Legislative genesis and judicial death of a directive: The European Court of Justice invalidated the data retention directive (2006/24/EC) thereby creating a sustained period of legal uncertainty about the validity of national laws which enacted it

The Grand Chamber has ruled that the data retention directive was invalid ex tunc since it seriously interfered with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and protection of personal data and exceeded the limits of the principle of proportionality which are provided for in the Charter. The scope and temporal effects of this ruling should be clarified, especially its legal impacts on national laws of Member States which enacted the directive. In addition, the findings of the Grand Chamber on geographical safeguards have far-reaching implications on the retention and storage of personal data in the EU.     

“Schrems II”: The return of the Privacy Shield

On 16 July 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered its landmark judgment in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (“Schrems II”). The Grand Chamber invalidated the Commission decision on the adequacy of the data protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield. It however considered that the decision of the Commission on standard contractual clauses (“SCCs”) issued by the Commission for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third states was legally valid.The legal effects of the judgment should first be clarified. In addition, it has far-reaching implications for companies which transfer personal data from the EU to the US. The judgment of the Grand Chamber has also far-reaching implications for transfers of personal data from the EU to other third states. Last, it has far-reaching implications for the UK in the context of Brexit.© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.     

Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual controversy

The existence of a fundamental right to the protection of personal data in European Union (EU) law is nowadays undisputed. Established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, it is increasingly permeating EU secondary law, and is expected to play a key role in the future EU personal data protection landscape. The right's reinforced visibility has rendered manifest the co-existence of two possible and contrasting interpretations as to what it come to mean. If some envision it as a primarily permissive right, enabling the processing of such data under certain conditions, others picture it as having a prohibitive nature, implying that any processing of data is a limitation of the right, be it legitimate or illegitimate. This paper investigates existing tensions between different understandings of the right to the protection of personal data, and explores the assumptions and conceptual legacies underlying both approaches. It traces their historical lineages, and, focusing on the right to personal data protection as established by the EU Charter, analyses the different arguments that can ground contrasted readings of its Article 8. It also reviews the conceptualisations of personal data protection as present in the literature, and finally contrasts all these perspectives with the construal of the right by the EU Court of Justice.     

The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search of an uncharted right

The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ensuing introduction of the right to data protection as a new fundamental right in the legal order of the EU has raised some challenges. This article is an attempt to bring clarity on some of these questions. We will therefore try to address the issue of the place of the right to the protection of personal data within the global architecture of the Charter, but also the relationship between this new fundamental right and the already existing instruments. In doing so, we will analyse the most pertinent case law of the Court of Luxembourg, only to find out that it creates more confusion than clarity. The lesson we draw from this overview is that the reasoning of the Court is permeated by a ‘privacy thinking’, which consists not only in overly linking the rights to privacy and data protection, but also in applying the modus operandi of the former to the latter (which are different we contend). The same flawed reasoning seems to be at work in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Therefore, it is crucial that the different modi operandi be acknowledged, and that any upcoming data protection instrument is accurately framed in relation with Article 8 of the Charter.     

The joined cases of Dwyer,SpaceNet and VD and SR before the European Court of Justice: The judgments of the Grand Chamber about data retention continue falling on deaf ears in Member States

On 5 April and 20 September 2022, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered three judgments in the cases of Dwyer, SpaceNet and VD and SR. It mainly reiterated its own applicable case law on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In the VD and SR judgment, the Grand Chamber however expanded its scope to the area of market abuse.Legislation adopted by Member States and decisions rendered by most domestic courts, tribunals and judges do not fully comply with the case law of the Grand Chamber on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In this particular context, the EU legislature should urgently adopt EU secondary legislation on the retention of personal data to provide legal clarity to all players involved.     

Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez

In the Google Spain judgment, the Grand Chamber of the EU Court of Justice determined the circumstances in which a search engine is obliged to remove links to data pertaining to an individual from the results displayed. The Court also considered the material and territorial scope of the EU data protection rules. This note argues that the Court's findings, which have been heavily criticised, are normatively coherent. The broad scope of application of data protection rules and the right of individuals to have their data deleted when certain conditions are fulfilled both play a part in granting individuals effective control over their personal data – an objective of EU data protection law.     

Exploring the non-absolute nature of the right to data protection

In two recent judgements, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that ‘The right to the protection of personal data is not, however, an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society’ (Eifert, para 48). This paper considers the ‘non-absolute’ nature of the right to data protection. Being a relatively new right, the boundaries of this right in the Charter are still somewhat unexplored. This paper considers five aspects that can be seen as setting boundaries to the otherwise absolute nature of the right to data protection: (a) consideration of the function of the right to data protection in society; (b) positive delimitations of the right that come from the formulation of the right (Article 8) in the Charter; (c) limitations on the right provided for in Article 52 of the Charter; (d) close connections with Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR; and (e) the detailed provisions in current data protection secondary legislation and the future data protection regulation framework. Based on the reflections on each of these boundary-setting aspects, the paper argues that in spite of occasional vagueness and conflicting approaches of each of the aspects, understanding of the right to data protection has evolved since its first formulation in the Charter. There is a subtle and gradual distancing from the initial understanding of the close relationship with the right to private and family life. This gradual distancing is a positive development as the two have different foundations, scope and purposes. Yet it is only when both are taken together that the shared common objective of providing effective protection to citizens' personal and family life can be achieved.     

Russian PNR system: Data protection issues and global prospects

The usage of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for security purposes is growing worldwide. At least six countries have PNR systems; over thirty are planning to introduce them. On 1 December 2013, a Russian PNR system will be implemented. But enhanced collection of personal data leads to increased surveillance and privacy concerns. Russian authorities state that passengers' rights will be respected, but a closer look at the Russian regime reveals a number of critical points. From a global perspective, the Russian regime is only one of many PNR systems, including new ones to come in the future. Apparently, for the majority of them, similar challenges and problems will apply. At the same time, for the EU, with its strict data protection requirements, PNR requests by third countries (i.e. non-EU countries) create conflicts of laws. In order to resolve them, the EU concludes bilateral PNR agreements. However, the current deals, especially the one between the EU and the USA, involve a number of weaknesses. Accepting the latter, and having a pending proposal on the EU PNR system, the EU has weakened its position in negotiations with third countries. How will the EU deal with the Russian as well as with all the future requests for PNR? This paper provides legal analysis of the Russian PNR regime, pointing out common problems and giving prognosis on the global situation.     

Adverse Possession and Article 1 of the European Convention

In the post-human rights era the question has arisen on several occasions as to whether the automatic and arbitrary termination of the registered owner’s title through the common law and statutory principles governing adverse possession of land is contrary to the Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention. The matter fell to be decided in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom ([2005] 3 EGLR 1) where the European Court of Human Rights held that the automatic termination of a registered owners title after 12 years possession was indeed a violation of Article 1, Protocol 1. More recently, the decision of the European Court has been overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber has held that a squatters’ right to another persons land are not disproportionate (J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom, The Times, October 1st 2007). This short article examines the decision of the Grand Chamber.

欧盟区域刑事合作进程中的制度缺陷与对策——从《马斯特里赫特条约》到《里斯本条约》

从《马斯特里赫特条约》到《里斯本条约》,随着一体化进程的不断发展,欧盟逐步加强了对内部区域刑事合作的影响。但是,这种变化的＂代价＂则分别体现为：成员国全体一致的决策机制、＂框架决定＂立法中的＂民主赤字＂,以及成员国利用＂紧急刹车＂条款以规避关乎其切身利益的敏感立法的适用等。本文重点探讨这些制度缺陷,进而评析欧盟在相关问题上的对策。     

A Struggle for Competence: National Security,Surveillance and the Scope of EU Law at the Court of Justice of European Union

In Privacy International and Quadrature Du Net, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled that the e-Privacy Directive generally prevents bulk retention and transmission of traffic and location data, unless Member States can prove serious threats to national security. In such cases, bulk data can be retained during a strictly necessary period, subject to review by a court or independent administrative body. The judgments will impact other data retention and sharing arrangements, such as the PNR, proposed e-Privacy Regulation and e-Evidence package, and adequacy decisions under GDPR, including for post-Brexit UK. The rulings suggest the CJEU's significance in national security, which has been outside of European integration, but has become a ground for political struggle between EU institutions and Member States. While Privacy International unequivocally asserts CJEU's authority in national security and is a victory for data protection, Quadrature Du Net does not oppose indiscriminate data retention in principle and is an ambivalent response to political pressure.     

我国《刑法》第13条但书规定新解——兼论但书在犯罪构成理论中的展开

规范刑法学的范畴内,遵循司法刑法学的逻辑要求,作为犯罪司法概念的《刑法》第13条,应该是形式和实质相结合的犯罪概念,前段是体现形式理性的刑事违法性的积极、类型化判断,而但书则是体现实质理性的社会危害性消极、个别化判断。因此,但书不仅仅是轻微违法的阻却事由,而且应当包含相当于三阶层体系中阻却构成要件符合性、阻却违法和阻却责任的全部内容。     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study—the European Arrest Warrant

Abstract: The European arrest warrant (EAW) is the first and most striking example of the extensive judicial cooperation in criminal matters that is beginning to take place in the European Union. Replacing traditional extradition between EU member states, including the ten accession countries after May 2004, it will operate on the basis of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, thus taking extradition decisions out of the hands of politicians. It rests on the presumption that criminal justice systems are equivalent throughout the EU and that the rights of the defence, in particular, are safeguarded adequately and in a comparable way EU‐wide. However, before the EAW has even been implemented, a number of practical problems are beginning to emerge, in particular in relation to the protection of individual rights and legal certainty in the European judicial space. The way in which these problems are tackled will be a litmus test of the respect for fundamental rights across the EU in the field of justice and home affairs. This article highlights the problems inherent in the rapid development of the principle of mutual recognition and suggests ways in which these problems can be addressed allowing for full protection of fundamental rights within a fully functioning European area of freedom, security, and justice. The EAW will be used to illustrate the prominent features of the emerging landscape of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, providing as it does the most radical example of developments in this field so far and their implications for fundamental rights.     

Extraterritorial laws for cross-border reproductive care: the issue of legal diversity

Certain states impose restrictions on assisted reproduction because they believe such acts to be morally wrong. However, people who live in a state with restrictive legislation always have the option of going abroad to evade that law. Turkey and several states in Australia have enacted extraterritorial laws to stop forms of reproductive travelling for law evasion. Within the EU, the European Convention of Human Rights would normally remove the need for extraterritorial laws. However, because of the wide margin of appreciation allowed by the European Court of Human Rights, legal diversity on these matters persists. In the case of S.H. and Others v. Austria, moral justification, consistency and proportionality were introduced by the First Section to rule on Member States' legislation on medically assisted reproduction. The First Section mostly ruled on the effectiveness of the law, while the focus should be on the validity of the normative aim. The Grand Chamber reversed this judgement based on the margin of appreciation doctrine, using it as a pragmatic substitute for a substantial decision. In general, the E.U.'s interests of harmonization and unification are at odds with the right to national identity of individual states in areas of contested morality.     

The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute

By affirming criminal responsibility of the individual, theICC Statute recognizes a distinction from the internationalresponsibility of states, which is the basis of modern internationalcriminal law. The importance of the principle is evident notonly in the breadth and analytical nature of the provision dealingwith it, i.e. Article 25 of the Statute, but by its being placedin the part of the Statute devoted to the ‘General Principlesof Criminal Law’. After an introductory considerationof the context of the Article and of its general implications,this article analyses the contents of the regulation and thetype of responsibility outlined in it. The principle that emergescould be called the ‘personal nature’ of internationalcriminal responsibility. Although the general principles setout in the ICC Statute are rather rudimentary in comparisonwith what is to be found in the ‘General Part’ ofmost national criminal laws, the principle of personal responsibilityemerging from the Statute is nevertheless in the best traditionsof criminal law. It serves both as the foundation and as thelimitation of international criminal responsibility, so helpingto ensure that modern international criminal law is not a toolfor oppression but rather an instrument of justice.     

The Strasbourg Court and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain

Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

A comparison of data protection legislation and policies across the EU

Although the protection of personal data is harmonized within the EU by Directive 95/46/EC and will be further harmonized by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018, there are significant differences in the ways in which EU member states implemented the protection of privacy and personal data in national laws, policies, and practices. This paper presents the main findings of a research project that compares the protection of privacy and personal data in eight EU member states: France, Germany, the UK, Ireland, Romania, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The comparison focuses on five major themes: awareness and trust, government policies for personal data protection, the applicable laws and regulations, implementation of those laws and regulations, and supervision and enforcement.The comparison of privacy and data protection regimes across the EU shows some remarkable findings, revealing which countries are frontrunners and which countries are lagging behind on specific aspects. For instance, the roles of and interplay between governments, civil rights organizations, and data protections authorities vary from country to country. Furthermore, with regard to privacy and data protection there are differences in the intensity and scope of political debates, information campaigns, media attention, and public debate. New concepts like privacy impact assessments, privacy by design, data breach notifications and big data are on the agenda in some but not in all countries. Significant differences exist in (the levels of) enforcement by the different data protection authorities, due to different legal competencies, available budgets and personnel, policies, and cultural factors.     

Redefining Apartheid in International Criminal Law

This article asks: to what extent is Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute—the crime of apartheid—a tenable crime in international criminal law? It will be argued that despite the obligations incumbent on states not to intentionally discriminate against social groups, there is no customary legal norm of apartheid as a distinct crime against humanity. This is premised on the distinction between state obligations as different from norms demanding individual liability in international criminal law, as well as inadequacies of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973) and the absence of case law relying on apartheid as a crime against humanity. Further, the weaknesses hindering the formation of a customary norm of apartheid as a distinct crime against humanity will be assessed with regard to the Rome Statute. Also it will be shown that the lack of coherence of Article 7(1)(j) demonstrates that the crime of apartheid is subsumed by the crime of persecution. Finally, two suggestions are offered on how the crime of apartheid could be established as a distinct offence in international criminal law. The central thesis of this paper is that the crime of apartheid is ambiguous and inoperable. In order for Article 7(1)(j) to be relevant in international criminal law, the offence must be reworked and clearly articulated.