Sanskrit literature.     

Two Investigations on the Madhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī

Purpose of the article is to provide support for the contention that two fundamental treatises representing the teaching of Madhyamaka, viz. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī, were designed to establish and justify a metaphysical tenet claiming that no particulars of any kind can exist on some level of final analysis and that this was the only primary concern of those works. Whereas the former text is in the first place dedicated to providing proofs of the central metaphysical thesis the major objective of the second treatise lies in a defense of the claim against possible objections. A correlate of this view regarding the content of those two works is on the one hand that the philosophy of the founder of the Madhyamaka-school essentially consists in a metaphysical teaching implying a radical rejection of a stance propagated in earlier Buddhist schools according to which objects of ordinary experience could be reduced to or explained by the existence of other sorts of particulars that can be theoretically postulated. On the other hand the exegesis advocated in the article implies that theorems pertaining to the nature of language or the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality are not at all a predominant issue in the pertinent texts and presumably were not a major matter of concern of early Madhyamaka in general. Accordingly matters pertaining to questions of semantics attain relevance at best in the form of objective consequences which the metaphysical doctrine might entail. The paper focuses on the second chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās as well as the segment of the Vigrahavyāvartanī which deals with the first major problem, represented by the verses 1–4 and 21–29. The reason is that a detailed and thoroughgoing investigation of these two textual passages is suited to disprove a contention voiced by Western scholars who suppose that the teaching of the founder of Madhyamaka embodies a particular claim pertaining to the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality.     

Is Word-Meaning Denoted or Remembered? Śālikanātha’s Cornerstone in Defence of Anvitābhidhāna

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The role of memory in one’s cognition of sentential meaning is a pivotal topic in Indian philosophical debates on the nature of language. The...     

The nyāya concept of Svābhāvika sambandha: A historical retrospect

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

Naming the Seventh Consciousness in Yogācāra

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Yogācāra School presents the seventh consciousness as the internal mental faculty of the sixth consciousness. According to the Hīnayāna...     

Conceptuality and Non-conceptuality in Yogācāra Sources

This paper investigates the Yogācāra notions of “conceptuality”, represented by terms such as vikalpa, on the one hand, and of “non-conceptuality” on the other. The examination of the process of thinking as well as its absence has played a central role in the history of Yogācāra thought. The explanations of this process provided by Yogācāra thinkers in works such as the Yogācārabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and the Mahāyānasa?graha appear to be mainly concerned with the contents and the components of thoughts, categorizing them into different classes. These lists are far more than arbitrary collections. Instead they are meant to represent exhaustive summaries of a person’s conceptual experience. The first part of the paper focusses on conceptuality, exploring (mostly Abhidharmic) definitions of the relevant terms and ideas. The second part is mainly an investigation of the question which parts of the Buddhist path to liberation were considered to involve conceptual activity and which were described as non-conceptual.     

A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipak?a) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.     

Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.     

Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images (*alīkākāravāda) and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

The paper aims to clarify Ratnākara?ānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with ?āntarak?ita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākara?ānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike ?āntarak?ita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākara?ānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (dharmanairātmya) and his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument for demonstrating the falsehood of mental images. On the other hand, the last section investigates into his defense of the alīkākāravāda against ?āntarak?ita?s severe criticism of it. Here, too, we can find his tactical usage of the neither-one-nor-many argument, or more precisely, one of its variants: the neither-identical-nor-different argument. Through the above procedure, we can see how Yogācāra philosophy survived in the late period of Indian Buddhism by blending the Madhyamaka opponent?s argument with its own thought.