Political Liberalism, Marriage and the Family

Can and should political liberals recognize and otherwise support legal marriage as a matter of basic justice? In this article, we offer a general account of how political liberals should evaluate the issue of whether the legal recognition of marriage is a matter of basic justice. And, we develop and examine some public reason arguments that, given the fundamental interests of citizens, could justify various forms of legal marriage in some contexts. In particular, in certain conditions, the recognition of some form of legal marriage may be the best way to protect the fundamental interests of women as citizens in freely chosen associations. Or, it may be that, in certain conditions, to secure the social conditions necessary for gays, lesbians and bisexuals to be free and equal citizens, some form of legal marriage can or should be recognized.     

The polyamorous threat to nonmarriage

Some progressive U.S. Cities and several Canadian provinces now provide mechanisms for polyamorous families to register as such with state authorities. More than a million people in the United States identify as polyamorous and many more practice some form of ethical nonmonogamy. This article suggests that the growing recognition of polyamory poses a substantial threat to a simultaneous development in family law: the call by scholars and the Uniform Law Commission for courts to enforce a more implied contract, implied partnership and equitable claims in the context of non-marital conjugal cohabitation. Non-marital cohabitants argue that courts can infer marital-type commitments to share property from the fact of conjugal cohabitation. They argue that their nonmarriage should entitle them to the kinds of relief afforded to divorcing couples. But polyamorous conjugal cohabitation involves very different norms and commitments to reliance, partnership and transparency than does traditional marriage. Marital-type relief maps awkwardly, if at all, onto the reality of most polyamorous relationships. By bringing into relief that which we cannot necessarily assume about conjugal cohabitation, the recognition of polyamory questions what many proponents of more legal protection of nonmarital couples ask courts to assume about conjugal cohabitation, namely that it gives rise to reasonable reliance on a status quo and an intent to share property. Moreover, by providing a means for polyamorous households to register their relationships, polyamorous registration normalizes the idea of non-marital relationship registration. The more normal and expected it is for people who want rights as some form of family to register their familial intent with the state, the harder it is for those who have not so registered to argue that the state must treat them as some sort of family.     

What’s Inside and Outside the Law?

In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn on the distinction between state action and the acts of non-state actors. I argue that legal doctrines should turn solely on normative considerations and should not turn on answers to conceptual questions. However, the doctrines I discuss appear to turn on the conceptual question regarding what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law. I show how each of these doctrinal areas appears to raise this conceptual issue, and I explain how the doctrines might or might not escape being held hostage to conceptual controversy.     

Realizing ‘Political’ Neutrality

Political liberalism is supposed to be neutral among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, including comprehensive liberalism. Some critics think that it implicitly assumes comprehensive liberalism. I argue that political liberalism has the resources to avoid this charge and chart a path between sectarianism and unprincipled accommodation that allows a range of policy justifications onto the political agenda of a scope that honors the ideal of neutrality.     

The asymmetries of pouvoir constituant mixte

This invited Symposium contribution discusses Jürgen Habermas's celebrated and influential theory of pouvoir constituant mixte. In that account, the EU is constituted by a double authority: that of citizens of nation‐states and that of (the same) citizens as subjects of the future EU. I argue that Habermas's theory is convincing only if the two constitution‐building subjects—citizens of the already constituted nation‐states and citizens of the to‐be‐constituted European Union—are positioned symmetrically in relation to each other. I argue that Habermas's construction is, in fact, asymmetrical. I identify three asymmetries: of expectations, of function and of origins. I argue that these asymmetries place the role of citizens as members of nation‐states in such an advantageous position that it would be irrational for citizens in their other capacity, as citizens of the to‐be‐constituted European Union, to participate in the constituent authority in the terms proposed and defended by Habermas.     

The Indirect Influence of Politics on Tort Liability of Public Authorities in English Law

The scope of negligence liability of public authorities in English law has undergone significant changes in the Post‐World War II period, first expanding and then, from the mid‐1980s, retracting. This article tries to explain why this happened not by focusing, as is common in most commentary on this area of law, on changing doctrinal “tests,” but rather by tying it to changes in the background political ideology. My main contention is that political change has brought about a change in the law, but that it did so by affecting the scope of the political domain, and by implication, also the scope of the legal one. More specifically, I argue that Britain's Post‐War consensus on the welfare state has enabled the courts to expand state liability in accordance with emerging notions of the welfare state without seeming to take the law into controversial territory. When Thatcher came to power, the welfare state was no longer in consensus, thus making further development of legal doctrines on welfarist lines appear politically contentious. The courts therefore reverted back to older doctrines that seemed less politically charged in the new political atmosphere of the 1980s.     

What is so special about [free] speech?

Legal and political philosophers (e.g., Scanlon, Schauser, etc.) typically regard speech as special in the sense that conduct that causes harm should be less subject to regulation if it involves speech than if it does not. Though speech is special in legal analysis, I argue that it should not be given comparable status in moral theory. I maintain that most limitations on state authority enacted on behalf of a moral principle of freedom of speech can be retained without supposing that speech is entitled to a degree of protection not afforded to (most) other forms of conduct. My argument questions some standard assumptions made by philosophers about the relationship between moral and legal principles.     

Punishment Drift: The Spread of Penal Harm and What We Should Do About It

It is well documented that the effects of legal punishment tend to drift to the family members, friends, and larger communities of convicted offenders. Instead of conceiving of punishment drift as incidental to legal punishment, or as merely foreseen but not intended by state authorities and thus permissible, I argue that efforts ought to be undertaken to limit or ameliorate it. Failure to confine punishment drift comes perilously close to punishment of the innocent and is at odds with other legal doctrines and broader penal practices that hold offenders, and offenders alone, responsible for their crimes. Numerous arguments urging tolerance of punishment drift, or more assertively defending it, are examined and found wanting.     

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

This article responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith that argued that the consistent application of generic liberal principles requires that same‐sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith's article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same‐sex partners. In correcting these flaws I tentatively propose a Voltairean argument in favour of same‐sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same‐sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Public Reason,Neutrality and Civic Virtues

In this paper I argue that political liberalism is not the “minimalist liberalism” characterised by Michael Sandel and that it does not support the vision of public life characteristic of the procedural republic. I defend this claim by developing two points. The first concerns Rawls's account of public reason. Drawing from examples in Canadian free speech jurisprudence I show how restrictions on commercial advertising, obscenity and hate propaganda can be justified by political values. Secondly, political liberalism also attends to the identity, and not just the interests, of its citizens. It attempts to cultivate certain virtues of character. But it does so in a way that does not entail the acceptance of a comprehensive or perfectionist doctrine. Rawls's defence of neutrality of aim does not mean the state should be neutral towards all the views its citizens espouse. I conclude that political liberalism shares little with the doctrine Sandel claims is embedded in American law.     

The Possibility and Value of Coherence

It would seem axiomatic that the law should be coherent in the sense that it should be consistent and correspond to an underlying justificatory rationale. Indeed, coherence would appear to be a good, in and of itself, and give rise to other benefits which are desirable in a legal system. In this article, I explore the value and achievability of coherence. I argue that it is largely inevitable that common law legal systems are not coherent, but that each legal system will comprise areas of coherence. I examine whether it is possible to improve coherence through legislation or adjudication but conclude that any coherence attained through the former may be temporary and achieving coherence through the latter is difficult both in principle and in practice. In looking at the value of coherence, I contend that while coherence may have various intrinsic and instrumental benefits, its value should not be overstated; many of the benefits which coherence is said to provide are present in legal systems where it is lacking; other benefits depend on the awareness of a country’s citizens and I suggest that, outside of extremes, citizens are probably unaware of the degree to which their legal system is coherent. Moreover, full coherence may lead to characteristics which are undesirable in a legal system.     

Theoretical Disagreement,Legal Positivism,and Interpretation

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.     

Tolerance and Liberal Justice

Tolerance, the mere “putting up” with disapproved behaviour and practices, is often considered a too negative and passive engagement with difference in the liberal constitutional state. In response, liberal thinkers have either discarded tolerance, or assimilated it to the moral and legal precepts of liberal justice. In contradistinction to these approaches I argue that there is something distinctive and valuable about tolerance that should not be undermined by more ambitious, rights‐based models of social cooperation. I develop a conception of tolerance as a complementary principle and an interim value that is neither incompatible with, nor reducible to, rights‐based liberalism. Tolerance represents a particular, non‐communitarian expression of the general dictum that the liberal state, having released its citizens into liberty, rests on social presuppositions it cannot itself guarantee.     

Alf Ross on the Concept of a Legal Right

In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound.     

Some Questions Concerning the Responsibility of Medical Personnel

The solution of one of the most important social tasks of Soviet society — that of securing the further development of the state health-care system and securing the right of citizens to health care — presupposes increasing the effectiveness of the means for the legal protection of this personal benefit.     

Punishment,Fair Play and the Burdens of Citizenship

The fair-play theory of punishment claims that the state is justified in imposing additional burdens on law-breakers, to remove the unfair advantage the latter have enjoyed by disobeying the law. From this perspective, punishment reestablishes a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among all citizens. In this paper, I object to this view by focusing on the case of civil disobedience. I argue that the mere illegality of this conduct is insufficient to establish the agent’s unfair advantage over his lawabiding fellows, hence the imposition of additional burdens upon him through legal punishment. I articulate a broader account of citizens’ fair-play duties, able to capture disobedience as well as obedience to the law. While claiming that some law-breakers may not be treated as free-riders, I also gesture at the fact that some law-obeying citizens may not be ‘playing fair’: in some cases, a failure to engage in civil disobedience represents a failure to do one’s own part within the cooperative scheme of society.

     

认识全球化的"问题化"进路——对中国法学"全球化论辩"中理论问题的追究与开放

对全球化本身做"问题化"理论处理首先便要求对中国法学的"全球化论辩"进行分析和反思,因此在本文中,我首先把中国法学之"全球化论辩"的"四步骤套路"转换成了一种参照性背景;其次通过把"全球化是经济全球化还是多维度的全球化"与"法律全球化"这两个问题转变成了对具体问题的分析进路,对中国法学的"全球化论辩"进行一般性的厘清和分析:在对中国法学两种对立的全球化论说的分析中,我批判了那种"经济主义"的全球化论说,认为全球化是一个多维度的既依凭民族国家又脱离民族国家的社会变迁过程;同时,本文也分析了与上述两种全球化学说紧密联系的中国法学学者有关"法律全球化"争辩之"肯定"、"否定"和"折衷主义"三种观点及其背后不同的理据。     

Very Long Engagements: The Persistent Authority of Bridewealth in a Post‐Apartheid South African Community

This article examines the persistent authority of lobola, the customary practice for forming marriages in many South African communities. South African marriage rates have sharply fallen, and many blame this on economic challenges completing lobola. Using in‐depth, qualitative research from a village in KwaZulu‐Natal, where lobola demands are the country's highest and marriage rates its lowest, I argue that lobola's authority survives because lay actors have innovated new approaches for pursuing emerging desires for marriage via lobola. I argue that dyadic narratives of marriage increasingly circulate alongside “traditional” extended‐family narratives, especially among the young women who strongly support lobola while yearning for gender‐egalitarian marriages. My argument synthesizes actor‐oriented analyses of legal pluralism with Ewick and Silbey's theorization of lay actors’ role in producing legality to illuminate how lay actors contribute not only to the form and content of different legal systems, but also to the reach of their authority.