All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search of an uncharted right

The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ensuing introduction of the right to data protection as a new fundamental right in the legal order of the EU has raised some challenges. This article is an attempt to bring clarity on some of these questions. We will therefore try to address the issue of the place of the right to the protection of personal data within the global architecture of the Charter, but also the relationship between this new fundamental right and the already existing instruments. In doing so, we will analyse the most pertinent case law of the Court of Luxembourg, only to find out that it creates more confusion than clarity. The lesson we draw from this overview is that the reasoning of the Court is permeated by a ‘privacy thinking’, which consists not only in overly linking the rights to privacy and data protection, but also in applying the modus operandi of the former to the latter (which are different we contend). The same flawed reasoning seems to be at work in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Therefore, it is crucial that the different modi operandi be acknowledged, and that any upcoming data protection instrument is accurately framed in relation with Article 8 of the Charter.     

EU Equality Law: Three Recent Developments

This article analyses three recent developments within the EU that have an impact on EU equality legislation: the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Proposal to extend the material scope of the provisions against discrimination on the ground of religion and belief, disability, age and sexual orientation beyond the area of employment, and the case law of the European Court of Justice regarding the EU Equality Directives of 2000. It will assess whether these three developments have led to improved protection against discrimination for people in the EU.     

The United Kingdom Right to Request as a Model for Flexible Work in the European Union

Flexible work, the practice of giving employees some control over their working time, can transform the modern workplace. Once the province of scattered national legislation, the European Union is now considering the inclusion of flextime rights in the Working Time Directive (WTD), the leading EU legislation related to work time. In this article, we propose that the European Commission should adopt a right to request flexible work as part of the WTD. Adoption of the right to request flexible work would significantly alleviate the challenges employees face in maintaining work–life balance. The right to request flexible work can also provide benefits to employers by increasing employee loyalty and productivity. Finally, adoption of the right to request flexible work into the WTD would improve the overall effectiveness of the EU's employment law framework in an increasingly fast‐paced and competitive society.     

Disability,Reasonable Accommodation and the Employer's Obligations: Nano Nagle School v Daly

The duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation is a well-established component of disability discrimination legislation, yet it continues to generate litigation in many jurisdictions. This article examines a recent decision of the Irish Supreme Court concerning the extent of the employer's obligations where, after having acquired an impairment, a worker is no longer able to perform all of the functions of her original job. The case also addressed the question of what procedures should be followed by an employer when considering the provision of reasonable accommodation, as well as the need for courts to justify awards of compensation. The issues in Irish law were intertwined with obligations arising from EU and international law instruments. Therefore, the decision is pertinent for other jurisdictions confronting similar challenges.     

“A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”? A Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law

In this paper I approach the European Union Treaties (Rome and Maastricht) and the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence from a Marxist standpoint. I argue that the treaties and case law of the European Union (EU) revolve around the rights of things (commodities), rather than of people. People primarily gain rights within the EU by demonstrating that they embody exchange value and are therefore personified commodities; people are not accorded rights merely for being human. In essence, the treaties and case law have enshrined Marx's notion of commodity fetishism, which Marx asserted to be a social mystification, into transparent law. Focusing on the grand scheme of the treaties' jurisdiction in this manner also illuminates the role of the court as it struggles to balance the demands of capital's self-valori-zation with fundamental human rights. I then consider the consequences of this balancing act for the EU integration process. I argue that this phenome'non as a whole also carries implications for EU civil society and for notions of legal equality among persons.     

Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty?

This analysis explores in detail various aspects of the possible legal impact of ‘British’ Protocol No 30 (the so‐called opt‐out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). On the basis of a legal appraisal, it concludes that the Protocol is not in any way to be understood as a substantial derogation from the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the EU or as an ‘opt‐out’ from the Charter in a substantial sense. Nevertheless, its significance is definitely not to be underestimated. Its adoption as a source of primary law enshrines a legally binding interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, an interpretation of its horizontal provisions. In Article 1(2) and Article 2, the Protocol in fact confirms that the application of the Charter cannot lead to a change in the existing competencies framework. These provisions are of a declaratory nature and apply to all Member States. In Article 1(1), the Protocol is of a constitutive nature since it rules out an extensive interpretation of what can be considered national legal acts adopted in the implementation of EU law only for those States signed up to the Protocol. This specifically means that if, in the future, as part of the application of the Charter, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) has a tendency to subsume a certain area of national legislation under the ‘implementation of Union law’ outside the field of implementing standards, in the spirit of the Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi judgment (and subsequently allow their reviewability with respect to their conformity with the Charter), such action would be admissible only for those Member States that have not acceded to the Protocol. However, the Protocol cannot exclude the continued application of the general principles of law instead of the positively constituted fundamental rights in the Charter by the ECJ.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Civic Citizenship Reintroduced? The Long‐Term Residence Directive as a Post‐National Form of Membership

This paper presents how the Long‐Term Residence Directive has created a status that can be considered as a subsidiary form of EU citizenship. This key revolution has been operated by EU law since this status escapes direct control by Member States that are obliged to grant EU long‐term residence and the rights associated with it to third‐country nationals (TCNs) fulfilling the conditions in the Directive. This represents a fundamental development and may be distinguished from the acquisition by TCNs of national/EU citizenship, which constitutes a prerogative of State sovereignty. Indeed, the recent cases by the Court of Justice analysed below confirm this truly post‐national form of membership and have profound implications for the relationship between borders, territory and population in the EU.     

Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District 1997: implications for employer liability in employment references

The California Supreme Court in the case entitled Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District 1997 ruled that employers may be liable for negligently and intentionally misrepresenting an employee's suitability in their employment references. The case concerned a 13‐year‐old girl student who was allegedly molested by a school vice‐principal, Robert Gadams, in his office. Gadams had been the subject of charges of sexual impropriety involving female students in his three previous teaching posts. The plaintiff sued Gadams, and a range of defendants who had written references recommending him for employment. The Court found that the defendants could be held liable for fraud and misrepresentation because the facts allegedly known about Gadams were not disclosed in the references. The article examines the consequences of the ruling for the provision of employment references. In particular, it examines the ‘no comment’ option, whereby employers only confirm basic employment details about employees.     

Brave New Fathers for a Brave New World? Fathers as Caregivers in an Evolving European Union

This article focuses on the role that fathers play when it comes to family responsibility, in particular the care of young children, and how EU policy and legislation have contributed to it. This is important for several reasons. From a theoretical perspective, access to care for fathers represents the other side of the access to paid employment for mothers debate, and completes the deconstruction of the two‐sphere structure. From a more practical point of view, including fathers in the work/family life reconciliation debate is essential for the achievement of important EU policies, such as employment and gender equality. Although society is ready for a change, the legislator has been slow to address it, thus fathers are still missing from the EU's reconciliation policy and legislation. Against this background, the decision of the Court of Justice in Roca Álvarez has, potentially, laid down the basis for a new model of fatherhood.     

The Territorial Scope of Employment Legislation and Choice of Law

Traditionally, the determination of the territorial scope of the statutory rights conferred by employment legislation forming part of English law has been regarded as an issue entirely disconnected from the choice‐of‐law process. Indeed, this view formed the basis of the key decision addressing the problem of territoriality, Lawson v Serco, decided by the House of Lords in 2006. After presenting the current state of the law with regard to the territorial scope of employment legislation, this article takes a critical look at Lawson v Serco. It is argued that the ‘European’ choice‐of‐law rules must have a greater importance for determining the territorial scope of employment legislation and, consequently, that the approach pursued in Lawson v Serco is no longer correct, if it ever was, and should not be followed in the future.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums

In the wake of the extensive scrutiny of the human rights credentials of the new Member States under the EU pre-accession conditionality, which itself was riddled with paradoxes, this article considers a rather unexpected irony thrown up by the accession of these countries. It is that the post-communist constitutional courts, which have been applauded for vigorous protection of fundamental rights after the fall of the Communist regime that was marked by nihilism to rights, have come rather close to having to downgrade the protection standards after accession, due to the new constraints of supremacy of EC law. The article will consider the sugar market cases of the Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts and of the Estonian Supreme Court, which appear to add weight to the concerns that have been voiced in some older Member States about the fundamental rights protection in the EU. Indeed such concerns were recently also addressed in the concurring opinions to the Bosphorus judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.     

Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’

Governing bodies have significant autonomy in the organisation of professional sport in the EU, a situation now supported by Article 165 TFEU. However the post‐Lisbon competence for sport does not grant any exemption for practices that infringe fundamental freedoms or competition law; such infringements can only be justified where they are a proportionate response to an inherent need in that sport. The football ‘transfer system’ has been the subject of a series of EU law challenges, but continues to place obstacles in the way of the free movement of players between Member States and may restrict the ability of most clubs to compete for the elite players. Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions in transfer dispute cases have entrenched this situation, and recent evidence casts doubt on both the ability of the authorities to justify the current system and the 2001 decision by the European Commission to sign it off as being an acceptable balance between the rights of the stakeholders.