论惩罚性赔偿的性质

惩罚性赔偿是一种超额赔偿.惩罚性赔偿是否具有惩罚性,理论界存在争议.惩罚性赔偿的定性影响到法律程序的选择和惩罚性赔偿的适用.基于保护受害人人格尊严而进行的赔偿(或者称为精神赔偿)和促使行为人将行为成本全部内化的威慑性赔偿,在性质上仍然归于民事处罚的范畴.对于基于报应正义而进行的惩罚性赔偿才是真正的惩罚性赔偿.刑法适用范围很小,只有当行为人给社会造成严重的危害,且其有非常大的道德可责性时,才能用刑罚威慑.在传统二元结构框架下,有大量的违法行为逃避法律的制裁,三元结构中的惩罚性民事责任可以弥补这种缺陷,强化法律的社会控制力.然而,惩罚性民事责任的扩张,会严重地威胁到个人的权利.因此惩罚性民事责任应当受到严格的监督和控制.     

我国疑罪从无的理论省察及规则重述

疑罪是刑事诉讼在司法实践中必然遭遇且无法绕开的实然性难题。刑事诉讼立法抑或刑事司法或显或隐地借助于从无来摆脱其困境。疑罪从无作为一项诉讼原则被我国理论所倚重,理论上不仅将其视为国外司法活动的惯常做法,在叙事上也将其与证据不足相等同,甚至还将其功能扩展到作为根治冤假错案的惟一途径。坚持疑罪从的无国家存在冤假错案的现实,与我国理论对其功能表达形成相当的反差,特别我国司法实践未遵从理论指导的现实样态,又使得人们对理论阐述衍生迷思并陷入困惑。实质上,疑罪从无是一种分配错误的裁判规则,是法官认定事实时存疑且心证无法形成情形下选择配置错误的一种方式,其本身不是减少错案的防范性规范,在证据理论层面不同于证据不足,理论也不宜作为纠正冤案的基本惟一准则。一般而言,对于有罪与无罪均有证据证明而难分伯仲时,疑罪应当从无;对于达到证明标准或者辩方自愿认罪而法官心证仍未形成,且对有罪无法排除合理怀疑的,此种情形下的疑罪也可以从轻。     

Retributivism: The Right and the Good

Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros also claims that the constitutive aim of punishment is to inflict harm or suffering on offenders. On the contrary, the constitutive aim of retributive punishment is to inflict (justified) wrongs on offenders that are proportionate to the (unjustified) wrongs they commit. Indeed, punishment should involve the least harmful wrong that is proportionate to the wrongfulness of the offense, adequate to facilitate recognition, and (perhaps) conducive to deterrence.     

Self-Defense,Punishment and Forfeiture

Abstract

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above.     

论犯罪构成新体系之常识、常理、常情化

犯罪构成新体系的常识、常理、常情化是刑法的常识、常理、常情化的一个极其重要的体现和组成。犯罪构成新体系的常识、常理、常情化是其人权保障机能的根本保障,有其必然性、道德性、价值性与环节性。犯罪构成新体系的常识、常理、常情化始于罪状形合性的常识、常理、常情化而终于应受刑罚惩罚性的常识、常理、常情化,而应受刑罚惩罚性的常识、常理、常情化不仅积累着始于罪状形合性的常识、常理、常情化,而且还要求着刑罚目的和刑事政策的常识、常理、常情化。     

The Intrinsic Good of Justice

Some retributivists claim that when we punish wrongdoers we achieve a good: justice. The paper argues that the idea of justice, though rhetorically freighted with positive value, contains only a small core of universally agreed meaning; and its development in a variety of competing conceptions simply recapitulates, without resolving, debates within the theory of punishment. If, to break this deadlock, we stipulate an expressly retributivist conception of justice, then we should concede that punishment which is just (in the stipulated sense) may be morally wrong.     

Two Mistakes about the Concept of Punishment

This article identifies two mistakes commonly made about the concept of punishment. First, confusion exists about when an analysis of punishment counts as retributive, and when as justificatorily neutral. In particular, a fair number of legal scholars claim to analyze punishment in a neutral way, but closer inspection shows that many of these definitions are not justificatorily neutral. Second, legal scholars tend to analyze the concept of punishment very restrictively, with a focus on the intention of the legislator. While there may be good reasons to restrict the scope of the concept of punishment in the legal arena, from a philosophical point of view, restrictive analysis is not fruitful. It is a bad starting point for critical evaluation, because it is perfectly possible for impositions generally experienced as punitive not to be classified as such. This is all the more troublesome given that these impositions often contain fewer safeguards than are offered in criminal law and that there is sometimes a taboo on the language game related to punishment. I argue that these problems can be overcome by embracing an inclusive, justificatorily neutral concept of punishment that takes the outward appearance of the harm inflicted as its starting point.     

美国对犯罪与违法的法理界定

本文阐述的是美国关于犯罪本质的哲学解释。刑罚既包括过错犯罪。也包括严格责任违法,这两者代表了两种不同的刑事责任类型。美国学界主张过错犯罪的要点在于其是侵害公众利益的不法行为,并非由于其危害公众利益,而是因为公众负责处罚此类行为,即它们应该得到国家的处罚。不法行为得到惩罚是因其性质严重,它们不敬重社会公认的价值;只有当行为人违反重要价值时才应得到处罚,不仅是出于对刑法实用主义的考虑,亦取决于罪刑法定原则的内涵。美国学者分析过错犯罪和不太严重的违法行为,认为后者同样存在着损害公众利益的危险。     

非刑罚化的界限研究

刑罚的流弊引发了西方国家的非刑罚化运动。对于西方国家的非刑罚化运动及其对我国的借鉴意义,国内学者认识不一。目前在我国,非犯罪化是广义的＂非刑罚化＂的内容之一,狭义的＂非刑罚化＂应当包括免予刑事处罚单纯宣告有罪、免予刑事处罚予以非刑罚处罚、对犯罪独立适用的保安处分等内容,对其中存在的问题,我们应当保持清醒的认识。     

从“耻辱刑”到“羞耻心”——-漫谈在监狱矫正中唤起服刑人的羞耻之心

古人对罪犯羞耻心的培养是从积极的教育和消极的教训两个维度并举的。本文从属于后一维度的耻辱刑入手,探讨它以“人皆有羞耻之心”为逻辑起点的教化功能;进而又从“劳动改造”和“罪犯人权保障”两方面切入,对当前监狱改造中存在的羞耻心缺失现象进行剖析,指出今天的监狱矫正同样需要立足于人们的社会心理、文化习俗、价值观念等来培育服刑人的羞耻之心,这样才能最大限度地发挥刑罚的改造功能。     

论我国死刑制度的实质性改革——以《刑法修正案(八)》削减死刑罪名为视角

《刑法修正案(八)》的出台引起社会高度关注,因为与以往历次《刑法》修正案相比,本次《刑法》修改可以说是幅度和力度最大的一次。《刑法修正案(八)》的亮点之一就是削减了死刑罪名,由于死刑是剥夺犯罪人生命的刑罚,因其严厉性、残酷性、非人道性和不可纠正性而长期为人所诟病,死刑之存废也是学界一直关注和争论的焦点问题,然而,就我国现阶段而言,对死刑依然保持现状或轻言完全废除都不可取,更重要的应当是在刑事立法和司法适用上对死刑进行有步骤地、渐进式地改革。从此意义上说,《刑法修正案(八)》充分表明我国已进入对死刑的实质性改革阶段。     

Defending the Right To Do Wrong

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.     

Belief and Death: Capital Punishment and the Competence-for-Execution Requirement

A curious and comparatively neglected element of death penalty jurisprudence in America is my target in this paper. That element concerns the circumstances under which severely mentally disabled persons, incarcerated on death row, may have their sentences carried out. Those circumstances are expressed in a part of the law which turns out to be indefensible. This legal doctrine—competence-for-execution (CFE)—holds that a condemned, death-row inmate may not be killed if, at the time of his scheduled execution, he lacks an awareness of his impending death or the reasons for it. I argue that the law of CFE should be abandoned, along with the notion that it is permissible to kill the deeply disturbed just so long as they meet some narrow test of readiness to die. By adopting CFE, the courts have been forced to give independent conceptual and moral significance to a standard for competence that simply cannot bear the weight placed upon it. To be executable, CFE requires that a condemned prisoner meet a standard demonstrating an awareness of certain facts about his death. Yet this standard both leads to confusing and counter-intuitive results and is unsupported either by the reasons advanced by the courts on its behalf or by any of the standard theoretical justifications of criminal punishment. If executing the profoundly psychotic or delusional is wrong the law needs a better account of the wrong done when prisoners like Ford are killed. I suggest wherein that wrong might be located.     

The Legitimacy of Judicial Responses to Moral Panic: Perceived vs. Normative Legitimacy

In some instances, the criminal justice system is affected by a moral panic; that is, by an exaggerated social reaction to an assumed threat to moral values. When influenced by moral panic, courts demonize defendants and aggravate punishments. Are such responses legitimate? This article argues that by contrast to legitimate condemnation of criminal conduct, demonizing defendants ought never be legitimate. The legitimacy of aggravating punishment requires distinguishing between the sociological concept of legitimacy (“perceived legitimacy”) and the moral concept (“normative legitimacy”). Aggravation of punishment in response to moral panic might be perceived as legitimate since it expresses public perceptions about the severity of the threat to a social value, even when these perceptions are exaggerated; however, punishments that are proportionate to such a perceived, exaggerated, threat to a social value are unjust and unfair, and therefore are normatively illegitimate. When the panic subsides, courts tend to return to lower levels of punishment. The subsidence of the panic enables one to realize that a gap between perceived and normative legitimacy has been created during the panic. Should and can the gap be bridged retroactively in order to gain full legitimacy? One way to bridge the gap is to grant clemency that will reduce the punishment of defendants whose sentences were exaggerated unduly during the panic. The article proposes a more radical mechanism that allows for sentence re-evaluation in cases of moral panic.     

论一般没收财产刑应予废止

由没收财产刑的体系地位与适用对象可以看出 ,没收财产刑是我国刑罚体系中最重的附加刑。但如果从罪刑法定原则的要求来看 ,没收财产刑如果作为一种剥夺部分财产的刑罚 ,在已经有罚金刑规定的情况 ,没有存在的必要 ;作为对危害国家安全罪和其他严重犯罪适用的判处没收财产 ,难于看出其特殊的性质 ;作为判处死刑、无期徒刑的附加刑 ,违反刑法的基本目的 ,其存在具有一定的超刑事责任范围的任意处置的违反罪刑法定原则基本精神的倾向。因此 ,笔者认为 ,一般的没收财产刑应予废止。     

Moore��s Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory

The purely retributive moral justification of punishment has a gap at its centre. It fails to explain why the offender should not be protected from punishment by the intuitively powerful moral idea that afflicting another person (other than to avoid a greater harm) is always wrong. Attempts to close the gap have taken several different forms, and only one is discussed in this paper. This is the attempt to push aside the ‘protecting’ intuition, using some more powerful intuition specially invoked by the situations to which criminal justice is addressed. In one aspect of his complex defence of pure retributivism, Michael S. Moore attempts to show that the emotions of well-adjusted persons provide evidence of moral facts which justify the affliction of culpable wrongdoers in retribution for their wrongdoing. In particular, he appeals to the evidential significance of emotions aroused by especially heinous crimes, including the punishment-seeking guilt of the offender who truly confronts the reality of his immoral act. The paper argues that Moore fails to vindicate this appeal to moral realism, and thus to show that intrinsic personal moral desert (as distinct from ‘desert’ in a more restricted sense, relative to morally justified institutions) is a necessary and sufficient basis for punishment. Other theories of the role of emotions in morality are as defensible as Moore’s, while the compelling emotions to which he appeals to clinch his argument can be convincingly situated within a non-retributivist framework, especially when the distinction between the intuitions of the lawless world, and those of the world of law, is recognised.     

Shame,Guilt, and Punishment

The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I␣contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state’s act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual. OB, JD, KM, FT, CEB, KKJ, ASP, JS, AD, NE and the SNF x2.     

Revisionism and Desert

Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all “victims of causal luck”, it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One (moderate) revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another (strong) revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all concepts of guilt, blame and punishment, and treat dangerous criminals as we treat people with contagious diseases. I argue against both strong and moderate revisionism that (1) it is not unfair to hold persons desert-entailingly responsible (in a weaker sense of ‘desert’) insofar as they take an interest in being treated as appraisable, and (2) that it is unfair to persons not to treat them as desert-entailingly responsible (in this weaker sense) contrary to their interests in being treated as such. The interest-based argument, I conclude, give us a justification for communicating retributive attitudes, but may still require a weak revision of our retributive practices, in the direction of a communicative theory of punishment.     

也论行政犯的性质及其对行政刑法定位的影响

行政犯的性质问题实质上是一个行政犯与刑事犯以及秩序违反行为的关系问题,行政犯包括对法益的侵害或威胁,属实质性的违法,是对派生性生活秩序的违反,其理念在行政上的合目的性;而刑事犯的理念在于社会正义;应被科以罚金或其他秩序罚的行政法规违反,并不是对行政法规的直接攻击,而是对顺利达到其行政目的而规定的一定义务(即行政义务)的违背。因而应当根据行政犯的特殊性相应适用与普通刑法的一般原则所不同的行政刑法原则。     

Punishment

The main previous analyses of punishment by Hart, Feinberg and Wasserstrom are considered and criticized. One persistent fault is the neglect of the idea that in punishment the person subjected to it is represented as having no valid excuse for wrongdoing. A new analysis is proposed which attempts to specify in what sense punishment by its very nature is retributive, as Wasserstrom has asserted. Certain problematic cases such as strict liability offenses and pre-trial detention are considered in light of the new analysis.