Courts and health policy: judicial policy making and publicly funded health care in Canada

The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provided political actors with the opportunity to make rights-based challenges to public policy decisions. Two challenges launched by providers and consumers of health care illuminate the impact of judicial review on health care policy and the institutional capacity of courts to formulate policy in this field. The significant impact of rights-based claims on cross-jurisdictional policy differences in a federal regime is noted.     

Why Does the Federal Government Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Charter of Rights Cases? A Strategic Explanation

Despite the impressive body of scholarship dedicated to analyzing litigation involving the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada, there remains an incomplete understanding of why these cases come to the Court. Notably absent from the literature is sustained analysis of why governments, the most frequent class of appellant, bring Charter cases to the Supreme Court. Recent work has addressed the decision to appeal by the U.S. federal government and state attorneys general and provides an excellent theoretical starting point. I use case data collected from interviews with federal government lawyers and law reports to test whether the Canadian federal government's decisions to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Charter cases are also "procedurally rational." I conclude that these decisions are primarily shaped by strategic considerations related to policy costs, case importance, reviewability, and the prospect of winning on appeal, regardless of the party in power. In the process, the article further extends the application of strategic decisionmaking theory with regard to law and courts beyond judicial behavior, and beyond the U.S. context.     

Fitness to be sentenced: a historical, comparative and practical review

A Canadian judicial decision recently held that a person convicted of a criminal offence who suffered a substantial deterioration in mental condition since the trial could be found unfit to be sentenced. The court based its conclusion on both historical arguments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There are compelling justifications for recognizing this concept. The paper looks at the history of fitness and how the sentencing phase became disconnected from claims of unfitness in the late 19th century. It then considers theoretical justifications based on fairness, viewing sentencing as a moral discourse, and the effect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Because of the number of practical questions that need to be addressed before implementing a concept of unfitness at the sentencing stage, the paper looks at some common law jurisdictions for guidance: Australia, New Zealand, and the American states of New York, Illinois, Connecticut, and Ohio. From these comparisons comes the idea of a "provisional cap". That is, the recognition of unfitness at the sentencing stage should be followed by a form of sentencing that takes into account the gravity of the offence, the prosecutor's position, any relevant aggravating or mitigating factors that can be adduced, and then results in a "provisional" sentence, whether custodial or community-based, which stays in effect until the offender becomes fit. The paper ends with a model that incorporates this approach while providing both that offenders will be confined, if necessary, in hospitals and not prisons, and also that the dispositions will be reviewed annually to ensure that the least restrictive and least onerous sanctions are imposed.     

Privative clauses in special education legislative schemes: are they constitutional under the Canadian Charter?

This paper suggests that privative clauses in the enabling statutes (Education Acts) governing provincially appointed special education appeal tribunals (SET) are unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is suggested that ‘final and binding’ SET decisions about children's designation as special needs and their educational placement infringe upon the Charter rights of both parent and exceptional child. The standard for judicial review of SET decisions, given a privative clause, is whether the decision is ‘patently unreasonable’ while ‘correctness’, according to case law, is the appropriate standard when finally determining fundamental rights. Parents of exceptional children in practice have recourse to the courts regarding only procedural rather than substantive issues regarding SET decisions due to the high deference the courts afford any administrat ive tribunal protected by a privative clause. The very high judicial review standard of ‘patently unreasonable’ rather than ‘correctness’ is not consistent, furthermore, with the child's ‘best interests’ or in meeting international obligations to disabled children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.     

The role of popular mobilizations in the struggle for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

In spite of the best efforts of Canada's first ministers, the debate leading up to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was characterized by the mobilization of several demanding factors of the Canadian populace. The Hays-Joyal hearings on the Constitution provided a formal setting for popular participation, and in fact drew submissions from a variety of special interest groups. Significantly, the minimal class representation in both the formal and informal processes of Charter construction was in stark contrast to the militant interventions of women's and Native's lobbies. In spite of the resistance of the politicians, and in spite of internal weaknesses, these movements were able to impose some elements of their collective demands on the otherwise limited vision of rights in Canada. Their voices were in fact heard over the din of federal-provincial squabbling.This article is a revised version of a Chapter from the author's Doctoral Dissertation, entitledCanada's Passive Revolution: The Charter and Hegemonic Politics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, August 1992.     

Charter rights & health care funding: a typology of Canadian health rights litigation

Canadian health consumers have increasingly relied on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to demand certain therapies and reasonably timely access to care. Organizing these cases into a 5-part typology, we examine how a rights-based discourse affects allocation of health care resources. First, successful Charter challenges can, in theory, lead to courts granting and enforcing positive rights to therapies or to timely care. Second, courts may grant a right to certain health services; however, subsequently government fails to deliver on this right. Third, successful litigation may create negative rights, i.e. rights to access care or private health insurance without government interference. Fourth, consumers can fail in their legal pursuit of a right but galvanize public support in the process, ultimately effecting the desired policy changes. Lastly, a failed lawsuit can stifle an entire advocacy campaign for the sought-after therapies. The typology illustrates the need to examine both legal and policy outcomes of health right litigation. This broader analysis reveals that the pursuit of health rights seems to have caused largely a regressive rather than progressive impact on Canadian Medicare.     

The Development of EU Case‐Law on Age Discrimination in Employment: ‘Will You Still Need Me? Will You Still Feed Me? When I'm Sixty‐Four’

This article addresses the development of age discrimination law in the Court of Justice and concludes that there is a marked difference in the level of discretion given to Member States in cases relating to mandatory retirement policies. The article will critique the approach of the Court of Justice to the legitimate objective test and the proportionality test in retirement cases. It will also argue that the decisions of the Court of Justice to date have all involved cases with very similar factual scenarios, and the article hypothesises how a different conclusion might be reached in cases with different factors. It also considers the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on such cases. The article concludes by arguing that mandatory retirement policies may no longer be compatible with EU law and that there is a need to move towards more flexible retirement policies.     

The body and the body politic: assisted suicide under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The author critically examines the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. Canada (A.G.) and concludes that the judges in the majority have adopted a legislative public policy mandate rather than carrying out a judicial function that accords with established canons of Charter interpretation and analysis. The author contends that the majority read section 7 of the Charter as enshrining the sanctity of life as an intrinsic, abstract societal value necessary to protect the ill and the vulnerable and not as an expression of the individual's entitlement to autonomy against the State. She also contends that the majority's section 1 analysis was unduly deferential not only to the Canadian Parliament but also to the legislatures of the majority of Western democracies. This came at the expense of considering the legislative pattern of abandoning laws against suicide, the common law respect for individual autonomy and quality of life regarding refusal of and withdrawal from medical treatment, and the widespread lax enforcement of laws critical of the majority's reliance on "slippery slope" reasoning, which subordinated Ms Rodriguez's Charter rights to apprehend wrongdoing by the medical profession and the presumed best interests of society as a whole. The author recommends that legislators who address the question of assisted suicide look to methods of regulating access to assisted suicide that reflect respect for individual dignity under the Charter at the end of life, and reject any reading of the majority judgment that suggests that legislators are free to regulate or to proscribe assisted suicide according to abstract notions of the sanctity of life, pragmatic views of the public good, or the false consciousness or perceived vulnerability of the terminally ill or disabled.     

A bad trip for health-related human rights: implications of Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957

Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957; [2011] HCA 34 arose from a prosecution for drug trafficking brought under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic). The Australian High Court held that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (the Charter) validly conferred a power on the Victorian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal to interpret legislation in a manner consistent with a defined list of human rights. By a slim majority it also held that the Charter validly created a judicial power to "declare" a law inconsistent with one or more enumerated human rights. In reaching its decision, however, the majority supported a narrow interpretation likely to undermine the intended capacity of the Charter to act as a remedial mechanism to reform laws, regulations and administrative practices which infringe human rights and freedoms. Although Momcilovic involved interpretation of a specific State human rights law, the High Court judgments allude to significant problems should the Federal Government seek to introduce a similar charter-based human rights system. Momcilovic, therefore, represents a risk to future efforts to develop nationally consistent Australian human rights jurisprudence. This has particular relevance to health and medically related areas such as the freedom from torture and degrading and inhuman treatment and, in future, enforceable constitutional health-related human rights such as that to emergency health care.     

E-mail,the Police,and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Retooling Our Understanding of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Cyber Age

As in other jurisdictions, technological innovation continues to impose burdens on our understanding of the reasonable expectation of privacy in Canada. Recently, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench was forced to weigh the privacy rights guaranteed under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms against Her Majesty's interest in collecting electronic evidence (in order to facilitate criminal proceedings against an individual who was accused of using e-mail to gain possession of child pornography). For the first time ever in Canada, the Court's analysis focused specifically on the technological aspects of e-mail. Although technological enthusiasts applaud this approach, it has resulted in a decision which, if followed, is sure to render ineffectual the ability of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to protect the privacy of Canadian e-mail users against overly intrusive police wire-tap interceptions. Upon a detailed review of this decision (within the context of an overview of the Canadian jurisprudence on unreasonable search and seizure), the author of this paper argues that the traditional test for sanctioning privacy protection must shift away from a merely technological analysis of the actual security offered by the communications medium in question. The author submits that the proper analysis should focus instead on the reasonable Canadian e-mail user's typical understanding and perception of the medium.     

The dilemmas of citizenship: Limitations on canadian legal rights

Since the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian courts have been burdened with a disproportionate number of cases concerned with issues arising from the newly introduced legal rights. However, the transition from the Canadian crime-control model to the American-style due-process model is far from complete. The rights of the accused are consistently deemed to be secondary to the aim of reinforcing the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Canadians' legal rights will in fact remain limited as long as judges continue to decide cases on the basis of harm done to the justice system, rather than individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a joint session of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association and the Canadian Law and Society Association, Leamed Societies Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario; June 7, 1993. I thank attending colleagues for their useful feedback. I am also grateful for the comments of Piers Beime.     

The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality

This article analyses the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Horizontal effect has been an integral part of the Union's application of fundamental rights, especially in the field of equality. However, the codification of fundamental rights in the Charter raises important questions as to how horizontal effect will continue to apply in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the Court's reticent rulings in cases such as Dominguez and Association de Médiation Sociale. This article argues that the emphasis on prior approaches to horizontal effect in recent rulings fails to address the profound constitutional issues that the horizontal effect of a fundamental rights catalogue raises, which concern the role of private responsibility within the developing constitutional order of the European Union. It therefore calls for a more systematically theorised approach towards the horizontal application of fundamental rights under the Charter framework.     

The Process is the Punishment: Criminal Libel and Political Speech in Canada

The number of U.S. states with criminal libel laws has been steadily declining since the 1960s, and the offense has been struck down in the United Kingdom and several former British colonies. In Canada, however, criminal libel not only continues to exist, but appears to be enjoying a resurgence, albeit one that has flown beneath the radar of Canadian lawyers, judges, and journalists, who frequently assert that criminal libel prosecutions are rare. The research reported in this article found more than 400 prosecutions since the beginning of the twenty-first century. While many of these cases were brought against people who disseminated sexual slurs against former romantic partners, in a substantial number of cases criminal libel law was used to punish citizens’ political speech, particularly speech critical of police or other justice system officials, a use wholly inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.     

"Chartering" the limits of involuntary psychiatric treatment in Victoria: interpreting the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) in the age of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)

The Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) allows for individuals with a serious mental illness to be treated on an involuntary basis either in a psychiatric hospital (on an involuntary treatment order) or in the community (on a community treatment order). The Act also establishes the Mental Health Review Board with the authority to review these orders within eight weeks of those orders being made and at least once every 12 months thereafter. This article analyses a recent decision of the board, Re Appeal of 09-085 [2009] VMHRB 1, in which the appellant challenged a decision of a psychiatrist to extend his community treatment order for a further 12 months. The appellant argued that aspects of his involuntary treatment under the Act amounted to "cruel, inhuman or degrading" treatment and therefore breached his right to freedom from "cruel, inhuman or degrading" treatment under s 10(b) of Victoria's recently enacted Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). Thus, the board was asked to consider whether the definition of "treatment" under the Act was compatible with the rights and freedoms enacted by the Charter. This was the first time that a Victorian court or tribunal had considered the impact of the Charter on involuntary psychiatric treatment. The decision was also a prelude to the Victorian Government's announcement that it would comprehensively review its mental health legislation, now the oldest in Australia. As this case highlights, in determining the future direction of mental health legislation and policy in Victoria, the Charter has been crucial.     

搜查与隐私权保护——加拿大宪法与美国宪法第4修正案之比较

<加拿大权利与自由宪章>第8条赋予了公民反对不合理的搜查和扣押的权利.与美国宪法第4修正案的发展历程类似,经由加拿大最高法院的判例解释,<宪章>第8条确立了隐私权的宪法保护.基于对美国宪法判例的批判和借鉴,<宪章>第8条下的隐私权在判断标准、保护范围方面体现了本国特色.第8条下隐私权具备的丰富内涵,不仅得益于加拿大最高法院确立的隐私权旨在促进的诸项基本价值,也与加拿大较为宽泛的非法证据排除规则有关.     

Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

Mental health law and the EU: the next new regulatory frontier?

Over the last decade the EU's engagement with health law and policy has rapidly increased and there is now a growing body of literature highlighting this evolution and the impact of legal and regulatory structures in this area. In contrast the specific impact of EU law and policy in relation to the area of mental health remains the subject of comparatively little engagement. The aim of this paper is to examine whether mental health law and policy will become a major site for EU policy and law in the future. It examines the development of EU policy in this area. It sets this in the context of related legal developments such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the new EU Patients Rights Directives. It suggests that while it might be at present premature to envisage that a single body of EU mental health law itself may be unlikely that nonetheless the EU presents what is a potentially very influential site for regulation, law and policy in this area in the years to come.     

So Long,Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen,Adieu: Brexit and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

The UK's relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can at best be described as strained, at worst, actively hostile. The Charter was, for the UK, an unwanted child, unloved at birth, grudgingly tolerated during life, and willingly surrendered at the death of the UK's membership of the EU. This article charts the UK's approach to the Charter from its inception to its demise in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It considers, in particular, the UK's so‐called opt out from the Charter in Protocol 30 and the confusion that has been generated as a result. It then argues that the Charter will have a legacy effect in the UK, primarily through the renaissance of the general principles of law.     

Rights-based mental health legislation and the right to be treated

Following the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons with Mental Illness (1991), the Australian Government released the National Mental Health Policy in 1992. Pointedly, the Report of the National Inquiry into the Rights of People with a Mental Illness in 1993 was critical of the failure of a number of Australian jurisdictions to adequately protect the rights of people with mental illness. A subsequent critique of the capacity of mental health law and policy to respond to current and future challenges of community-based care suggested that while Australian legislation and policies may pass human rights scrutiny in principle, there was insufficient focus on the monitoring processes to ensure implementation and adherence to those measures. The new Commonwealth Attorney-General has foreshadowed the development of a Charter of Rights to create a framework for legislators and regulators when drafting legislation to cover "aspirations" such as the recognition of fundamental human rights. However, it is argued that the dilemma of how best to care for and protect those afflicted with mental illness as well as the public who may be affected by violence or offending by those persons with untreated mental illness, will not be resolved by resort to a didactic Charter of Rights, however idealistic or well intentioned.     

The Sinews of Peace: Rights to Solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Abstract. This article examines the provisions on social and economic rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. After a conceptual clarification of the terms “fundamental rights” and “rights to solidarity,” three main claims are made. First, not all rights to solidarity are granted the status of fundamental rights in the Charter, in contrast with the treatment of the right to private property. Second, positive law does not justify such an approach. An analysis of the sources of the Charter clearly indicates that the right to private property is not a proper fundamental right as Community law stands. Third, rights to solidarity could be construed as a repository of arguments that Member States and regions could invoke when claiming an exception to the four fundamental freedoms.