Post‐Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away

This article analyses the critical yet elusive notions of state neutrality, secularism and religious coercion under the European Convention in light of the European Court of Human Rights recent decision in Lautsi v Italy. We contend that the real concern in the Italian crucifix case was not the infringement of the school pupils’ religious freedom nor the proselytising or coercive effect of the ‘passive’ religious symbols. Rather, opponents of the longstanding symbols were animated by desire for strict religious equality, a notion that is, correctly in our view, not guaranteed under the Convention. Lautsi has significantly cleared the conceptual undergrowth surrounding state neutrality and the varieties of secularism, reined in the elastic notion of religious coercion and eschewed attempts to squeeze the constitutional diversity of European religion‐state frameworks into a strict American‐style separationist mould. The Convention jurisprudence on freedom of religion has finally come of age.     

MARRIAGE IN CANADA—EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?*

On July 20, 2005, the Canadian Civil Marriage Act became law, extending equal access to civil marriage to same‐sex couples while respecting religious freedom. This article briefly traces the distinctive juridical factors that have contributed to the legislation: the constitutional comity or dialogue among Parliament, the courts and the people resulting from the constitutional entrenchment of a Charter of rights and freedoms; the growth of the substantive concept of equality in Canadian law; and the impact of the constitutional division of powers and the nature of Canadian federalism. Together, these factors contributed to a constructive debate centered on respect for diversity.     

Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights judgment in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom dealt with the increasingly controversial questions of religious symbols at work and the clash between free conscience and anti‐discrimination norms. In a change of approach, it held that the right to resign could no longer be seen as adequate protection for religious freedom and that workplace norms that restrict religious liberty must satisfy a proportionality test. However, it accorded a wide margin of appreciation to States in reconciling freedom of conscience and freedom from discrimination, ruling that the importance of non‐discrimination could justify a failure to exempt a religious individual from complying with a policy forbidding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.     

“Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin's Soul,Self, and Society: The New Morality and the Modern State

Ed Rubin's provocative new book, Soul, Self, and Society: The New Morality & the Modern State (2015), attempts to capture the relationship between morality and the state. It maintains that that there are three comprehensive moral systems: the morality of honor that characterized feudal relationships and survives today in failed states and urban gangs, the morality of higher purposes that linked individual self‐worth and state legitimacy to a shared belief system, and the morality of self‐fulfillment that entrusts development of a moral code to each individual and sees the role of the state as creating the conditions for individual flourishing. This review essay argues that Rubin's work is critically important in explaining that the idea of self‐fulfillment combines public tolerance with private discipline, and rests on obligation as well as freedom. It suggests, however, that if the new morality were to truly take hold, it would weaken the links between citizen and state that make the system possible.     

Compromise and religious freedom

Compromise is surprisingly common in the context of religious freedom. In Holt v. Hobbs, for example, a Muslim prison inmate challenged his prison’s no-beards policy on religious freedom grounds. He proposed, and was eventually granted, a compromise that allowed him to grow a half-inch beard rather than the full beard normally required by his beliefs. Some have argued that such a compromise is inconsistent with the purpose of religious freedom, which is to guard against interference with an individual’s religious practices. Accepting a compromise, after all, may require a significant modification to one’s default practices. But this paper argues that compromise can be appropriate if the purpose of religious freedom is to foster the inclusion and acceptance of all people in a diverse political community. Moreover, the benefits of compromise may lend support to the inclusion-based conception of religious freedom as against the more traditional non-interference conception.

     

Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm,Clothing or Symbols,and Refusals to Serve Others

Is there a middle path between the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which rarely requires accommodation of a religious individual's beliefs, and a ‘general right to conscientious objection’, which would exempt religious individuals from all anti‐discrimination and other rules interfering with manifestations of their beliefs? The author argues that failure to accommodate is better analysed as prima facie indirect discrimination, to highlight the exclusionary effects of non‐accommodation on religious minorities, and that the presence or absence of direct or indirect harm to others (or cost, disruption or inconvenience to the accommodating party) could guide case‐by‐case assessments of whether the prima facie indirect discrimination is justified. The author then applies a harm analysis to the examples of religious clothing or symbols and religiously motivated refusals to serve others, recently considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom.     

Law and the Image of a Nation: Religious Conflict and Religious Freedom in a Brazilian Criminal Case

This article examines a criminal trial in Brazil that touched on the imagined role of religion in public life. The case involved a Protestant minister accused of religious discrimination and of vilipending an image of Nossa Senhora Aparecida, the patron saint of Brazil. The prosecution argued and the court concurred that the minister's iconoclastic verbal and physical gestures endangered the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Yet the defense claimed that his actions, stemming from his religious convictions, expressed this same principle of freedom. Different visions of religious free-dom are at stake in the case as well as how such freedom relates to the rights and private lives of citizens. Placed in the history of church-state relations in Brazil, the case raises the problem of interpreting concepts of religious pluralism, religious freedom, and freedom of expression in Brazilian law.     

Social Justice Issues in the Management of Religious Diversity in Australia

New religions, both those arriving by way of the cultural baggage of migrants and those which are part of the panoply of recent New Religious Movements and the New Age, have challenged and changed Australia's religious demography, but have been incorporated into Australian society in a comparatively peaceable way due to Australia's very tolerant religious institution. The effective management of this new religious diversity has been made possible by previously existing norms and expectations (i.e., institutions). The attempt to enact federal legislation to protect freedom of religion and belief in response to ICCPR Article 18 spearheaded by Australia's Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission provides an opportunity to examine a particular case of the management of religious diversity. Groups that viewed the consequences of religious difference from a social justice perspective supported the legislation, and those that essentialize religious difference opposed it.     

Freedom of Religion and Minority Religions in Hungary

Religiosity in Hungary is not especially high; however, the vast majority of the population has a denominational identity. There has been a religious revival since the early 1980's, both in the mainstream churches and due to some religious groups newly active in the country. Religious claims are mostly accommodated on an individual basis. Legal entities called churches can be founded for the purpose of exercising religion, but the registration of a church is not a condition of the free exercise of religion. Religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. The Hungarian state regards itself neutral in matters concerning ideology and religion. Church and state operate separately. The state, however, appreciating religious phenomena, provides support for churches and is open for cooperation with them on a sophisticated legal basis. A new method of offering state support for religions using taxpayer choices is described, which shows some interesting patterns of support for minority faiths as well as traditional ones.     

What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?

Abstract The purpose of this article is to review the main challenges to the principle of free movement of persons in theory and practice in an enlarged European Union. The right to move freely represents one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market as well as an essential political element of the package of rights linked to the very status of EU citizenship. The scope ratione personae and the current state of the principle of free movement of persons is assessed by looking at the most recent case law of the Court of Justice and the recently adopted Directive on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. But what are the hidden and visible obstacles to free movement of persons in Europe? How can these barriers be overcome to make free movement and residence rights more inclusive? This article addresses these issues along with the following questions: Who are the beneficiaries of the free movement of persons in an enlarged Europe? What is the impact of the recent legal developments in the freedom of movement dimension, such as the European Court of Justice case law and the new Directive? And to what extent are pro‐security policies such as the Schengen Information System II and an enhanced interoperability between European databases fully compatible with the freedom of movement paradigm?     

Muslim Mandarins in Chinese Courts: Dispute Resolution,Islamic Law,and the Secular State in Northwest China

Many sociolegal studies have investigated the relationship between state law and informal law, examining alternative dispute resolution and popular justice as intersections between such types of law. However, such questions have received little attention in East Asian authoritarian states. I use the case of dispute resolution among Chinese Muslim minorities (the Hui) to reexamine the relationship between state law and Islamic law. Based on nineteen months of fieldwork in Northwest China, I argue that the Hui case shows codependence between the types of law. Law is deeply embedded in social relationships between the Hui and the party‐state. An analysis of personalistic relationships shows the ways in which religious and secular authorities access each other, transforming each other's law to augment their own legitimacy, but not without the potential for violence. The China case illuminates dynamics between Muslim communities and states that are prevalent elsewhere in the post‐9/11 period.     

“Going to Law”: Reflections on Law,Religion, and Mitra Sharafi's Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia

This essay explores religion's need for law, comparing the story told in Mitra Sharafi's Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia (2014)—about the virtual hijacking of British colonial law to serve the communal religious needs of Parsis in colonial India—to other contexts in which secular and religious legal systems have built symbiotic relationships, including in the United States and Thailand. It concludes by urging a reweaving of religious and legal histories after the critique of secularism and its shadows, separationism, and antinomianism.     

Toward a New Legal History of Capitalism and Unfree Labor: Law,Slavery, and Emancipation in the American Marketplace

New work on the “history of capitalism” reveals how the personal freedom enjoyed by people living within the liberal capitalist mainstream is often purchased by coerced labor at the social margins. Walter Johnson's book River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom makes this argument with force, utilizing the concept of “slave racial capitalism” to suggest how race‐based slavery constituted a necessary component of early American economic expansion. Using Johnson's framework as a starting point, this essay argues that the legal institutions of property and contract, institutions underwriting a genuinely “slave racial capitalist” regime, also contained certain subversive possibilities within themselves, eventually challenging unfree labor as a modality of rule within the modernizing United States.     

Ideological Neutrality in the Workplace

This note assesses the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV and Bougnaoui v Micropole SA, the first cases dealing with religious discrimination under the Equal Treatment Directive 2000/43. Both cases concerned Muslim women wishing to express their religious beliefs by wearing an Islamic headscarf while working in a private undertaking. The Court held that the employees’ dismissal could not be justified by reference to clients’ prejudices against the headscarf. However, dismissal could be justified if pursued on the basis of a corporate policy of ideological neutrality which prohibited all visible religious, political and philosophical symbols. This note criticises the latter part of the Court's decision for, inter alia, placing too much weight on an employer's freedom to run its business in spite of the grave effects this has on employees’ fundamental right to manifest their beliefs at work.     

Alachua free‐net: Looking for the First Amendment at one outpost on the information highway*

Many communities are developing civic computer networks to provide citizens with free access to local information resources and the Internet. However, most networks restrict both commercial speech and any language deemed “objectionable.”; Whether such broad discretionary power violates the First Amendment depends on whether the networks are state actors. An examination of one such network, Alachua Free‐Net, reveals a close symbiotic relationship between the network and several local government entities. Symbiotic relationships between the state and a private party in other contexts have been held by the courts to constitute state action. Thus, Alachua Free‐Net appears to be a state actor and must conform its speech restrictions to the requirements of the First Amendment. Moreover, whether state actors or not, civic computer networks such as Alachua Free‐Net should commit themselves to providing full First Amendment freedoms to their users.     

Secularism before the Strasbourg Court: Abstract Constitutional Principles as a Basis for Limiting Rights

The justification for the restrictions on religion inherent in secularism is the subject of lively debate in constitutional and political theory. As a rights‐focused text, the ECHR struggles to accommodate constitutional principles such as secularism whose aims and justifications may go beyond the protection of the rights of others and include abstract goals such as upholding the religious neutrality of the state. Rights alone cannot provide an adequate account of the relationship between religion, state and law, and in Ebrahimian v France, the Strasbourg Court rightly reaffirmed that secularism and strict neutrality can be in harmony with the values of the Convention. However, the Court needs more clarity about the reasons for this stance and to be vigilant in its protection of private autonomy so that the use of abstract principles to restrict religious expression does not give excessive latitude to states to restrict individual autonomy and minority rights.     

Religious Freedom and Religious Antidiscrimination

This article develops a theoretical framework that prompts a new understanding of the role of religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination in human rights law. Proceeding from the prevailing theoretical and doctrinal uncertainty over the relationship between the two rights, which are currently seen as either synonymous or as distinct and in competition, the article develops an account of the moral right to ethical independence and argues that religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination share their main normative basis on that moral right. However, religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination have different emphasis, and both are essential to secure fair background circumstances for the pursuit of different individual plans of life. The proposed framework illuminates the relationship of individual and collective aspects of religious freedom with discrimination law. The analysis has crucial implications for human rights interpretation in cases involving state interference with liberty, in relation to religion or belief, and more broadly.     

Knowledge of Brahman as a solution to fear in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa/Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James suggests that the human experience of a fundamental and existential uneasiness can be found at the core of most religious traditions, and that these traditions constiute essentially a proposed solution to this uneasiness. The present investigation focuses upon the notion of uneasiness, particularly fear, and its solution in the early Hindu tradition. Through a close examination of textual expressions of both desire and fear from the R̥gveda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, it is proposed that “liberation” in the early Upaniṣadic period, or at least the precursor to the traditional notion of liberation, actually meant freedom from fear, rather than freedom from karma or saṁs̥ra. The Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad suggests that the origin of duality is desire, and duality necessarily results in fear. By relinquishing the sorts of desires so frequently expressed in the earlier vedic literature, together with an understanding of the essentially non-dual relationship between the ātman and brahman, a state of complete freedom from fear (abhaya) may be achieved.     

Negative governmentality through fundamental rights: The far side of the European Convention on Human Rights

This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protection ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as negative governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of negative governmentality by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency (Section 2 ). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to them (Section 3 ). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4 ). Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5 ). The essay concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6 ).